RHONDA GAIL NEWMAN v. LARMAN ROGERS
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 19, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002723-MR
RHONDA GAIL NEWMAN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID CAUDILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00433
v.
LARMAN ROGERS
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER AND JOHNSON, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Rhonda Gail Newman has appealed from an order
of proceedings and judgment of the Floyd Circuit Court entered
on September 4, 2003, and an amended judgment, entered on
November 20, 2003, which granted Larman Rogers an undivided onehalf interest in real estate conveyed to Rhonda.
Having
concluded that the trial court erred in denying Rhonda’s motions
for a directed verdict, we reverse and remand.
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
In 1983 Rhonda, who was 16, and Larman, who was 33 or
34, were involved in a romantic relationship when Rhonda became
pregnant.
On January 19, 1984, Rhonda gave birth to the
parties’ child, Kenneth Wayland Rogers.
for 18 years, but never married.
The parties cohabitated
Initially, the parties rented
a mobile home from Larman’s brother for one and one-half years.
During this time, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) made the parties’ rent payments.
In September 1985 Rhonda and the child moved out of
the rented mobile home and Rhonda’s grandmother, Pearl Roberts,
purchased a mobile home for Rhonda and the child to live in.
The mobile home sat on land titled in Pearl’s name.
Pearl paid
$4,000.00 as a down payment on the mobile home and took out a
mortgage for the balance of the purchase price.
Rhonda had the
HUD payments switched to this mobile home and HUD paid all
mortgage payments.
After purchase of this mobile home, but
prior to Rhonda moving in, she and Larman reconciled and the
parties and their child moved into the new mobile home.
Larman
testified that he was supposed to pay off the debt on the mobile
home, but while working in 1985, he got hurt and did not return
to work until 1993.
He gave Pearl $1,000.00 cash at some point
from monies received from a workers’ compensation award.
It is
disputed whether this money was for an interest in the mobile
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home or whether it was reimbursement for monies Pearl paid for
hook-up fees for the mobile home on her property.
Upon Pearl’s death on July 19, 1993, Rhonda inherited
the mobile home and the land on which it is situated.
Larman
testified at trial that there was an agreement that when the
mortgage on the mobile home was paid in full, the mobile home
would belong to Rhonda and him.
However, Larman lost on this
part of his claim at trial, and on appeal he makes no claim to
any interest in this mobile home, where Rhonda still resides.2
After this mobile home was free of debt, Rhonda took
out a loan for $3,000.00 with Matewan Banks in her name to
purchase and repair another mobile home, owned by Tracy
Hamilton.
To secure the loan, Rhonda used a vehicle that was
titled in her name as collateral, which she testified she
purchased with money she had saved.
Tracy made out a written
receipt to Rhonda for the purchase price of $2,000.00, however
he testified at trial that he assumed that both Rhonda and
Larman made the purchase.
at the time of purchase.
There was no title to the mobile home
name.
Rhonda later obtained a title in her
The parties used a Lowe’s credit card to purchase items
to repair the mobile home.
They also poured steps to the mobile
2
Larman testified that he made improvements on Pearl’s land and the mobile
home. He installed a new septic system, landscaped, filled land with dirt,
built two outbuildings on the land, refloored the kitchen and bathroom of the
mobile home, and dug the line for the city water hookup and paid for it to be
hooked up.
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home.
They then rented the mobile home to Terry Tackett, who
was still renting the mobile home as of the date of trial.
Terry made his rent payments through HUD and Rhonda applied
these payments to the bank loan until it was paid in full.
Since Rhonda and Larman separated, Rhonda has collected the rent
from Terry.
After the loan on the rented mobile home was paid in
full, both parties met with Kenneth Roberts regarding a tract of
land that he was interested in selling.
Larman testified that
he was the first to approach Kenneth about buying the property.
Using the land as security, Rhonda borrowed $15,000.00 from Bank
One, Pikeville, NA and paid Kenneth cash for the land.
In
return, Kenneth executed a general warranty deed to Rhonda as
grantee on September 1, 1995.
Larman’s name was not on the deed
or the mortgage, and he signed no papers involved in the
transaction.
On September 6, 1995, the deed was recorded in the
Floyd County Court Clerk’s Office in Deed Book 389, Page 239.
Larman admitted that Rhonda acquired the real estate through a
bank loan.
He claimed that the only reason Rhonda’s name was
the only name on the deed was because only Rhonda was obligated
on the bank loan.
