JAMES NICK HARRISON v. BILL CASE, LONNIE MATLOCK, JAMES MITCHELL, JOHN THOMPSON, ROGER SOWDER, ALAM SIMS, RAYMOND CANTERBERRY, CARL JONES, CHARLES RADER, DANNY BOTTOM, JAMES MORGAN, CHARLES HOWELL, ANTHONY CLARK, DOUG SAPP, JUDITH MORRIS, CLARK TAYLOR, CAROL WILLIAMS, AND JOHN DOE(S)
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000951-MR
JAMES NICK HARRISON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DARREN W. PECKLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00027
BILL CASE, LONNIE MATLOCK,
JAMES MITCHELL, JOHN THOMPSON,
ROGER SOWDER, ALAM SIMS,
RAYMOND CANTERBERRY, CARL JONES,
CHARLES RADER, DANNY BOTTOM,
JAMES MORGAN, CHARLES HOWELL,
ANTHONY CLARK, DOUG SAPP,
JUDITH MORRIS, CLARK TAYLOR,
CAROL WILLIAMS, AND JOHN DOE(S)
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
SCHRODER, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
James Harrison appeals the trial court’s
granting of the appellees’ motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, on some counts, and for granting summary judgment
against Harrison on the remaining counts.
A detailed analysis
of Harrison’s claims confirms the trial court’s decision was not
in error, hence, we affirm.
On January 22, 1999, Harrison filed a complaint, pro
se, in the Boyle Circuit Court against various Kentucky
Department of Corrections personnel employed at the Northpoint
Training Center prison facility in Burgin, Kentucky.
The
complaint sought relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985, and 42 U.S.C. § 1986, based upon various alleged
incidents relating to disciplinary matters and to Harrison’s
treatment as an inmate of the Department of Corrections.
On
February 19, 1999, Harrison filed an amendment to the original
complaint.
The amendment sought to add additional defendants
and also alleged additional incidents in support of his original
claims.
On March, 22, 1999, the appellees filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.
On April 29, 1999, the trial court entered an order
granting the appellees’ motion to dismiss.
On May 17, 1999,
Harrison filed a “Motion to Amend Judgment and Order Pursuant to
CR 59.”
On August 3, 2001, after an appeal to this Court,1 the
trial court allowed Harrison to amend his complaint and it was
filed August 30, 2001.
1
An answer was filed October 18, 2001.
1999-CA-001613-MR.
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Harrison moved for partial summary judgment on November 26,
2001.
On December 17, 2001, appellees filed a “Motion To
Dismiss, For Summary Judgment, And Response To Plaintiff’s
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment”.
On January 2, 2002,
Harrison filed additional grounds in support of summary judgment
and a reply to appellees’ motion to dismiss and for summary
judgment.
On January 3, 2002, the trial court denied Harrison’s
request for partial summary judgment and granted the appellees’
motion to dismiss and summary judgment.
Harrison’s motion to
alter, amend, or vacate was also denied.
On appeal, Harrison contends the trial court erred in
dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim or for
summary judgment without addressing each paragraph of his
claims.
For a comprehensive understanding of this appeal, we
will describe the amended complaint, which is part of the
record.
The pro se amended complaint is typed and divided into
seventy-one numbered paragraphs (there are two paragraphs 41).
The first five paragraphs deal with jurisdiction, venue, and the
parties.
Harrison’s “Cause of Actions” begin with paragraph
six, which paragraph incorporates by reference, the actions,
inactions, intentional conduct, negligent conduct, statutory,
regulatory and constitutional violations of each appellee to
Harrison.
Paragraphs seven through fifty-five briefly described
numerous facts or allegations which Harrison contends give rise
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to his causes of action.
Paragraph fifty-six incorporates the
original complaint by reference.
Paragraph fifty-seven accuses
the appellees of harassing Harrison.
Paragraph fifty-eight
cites a number of constitutional, statutory, and regulatory
provisions which Harrison contends were violated, although there
is no cross reference between the actions or inactions of the
appellees to the law violated.
