COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. KAREN BROWN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
AUGUST 26, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
NO.
2003-CA-002624-MR
AND
2003-CA-002714-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANT/
CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE, GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
ACTION NO.86-CR-00172
KAREN BROWN
APPELLEE/
CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; HENRY AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
HENRY, JUDGE:
The Commonwealth appeals from a November 25, 2003
order of the Fayette Circuit Court sustaining Karen Brown’s RCr 1
11.42 motion for post-conviction relief.
On review, we reverse.
On March 25, 1986, Brown, along with Elizabeth Turpin
and Keith Bouchard, were indicted by the Fayette County Grand
Jury for the February 3, 1986 murder of Michael Turpin.
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The
grand jury specifically charged that they “committed the capital
offense of murder when Keith Bouchard, while aided and assisted
by Karen Brown, stabbed Michael Turpin and caused his death
pursuant to an agreement and conspiracy between Elizabeth
Turpin, Karen Brown and Keith Bouchard to murder Michael Turpin
for the purpose of receiving the money from life insurance
proceeds paid as a result of his death.”
Before trial, the
Commonwealth reached a deal with Bouchard whereby he would
receive a life sentence on a plea of guilty in exchange for his
testimony at trial against Brown and Turpin.
During the guilt phase of trial, Karen’s defense was
that she was completely innocent.
She did not take the stand in
her own defense and she put on no other witnesses.
Turpin, on
the other hand, did take the stand, where she testified that she
was not involved in the actual murder and was unaware of it
until after it was completed.
She placed full blame for the
murder upon Bouchard and Brown.
Bouchard’s testimony implicated
both women as having been involved in the awareness, planning,
or execution of the murder.
The jury ultimately found both Brown and Turpin guilty
of murder.
During the penalty phase of the trial, Brown put on
three witnesses for the purposes of mitigation, none of whom had
any contact with Brown following her move to Fayette County.
Brown herself did not testify herself at this phase, nor did any
-2-
other family members.
The jury subsequently sentenced her to
life without benefit of parole for twenty-five years, with final
judgment in accordance with this sentence being entered on
December 2, 1986.
Brown appealed her conviction, but it was
upheld by the Supreme Court of Kentucky on November 30, 1989, in
the published decision of Brown v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 627
(Ky. 1989). 2
On April 22, 1997, Brown filed an RCr 11.42 motion in
the Fayette Circuit Court seeking to vacate her conviction.
As
grounds for this motion, Brown argued that she received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
On February 4, 1999, the
court entered an order overruling Brown’s motion without a
hearing.
Brown subsequently filed a motion pursuant to CR 3 59.05
and CR 52.02 to vacate the court’s order or, in the alternative,
to enter specific findings of fact.
Brown also filed a separate
motion for a court order to obtain Bouchard’s psychiatric
records so as to supplement the record.
overruled in a September 22, 2000 order.
All motions were
Brown subsequently
appealed.
2
Turpin’s conviction was also affirmed by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in
the published decision of Turpin v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1989).
The conviction was subsequently upheld by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
on review of Turpin’s habeas corpus petition in Turpin v. Kassulke, 26 F.3d
1392 (6th Cir. 1994).
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-3-
On October 12, 2001, a panel of this court entered an
opinion reversing and remanding this case back to the circuit
court for an evidentiary hearing.
The opinion generally noted:
“we are unable to determine trial counsel’s strategy and whether
trial counsel’s actions were the result of such strategy or the
result of inadequate preparation and investigation.”
It also
expressed a particular concern with Brown’s “allegation that
trial counsel was ineffective for failure to investigate
Bouchard’s alleged mental illness.”
The opinion specifically
cited to Brown’s assertion “that Bouchard is suffering from a
mental illness, and was suffering from such mental illness
during appellant’s trial,” noting:
“We believe such evidence,
if true, certainly should have been used to attack the
credibility of Bouchard’s testimony, and possibly could have
impacted upon the outcome of trial.
We reach such decision in
view of the central role Bouchard played for the Commonwealth in
appellant’s trial.”
On remand, the circuit court conducted an evidentiary
hearing that spanned 2 ½ days and included 17 witnesses,
including Julius Rather, Brown’s trial counsel.