Larman testified that the parties intended to build a
house on the land; but that after Rhonda’s mother moved on or
near the land, Rhonda stated that she would not live near her
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mother.
The payments from the rented mobile home were used to
make all the monthly payments on the real estate mortgage.
The
parties installed a water line and a septic tank on the land.
Larman testified that he paid $2,000.00 for the installation of
the septic system, but Rhonda disputes his claim.
The land was
later rented and Rhonda has collected all of the rent payments
since that date.
The mortgage on the real estate was paid off
in September of 2000.
The parties ended their cohabitation in
2001.
During the period that the parties cohabitated, Larman
worked from 1983 until 1985 in the mines until he got hurt.
He
did not return to work until sometime in 1993 or 1994, and had
no income during this time.
He did receive a lump-sum workers’
compensation award of $7,000.00 or $8,000.00 and received
benefits of $105.00 per month during this period, and also
performed some contract labor.
In 1994 he worked for Harold
Telephone, and, beginning in 1997, he worked for a landscaping
company, making between $10.00 and $11.00 per hour.
During the
period of cohabitation, Rhonda went to beauty school, but she
mainly worked as a housekeeper.
Larman testified that all the bills were paid during
the period of cohabitation with his money.
However, he also
testified that Rhonda earned income as well, but he contends
that he made at least $30,000.00 more than she did during this
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time.
It is undisputed that Rhonda had set up a savings account
at the Bank Josephine in the name of the parties’ child.
Larman
did not have a checking account, so he would endorse his
paychecks over to Rhonda who would then cash them at the Bank
Josephine.
Larman testified that Rhonda would pay bills and
then give the rest of the money to him.
Rhonda testified that
Larman only contributed financially to their relationship during
the last four years before it ended, by paying the electric
bill, phone bill, television bill, and water bill.
Both parties testified as to their understanding
regarding their ownership of property during the cohabitation
period.
Larman stated that Rhonda and he never agreed that he
would own items, they just “bought them together.”3
It is
undisputed that Larman never asked for any of the property to be
titled in his name, and that Rhonda never said Larman was the
owner of any of the property.
Larman stated, “[w]e planned on
building a house together on the hill and so I figured I owned
half of it.”
Larman stated that he always assumed that he and
Rhonda shared everything, but there was no written agreement.
However, Larman did testify that before their relationship
3
Larman stated in his answers to interrogatories served upon him by Rhonda
that “[t]he parties hereto had an agreement which was that when they bought
the first trailer, they would share ownership of it, fix it up, share the
rent and that notwithstanding whose name something was put, everything they
owned together. Each of the parties made like contributions to the
acquisition of the property or to the general upkeep of their relationship.”
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ended, Rhonda offered to sell a portion of the real estate and
to give him one-half of the proceeds.
Rhonda testified that
Larman never stated that she owed him any money for the land or
the mobile homes and that when Larman moved out in 2001 he took
whatever he wanted.4
Rhonda further denied having any financial
agreement with Larman.
She stated that the land and the mobile
homes were not acquired through joint efforts, but solely
because of her efforts.
Larman moved out of the mobile home on August 4, 2001.
Larman claims to have been “ejected” from the property, while
Rhonda testified that the parties had discussed Larman moving
out for about six months prior to the time he left.
She had
helped him set up house in a mobile home on his daughter’s
property, prior to his move.
On May 1, 2002, almost one year after Larman moved out
of the mobile home, he filed a complaint in the trial court
alleging that, during the parties’ 19-year cohabitation, they
acquired various property paid for wholly or partly by him.
Larman described his relationship with Rhonda as a joint venture
4
The items that Rhonda claimed Larman took included: riding lawn mower, ATV
(four-wheeler), loading ramps, floor model television, stereo system,
records, tapes, Rainbow vacuum cleaner, approximately 75 game cocks, roosters
and hens, chicken cages, deep freezer, window air conditioner, chest of
drawers, porch swing, tools, meat saw, skill saw, jig saw, camcorder, several
guns, long aluminum ladder, binoculars, scanner, deep fryer, electric
skillet, coffee maker, alarm clock, pots and pans, dishes, pet carrier, two
ice coolers, VCR, weed eater, gas grill, wall pictures, pillows, afghan, bed
clothes, cordless phone, clothes, personal items, fishing rods, reels and
tackle.