Paragraphs fifty-nine and sixty
are under “Claims” which attempts to create joint and several
liability among the appellees and includes a claim for mental
duress caused by violation of Harrison’s civil, vested,
regulatory, statutory, and constitutional rights.
A string
citation of Constitutional rights are also alleged to have been
violated, but again, without any reference to particular acts.
Paragraphs sixty-one through seventy-one are listed under
“Relief” and appear to be a demand for relief, but again, there
is no cross reference to the specific claims in paragraphs seven
through fifty-five.
The original complaint, incorporated by reference by
paragraph fifty-six, is also part of the record and covers the
same causes of action as the amended complaint, but adds a few
facts.
After reading numerous paragraphs in the amended
complaint and the complaint, we realize many paragraphs add
facts or refer to other paragraphs, which if read together,
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support a particular count or cause of action2.
Harrison’s
appellate brief takes this approach (although we recognize the
trial court did not have the benefit of this grouping).
The
appellate brief contains arguments (a) through (n) and groups
the paragraphs as if together they support a particular count,
or argument.
Therefore, below is listed the argument or count,
together with a summary of the paragraphs in the amended
complaint, referred to as “P-[_]”, and a summary of the counts
in the original complaint, referred to as “C-[_]”.
After listing both the argument and its supporting
paragraphs, we will give our analysis.
Our analysis will review
the paragraphs in the amended complaint, and the original
complaint to see if they contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .”
CR 8.01(1)(a).
conclusions.
This requirement is for facts, not just for
See Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968);
Security Trust Co. v. Dabney, 372 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1963); Bank of
Marshall County v. Boyd, 308 Ky. 742, 215 S.W.2d 850 (1948).
Where there is a claim for relief stated, we will then review
the subsequent materials (i.e. affidavits, depositions, etc.)
under CR 56.02 to see if there is a genuine issue as to material
facts and whether the moving party was entitled to a judgment as
2
See CR 10.02.
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a matter of law.
See Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service
Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991).
A. PRISON JOBS
Harrison contends KRS 197.070(1) mandates the prison
provide employment for all prisoners, including Harrison.
P-32.
Westerfield failed and/or refused Harrison a job in
violation of CPP 10.1 and other CPP’s.
P-49.
Sapp by his actions and/or inactions has failed and/or
refused to provide employment for all prisoners in the
penitentiaries as required pursuant to KRS 197.070(1).
P-52.
Morgan and Sapp have failed and/or refused to create jobs
for inmates, and/or used the available jobs to punish inmates
and/or create an informant-type system.
C-14 & C-19.
Duplicates P-49 & P-52.
KRS 197.070(1) does provide that “[t]he Department of
Corrections shall provide employment for all prisoners. . . .”
Even if we assume the prison is not providing Harrison with a
job, his claim must fail for at least two reasons.
First,
neither the amended complaint nor the original complaint joined
the Department of Corrections as a party.
The Department of
Corrections is an indispensable or necessary party under CR
19.01 in order to be able to grant Harrison’s request for
relief.
Secondly, if the Department of Corrections had been
made a party, prisoners do not acquire “rights” or standing to
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litigate this issue under this type of statute per the United
States Supreme Court.
See Sandlin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115
S.Ct. 229 3, 132 L.Ed. 2d 418 (1985).
Therefore, the trial
court did not err in dismissing this count.
B. PRISON CLOTHING
Harrison contends KRS 197.070(2) allows prisoners to
receive privately furnished clothing and the Department is
returning such clothing, contrary to the statute.
P-50.
Sapp has implemented CPP 17.1 (effective May, 2000) which
prevents Harrison from obtaining privately furnished clothing as
provided pursuant to KRS 197.070(2).
The statute imposes a requirement on the prison to
furnish uniforms, and all the usual and suitable clothing for
all state prisoners.
The private clothing exception does not
require the prison to allow private clothing but subtracts
private clothing from the state requirement of what it has to
provide.
Also, more importantly, the Department of Corrections
runs the prisons and is an indispensable party under CR 19.01,
but was not made a party.
