KENTUCKY NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. TONYA FLETCHER
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RENDERED: MARCH 25, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002541-MR
KENTUCKY NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS B. WINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-008547
v.
TONYA FLETCHER
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND
REVERSING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Kentucky National Insurance Company (KNIC) has
appealed from an opinion and order entered by the Jefferson
Circuit Court on October 24, 2003, which denied its motion for
summary judgment as to whether the tortfeasor, Brittany
Brockman, was uninsured and whether the appellee, Tonya
Fletcher, was entitled to stack uninsured motorist coverages.1
1
The judgment in the amount of $102,143.72 against Brockman entered on April
4, 2003, left open the question of KNIC’s liability for uninsured benefits.
The trial court ordered KNIC to pay Tonya $102,143.72 in
uninsured motorist coverages under her father, Roy Fletcher’s,
automobile insurance policy.2
Having concluded that the trial
court did not err in determining that there was no genuine issue
as to any material fact as to whether Brockman was uninsured, we
affirm the trial court’s order denying KNIC’s motion for summary
judgment to this extent.
Having further concluded that the
trial court erred by denying KNIC’s motion for summary judgment
as to whether Tonya was entitled to stack the uninsured motorist
coverages of the policy in question and by entering judgment
against KNIC in an amount exceeding $50,000.00,3 we reverse that
portion of the trial court’s order.
On December 26, 1999, at approximately 6:42 p.m.,
Tonya was driving to work in a 1995 Chevrolet Baretta on
Interstate 65 North in Louisville, Kentucky.
Tonya exited onto
the Preston-Grade Lane exit and came to a stop at the red light
at the bottom of the ramp.
When the light turned green, Tonya
proceeded forward and she was immediately hit by a car driven by
Brockman.
Tonya remembered seeing lights to her left just prior
to the accident, then she blacked out.
When she regained
consciousness she was lying in the middle of the road, despite
having her seat belt fastened at the time of the accident.
2
She
This amount is less $10,000.00 in no-fault benefits previously paid by KNIC.
3
This was the amount of uninsured motorist coverage, per person, on the 1995
Chevrolet Baretta that Tonya was driving at the time of the accident.
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did not see Brockman at the scene of the accident and has never
spoken to her.
Tonya sustained road burns to her right arm and
left lower leg, knots on the left side of her head, injury to
her right index finger, and experienced pain in her left lower
back and hip, which radiated down her leg into her foot.
On April 22, 2003, Tonya signed an affidavit, as a
part of this civil action, stating that she owned the Baretta
with her father, Roy Fletcher.4
The vehicle was insured under a
policy through KNIC in the name of Roy.
At the time of the
accident, there were four vehicles on the policy,5 for which
separate premiums were paid, including the Baretta.
In addition
to Roy, Tonya and her mother, Janice Fletcher, were listed on
the policy as drivers.
It is undisputed that at the time of the
accident, Roy and Janice resided at 9617 Maple Drive in
Louisville, and Tonya, who was 27 years old, resided at 315
Barracks Road #272, in Louisville.
Under the policy, Tonya was
not listed as the driver of the Baretta, but rather the 1988
Chevrolet S-10 pickup truck.
The policy provided uninsured
motorist benefits on three of the four vehicles in the amount of
$50,000.00 per person, and $100,000.00 per accident.6
4
KNIC argues that it was unaware of Tonya’s claimed ownership in the vehicle
until she filed the affidavit in the case.
5
The four vehicles listed on the policy at the time of the accident were a
1995 Chevrolet Baretta, a 1989 Chevrolet Astro Van, a 1988 Chevrolet S-10
pickup, and a 1993 Viking Camper.
6
There was no uninsured motorist coverage on the 1993 Viking Camper.
-3-
On December 14, 2001, Tonya filed suit in Jefferson
Circuit Court against Brockman and KNIC claiming that Brockman
was uninsured, and that she was entitled to uninsured motorist
coverage under the KNIC policy in Roy’s name.
On December 17,
2001, Brockman was served by certified mail, but she did not
file an answer.
KNIC was also served on December 17, 2001, and
filed an answer and a cross-claim against Brockman.7
In its
answer, KNIC asserted various defenses, challenged Tonya’s claim
for damages, and denied that Brockman was an uninsured motorist.