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and claimed that the two mobile homes, the real estate, and
certain vehicles were purchased by a specific agreement that
they would jointly share the property, its income, and its debt.5
Larman requested an accounting from Rhonda as to profits and
assets of the joint venture and an equitable division of
property.
On May 29, 2002, Rhonda filed a verified answer
denying that Larman contributed to the purchase of the mobile
homes, the real estate, or the vehicles.
She then filed a
counterclaim on February 19, 2003,6 requesting one-half of the
value of all items that Larman removed from the mobile home when
he left in August 2001, and reimbursement for credit card
charges that he placed on her Lowe’s credit card in the amount
of $584.30.
On March 13, 2003, in reply to Rhonda’s
counterclaim, Larman admitted that he took some of the items,
but denied taking other items.
He also admitted charging the
purchase of a refrigerator on the credit card, but he claimed
that he was paying on the credit card, while Rhonda was adding
charges to it.
5
In his answers to interrogatories served upon him by Rhonda, Larman stated
that the two mobile homes had values of $5,000.00 and $2,500.00 and the real
estate had an estimated value of $22,000.00.
6
Rhonda filed a motion on the same date to file the counterclaim, but it does
not appear that the trial court entered an order regarding this motion.
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A jury trial was held on August 15, 2003.
Rhonda’s
attorney made a motion for a directed verdict at both the close
of Larman’s evidence and at the close of all evidence.
trial court denied both motions.
The
The jury returned a verdict
finding that the two mobile homes and the two vehicles were not
subject to an agreement between the parties and belonged to
Rhonda.
However, the jury found that the real estate was
subject to an agreement between the parties, and that Larman was
entitled to an interest in that property.7
In its order of
proceedings and judgment, entered on September 4, 2003, the
trial court dismissed all of Larman’s claims, except as to the
real estate, and found that Rhonda and Larman were owners of the
real estate “pursuant to the parties[’] previous agreement.”
The trial court ordered the parties to submit proof of the
income from the real estate from August 4, 2001, to date, and
all expenditures related to the real estate.
The trial court
stated that it would then conduct a hearing to determine the
parties’ percentage of ownership in the real estate.
The trial
court dismissed Rhonda’s counterclaim, “subject to such as she
7
Specifically, the jury instruction stated: “If the jury believe from the
evidence that [ ] Larman [ ] and [ ] Rhonda [ ] made and entered into an
agreement whereby the ownership of certain property would be shared by them
in equal parts in return for maintaining the same property you will find for
[ ] Larman [ ]. Unless you so believe you will find for [ ] Rhonda [ ]. You
will say opposite each item claimed by [Larman] whether you believe an
agreement was made concerning said item. Checking ‘yes’ will mean that you
have found such agreement and checking ‘no’ will mean you have not found such
an agreement.”
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may be entitled to by virtue of the previous portions of this
Judgment.”
Rhonda then submitted her expenditures and receipts
and filed a motion to set a hearing on the matter.8
Larman filed
a response stating that he had no report of expenditures with
regard to the real estate, but that the percentages of ownership
had already been determined by the jury as equal and therefore
the trial court should enter an order stating the division as
equal.
Rhonda then filed a motion for the trial court to
clarify the judgment and order as to proportions of ownership so
the judgment could be made final and appealable.
On November 20, 2003, the trial court entered an
amended judgment ordering the parties to have equal ownership of
the real estate and rendered the judgment final and appealable.
Then on December 2, 2003, the trial court entered findings of
fact, conclusions of law and final judgment ordering the Floyd
County Master Commissioner to execute and deliver to Larman a
conveyance conveying the undivided one-half interest and also
“the sum of $918.46, and one-half of any income from the
property in question subject to expenses in the future, from and
including October 2003.”9
This appeal followed.
8
On November 18, 2002, the parties entered into an agreed order as to the
expenditures paid by Rhonda after the parties’ cohabitation.
9
Rhonda did not appeal this order.
entered on November 20, 2003.
She only appealed the amended judgment
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Rhonda’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial
court erroneously denied her motions for a directed verdict,
pursuant to CR10 50.01,11 made at the close of Larman’s
presentation of evidence and her motion made at the conclusion
of all evidence.
She specifically states in her brief as
follows:
The Appellant’s counsel made an appropriate
Motion on the ground that the Appellee had
failed to produce evidence of title in any
form to the parties’ property, and that the
only evidence in the record is that the Deed
of Conveyance was in the Appellant, Rhonda
Newman’s, name only. The Appellee failed to
produce even a scintilla of evidence to the
contrary from which the Jury might
reasonably infer that the parties had
contracted another form of ownership.