On November 25,
2003, the court entered an order sustaining Brown’s RCr 11.42
motion to vacate or set aside her conviction.
As its basis for
this ruling, the court cited to counsel’s failure to require
Brown to testify at trial and the lack of mitigation evidence
-4-
presented during the penalty phase of the trial.
The court
acknowledged that it understood counsel’s concerns about Brown’s
statement to the police coming into evidence in its entirety and
the grueling cross-examination she would have had to face had
she been allowed to testify.
However, the court stated that
“the only way to sway the jury that she was innocent was to have
her testify” because of the testimony given by Turpin and
Bouchard directly implicating her in the murder.
The court
added that the only way Brown could have been entitled to a
renunciation defense was to have taken the stand; since she did
not, such an instruction had no evidentiary basis.
The court
further noted that the record did not reflect that Brown was
informed of her right to testify in the penalty phase of her
trial, and that counsel did not adequately investigate her life
history and did not present crucial evidence to the jury during
the penalty phase.
However, the court rejected Brown’s
arguments relating to her counsel’s failure to request a
psychiatric examination of Bouchard to determine his competency
as a witness, citing said counsel’s testimony at the evidentiary
hearing that his strategy was to portray Bouchard as sane in
order to convince the jury that Brown was not a leader in the
murder.
This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following
issues: (1) whether the court below erred in failing to cite to
-5-
any case law in its order granting Brown’s RCr 11.42 motion; (2)
whether the court below failed to take into account the fact
that Brown filed her RCr 11.42 motion eight years after her
conviction was affirmed by our Supreme Court; (3) whether it was
ineffective assistance of counsel for Brown’s counsel not to
advise her to testify in the guilt phase of her trial; (4)
whether it was ineffective assistance of counsel for Brown’s
counsel not to advise her to testify in the penalty phase of her
trial; and (5) whether it was ineffective assistance of counsel
for Brown’s counsel not to present additional evidence to the
jury during the penalty phase of her trial.
On cross-appeal,
Brown raises the following issues: (1) whether it was
ineffective assistance of counsel for Brown’s counsel not to
make further investigation of Keith Bouchard’s mental illness;
(2) whether it was ineffective assistance of counsel for Brown’s
counsel not to move for a change of venue; and (3) whether it
was ineffective assistance of counsel for Brown’s counsel not to
advise her of a plea offer.
The standards that measure ineffective assistance of
counsel are set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and require a movant to
show: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that
the deficiency resulted in actual prejudice.
Id., 466 U.S. at
687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; see also Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975
-6-
S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1998); Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky.
1985).
In assessing counsel's performance, the standard is
whether the alleged acts or omissions were outside the wide
range of prevailing professional norms based on an objective
standard of reasonableness.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104
S.Ct. at 2064-65; Wilson v. Commonwealth, 836 S.W.2d 872, 878
(Ky. 1992); Commonwealth v. Tamme, 83 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Ky.
2002).
“The trial court’s inquiry into allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel requires the court to
determine whether counsel’s performance was below professional
standards and ‘caused the defendant to lose what he otherwise
would probably have won.’”
Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d
482, 487 (Ky. 2001), quoting Foley v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d
878, 884 (Ky. 2000).
It also requires an evaluation of “whether
counsel was so thoroughly ineffective that defeat was snatched
from the hands of probable victory.”
Id., quoting Foley, supra.
“Under Strickland it is not enough [for a showing of actual
prejudice] that counsel erred and Appellant's trial reached an
unfavorable result.
Instead, Appellant must demonstrate that,
absent counsel's errors, there exists a ‘reasonable probability’
the jury would have reached a different verdict.”
Bowling v.
Commonwealth, 981 S.W.2d 545, 551 (Ky. 1998), citing Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.
Furthermore, showing that
“the error by counsel had some conceivable effect on the outcome
-7-
of the proceeding” is not enough to satisfy the requirements of
Strickland.
Sanders v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380, 386 (Ky.
2002), citing Strickland, supra.