In KNIC’s cross-claim against Brockman, it sought to recover
from her any damages that it had to pay Tonya in the event
Brockman was determined to be uninsured.
KNIC’s counsel took Tonya’s deposition on March 1,
2002, and she testified that she had contacted the insurance
company listed on the accident report and determined that
Brockman was not insured through that company.
On February 2,
2002, Tonya served notice on both KNIC and Brockman that she
would take Brockman’s deposition on March 20, 2002; however,
neither Brockman nor KNIC appeared for the deposition.
The discovery before the trial in this matter included
requests for admissions that Tonya served on Brockman asking her
to admit that she was uninsured at the time of the accident.
Brockman failed to answer this discovery request.
7
Brockman did not respond to the cross-claim.
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Tonya also
served interrogatories on KNIC regarding her status with KNIC
under the policy.
KNIC responded by admitting Tonya was an
“insured” under the policy, but conditioned its admission upon
all the terms and provisions of the insurance contract being
fulfilled.
A jury trial was held on January 28 and 29, 2003.
Prior to voir dire, after hearing arguments from counsel for
Tonya and KNIC, the trial court ruled Brockman to be uninsured.8
KNIC’s counsel asked Tonya’s counsel if Tonya intended to seek
damages in excess of $50,000.00, which was the amount of
uninsured motorist coverage per person on the Baretta under the
KNIC policy.9
Tonya’s counsel stated that he intended to prove
her full damages.
In response, KNIC’s counsel stated that at
trial he needed to ask Tonya questions regarding her coverage.
Tonya’s counsel objected and stated that stacking was a question
of law and not a question for the jury.
He stated that if
stacking became an issue, it could be brought before the trial
court after the jury trial.
No written motions were filed
regarding stacking and the issue was passed for post-verdict
proceedings.
8
This ruling was in effect a partial summary judgment, but other than KNIC’s
answer the record only reflects an oral request for this relief. This was
one of many procedural oddities in this case that have caused difficulty in
our review.
9
In addition to challenging the extent of Tonya’s entitlement to coverages
under the policy, KNIC also disputed the value of Tonya’s claim.
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The jury found Brockman to be 100% at fault for the
accident and awarded Tonya $112,143.72 in damages for her past
and future medical expenses, past and future lost earning
capacity, and past and future pain and suffering.
Subsequently,
Tonya tendered a written judgment to the trial court, but KNIC
objected to the judgment before it was entered.10
On March 20, 2003, KNIC filed a motion for summary
judgment, claiming (1) Tonya was not entitled to any coverage
because the insurance policy issued to Roy had been obtained by
fraud or misrepresentation since Tonya did not reside in the
same household as her father; (2) if Tonya was an innocent party
to the alleged fraud of obtaining the insurance policy, her
uninsured coverage should be limited to $25,000.00; and (3) as a
“second class” insured, Tonya would only be entitled to
$50,000.00 for uninsured motorist coverage, not $150,000.00
under the stacking provision of the policy.
While Tonya did not
directly reply to the motion for summary judgment, on March 24,
2003, she did reply to KNIC’s objection to her tendered
judgment.
Tonya stated as follows:
[KNIC] is nothing more than an
impediment to [Tonya’s] obtaining a proper
judgment against the tortfeasor which
10
KNIC objected because the judgment stated Brockman was uninsured. KNIC
argued that that language had nothing to do with the judgment tendered; that
the judgment was also against KNIC in the full amount of the jury award,
prior to a post-judgment hearing being held to determine if Tonya was
entitled to stack coverages; and the judgment indicated that it was final and
appealable, before the stacking issue had been addressed.
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defaulted on the issues of liability, and
which a jury has now found to have caused
harm. The Court should enter an appropriate
judgment consistent with the record in this
case, and should enter a final judgment
against [Brockman].
The trial court entered a judgment on April 4, 2003, granting a
default judgment against Brockman in the amount of $102,143.72,
and stating that the issues relating to KNIC’s liability for
uninsured motorist coverages were “pending.”
The trial court held a hearing on KNIC’s motion for
summary judgment on September 17, 2003, at which time counsel
for Tonya and KNIC argued the legal issues regarding stacking.
No evidence was offered.