The colloquy concerning Rhonda’s motion for directed
verdict after the close of Larman’s case-in-chief was as
follows:
Mr. Webster:
Plaintiff closes.
By the Court: Motion?
10
11
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
CR 50.01 states as follows:
A party who moves for a directed verdict at
the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may
offer evidence in the event that the motion is not
granted, without having reserved the right so to do
and to the same extent as if the motion had not been
made. . . . A motion for a directed verdict shall
state the specific grounds therefor. . . .
CR 50.01 applies to jury trials. See Morrison v. Trailmobile Trailers, Inc.,
526 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Ky.App. 1975).
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Mr. Webb: Your Honor, I would make a
directed verdict--is that . . .
By the Court:
move for one?
Do you want to make one or
Mr. Webb: I will move for one, Your Honor.
Based on Kentucky Law, there is no palimony
in the State of Kentucky. There is
presumption that the person whose name
appears on the title and/or deed is presumed
to be the owner thereof. Is that there has
been no documentary evidence by the
Plaintiff showing that there was an express
agreement between the parties that they
could be co-owners [sic]. And, therefore,
based upon the fact that my client’s name
appears [as] the titled owner on the
vehicles as well as the deeds of the
property and the mobile homes, I would ask
the Court to have the Court to give a
directed verdict, she’s the owner thereof.
By the Court:
Response?
Mr. Webster: The proof is that there’s a
joint economic venture and that various
items were purchased pursuant, and he’s the
owner of one-half (1/2) of that venture.
By the Court: Well, the Plaintiff has
testified in this case. He testified that
it was intended that both have it. That’s a
jury issue. Motion is OVERRULED.
The colloquy concerning Rhonda’s motion at the close
of all the evidence was as follows:12
12
In her brief, Rhonda’s attorney refers to this second motion as a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under CR 52.02. However, we
conclude that a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict would not
have been appropriate at this juncture in the case as she had not moved for a
directed verdict at that point. See Hall v. King, 432 S.W.2d 394, 396
(Ky.App. 1968)(citing CR 50.02). While Rhonda stated at trial that the
motion was for “judgment,” we construe it as a motion for directed verdict
under CR 50.01.
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By the Court: Let the record reflect
we’re back in Chambers outside the
presence and hearing of the Jury.
Motions, Counsel?
Mr. Webb:
Yes, Your Honor. At
this point, I’ll make a motion for
judgment. Based upon the testimony of
the Plaintiff upon being recalled, he
admitted that there had been no
expressed agreement or agreement by the
parties at the time of acquiring these
properties as to its joint ownership.
We point Your Honor to the Complaint of
the Plaintiff which states specifically
the parties hereto bought a mobile home
in the early 80s pursuant to a specific
agreement between them. Paragraph 5:
The second mobile home was acquired by
the parties pursuant to the same
agreement. Number 6: The parties next
bought a tract of property and the
property was paid for by rent from the
mobile home portion of the same joint
venture.
Your Honor, they have maintained
from the outset of this that there was
a specific agreement by the parties.
My client denied that. His client
basically supported that by his
testimony that there was no agreement
nor had they ever discussed it prior to
either him moving out or them
apparently at one time going to build a
home.
By the Court:
Response.
The parties agreed when
Mr. Webster:
they got the first trailer that the
rent would pay for it. And then when
they had the next trailer, they agreed
that they’d go buy this trailer and
jointly own it and share the rent. And
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then the proceeds of that paid for the
land. It’s all part of the same
economic venture.
Mr. Webb:
I’ll point to the
Complaint, Your Honor. It says,
“Specific agreement”, and they’ve
alleged that.
By the Court: I’m going to OVERRULE
your motion in that the jury can reach
its own conclusions based upon the
conduct of the parties as to whether
there was an agreement, which is
specific by its very nature based upon
their conduct. Anything else?
Mr. Webb:
No.
Mr. Webster:
No.
Our standard of review of the denial of a motion for a
directed verdict is to determine whether the trial court erred
as a matter of law.13
“All evidence which favors the prevailing
party must be taken as true and [we are] not at liberty to
determine credibility or the weight which should be given to the
evidence, these being functions reserved to the trier of fact”
[citations omitted].14
There must be “a complete absence of
proof on a material issue in the action, or [ ] no disputed
issue of fact exists upon which reasonable men could differ”
13
Taylor v. Kennedy, 700 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky.App. 1985).