Therefore, the trial court did not
err in dismissing this count.
C. SHAVE & CUT
Harrison contends he was shaved and given a haircut in
prison by someone not licensed as a barber in violation of KRS
317.410 et seq.
-7-
P-41.
Sims, Canterberry, and John Doe(s) threaten to use force
against Harrison and did in fact use force against Harrison in
violations of the Constitution, regulations, and CPP’s, and
without notice and/or due process, did shear the hair from
Harrison’s head and face.
P-41 & C-6.
On December 1, 1998, Canterberry and Sims did act
as licensed barbers without a barber’s license and outside of a
licensed establishment when they used tools of the barber’s
profession and/or without being medically certified when they
practiced the use of barbering to forcibly shear the hair from
Harrison’s head and face in violation of KRS 317 et seq. and
CPP.
KRS 317.420(2) requires a person practicing barbering
for the general public to obtain the appropriate license.
A
prison barber shop is not open to the general public but is a
state institution wherein the Department of Corrections sets the
standards for who can cut and shave hair.
See Commonwealth,
Board of Examiners of Psychology v. Funk, 84 S.W.3d 92 (Ky.App.
2002), for a discussion of the professional equivalents for
state institutions.
Also, the Department of Corrections was not
a party under CR 19.01.
Therefore, the trial court did not err
in dismissing this count.
D. POLYGRAPH EXAM
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Harrison complains in one paragraph that he was not
given a polygraph examination, and in the next that he was given
a polygraph examination.
He cites P-51, but that discusses
classifications discussed later.
P-29.
Sapp and Morgan arbitrarily denied Harrison’s request for
a polygraph examination, a privilege usually granted other
inmates, thus denying Harrison the same treatment, fairness and
access as other inmates similar situated.
P-53.
Sapp has implemented the use of polygraph examination
without proper authority, which is arbitrary and/or without
procedural safeguards.
Harrison does not give us enough facts under CR 8.01
to evaluate whether this is an actual controversy.
Also, KRS
197.020 allows the Department of Corrections to formulate and
prescribe all necessary regulations for discipline in the
penitentiaries, and for the government of prisoners in their
department and conduct.
Even if we had concluded this count
attacks a known regulation, the failure to make the Department
of Corrections a party under CR 19.01 was fatal, and the trial
court did not err in dismissing this count.
E. CLASSIFICATION SCORING
Harrison complains that upon incarceration in 1986, he
was given a custody score.
In 1992, there was a change in the
classification scoring which added fourteen points to his score,
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which Harrison contends is in violation of KRS 446.083(3) which
prohibits statutes from applying retroactively.
P-51.
Morris and John Doe(s) changed the classification
policies and/or applied the 1992 classification policies
retroactively and in violation of KRS 446.080(3), which has
increased Harrison’s custody score by adding an additional
fourteen points.
Harrison is misreading the statute.
KRS 446.083(3) is
a rule of construction which does not forbid statutes from being
retroactive, but as a rule of construction, statutes shall not
“be retroactive, unless expressly so declared.”
Also, prisoners
have no constitutional right to a particular security
classification.
Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 97 S. Ct. 274,
50 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1976).
Even if Harrison had a claim under
this count, the statute of limitations, KRS 413.120, would bar
or extinguish the claim.
Therefore, the trial court did not err
in dismissing this count.
F. RING CONVERSION
Harrison contends that two prison employees converted
or illegally confiscated a gold ring of his.
P-7.
On November 17, 1998, Bill Case and Lonnie Matlock
confiscated Harrison’s gold signet ring and failed to return the
ring.
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P-8.
Doug Sapp and James Morgan failed to direct their
subordinates to return Harrison’s ring.
P-22.
John Doe(s) gave false and misleading information
concerning Harrison’s ring and caused the confiscation of the
gold signet ring.
On first blush, P-7 does appear to present a claim
under CR 8.01.
However, as the amended complaint reveals, the
ring was not kept by the employees but confiscated and
introduced into evidence in a disciplinary proceeding.