On October 24, 2003, the trial court
entered its opinion and order, denying KNIC’s motion for summary
judgment, and awarding Tonya a judgment against KNIC in the
amount of $102,143.72.
Thus, Tonya was allowed to stack the
three uninsured motorist coverages under the policy.
On November 3, 2003, KNIC filed a motion to reconsider
and to set aside the trial court’s order, arguing that the trial
court erred when it denied summary judgment to KNIC and
essentially cut off the post-trial proceedings by not allowing
it to submit evidence.
KNIC argued that the trial court should
have either granted it summary judgment or it should have
returned the case to the active docket for submission of further
proof by the parties on the uninsured issue.
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On November 10,
2003, the trial court denied KNIC’s motion to set aside its
order of October 24, 2003.
This appeal followed.
KNIC argues that Tonya’s proof was not sufficient to
establish Brockman’s uninsured status and that Fletcher should
not be allowed to stack uninsured motorist coverages under the
policy because:
(1) the trial court improperly interpreted the
“stacking” law and misapplied it to the undisputed facts of the
case; (2) any misrepresentations by Tonya or Roy should not
benefit Tonya; and (3) KNIC was denied an opportunity to present
evidence to the trial court regarding insurance coverages.
Since this case has many procedural twists, we will discuss the
procedural issues first.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Tonya makes several arguments throughout her brief
regarding procedural failures by KNIC in trying this case.
Tonya argues that KNIC waived various affirmative defenses by
failing to specifically plead them, including whether Tonya was
a “first class insured”, and whether Brockman was uninsured.11
CR12 8.03 sets forth specific defenses that must be pled
affirmatively, and includes “any other matter constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense.”
11
All affirmative defenses
Tonya also asserts that KNIC failed to affirmatively plead fraud, but since
fraud is not an issue alleged in KNIC’s appeal, we will not address it any
further.
12
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-8-
must be pleaded.13
Tonya has not cited any legal authority to
support her contention that the defenses that she claims KNIC
waived come under the general language of the rule.
We conclude
that these defenses do not come under the CR 8.03 language
requiring the pleading of “any other matter constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense.”
From our review of the record, we do not see where
Tonya asserted a claim to stack coverages prior to trial.
She
stated in her complaint as follows:
[Tonya] . . . was, at the time of the
accident referred to above, insured under a
policy of automobile liability insurance
with [KNIC], which among other coverage’s
[sic] provided [Tonya] with uninsured
motorist coverage; upon which policy
premiums were paid and which policy was in
full force and effect on the date of the
accident referred to above.
As the case proceeded toward trial, the parties in
their memoranda identified the sole issue in the case as the
extent of Tonya’s damages.
As mentioned previously, prior to
voir dire the issue of stacking appeared to be raised for the
first time.
However, Tonya’s counsel insisted that the issue
was a matter of law which could be addressed by the trial court
13
Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Cisneros, 657 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Ky.App.
1983). See also First National Bank of Grayson v. Citizens Deposit Bank and
Trust, 735 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Ky.App. 1987)(stating that when looking at how
claims are set out in a pleading it is important to determine whether there
was “undue prejudice or surprise[.]” “The nature and legal effect of a
pleading will be determined by its substance rather than by mere linguistic
form” [citations omitted]).
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post-verdict.
After the jury returned a verdict for
$112,143.72, Tonya tendered a judgment against KNIC and Brockman
for the full amount, except the $10,000.00 already paid by KNIC
in no-fault benefits.
As noted previously, KNIC objected to
coverage in excess of $50,000.00 and filed a motion for summary
judgment on that issue.
Only after the jury trial and the filing of Tonya’s
affidavit on April 10, 2003, did her basis for stacking
uninsured motorist coverages become apparent in the record.
Accordingly, this procedural history negates Tonya’s argument
that KNIC failed to preserve the stacking issue by not pleading
affirmative defenses, in failing to amend its answer to the
complaint, in failing to take discovery, in failing to provide
witnesses at trial, or in failing to file a compulsory
counterclaim to determine whether Tonya was a first class
insured.
Instead of filing a declaratory judgment action,14 KNIC
chose to integrate the stacking issue as part of this action.
Additionally, we find no merit to Tonya’s claim that
KNIC’s summary judgment motion was not timely because it was not
filed within 90 days of entry of the trial court’s pretrial
order.