Moreover, “[i]n considering ineffective assistance,
the reviewing court must focus on the totality of evidence
before the judge or jury and assess the overall performance of
counsel throughout the case in order to determine whether the
identified acts or omissions overcome the presumption that
counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance.”
Haight v.
Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 441-42 (Ky. 2001), citing United
States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1992); Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986).
We further note our Supreme Court’s mandate that “[j]udicial
review of the performance of defense counsel must be very
deferential to counsel and to the circumstances under which they
are required to operate.
There is always a strong presumption
that the conduct of counsel falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance because hindsight is always
perfect.”
Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3 463, 469 (Ky. 2002),
citing Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d
914 (2002).
“A defendant is not guaranteed errorless counsel,
or counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel likely
to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.”
Haight, 41 S.W.3d at 442, citing McQueen v. Commonwealth, 949
-8-
S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1997).
"RCr 11.42 motions attempting to
denigrate the conscientious efforts of counsel on the basis that
someone else would have handled the case differently or better
will be accorded short shrift in this court."
Moore v.
Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d 479, 485 (Ky. 1998), quoting Penn v.
Commonwealth, 427 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Ky. 1968).
“In a RCr 11.42 proceeding, the movant has the burden
to establish convincingly that he was deprived of some
substantial right which would justify the extraordinary relief
afforded by the post-conviction proceeding.”
Id., citing Dorton
v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1968).
Both halves of
the test for ineffective assistance of counsel—the performance
prong and the prejudice prong—involve mixed questions of law and
fact.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct. at 2070;
Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161, 1164 (6th Cir. 1997).
“Even
when the trial judge does conduct an evidentiary hearing, a
reviewing court must defer to the determination of the facts and
witness credibility made by the trial judge.”
Id., citing
Sanborn, supra; McQueen v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694 (Ky.
1986); McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302 (6th Cir. 1996).
However, whether counsel’s performance was deficient and actual
prejudice resulted therefrom are matters subject to de novo
review.
See Groseclose, 130 F.3d at 1164; McQueen v. Scroggy,
99 F.3d at 1310-1311.
-9-
The Commonwealth’s first contention is that the trial
court erred in failing to cite to any case law—in particular,
the two-prong Strickland test—in its order granting Brown’s RCr
11.42 motion.
The Commonwealth specifically argues that the
trial court did not do the prejudice analysis required by
Strickland.
While the Commonwealth is correct is noting that
the trial court did not cite to any cases, including Strickland,
in its order, we do not believe that this alone merits a
reversal in the Commonwealth’s favor.
The trial court was
obviously made aware of the prevailing standards for ineffective
assistance of counsel through the parties’ briefs.
Moreover,
the court clearly perceived counsel’s failure to have Brown
testify at trial as prejudicial because it noted in its order
that “the only way to sway the jury that she was innocent was to
have her testify,” and it specifically blamed her failure to
testify as a basis for not allowing a renunciation instruction.
Given these facts, as well as the fact that we review an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the trial court’s
decision under a de novo standard, we cannot say that the
Commonwealth’s contention here is a ground for reversal.
The Commonwealth’s next argument is that the trial
court did not properly take into account the fact that Brown
filed her RCr 11.42 motion eight years after her conviction was
affirmed by our Supreme Court.
We see no evidence of this being
-10-
the case and certainly do not believe that this contention alone
merits reversal.
Nevertheless, in our de novo review, we
recognize the long-standing principle that, as to postconviction proceedings, “a prisoner who has slept on his rights
will bear a heavy burden to affirmatively prove the facts on
which his relief must rest.”
Prater v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.2d
383, 384 (Ky. 1971); see also McKinney v. Commonwealth, 445
S.W.2d 874, 877-78 (Ky. 1969); Brumley v. Seabold, 885 S.W.2d
954, 957 (Ky.App. 1994).
The Commonwealth’s next contention is that the trial
court erred in finding that it was ineffective assistance of
counsel for Brown’s attorney not to advise her to testify in the
guilt phase of her trial.
We agree.
As noted above, the trial court expressed sympathy
with counsel’s concern that allowing Brown to testify would
allow her statement to the police to be introduced in its
entirety for impeachment and also with his concern that she
would not stand up well to a grueling cross-examination.