Ownership of the ring will depend on the outcome of the
disciplinary proceeding, and be determined therein.
Possession
of the ring is with the Department of Corrections, not the two
employees that confiscated, not converted, the ring.
Therefore,
the trial court did not err in dismissing this count.
G. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
Harrison contends the use of confidential informants
in prison is limited to use before an adjustment committee or
classification committee.
P-23.
John Doe(s) and/or misleading information was used
against Harrison on or about January, 1999, for the purpose of
classification and/or transfer in violation of CPP 9.18.
-11-
P-24.
Charles Howell used confidential information against
Harrison during the December disciplinary hearing on the offense
referred to in paragraph 15 knowing he was without authority to
use such information pursuant to CPP 9.18.
P-40.
Morris, Clark, Taylor, Morgan, and Sapp failed and/or
refused to adequately investigate the claims and the complaints
submitted to them about the other appellees’ abuse, harassment,
and unfair treatments directed toward Harrison.
P-43.
Morgan and Howell violated CPP 9.18 by using or
permitting to be used confidential informant information by a
hearing officer and/or by using staff as the source of
confidential informant information.
C-18.
Doug Sapp permitted the illegal use of informants to
allow the other appellees to confiscate the ring.
Again, the Department of Corrections was not made a
party under CR 19.01 which would be necessary if we were to
prohibit the use of informants.
Also, in Gilhaus v. Wilson, 734
S.W.2d 808 (Ky.App. 1987), this Court recognized the legitimate
institutional needs of assuring safety and control of inmates,
preserving the disciplinary process, and the use of informants.
On keeping the informants confidential, we said: “Revealing the
names of informants could lead to the death or serious injury of
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some or all of them. . . .”
Id. at 810.
This Kentucky rule of
law allows the use of informants as long as the prison provides
a method of keeping the informant’s identity confidential, while
assuring the inmates that the information is reliable.
Id.
Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed this count.
H. DISCIPLINARY APPEAL (over the ring)
This count involves the gold ring discussed earlier in
“F.”
P-15.
On December 10, 1998, Bill Case issued a disciplinary
report charging Harrison with a category 4 Item-14 infraction
knowing it was false and/or not based on reliable evidence.
C-7.
Unauthorized Transfer of Property.
Case states in the
disciplinary report as follows:
“During the course of an investigation, I
received reliable information (sic) IM John
Carter, #084380 was attempting to sell a
ring discribed (sic) as being gold in color
with seven (7) white stones surrounded by
twelve (12) blue stones. The ring in
question was on IM Carter’s property list
dated 6-13-97 and 7-4-96 (sic) IM Carter
was placed in SMU on 11-18-98 (sic) at which
time he did not have possession of the ring.
On 11-17-98 (sic) I received information
that the ring was in the possession of IM
James Harrison, #095435. IM Harrison could
not provide documentation as being the owner
of the ring nor was this type ring described
on any of his forms at R & D. To provide
any additional information would reveal the
identity of the source of the confidential
information. The description of the
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incident is sufficient to serve as the
inmates (sic) summary of the confidential
information to be used at the adjustment
hearing. All information forwarded to the
adjustment Officer for his review and
determination of reliability. Investigation
is still on going (sic).”
P-16.
Bill Case withheld exculpatory evidence and added
unverified statements in the disciplinary report and threatened
Harrison’s assigned legal aide and witnesses with disciplinary
actions if they assisted in Harrison’s defense.
C-11.
Adds Charles Rader, and Carl Jones to P-16 and says this
occurred between November 17, 1998, through December 17, 1998.
P-17.
Danny Bottom, as supervisor in paragraph 15 above, failed
and/or refused to conduct any type of investigation.
C-9.
P-18.
Adds December 10, 1998, to P-17.
Roger Sowder, in charge of the investigator’s review
referred to in paragraph 15 above, failed and/or refused to
collect evidence, knowing that the disciplinary report was
false.
C-10.
Adds the date, December 12, 1998, to P-18.