First, the claim of untimeliness was not raised before
the trial court, and second, it is our opinion that the
14
Despite Tonya’s argument to the contrary, we know of no law requiring KNIC
to file a declaratory judgment action in order to resolve the stacking issue.
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deadlines in the pretrial order related to issues of damages
only, as that was the limited scope of the trial.
Tonya argues
that there is no way she could have known that KNIC disputed
that she was a first class insured before the stacking issue was
first raised by KNIC prior to voir dire.
From our review of the
record, we conclude to the contrary that there was no way KNIC
could have known before that time that Tonya was going to claim
stacking, and thus, KNIC did not fail to adequately preserve
this argument for appeal.15
Further, we find no error in the
preservation of KNIC’s argument that Brockman was uninsured;
however, since we hold in Tonya’s favor regarding this issue,
the procedural aspects of this issue do not merit further
discussion.
UNINSURED STATUS OF BROCKMAN
KNIC argues that Tonya failed to meet her burden of
proof that Brockman was an uninsured motorist at the time of the
accident, and therefore, the default judgment entered by the
trial court against Brockman was improper.
“UM coverage is
first party coverage, which means that it is a contractual
15
In fact, in Tonya’s answer to KNIC’s interrogatories in compliance with CR
8.01(2) she said that her unliquidated damages for pain and suffering, future
medical expenses, and future lost wages were all “undetermined at this time.”
While this is not an issue on appeal, under LaFleur v. Shoney’s Inc., 83
S.W.3d 474 (Ky. 2002), it would appear that Tonya could have been prohibited
from recovering the $70,000.00 for pain and suffering, $10,000.00 for future
medical expenses, and $19,250.00 for future lost earnings even though she had
tendered proposed jury instructions on the day of trial that equaled or
exceeded these amounts.
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obligation directly to the insured which must be honored even if
the tortfeasor cannot be identified” [emphasis original].16
As
stated earlier, Brockman accepted service of the summons and
complaint filed by Tonya, but never answered the complaint or
Tonya’s requests for admissions requesting her to admit that she
was uninsured.17
In its pleadings, KNIC denied that Brockman was
uninsured and filed a cross-claim against her, which Brockman
did not respond to.
“‘The burden of showing that the party
responsible for the accident was uninsured is on the insured
plaintiff attempting to recover under the uninsured motorist
coverage’” [citations omitted].18
This burden requires that
“‘all reasonable efforts have been made to ascertain the
existence of an applicable policy and that such efforts have
proven fruitless.’”19
Tonya relies on Hunt, supra, and argues that she made
all reasonable efforts to determine whether Brockman was an
16
Coots v. Allstate Insurance Co., 853 S.W.2d 895, 898 (Ky. 1993) (citing
First National Insurance Co. v. Harris, 455 S.W.2d 542 (Ky. 1970); and
Puckett v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 477 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1971)).
17
Pursuant to CR 36.01, failure to
prescribed period of time, has the
admitted, and pursuant to CR 36.02
“conclusively established[.]” See
1961).
18
answer a request for admissions within the
effect of the request being deemed
any matter admitted under this rule is
also Lyons v. Sponcil, 343 S.W.2d 836 (Ky.
Motorist Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hunt, 549 S.W.2d 845, 846 (Ky.App. 1977).
19
Id. at 847 (quoting Merchants Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schmid, 288 N.Y.S.2d
822 (N.Y. 1968).
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uninsured motorist at the time of the accident.20
Tonya’s
actions included contacting the insurance company listed on the
accident report, which denied that it provided Brockman
coverage; noticing Brockman to take her deposition, but Brockman
failed to appear; and serving requests for admissions on
Brockman asking her to admit or to deny that she had automobile
coverage, which Brockman failed to answer.
Tonya claims that if
KNIC’s argument were accepted, a plaintiff would never be able
to prove that an unanswering defendant was uninsured as long as
the defendant never made an appearance.
Tonya claims that she
did all she could do to determine whether Brockman was uninsured
at the time of the accident, and that pursuant to Hunt, absent
affirmative proof from KNIC, an inference may be drawn that no
insurance policy was in force.21
20
The Court in Hunt stated as follows:
“Since the absence of insurance upon the
offending vehicle and its driver is a condition
precedent to the applicability of the uninsured
driver endorsement, we hold that the burden of
proving such absence is on the claimant.”