However, the trial court believed that “the only way to sway the
jury that she was innocent was to have her testify” because of
the testimony given against her by Turpin and Bouchard.
The
trial court also indicated its belief that Brown’s testimony
could have been a legitimate basis for the renunciation
instruction requested by counsel at trial.
-11-
The Commonwealth
argues that Brown knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived her right to testify at trial, and that the trial court’s
decision that Rather was ineffective for not putting Brown on
the stand is essentially nothing more than a second-guessing of
his strategic decisions.
Rather testified at the evidentiary hearing that his
theory of defense was one of innocence or lesser culpability.
Specifically, his strategy for Brown’s defense was to make
certain that she was not perceived as the mastermind or leader
in the killing of Michael Turpin.
He admitted that he believed
that the defense position for trial was not a very strong one
because the Commonwealth had Bouchard ready to testify as its
key witness, the facts were well-known, and it was a death
penalty case.
He recalled cross-examining Bouchard “fiercely”
and that he was able to elicit an admission from him that Brown
was unable to join in the actual stabbing of Turpin, as she told
him, “Keith, I can’t do that.”
However, he indicated that this
statement to Bouchard was made while he was already well into
the act of killing Turpin while Brown was standing near him.
The trial record does reflect that Brown specifically
advised the court that, after talking with Rather, she had
decided not to testify on her own behalf, and that this decision
was made of her own free will and accord.
When specifically
questioned about the decision not to have Brown testify in her
-12-
own defense, Rather stated his recollection that he and Brown
had reached this decision even before the Commonwealth put
Elizabeth Turpin through a very difficult cross-examination.
Indeed, he remembered asking Brown after this examination if
“she could handle that,” and she told him “No.”
Rather further
indicated that, going into trial, he did not anticipate that
Brown would testify, and he did not recall rehearsing any
testimony with her, because he could see no advantages in having
her testify because of her lack of maturity and his belief that
she could not hold up under cross-examination.
Rather also expressed concerns about Brown’s entire
statement to the police being used for impeachment if she
testified, including the second part of that statement (which
had been suppressed as evidence), and about other incidents from
Brown’s past coming into evidence through her testimony,
including occasions where her father had been poisoned and
occasions where she had engaged in “aggressive behavior.”
Brown testified at the evidentiary hearing that she
did not remember discussing strategy with Rather in any
significant detail until after Turpin testified at trial.
She
also indicated that she assumed that she would be testifying
even though she admitted that she would be a “basket case” and
emotional; however, she did not see why that would be
detrimental.
She also testified that she did not know that she
-13-
had the right to testify against Rather’s advice and believed
that she had to do what he told her.
Brown then gave her version of what happened on the
night of the murder:
She stated that Elizabeth Turpin and
Bouchard came up with a plan whereby Brown would go to the
Turpin residence to tell Michael Turpin that his wife wanted a
divorce; Bouchard would go with her for protection.
When Brown
and Bouchard pulled into the Turpin driveway to carry out this
plan, Bouchard told her that he was going to kill Michael.
Brown stated that this was the first sign that she and Michael
were in trouble.
She further testified that she told Bouchard
not to do it, but he showed her the knives he had brought with
him, opened her door, and said that they were going in.
Bouchard told Brown to knock on the door of the Turpins’ home,
but she indicated that she would not until he put the knives
down.
Bouchard then told her that he would only rough up Turpin
if he got rough with her, but he carried a butcher knife to the
door.
When Brown knocked on the door, Michael answered, and
Brown told him that she was there to get clothes for Elizabeth
because she did not want to come home.
However, she did not get
all of the way into the house before Bouchard rushed at Michael
and stabbed him.
Bouchard then asked Brown to help her finish
him off, but Brown told him that she couldn’t do it.
He then
ordered her to get a towel, blankets, water, and a cigarette,
-14-
which she did.
Brown then testified that when they returned to
her apartment, Elizabeth jumped up excitedly and asked if it was
over, while Bouchard asked how much he was going to get paid.
Then the two talked about Michael’s life insurance policy.
Brown stated that it was at that point that she knew Elizabeth
wanted Michael killed.