P-19.
Morgan, Howell, Sowder, and Jones’ blanket policies of
denying witnesses to inmates in segregation denied Harrison due
process and a right to present a defense.
C-8.
Case and Matlock used detention orders, segregation, and
informants to win.
-14-
P-20.
Rader, Jones, and Case interfered with Harrison’s
attempts to have witnesses and prepare a defense for charge
alleged in paragraphs 14 and 15.
P-21.
On December 17, 1998, Charles Howell, the hearing officer
hearing the charge referred to in paragraph 15, found Harrison
guilty, knowing it was false.
C-3.
P-33.
Duplicative of P-21.
Morgan, Morris, and Sapp failed and/or refused to
investigate the facts and circumstances raised in each of
Harrison’s administrative appeals, grievances, and/or complaints
about the hearing officer’s decisions, classification decisions,
and/or about improper segregation time.
P-40.
Morris, Clark, Taylor, Morgan, and Sapp failed and/or
refused to adequately investigate the claims and the complaints
submitted and/or designated to them about the other appellees’
abuse, harassment, and unfair treatments directed toward
Harrison.
P-47.
Howell denied Harrison adequate findings of fact, and
other due process raised in Harrison’s administrative appeal on
the Category 4 item-15 disciplinary report mentioned in
paragraph 15 above and in violations of CPP 15.6 and CPP 9.18.
P-55.
Bill Case violated Harrison’s right for a fair and
impartial disciplinary hearing over the offense in paragraph 15
above, by: 1) withholding evidence, exculpatory and otherwise
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statements; 2) by threatening Plaintiff’s legal aide and other
legal aides gaining and confirming information for a defense; 3)
by making conclusions and/or allegation as to Harrison’s ring
and/or the ring mentioned by alleged informants; 4) by bringing
a false disciplinary report against Harrison, and 5) by
interfering with obtaining statements from other witnesses such
as Marion Buris, who could have verified allegations concerning
Harrison’s ring.
It is obvious to this Court that in this count, and in
“M”, that Harrison is trying to appeal the disciplinary action
involving the gold ring.
Appeals from disciplinary actions must
be filed in the circuit court within one year of the
institutions final action.
See Million v. Raymer, 139 S.W.3d
914 (Ky. 2004); and KRS 413.140.
With our Court’s earlier
ruling that the trial court should have filed the tendered
amended complaint, the amended filing relates back to the time
tendered (May 17, 1999), and thus the appeal was timely.
“While
technically original actions, these inmate petitions share many
of the aspects of appeals.
They invoke the circuit court’s
authority to act as a court of review.”
S.W.2d 353, 355 (Ky.App. 1997).
Smith v. O’Dea, 939
As a court of review, the
circuit court reviews the administrative agency’s decision for
error, not de novo.
In Harrison’s case, the circuit court
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granted summary judgment.
O’Dea sets the standard for summary
judgment in disciplinary proceedings.
In these circumstances we believe summary
judgment for the Corrections Department is
proper if and only if the inmate’s petition
and any supporting materials, construed in
light of the entire agency record
(including, if submitted, administrators’
affidavits describing the context of their
acts or decisions), does not raise specific,
genuine issues of material fact sufficient
to overcome the presumption of agency
propriety, and the Department is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. The court must
be sensitive to the possibility of prison
abuses and not dismiss legitimate petitions
merely because of unskilled presentations.
Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235 (5th
Cir.1989). However, it must also be free to
respond expeditiously to meritless
petitions. By requiring inmates to plead
with a fairly high degree of factual
specificity and by reading their allegations
in light of the full agency record, courts
will be better able to perform both aspects
of this task. Id. at 356.
Applying this standard, we are considering the
arguments in “M” here with “H” because they both cover the
disciplinary action over the gold ring.
The United States
Supreme Court has instructed us that if “some evidence” exists
which supports the decision arrived at by the prison
disciplinary body, the circuit court may not disturb that
decision on appeal.
