NOAH RANDAL AMBURGEY , DIVISION III v. VANESSA MAE SLONE AMBURGEY
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RENDERED: April 15, 2005; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002535-MR
NOAH RANDAL AMBURGEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT, DIVISION III
HONORABLE JULIE M. PAXTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00583
VANESSA MAE SLONE AMBURGEY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
BARBER AND JOHNSON, JUDGES; AND HUDDLESTON, SENIOR
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellant Noah Amburgey appeals a ruling of the
Floyd Circuit Court denying his motion to enforce terms of the
parties’ decree of dissolution.
We affirm the trial court’s
rulings.
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
Noah claims that Appellee Vanessa Mae Slone Amburgey
induced him into signing a “Waiver and Agreement” on June 7,
2002.
The terms of the document gave Vanessa the very limited
equity in the marital residence, the household furnishings, one
vehicle, half of Noah’s Social Security back pay award, and all
her personal belongings.
Noah was relieved of the substantial
debt remaining on the residence and was granted his personal
property and one vehicle.
The Waiver and Agreement states at
paragraph 10, “the parties agree and acknowledge that they make
no claims to any property or items in the other’s possession and
state that each has in his or her possession those items
belonging to them.”
The Agreement was signed and filed by the
parties.
A Petition for Dissolution was filed on June 10, 2002.
A Decree of Dissolution was entered on June 21, 2002.
The
Decree of Dissolution adopted the terms of the Agreement signed
by the parties on June 7, 2002 which stated that the parties
already had their own property in their possession and that no
further issues remained to be resolved.
Noah filed a timely motion seeking to nullify the
waiver and agreement, and to amend, alter or vacate the decree
of dissolution.
The motion was made on the grounds that he was
functionally illiterate and did not understand the true nature
of the waiver and agreement at the time he signed the document.
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Vanessa asserts that Noah is able to read.
on the motion.
A hearing was held
the hearing.
Both parties were represented by counsel during
At the hearing, counsel for Vanessa informed the
court that he had “sat them [Noah and Vanessa] down and
explained it [the property settlement agreement] to them. . . .”
Counsel stated that at no time had Noah informed him that he
couldn’t read.
The uncontroverted testimony shows that the
parties appeared to be reading the document while at the
attorney’s office.
The parties agree that Noah and Vanessa
discussed the document while at the attorney’s office after they
had reviewed it.
Noah contended that Vanessa’s attorney had not
explained the document to him, and that he did not understand
what he was agreeing to at the time he signed the agreement.
Noah claims that for this reason, the document should be set
aside.
Counsel for Noah also argued that his client had not
received the personal property he was entitled to under the
terms of the agreement, which consisted of a third automobile
and numerous tools.
Vanessa testified that at the time the
Petition for Dissolution was filed, Noah had already taken the
tools from the home.
Vanessa stated that no further personal
property belonging to Noah was in her possession.
With regard
to the third automobile which Noah was claiming Vanessa stated
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that the car was junk, that she had bought it for $400 and that
she had sold it for $1000.
The court entered an Order in
January 2003 stating:
The Court finds the agreement of the parties
to be fair and equitable and entered into by
both with full understanding. This is a
final and appealable order.
No appeal was taken by either party and no timely
motion to reconsider or set aside the order was filed.
It is
fairly settled that where a property settlement is not
manifestly unjust, the court should affirm it.
McMurry v.
McMurry, 957 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Ky.App. 1997).
In April 2003 Vanessa filed a motion to compel Noah to
pay her half of his Social Security back pay in accordance with
the Agreement.
Noah requested that the court offset that sum by
the profit Vanessa earned selling the third vehicle.
ownership of that automobile.
He claimed
Noah asserted that Vanessa had
converted the vehicle, which he claimed was worth approximately
$8,000, and had retained the money from the sale.
Vanessa
stated that the vehicle was purchased for $400, that she paid
for it, and that she sold it for $1000.
Noah also asserted that
Vanessa had failed to return other items of his personal
property.
No items were listed with specificity and the court
did not rule on Noah’s assertions.
The court denied Noah’s
request for an offset and ruled that Noah was required to
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provide Vanessa with half of his back pay.
Noah contends that
at that time, he had not yet received the Social Security award
and therefore, could not provide Vanessa with her share of the
funds.
No appeal or motion to reconsider was filed with regard
to the court’s order.
In August 2003 Vanessa filed a motion to hold Noah in
contempt for failing to pay her half of the back pay award.
Noah asserted that he had not received the back pay at that time
and permitted the court and counsel for Vanessa access to his
social security attorney so that the parties could determine
when the back pay arrived.
During the hearing, Noah asked the
court to be heard by a jury on his allegations that Vanessa had
not given him half the “stuff” in the house.
The court declined
to hear that issue as the parties were before the court only on
the motion for contempt.
It is clear that the court may not
address outside issues in a hearing on a specific motion.
Gladish v. Gladish, 741 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Ky.App. 1987).
The
court issued an order permitting Vanessa access to Noah’s Social
Security attorney so that she could obtain her share of the
funds when they became available.
Noah does not appeal the
right of Vanessa to one half of the funds.
He also did not
appeal the court’s refusal to address the property settlement
issues in the hearing.
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In October 2003 Noah filed a motion to restore his
personal property, asking for return of all property still in
Vanessa’s possession, and compensation for any property sold by
Vanessa.
The motion contended that Vanessa had never permitted
Noah to get his personal belongings from the home in which the
parties formerly resided.
A list of tools allegedly still in
Vanessa’s possession was attached to the motion.
had never previously been filed.
Such a list
During the hearing the court
held that the final and appealable order had been issued long
before, and that no further motions would be entertained.
The
court held that, with the exception of the social security
issue, the case was over.
The ruling stated that “it is ORDERED
that this matter is final except for the issue of payment by the
Respondent to the Petitioner of one-half of Respondent’s Social
Security back pay when received.”
Noah contends that there is a fifteen year statute of
limitations for enforcement of a judgment, decree or written
contract.
He alleges that Vanessa has failed to give him his
personal property that was in the home at the time of the
dissolution.
He claims that the court has power to enforce the
terms of the divorce decree.
The record shows that Vanessa
repeatedly refuted Noah’s assertion that any personal property
belonging to him remained in the home after dissolution of the
marriage.
The record also contains evidence indicating that the
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third automobile Noah claims was purchased by Vanessa, and that
she sold that automobile after the dissolution.
A settlement of property rights is to be finalized as
much as possible at the date of divorce.
S.W.2d 476, 479 (Ky.App. 1980).
Light v. Light, 599
A settlement agreement should
be reopened only in light of the most unusual circumstances.
Cawood v. Cawood, 698 S.W.2d 823, 826 (Ky. 1985).
Repeated
hearings before the trial court contained testimony showing that
the property was divided at the time of the dissolution.
The
property settlement agreement executed and filed by the parties
stated that the parties each had in their own possession any
personal property at the time the agreement was executed.
At
the time Noah finally filed his motion requesting certain items
of personal property, the divorce had been final for over a
year.
Based on the earlier evidence that the property had
previously been divided, the court declined to allow Noah to
reopen the issue.
A trial court’s ruling in a dissolution
matter is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of
review.
Hunter v. Hunter, 127 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Ky.App. 2003).
As Noah failed to show that the trial court’s ruling was clearly
erroneous, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Nathan Collins
Lackey, Kentucky
Ralph H. Stevens
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
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