Brown then acknowledged that she persisted in
protecting Elizabeth Turpin because that is what she did for her
friends.
She specifically testified that her statement to the
police, particularly the second part, was full of lies because
of her desire to protect Elizabeth.
However, this need lessened
as time went on and she realized that Elizabeth had been
manipulating her.
Brown then testified that she had never told
Rather her entire side of the story until Elizabeth finished
testifying at trial.
On cross-examination, Brown acknowledged that she had
waived her right to testify in front of the trial judge.
She
also admitted that in her pre-sentence investigation report, she
was trying to protect Elizabeth Turpin in her statement to the
police, and that was why the statement was full of lies and was
the reason why she could not testify at trial.
Brown also
acknowledged that in her statement to the police, she told them
that she tried to give a gun to Bouchard to take care of Michael
Turpin, but she only meant that in the sense of protecting her.
-15-
She also admitted that in her statement she knew Bouchard had
knives in his possession after stopping at Bouchard’s trailer
and before they arrived at the Turpin home.
Following Brown’s testimony at the evidentiary
hearing, Rather was recalled to the stand.
He again discussed
Brown’s statement to the police, which he described as being
very damning for her.
Rather then testified that Brown had
disagreed very little with Bouchard’s statements, and that she
had actually told him that the murder had essentially happened
as it was presented in court, with only small variations.
Rather further testified that Brown’s original version of what
had happened (as told to him and the police) did not change as
they prepared for trial, and that there was no point during the
course of trial during which Brown attempted to give him a
version of events consistent with what she testified to at the
evidentiary hearing.
He also indicated that Brown never told
him that she did not know that the murder was going to occur,
but was only an innocent bystander, and did not tell him after
Elizabeth Turpin’s testimony that she was involved in the plan
to kill Michael.
Rather’s concerns about the statement Brown gave to
police were, in our opinion, valid ones.
In Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), the United
States Supreme Court held that statements that were inadmissible
-16-
against the defendant in the prosecution's case-in-chief because
the defendant had not been advised of his Miranda rights could
be used for impeachment purposes. Harris, 401 U.S. at 226, 91
S.Ct. at 646; see also Canler v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 219,
221 (Ky. 1994): (“[S]tatements made by a defendant in
circumstances violating Miranda are admissible for impeachment,
so long as their trustworthiness satisfies legal standards.”)
(Citation omitted).
The second half of Brown’s statement to the
police, which was suppressed as evidence for Miranda violations,
was extremely damaging to Brown’s defense because it explicitly
implicated Brown in Michael Turpin’s murder as the person who
drove Bouchard to Turpin’s house, gained him entry into the
house, and helped him dispose of his body afterwards.
Moreover,
it indicates that Brown knew that Bouchard stated that he would
kill Michael while everyone was talking at a nightclub and
agreed to drive him to the Turpin home after he said it, even
though she said that she couldn’t do it herself.
She also told
him that she knew someone who owned a gun that he could use and
actually went to that person’s home to procure it.
She also
stated that, when that effort failed, she went with Bouchard to
his home to look for a gun, and that she knew he had knives in
his possession when they left to go to the Turpins’ house.
Perhaps most tellingly, she also admitted that she knew what
Bouchard planned to do with the knives when he met Michael, and
-17-
that she knew he had the knives when she knocked on the door.
Consequently, Rather’s reluctance to have this information
relayed to the jury is understandable, as it would have proven
to be a tremendous detriment to Brown’s defense.
We also note that Rather relied heavily upon the
version of events told to him by Brown at the time of the trial,
a version that differed substantially from the story Brown
testified to at the evidentiary hearing even though Rather
testified that Brown essentially agreed with the facts as they
had been presented at trial.
In Strickland, the U.S. Supreme
Court placed great emphasis upon the role a defendant’s own
actions play in examining an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim:
The reasonableness of counsel's actions may
be determined or substantially influenced by
the defendant's own statements or actions.