Superintendent Massachusetts Correctional
Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 86
L. Ed. 2d 356 (1985).
Our reading of the record supports the
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circuit court’s grant of summary judgment affirming the
disciplinary action of the Department of Corrections over the
ring.
To summarize a lengthy record, the Department received
information that another inmate’s ring ended up with Harrison’s
property.
After the confidential informant’s information was
taken, an investigation was conducted which revealed John
Carter, inmate no. 084380, had in his property list, a gold ring
with seven white stones surrounded by twelve blue stones.
Harrison was found to have an identical ring which was not so
described on his property list.
Carter’s explanation as to what
happened to this ring (placed it on his father’s hand at his
funeral) was shown by the guard accompanying Carter to not have
happened.
Harrison’s explanation as to how he came into
possession of the ring was also questionable (Receipt dated 122-98 for the “Underground Jewelry & Repair” from Richmond, Ky.,
indicated Charley Harrison purchased in May of 97, a gold Ky.
Cluster style ring, size 11, saphire (sic) & dimond (sic)
stones, paid cash).
His property list from that time lists
simply three gold rings, no further explanation.
We believe the
record below contains “some evidence” to comply with Smith v.
O’Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353 (Ky.App. 1997) and therefore we affirm the
circuit court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing Harrison’s
disciplinary appeal.
I. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING (covering the shave and cut)
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Harrison was upset that he was punished for not
cutting his hair and not shaving.
The issue of barber licensing
was disposed of in “C” above and will not be considered part of
this count.
“I”, “J”, and “L” all deal with his infraction,
forced cut, disciplinary proceeding, and punishment.
P-11 & C-3.
On November 27, 1998, John Thompson issued Part I
of a disciplinary report charging Harrison with a category 3
Item-2 infraction knowing that it was false and/or not based on
reliable evidence.
P-12 & C-4.
Anthony Clark, in charge of the supervisor’s review
of disciplinary report referred to in paragraph 11 above, failed
and/or refused to conduct any type of investigation to determine
if the disciplinary report contained all pertinent data as
required by CPP 15.6.
P-13 & C-5.
On November 28, 1998, Roger Sowder, in charge of
the investigator’s review of the disciplinary infraction
referred to in paragraph 11 above, failed and/or refused to
conduct any investigation, collect any evidence, documents, or
statements on Harrison’s behalf as required by CPP 15.6 and
charged Harrison with an offense knowing it was false and/or not
based on reliable evidence as required pursuant to CPP 15.6.
P-14 & C-12.
Carl Jones, while acting as the adjustment hearing
officer on December 17, 1998, hearing the charge against
Harrison referred to in paragraph 11 above, found Harrison
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guilty of the offense, knowing that the disciplinary report was
false and/or not based on reliable evidence and/or knowing
Harrison was not given notice that his conduct violated any
procedures and/or knowing the procedures were flawed and/or
contrary to established procedures.
P-33.
Morgan, Morris, and Sapp failed and/or refused to
investigate the facts and circumstances raised in each of
Harrison’s administrative appeals, grievances, and/or complaints
about the hearing officer’s decisions, classification decisions,
and/or about improper segregation time.
P-40.
Morris, Clark, Taylor, Morgan, and Sapp failed and/or
refused to adequately investigate the claims and the complaints
submitted and/or designated to them about the other appellees’
abuse, harassment, and unfair treatments directed toward
Harrison.
P-54 & C-15.
Morgan implemented NTC policy 12-01-07 without the
approval of LRC and/or following KRS 13A et seq., which
conflicted with other policies and statutes, and violated
Harrison’s rights to be free from the use of force and the right
of expression.
Harrison has been in prison for a very long time.
prison has a policy against long hair and beards.
told to get a shave and cut.
He did not.
still refused to get a shave and cut.
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The
Harrison was
He was punished and
It was cut for him,
albeit by force.
Harrison was incensed and complains in “I”,
“J”, and “L” that he was disciplined and forced to comply with
the prison rules.
lost.
He appealed his disciplinary proceeding and
On appeal to the circuit court, Harrison complained that
the charges against him were false, that the appellees never
investigated the charges fully, used force, and didn’t give him
a fair shake below.