Hunt, 549 S.W.2d at 847 (quoting Merchants Mutual, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 822).
21
Tonya argues that this is not a shift in the burden of proof, but rather is
simply an opportunity for the insurance company to rebut the proof that the
other driver was not uninsured. The Court in Hunt stated as follows:
“However, we must keep in mind that proving a
negative is always difficult and frequently
impossible and that, consequently, the quantum of
proof must merely be such as will convince the trier
of facts that all reasonable efforts have been made
to ascertain the existence of an applicable policy
and that such efforts have proven fruitless. In such
an event, and absent any affirmative proof by
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KNIC argues that there was “no proof” that Brockman
was uninsured and that the trial court used a procedural
mechanism, i.e., Brockman’s failure to respond to requests for
admissions, to deem admitted that she was uninsured and then
entered a default judgment.22
Tonya argues that Brockman’s
failure to answer the requests for admissions was essentially a
declaration against her interest,23 because Brockman was subject
to being held personally liable to Tonya or KNIC, if she did not
have insurance, and thus, it would have been better for her to
admit that she had insurance, if she did.
Further, Tonya argues
that Brockman’s silence is no different than if Brockman had
answered the admission affirmatively.
petitioner (the insurance company), the inference may
be drawn that there is in fact no insurance policy in
force which is applicable.”
Hunt, 549 S.W.2d at 847 (quoting Merchants Mutual, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 822).
22
KNIC cites Tackett v. Green, 187 Ky 49, 218 S.W. 468 (1920), and Beddow’s
Adm’r v. Barbourville Water, Ice & Light Co., 252 Ky. 267, 66 S.W.2d 821
(1933), and argues that because it and Brockman were in pari delicto, the
trial court erroneously ruled that it was liable because of Brockman’s
failure to respond to discovery. KNIC argues that where the defense
interposed by an answering defendant is not personal to himself, but common
to all, or questions the merits of the validity of the plaintiff’s cause of
action in general, or questions plaintiff’s right to sue, such defense inures
to the benefit of any defaulting defendant both in actions at law and suits
in equity, with the result that the eventual judgment must apply not merely
to the answering defendant, as appropriate, but also any defaulting
defendants.
Tonya argues that in pari delicto means “equal fault” and does not apply
to the defendants in this case. The defendants in the cases cited by KNIC
had defenses common to each other, but Tonya argues that KNIC and Brockman
had adverse interests, as evidenced by KNIC’s counterclaim. We agree with
Tonya that there is no merit to KNIC’s argument.
23
See Hunt, 549 S.W.2d at 847.
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Tonya’s argument is supported by Hunt, where the Court
held that the tortfeasor’s statement that he had no insurance,
which is the equivalent to Brockman’s admission by law in this
case, while hearsay, would be admissible as a statement against
the tortfeasor’s “pecuniary interest,” because he was
“personally liable for his tortious acts”.24
Further, “in most
jurisdictions, any type of actual unavailability . . . is
sufficient cause for the introduction of declarations against
interest . . .” [citations omitted].25
Thus, we conclude that
Tonya met her burden of proof that Brockman was uninsured, and
absent any evidence by KNIC rebutting this proof, it was proper
for the trial court to in effect grant Tonya a summary judgment
on the question of whether Brockman was uninsured.
STACKING ISSUE
“[Stacking] is a contractual issue, related solely to
construing the insurance policies involved in light of their
terms and of previous decisions of our Court related to similar
questions in uninsured motorist insurance coverage cases.”26
Interpretation of a contract or a written instrument is a matter
of law for court determination, subject to de novo review on
24
Hunt, 549 S.W.2d at 847.
25
Id.
26
Coots, 853 S.W.2d at 903.
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appeal,27 and, thus, “without deference to the interpretation
afforded by the [trial] court.”28
Thus, we give de novo review
to KNIC’s argument that the trial court misapplied the law
regarding stacking.
There are three parts to KNIC’s argument that the
trial court improperly stacked coverages in awarding Tonya
uninsured motorist benefits under the policy.
First, KNIC
argues the trial court misapplied the law to undisputed facts of
the case.
KNIC states that the trial court misunderstood KNIC’S
judicial admission that Tonya was an “insured” under the policy.