Counsel's actions are usually based, quite
properly, on informed strategic choices made
by the defendant and on information supplied
by the defendant. In particular, what
investigation decisions are reasonable
depends critically on such information. For
example, when the facts that support a
certain potential line of defense are
generally known to counsel because of what
the defendant has said, the need for further
investigation may be considerably diminished
or eliminated altogether. And when a
defendant has given counsel reason to
believe that pursuing certain investigations
would be fruitless or even harmful,
counsel's failure to pursue those
investigations may not later be challenged
as unreasonable. In short, inquiry into
-18-
counsel's conversations with the defendant
may be critical to a proper assessment of
counsel's investigation decisions, just as
it may be critical to a proper assessment of
counsel's other litigation decisions.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066.
Upon a review
of Rather’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing, it is clear
that Brown did not convey to him the same version of events and
the same details that she set forth at the evidentiary hearing,
instead substantially agreeing with the evidence implicating her
in Michael Turpin’s murder.
Consequently, this undoubtedly
affected Rather’s decision as to whether she should testify.
Given these facts, the difficult standard for RCr 11.42 relief,
and the substantial deference that we are required to afford to
counsel, we must conclude that Brown did not receive ineffective
assistance of counsel as to the decision not to allow her to
testify during the guilt phase of her trial.
We next address Brown’s contentions that she was
denied ineffective assistance of counsel as to the decision not
to have her testify in the penalty phase of her trial, and
whether it was ineffective assistance of counsel for Brown’s
counsel not to present additional evidence to the jury during
the penalty phase of her trial.
At the penalty phase, Rather presented as witnesses
Brown’s sister, Donna Brown, her middle school principal and
basketball coach, Bruce Johnson, and Billie Randolph, a family
-19-
friend for whom Brown baby-sat on several different occasions.
Donna Brown testified that her sister was a member of the
National Honor Society, the Beta Club, the basketball team
(where she was elected captain), the pep club, and student
council.
She also testified that she did not know the people
with whom Brown associated after she dropped out of college very
well, but they “seemed to be wilder” than the friends that she
had in high school and college.
Donna also indicated that her
sister tended to be a follower and just “one of the group.”
She
also talked about the fact that Karen was not the type of person
to be violent or hurt people, specifically referencing incidents
in school where people would try to fight Karen, but she would
refuse to fight back.
Donna further testified that her sister
had no criminal record before the incident in question.
Bruce
Johnson testified that Brown was a straight-A student and
participated in a number of extracurricular activities.
He also
indicated that she tended to be a follower, but functioned well
as a team member because she was a hard worker.
Rather
testified at the evidentiary hearing that he chose these
particular witnesses because he believed that they would portray
Brown as a follower.
Again, for the same reasons set forth above, we
recognize the legitimate concerns expressed by Rather at the
evidentiary hearing as to the decision not to have Brown testify
-20-
at the penalty phase.
Such testimony had the potential of
subjecting Brown to a lengthy and damaging cross-examination,
particularly by drawing attention to Brown’s statements to the
police.
We are loathe to second-guess Rather’s conscientious
strategic decision as to this issue where the record
demonstrates that a valid basis for the decision existed.
See
Moore v. Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d 479, 485 (Ky. 1998).
Moreover, we do not believe that it was ineffective
assistance of counsel for Rather not to call the witnesses
presented by Brown at the evidentiary hearing.
Rather testified
that he felt that these witnesses wanted to portray Brown as a
leader, which would contradict his strategy of trying to paint
her as a follower.
It is easy to speculate, in hindsight, that
these witnesses might have had a mitigating effect on the jury’s
sentencing; however, given Rather’s strategy and the fact that
we believe the testimony of the proffered witnesses would have
been at best cumulative and at worst harmful, we cannot hold
that failing to have them testify constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Moreover, Rather testified that Brown’s
mother had given him a note indicating that she was physically
and mentally incapable of providing testimony, and presenting
testimony from Brown’s father had the strong potential of
revealing a number of past family incidents that could reflect
-21-
negatively on Brown.
Accordingly, we must reject this
contention.
For similar reasons, we must reject the arguments set
forth in Brown’s cross-appeal.
Brown’s first argument is that
she received ineffective assistance of counsel due to Rather’s
failure to investigate Keith Bouchard’s mental illness.