All the allegations are conclusory.
There
are no facts in his amended complaint or complaint which support
his accusations.
The circuit court found:
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he has
been deprived of any right secured by the
constitutional amendments that he claims
have been violated. He has demonstrated no
violation of his procedural due process
rights under the Federal Fourteenth
Amendment. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).
He has not indicated what penalty was
imposed in connection with the disciplinary
proceedings to which he was subject, and,
therefore, has not demonstrated a loss of a
federally protected liberty interest.
Confinement in administrative segregation
does not represent a deprivation of a
liberty interest. Sandin v. Conner, 115
S.Ct. 2293, (1995). Neither has he made any
showing of conduct on the part of the
defendants “so reprehensible as to ‘shock
the conscience’ of the Court.” Rimmer-Bey
v. Brown, 62 F.3d. 789, 790 n.4 (6th
Cir.1995).
We agree with the circuit court.
Harrison does not
present us with sufficient facts under CR 8.01.
there is no issue of fact.
Therefore,
Clearly there is no issue of law on
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the facts given.
Harrison does not like the outcome but gave
the circuit court no legal reason to reverse.
Therefore, the
circuit court did not err in dismissing this count.
J. DISCIPLINARY SEGREGATION
Harrison contends he was held in segregation
consecutively while he should have been held on concurrent
punishments.
The rest of his argument in “J” is discussed in
“I”.
P-33.
Morgan, Morris, and Sapp failed and/or refused to
investigate the facts and circumstances raised in each of
Harrison’s administrative appeals, grievances, and/or complaints
about the hearing officer’s decisions, classification decisions,
and/or about improper segregation time.
P-36.
Morgan and Sims continued to hold Harrison in the
segregation unit after January 18, 1999, once Harrison’s
disciplinary segregation sentence expired without providing
Harrison reasons and/or due process.
P-37.
Sims increased Harrison’s sentence and number of days in
disciplinary segregation from forty-five to sixty days without
notice and/or due process in violation of CPP 15.6 and contrary
to the instructions set out in Part-II of the disciplinary
report and final hearing of December 17, 1998, which gave
Harrison credit for time served.
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P-40.
Morris, Clark, Taylor, Morgan, and Sapp failed and/or
refused to adequately investigate the claims and the complaints
submitted and/or assigned to them about the other appellees’
abuse, harassment, and unfair treatments directed toward
Harrison.
P-46.
Sims, Morgan, and Sapp denied Harrison due process by
holding him in a segregation unit without reason, violating CPP
10.2 and CPP 18 et seq.
P-48.
Sims falsified documents in an attempt to justify holding
Harrison in a segregation unit after the expiration date on his
ordered disciplinary segregation sentence.
Harrison is wrong, again.
The record does contain the
disciplinary actions Harrison is referring to.
The discipline
for the unauthorized transfer of property (the gold ring)
resulted in disciplinary segregation for forty-five days.
The
incident involving the haircut and shave resulted in another
fifteen days disciplinary segregation.
There is nothing in
either decision from the hearing/appeal that indicates the time
is to be served concurrently.
He was given credit for time
served (CRTS), but that is factually different from time to be
served concurrently.
Therefore, the circuit court did not err
in dismissing this count.
K. CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION
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Harrison contends he was improperly reclassified by a
classification committee.
P-33.
Morgan, Morris, and Sapp failed and/or refused to
investigate the facts and circumstances raised in each of
Harrison’s administrative appeals, grievances, and/or complaints
about the hearing officer’s decisions, classification decisions,
and/or about improper segregation time.
P-34.
Sims and Canterberry held a classification hearing on or
about January 13, 1999, without providing Harrison notice and/or
due process as required pursuant to CPP 18.1.
P-35.
Sims and Canterberry failed and/or refused to provide the
general nature of the alleged confidential informants’
information before or during the January 13, 1999,
classification hearing in violation on CPP 9.18.
P-40.