KNIC argues that its admitting Tonya was an insured was not an
admission that she was a “named insured” under the policy and
that it further qualified its admission that Tonya’s insured
status was dependent upon all terms and provisions of the
insurance policy being fulfilled.29
The policy language
establishes that an insured is not limited to a named insured,
and thus, KNIC’s admission that Tonya was insured did not
establish Tonya’s rights as those of a named insured.
27
Cantrell Supply, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 94 S.W.3d 381, 385
(Ky.App. 2002). See also Cinelli v. Ward, 997 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky.App.
1998).
28
Cinelli, 997 S.W.2d at 476.
29
The trial court stated: “Each answer (of KNIC’s admitting that Tonya was
insured under the KNIC policy) was conditioned upon all the terms and
provisions of the insurance contract being fulfilled.”
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The policy stated that “[t]hroughout this policy,
‘you’ and ‘your’ refer to:
1. The ‘named insured’ shown in the
Declarations; and 2. The spouse if a resident of the same
household.”
“Insured” is defined, in part, in the policy as (1)
“You or any ‘family member’ for the ownership, maintenance or
use of any auto or ‘trailer’”; and (2) “Any person using ‘your
covered auto.’”
“Family member” is defined under the policy as
“a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a
resident of your household.”
Kentucky law distinguishes the rights of different
insureds under an insurance policy; e.g., persons of the “first
class” and persons of the “second class.”
The first class is composed of the named
insured, the insured who bought and paid for
the protection and who has a statutory right
to reject uninsured motorist coverage, and
the members of his family residing in the
same household. The protection afforded the
first class is broad. Insureds of the first
class are protected regardless of their
location or activity from damages caused by
injury inflicted by an uninsured motorist.30
Thus, it is clear that the coverage of a “second class” insured
is limited to damages from injury inflicted by an uninsured
motorist while the second class insured is “‘occupying an
insured highway vehicle.’”31
Accordingly, to determine if the
30
Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Stanfield, 581 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Ky. 1979);
see also James v. James, 25 S.W.3d 110, 113, (Ky. 2000).
31
Id. (citing Sturdy v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 457 P.2d 34 (Kan. 1969)).
-17-
trial court properly allowed Tonya to stack uninsured motorist
coverages, this Court must determine her insured status under
the policy.
Pursuant to Stanfield, for Tonya to be a first class
insured, she must (1) be a named insured; (2) be a spouse of the
named insured who is also a resident of the same household; or
(3) be another member of the named insured’s family who is also
a resident of the same household.32
Otherwise, Tonya would be a
second class insured and she would not be allowed to stack
coverages under the policy.33
The trial court stated in its order dated October 24,
2003, that Roy was the policyholder, and thus, a first class
insured.
KNIC contends that Roy was the only named insured
under the policy and that he and Janice, his spouse who was a
resident of the same household, were the only first class
insureds under the policy.
KNIC further contends that since
Tonya was not listed as a named insured and was not a resident
of Roy’s household, but was a permissive user of a vehicle shown
on the policy, she was a second class insured.
The insurance policy of record in this case is a
“specimen” policy.
The front page of the policy contains two
32
There is no question that Tonya, as Roy’s daughter, was a member of his
family. However, it is undisputed that Tonya did not reside in the same
household as Roy, so this option does not apply.
33
Stanfield, 581 S.W.2d at 559.
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boxes – one to identify the insured and one to identify the
policy number.
are blank.
Both boxes on the specimen policy in the record
The policy does not define the term “named insured,”
but in defining “you” and “your” it states “[t]he ‘named
insured’ shown on the Declarations[.]”34
When considering the issue of an insured’s reasonable
expectations, the policy’s declarations page has “signal
importance” as it is “the one page of the policy tailored to the
particular insured and not merely boiler plate.”35
In this case,
the first page of the declaration has a place to enter “name and
address” and Roy’s name and address are listed there.
“insured” is not present.
The word
On the second page of the declaration
is the following section:
The following individuals have been
reported as drivers on this policy:
Date of
Birth
Assigned to
Auto Number
34
While “named insured” is not defined, other courts have held that the term
“named insured” refers to the person named in the declaration of the policy.
Waller v. Rocky Mountain Fire & Casualty Co., 535 P.2d 530, 534 (Or.