14
Lewis v. Bledsoe Surface Mining Co., 798 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Ky. 1990); Humana
of Kentucky, Inc. v. McKee, 834 S.W.2d 711, 718 (Ky.App. 1992).
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[citation omitted].15
After reviewing all of the evidence
presented at trial and utilizing the required standard of
review, we conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of
law in failing to direct a verdict as we find no evidence
indicating that Larman had any interest in the real estate.
Larman argues to this Court that Rhonda’s motions for
directed verdict were not properly made because the motions did
not address the sufficiency of the evidence, but were instead
based upon a lack of an expressed agreement, and because Rhonda
failed to file a post-judgment motion challenging any error of
law.
We disagree.
Larman’s complaint alleges that there was a
specific agreement between the parties.
In both motions, Rhonda
argues that there was not sufficient evidence to prove this
allegation.
Further, we know of no authority which requires
Rhonda to file a post-judgment motion to properly preserve her
motions for a directed verdict.
Therefore, we conclude that
Rhonda’s motions for a directed verdict met the requirements of
CR 50.01.
Having concluded that Rhonda’s appeal is properly
before this Court,16 we will address whether the trial court
incorrectly denied her motions for a directed verdict.
15
Taylor, 700 S.W.2d at 416.
16
Larman further argues that Rhonda failed to state the issues on appeal in
her prehearing statement. Rhonda’s prehearing statement lists the issues as
“[t]he parties acquired certain property while living together that was not
equitably divided” and “lack of support for the judgment in fact and
evidence.” Rhonda’s only argument before this Court is that it should have
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Larman argues that Rhonda’s appeal has no merit
because it is based on a lack of written proof that Larman had
an interest in the real estate as required by the Statute of
Frauds, but that these issues were never affirmatively pled,17
nor raised before the trial court.
However, Rhonda’s argument
is not based on lack of written proof, but rather lack of
“evidence of title in any form,” or lack of proof that “the
parties had contracted another form of ownership.”
Therefore,
we reject Larman’s Statute of Frauds argument.
As to the central issue on appeal, we begin our
analysis by noting that this Commonwealth does not recognize
common-law marriage and no contractual rights or obligations
arise from mere cohabitation.18
It has long been the law in
Kentucky that “‘[r]ecord title or legal title is an indicia
sufficient to raise a presumption of true ownership.’”19
In this
case, it is undisputed that there are no written documents
upheld her motions for a directed verdict. This is adequately covered in her
prehearing statement. Therefore, this argument by Larman has no merit.
17
CR 8.03 requires that certain defenses be affirmatively pled, including
the Statute of Frauds, which is defined as “a statute . . . designed to
prevent fraud and perjury by requiring certain contracts to be in writing and
signed by the party to be charged.” Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1422 (7th ed.
1999).
18
Murphy v. Bowen, 756 S.W.2d 149, 150 (Ky.App. 1988) (stating that “[w]ere
it otherwise, the courts, in effect, would be reinstituting by judicial fiat
common law marriage which by expressed public policy is not recognized. See
KRS 402.020(3)”).
19
Rakhman v. Zusstone, 957 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Ky. 1997) (quoting Tharp v.
Security Insurance Co. of New Haven, 405 S.W.2d 760, 765 (Ky. 1966)).
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evidencing any agreement between Rhonda and Larman that the real
estate deeded in Rhonda’s name would be owned equally by them.
Therefore, Larman was required to offer evidence of an expressed
agreement between the parties or an agreement implied from the
actions of the parties.20
Larman argues that the long duration of the parties’
cohabitation and their having a child is sufficient evidence to
support an agreement.
Larman further argues that he and Rhonda
were in a joint venture21 or partnership22 and the real estate
was an asset of the partnership.
In Murphy, the plaintiff,
Murphy, made the same argument regarding her relationship with
the defendant, Bowen.
This Court found nothing to indicate that
either party “expected, understood, and intended that [Murphy]
would receive monetary compensation or an interest in [Bowen’s]
farm, for her work on it” [citation omitted].23
In this case, it is undisputed that the two mobile
homes titled in Rhonda’s name were solely her property.
Larman
claimed no interest in the mobile home purchased by Rhonda’s
20
See First Security National Bank & Trust Company of Lexington v. Merriman,
440 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Ky. 1969); see also Victor’s Executor v. Monson, 283
S.W.2d 175, 176-77 (Ky. 1955).
