CHASTIDY NOEL v. RANDELL NOEL
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: APRIL 22, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002545-ME
CHASTIDY NOEL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BRUCE PETRIE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00203
v.
RANDELL NOEL
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; McANULTY, JUDGE; MILLER, SENIOR
McANULTY, JUDGE:
Chastidy Noel and Randell Noel are the
divorced parents of a son, Scooter.
Initially, they were
awarded joint custody of Scooter with equal time-sharing.
Later, upon motion by Chastidy to modify this arrangement, the
trial court designated Randell as the primary residential
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
custodian.
Chastidy appeals on the basis that the trial court
should have conducted an evidentiary hearing before determining
that Randell was the proper primary residential custodian.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Chastidy and Randell were divorced by decree entered
March 15, 2002.
At that time, the trial court reserved ruling
on the custody arrangement of Scooter, whose date of birth is
January 29, 1999.
Later, a domestic relations commissioner
(DRC) heard the matter and recommended that Chastidy and Randell
share joint custody and have physical custody of Scooter for
equal periods of time.
The trial court adopted the recommendation of the DRC.
Under the equal time-sharing arrangement, Randell had physical
custody of Scooter Monday through Wednesday of one week and
Monday through Thursday the next week.
The schedule alternated
in that pattern from week to week for about a year and a half.
After Chastidy and Randell divorced, Chastidy moved
from Boyle County to Jessamine County.
When it came time for
Scooter to start pre-school, Chastidy and Randell could not
agree on where he would attend school on a daily basis.
Because
of their inability to agree, Chastidy filed a Motion for
Assignment of Periods of Joint Custody.
Chastidy set a date of
August 7, 2003, for her motion to be heard.
-2-
The trial court dealt with Chastidy’s motion as a
motion to modify custody, although Chastidy characterized her
motion as a request for a “necessary change in the periods of
time the child spends with each parent which naturally occurs as
the child matures and the parents [sic] schedules change.”
The
trial court heard Chastidy’s motion, and then it took the case
under submission.
Later, the trial court directed Chastidy and
Randell to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law, as well as a calendar showing the days that Scooter resided
with each parent.
About a month after receiving the proposed findings
and conclusions, the trial court issued its findings of fact,
conclusions of law and an order.
In that order, the trial court
concluded that the best interests of the child would be served
by continuing the parties’ joint custody.
However, to maintain
stability in Scooter’s life and ensure that he started his preschool education, the trial court designated Randell as the
primary residential custodian.
And the trial court granted
Chastidy time-sharing according to the Boyle and Mercer family
court guidelines.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court
erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing before
modifying custody.
Chastidy contends that instead of taking the
case under submission after hearing her motion at the court's
-3-
regularly-scheduled motion hour, the trial court should have
afforded her an evidentiary hearing tantamount to a domestic
trial.
We conclude that Chastidy’s argument is unmeritorious
for three reasons.
First, Chastidy does not claim on appeal
that the trial court’s findings in support of its conclusion are
erroneous.
Second, Chastidy does not point to any evidence that
she was not permitted to present due to the way in which the
trial court handled this case.
The third reason concerns the record that is before
this Court on appeal.
Randell argues that at the conclusion of
the August 7, 2003, hearing, the trial court asked the parties
if they wished to present additional proof.
According to
Randell, both parties indicated that they had no other evidence
to present other than the time-sharing calendars.
Randell
argues that Chastidy waived the evidentiary hearing that she now
claims the trial court should have conducted.
Chastidy did not file a designation of evidence in
this case.
See CR 75.01 and CR 98.
Consequently, the clerk of
the Boyle Circuit Court did not include a videotape of the
August 7, 2003 hearing as part of the record on appeal.
We
acknowledge that under CR 75.01 Randell could have had this
evidence, which supported his waiver argument, included in the
record.
Instead, he seems to rely on the rule that as to all
-4-
disputed issues of fact, this Court is to assume that all
undesignated parts of the record support the judgment of the
lower court.
See Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Weartz, 636
S.W.2d 891, 893 (Ky.App. 1982); Hamblin v. Johnson, 254 S.W.2d
76, 76 (Ky. 1953).
Considering Chastidy’s sole argument on
appeal and the record before us, we conclude that this is a
proper case for the application of the rule.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Boyle
Family Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel W. James
Nicholasville, Kentucky
Kevin L. Nesbitt
Danville, Kentucky
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.