1975)(quoting 1 Long, Law of Liability Insurance 3-3, § 301 (1966) for the
rule that “[w]herever the description ‘named insured’ is used, only the
person named in the declarations of the policy is meant”); Adkins v. Inland
Mutual Insurance Co., 20 S.E.2d 471, 473 (W.Va. 1942) (stating that “‘named
insured’” “can apply only to the person named as the insured”); Holthe v.
Iskowitz, 197 P.2d 999, 1002 (Wash. 1948) (quoting 7 Appleman, Insurance Law
& Practice, § 4354, that “[w]henever the term ‘named insured’ is employed, it
refers only to the person specifically designated upon the face of the
contract; but whenever the unqualified term ‘insured’ is used, it includes
not only the named insured but such other persons as are protected by the
omnibus clause. The owner of an automobile is not the named insured where
another is so designated by the policy” [citations omitted]).
35
Lehrhoff v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 638 A.2d 889, 892 (N.J.Super.
1994).
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Roy S. Fletcher
Janice L. Fletcher
Tonya L. Fletcher
04/05/46
04/27/47
02/19/72
336
Since the only manner in which Tonya was listed on the policy
was as a driver for the 1998 Chevrolet S-10 pickup, KNIC argues
that under True v. Raines,37 there was no ambiguity concerning
whether she was a named insured for purposes of determining
uninsured motorist coverages under the policy.
We agree
In True, Raines was involved in an accident with True,
whose insurance coverage did not cover all of Raines’s accidentrelated expenses.
Raines, who was driving her own vehicle at
the time, was also identified on Rice’s38 automobile insurance
policy as a driver “residing in your household,”39 but Raines’s
vehicle was not a covered auto under the policy, nor was she a
named insured on the policy.
Raines sought underinsured
motorist coverage under Rice’s policy.40
Our Supreme Court
concluded “[b]ecause Rice’s policy was clear and unambiguous in
its UIM coverage, and Raines was neither a named insured nor
otherwise covered by Rice’s policy while driving her own
36
This is covered auto number 3 on the front page of the policy, which is
identified as a 1988 Chevrolet S-10 pickup. The 1995 Chevrolet Baretta is
identified as covered auto number 1.
37
99 S.W.3d 439 (Ky. 2003).
38
Raines and Rice were not married but they lived together as companions and
jointly owned the home in which they lived. Id. at 441.
39
No additional premium was charged for this listing.
40
Id. at 441.
-20-
Id.
automobile, we hold that Raines was not entitled to recover UIM
benefits under Rice’s policy.”41
Tonya argues that there are factual distinctions
between this case and True that make True inapplicable.42
However, we conclude that the factual distinctions are not
significant in determining the applicability of the holding in
True to this case.
The outcome of True did not turn on whether
Raines and Rice had separate insurance policies.
43
Further,
while Raines and Rice did not pay additional premiums for the
coverages set out in their policy, in this case KNIC argues that
41
True, 99 S.W.3d at 441.
42
Further, Tonya argues that KNIC’s argument that True lends support that the
policy in this case is not ambiguous is irrelevant because the trial court
did not find the policy ambiguous, but stated that it plainly showed Tonya
was a named insured, and thus, a person of the first class and entitled to
stacking. However, for the reasons stated above, we conclude Tonya is not a
named insured under the policy.
43
Tonya argues that she was a first class insured and that because separate
premiums were paid for each vehicle, she was entitled to stack uninsured
motorist coverages pursuant to the law in Meridian Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Siddons, 451 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1970). Siddons was the first case to permit
stacking of uninsured motorist coverages from several policies. Stanfield,
581 S.W.2d at 556. While this Court in Stanfield, made an argument similar
to Tonya’s that stacking should apply when separate premiums are paid on the
policies, the Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that this was not really
the issue.
It appears to us, however, that this rationale is
incomplete because it neglects the significant
element of the type of insured who is seeking to
stack coverages. In the case under consideration an
employee who did not pay the premium seeks to stack
coverages contained in his employer’s insurance
policy. Siddons presented a case where the named
insured who paid the premium charged sought to stack
coverages.
Stanfield, 581 S.W.2d at 556. Similarly, we conclude that Siddons does not
support Tonya’s stacking argument in this case.