21
See Jones v. Nickell, 297 Ky. 81, 179 S.W.2d 195, 196 (1944) (stating that
“[a] joint adventure is a special or limited partnership or partnership for a
special purpose. Ordinarily, it is an association for a particular
transaction, while a partnership contemplates a continuing business”
[citations omitted]).
22
Partnership is defined as “[a]n association of two (2) or more persons to
carry on as co-owners a business for profit . . . .” See KRS 362.175(1).
23
Murphy, 756 S.W.2d at 151.
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grandmother.
Larman did not appeal the jury’s determination
that the second mobile home put in Rhonda’s name was solely her
property.
It is undisputed that the second mobile home was paid
for through rent received from its tenant.
It is undisputed
that the real estate was purchased through a loan which was paid
in full from the rental payments on the second mobile home,
determined solely to be owned by Rhonda.
Larman argued, as the
plaintiff did in Murphy, that his other contributions during the
cohabitation justify his entitlement to one-half the value of
the real estate.
However, Larman’s own testimony indicates that
other than one discussion with Rhonda about building a house on
the real estate, there was no other discussion about the real
estate.
Larman further argues that the real estate was placed
in Rhonda’s name only as a resulting trust24 or a constructive
trust,25 while he provided the consideration for the real estate
purchase.
We conclude under our Supreme Court’s holding in
Rakhman, that Larman has failed to prove that a trust existed.
In Rakhman, the parties had cohabitated in a non-marital
24
Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1517 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a “resulting
trust” by stating, “[a] trust imposed by law when property is transferred
under circumstances suggesting that the transferor did not intend for the
transferee to have the beneficial interest in the property”).
25
Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1515 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a “constructive
trust” by stating, “[a] trust imposed by a court on equitable grounds against
one who has obtained property by wrongdoing, thereby preventing the wrongful
holder from being unjustly enriched. Such a trust creates no fiduciary
relationship”).
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relationship from 1979 until 1992, and had two children during
this time.26
During this period, a house was purchased with
cash supplied by Zusstone, but title to the real estate was
placed in Rakhman’s name.
The cash was placed in a bank
account, solely in Rakhman’s name and Rakhman wrote a check to
the grantor of the real estate and a deed was recorded in
Rakhman’s name.
Just as in this case, Zusstone only asserted a
beneficial interest in the real estate after the parties’
separation.27
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts, Sec. 442 (1959)
states as follows:
Where a transfer of property is made to
one person and the purchase price is paid by
another and the transferee is a . . .
natural object of bounty of the person by
whom the purchase price is paid, a resulting
trust does not arise unless the latter
manifests an intention that the transferee
should not have the beneficial interest in
the property.
. . .
It is inferred that [the payor] intends to
make a gift if the transferee is by virtue
of the relationship a natural object of his
bounty.
. . .
The fact that the transferee is a . . .
natural object of bounty of the payor is
26
Rakhman, 957 S.W.2d at 243.
27
Id. at 245.
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more than merely a circumstance tending to
rebut the inference of a resulting trust.
It is of itself a circumstance sufficient to
raise an inference that a gift was intended,
and the burden is upon the payor seeking to
enforce a resulting trust to prove that he
did not intend to make a gift to the
transferee.28
Our Supreme Court in Rakhman concluded that parties, who have
cohabitated for several years and who have raised children
together, would qualify as the natural objects of each other’s
bounty.29
As in Rakhman, the only evidence offered by Larman to
rebut the presumption was his own testimony.
“He offered no
corroborating evidence about this particular transaction.”30
Our
Supreme Court concluded this evidence was insufficient to rebut
the presumption of a gift to Rakhman.
In this case, there is no
proof that Larman made any contribution to the purchase of the
real estate, other than his own testimony, and even if he did,
and based on our Supreme Court’s holding in Rakhman, we are not
persuaded by his trust argument, but conclude that the evidence
only supports a finding that his contributions to Rhonda were
gifts.
Based on the foregoing reasons, we reverse the
judgment and remand this matter for any necessary action to
28
Rakhman, 957 S.W.2d at 244.
29
Id. at 244-45.
30
Id. at 245.
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restore fee simple title to the real estate to Rhonda and to
reimburse her for any income payments from the real estate made
to Larman.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James P. Pruitt, Jr.
Pikeville, Kentucky
Lawrence R. Webster
Pikeville, Kentucky
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