Rather
testified at the evidentiary hearing that the Commonwealth, in
discovery, had provided him with the Kentucky Correctional
Psychiatric Center (“KCPC”) report on Bouchard’s competency.
The report found that Bouchard was fit to stand trial and that
the strange behaviors he had been demonstrating in confinement
were exaggerated or put on.
Rather acknowledged that he did not
seek out other records pertaining to Bouchard’s mental
competency or pursue that avenue at trial because he wanted
Bouchard to be portrayed as sane and fully cognizant of his
actions.
Rather reasoned that if Bouchard were found to be
incompetent or otherwise mentally disabled, the jury would be
more prone to find him as a “follower” in the murder and Brown
as a “leader.”
We also note that Brown actually told Rather
that the murder had essentially happened as it was presented in
court, including Bouchard’s testimony, with only small
variations.
As noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court has made it
clear that the reasonableness of counsel’s actions can be
measured by the statements or actions of the defendant in issue.
-22-
While this course of action might not have led to the
absolute “best” possible defense for Brown, by Rather’s
testimony it appears to have been the result of a conscientious
strategic decision on his part.
was entirely unreasonable.
Moreover, we cannot say that it
Again, given the substantial
deference that we are required to afford to trial counsel as to
strategic decisions, we cannot find that Brown received
ineffective assistance of counsel in this respect.
Likewise, we must reject Brown’s argument that she
received ineffective assistance of counsel when Rather failed to
seek a change of venue for the trial.
Brown specifically argues
that she was prejudiced by the “overwhelming pretrial publicity”
surrounding the case, which was certainly a notorious one at the
time it went to trial.
Rather testified that he decided to try
the case in Fayette County and not to move the case because it
involved an “alternative lifestyle,” and he felt that this fact
would be better received in Lexington, a university town.
Certainly, there are pros and cons with this decision, and it
can be reasonably argued that the case could have been moved to
another venue containing a university or college, even though
the case almost certainly would have garnered the same amount of
attention given its nature.
Again, however, we cannot say that
counsel’s decision not to do so constitutes ineffective
assistance.
To do so would be nothing more than second-guessing
-23-
a conscientious strategic decision on Rather’s part.
Nor can we
say from the record that counsel failed to adequately
investigate the depth and effect of the publicity surrounding
the case.
We also cannot say that Brown has demonstrated the
type of prejudice that would necessarily merit a change of
venue. “It is not the amount of publicity which determines that
venue should be changed; it is whether public opinion is so
aroused as to preclude a fair trial.”
Kordenbrock v.
Commonwealth, 700 S.W.2d 384, 387 (1985).
However, "‘the mere
fact that jurors may have heard, talked, or read about a case’
does not require a change of venue, ‘absent a showing that there
is a reasonable likelihood that the accounts or descriptions of
the investigation and judicial proceedings have prejudiced the
defendant.’”
Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 819 S.W.2d 713, 716
(Ky. 1991), quoting Brewster v. Commonwealth, 568 S.W.2d 232,
235 (Ky. 1978).
Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 412 (Ky.
1994), one of the cases upon which Brown relies, involved a
situation where 74% of the jury pool demonstrated fixed opinions
as to guilt and an inability to presume innocence.
Brown has
failed to show similar circumstances and prejudice here and
instead only relies upon the amount of awareness the jury pool
had about the case.
This is simply not enough to establish
-24-
ineffective assistance of counsel, and we must consequently
reject Brown’s argument.
Lastly, we must reject Brown’s contention that it was
ineffective assistance of counsel for Rather to fail to convey
to her the Commonwealth’s plea offer of fifteen (15) years
imprisonment.
Rather testified that he did make this conveyance
to Brown, but that she turned down the offer and asked for a
sentence of three (3) years.
occur.
Brown insists that this did not
Given this clear factual dispute as to this matter, we
cannot reasonably find as a matter of law that counsel was
ineffective.
The judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court granting
Brown’s RCr 11.42 motion for post-conviction relief is hereby
reversed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Office of Attorney General
Marguerite Neill Thomas
Frankfort, Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Marguerite Neill Thomas
Richard Edwin Neal
Frankfort, Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-25-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.