-21-
the additional premiums paid for the uninsured motorist
coverages under Roy’s policy did not cover Tonya.
Tonya argues
that a critical distinction between this case and True is that
she was named as a driver under the policy but Raines was named
as a driver residing in the same household.
However, Tonya does
not provide any support for how this distinction elevates her to
a status higher than Raines under the respective policies.
One very important similarity between the two cases is
that the policy language in this case has a striking resemblance
to the language in the policy in True.
The Supreme Court in
True found no ambiguity in the policy’s terms defining those
entitled to underinsured motorist coverage.
While the language
at issue in this case concerns uninsured motorist coverage, in
all other respects it is the same.
In Coots, the Supreme Court
stated that “UIM coverage serves the same purpose and follows
the same pattern as UM coverage.
While wording of the UIM
statute is different from that of the UM statute, we can discern
no fundamentally different insurance arrangement from that
provided for under the UM statute.”44
Thus, the Supreme Court’s
analysis in True concerning underinsured coverage is also
applicable to uninsured motorist coverage.
The Supreme Court in True stated that the “only
connection” Raines had “to Rice’s policy is her listing on the
44
Coots, 853 S.W.2d at 898.
-22-
policy’s declarations page as a driver of his covered
automobile.”45
Raines argued to the Supreme Court that since she
was listed as a driver but the term “driver” was not defined or
explained in the policy, this omission created an ambiguity that
implicates the reasonable expectations doctrine.
The Supreme
Court disagreed and concluded “that the policy’s failure to
define ‘driver’ does not constitute an ambiguity that reasonably
permits Raines’s interpretation of the policy’s coverage.”46
Further, the Supreme Court indicated that a purpose for naming
designated drivers on policy declaration pages is to eliminate
“potential disputes as to whether the driver’s use was
permissive, so as to obligate the insurer to provide liability
coverage under the policy in the event that person subsequently
is involved in an accident in the insured vehicle.”47
We agree
with KNIC that pursuant to True a listed or reported driver is
not entitled to stack uninsured motorist coverages, and thus,
Tonya is only entitled to the uninsured motorist coverage on the
vehicle she was driving at the time of the accident.
Tonya also claims that she is entitled to stack
coverages under the policy because she paid part of the policy
45
True, 99 S.W.3d 444.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 445.
-23-
premium.48
Tonya testified that since she and Roy jointly owned
the 1995 Chevrolet Baretta and since she paid her proportional
share of the policy premium, she expected to receive full and
complete benefits under the policy.
However, since Tonya is not
a named insured and is only listed as a driver, pursuant to True
the policy is unambiguous.
Thus, Tonya’s reasonable
expectations are not relevant.49
KNIC’s final argument regarding stacking is based on
an insufficient opportunity to be heard on insurance issues
after trial.
It argues that it raised issues regarding coverage
prior to voir dire, but was ordered to argue these issues at a
later hearing.
We conclude that Tonya’s intent to stack was not
apparent until the day of trial and that Tonya’s counsel agreed
that any stacking arguments would be reserved for a later date.
Thus, KNIC was entitled to a hearing regarding the stacking
coverages.
However, based on the applicability of True to this
case, it is unnecessary to remand the case to the trial court,
as we have concluded as a matter of law that Tonya is a second
class insured and not entitled to stacking.
48
The only proof offered that Tonya made payments on the policy or that she
owned the vehicle was not made a part of the record until April 10, 2003, and
was based on her testimony. KNIC states that prior to April 10, 2003, it did
not know that Tonya claimed to have paid a portion of the premiums, and
further, the policy did not state that Tonya was paying part of the premiums.
49
Woodson v. Manhattan Life Insurance Co. of New York, 743 S.W.2d 835, 839
(Ky. 1987).
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm that portion of
the Jefferson Circuit Court’s order finding Brockman was an
uninsured motorist, and we reverse that portion of the trial
court’s order denying KNIC’s motion for summary judgment, which
allowed Tonya to stack uninsured motorist coverages under the
policy and awarded her a judgment against KNIC in an amount in
excess of $50,000.00, as Tonya as a matter of law is a second
class insured and thus not entitled to stack coverages under the
policy.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
William Clifton Travis
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth L. Sales
Paul J. Kelley
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth L. Sales
Louisville, Kentucky
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