Morris, Clark, Taylor, Morgan, and Sapp failed and/or
refused to adequately investigate the claims and the complaints
submitted and/or assigned to them about the other appellees’
abuse, harassment, and unfair treatments directed toward
Harrison.
P-44.
Judith Morris, Carol Williams, James Morgan, and Clark
Taylor failed and/or refused to properly investigate complaints
made by Harrison and they failed and/or refused to house
Harrison in the least restrictive environment pursuant to
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Chapter CPP 18 et seq. and they failed and/or refused to ensure
that CPP’s were followed.
P-45.
Sims and Canterberry empanelled a classification
committee and had a hearing without providing notice and/or
other due process when they conducted such hearing in order to
transfer Harrison, and their actions were in violation of CPP
18.1.
P-46.
Sims, Morgan, and Sapp denied Harrison due process by
holding him in a segregation unit without reason, violating CPP
10.2 and CPP 18 et seq.
The reclassification is alleged to have occurred as a
result of Harrison’s disciplinary action already discussed in
“I”.
Having affirmed the disciplinary action taken in “I”, the
argument in “K” becomes moot.
Even if Harrison’s only complaint
is the severity of punishment, to include reclassification, he
would lose because decisions as to the custody level and the
institution the inmate is to be housed do not trigger any
liberty interests that require due process protections.
Newell
v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880-887 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 842, 114 S. Ct. 127, 126 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1993); Mahoney v.
Carter, Ky., 938 S.W.2d 575 (1997).
Therefore, we still believe
the circuit court did not err in “I”.
L. DETENTION ORDER (November 17, 1998)
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Harrison contends he was given a detention order and
placed in segregation on November 17, 1998, without notice as to
why.
P-9.
On August 14, 1998, and November 18, 1998, Lonnie Matlock
issued detention orders placing Harrison in administrative
segregation without providing sufficient notice to Harrison to
articulate a response for a defense or appeal purposes, which
denied due process.
C-1.
Duplicate of P-9.
P-10.
On August 16, 1998, and November 18, 1998, James
Mitchell, Deputy Warden, approved Harrison’s placement in
administrative segregation, knowing that the detention order was
not adequate, false and/or based on unreliable evidence.
C-2
Duplicate of P-10.
P-33.
Morgan, Morris, and Sapp failed and/or refused to
investigate the facts and circumstances raised in each of
Harrison’s administrative appeals, grievances, and/or complaints
about the hearing officer’s decisions, classification decisions,
and/or about improper segregation time.
This argument relates back to the shave and haircut
discussed in “I”.
The arguments were fully discussed therein.
M. DUE PROCESS
Harrison contends his rights were violated, the
proceedings arbitrary, and his punishment disproportionate as
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that given to other inmates.
This court refers back to the
December 10, 1998, disciplinary action over the gold ring,
discussed in “H” above.
P-20.
Rader, Jones, and Case interfered with Harrison’s
attempts to have witnesses and prepare a defense for charge
alleged in paragraphs 14 and 15.
P-25.
On March 10, 1999, Bill Case issued Part-I disciplinary
report against Harrison for a category 5 Item-4, knowing it to
be false and/or not based on reliable evidence.
P-26.
Bill Case’s action in paragraph 25 above, was for the
sole purpose of harassing Harrison and causing conflicts between
other inmates.
P-27.
Case interfered with Harrison’s private communication and
denied Harrison’s first amendment right of expression by
violating CPP 16.1 in prohibiting the processing of Harrison’s
mail.
P-28.
Case violated Harrison’s right to privacy when Case
issued a disciplinary report to other inmates, giving them
copies of Harrison’s letter(s), which included family members’
addresses.
P-30.
Howell, Morgan, Sapp, and Sims, arbitrarily imposed
disciplinary punishment on Harrison that was disproportionate to
other similarly situated inmates.
-27-
P-33.
Morgan, Morris, and Sapp failed and/or refused to
investigate the facts and circumstances raised in each of
Harrison’s administrative appeals, grievances, and/or complaints
about the hearing officer’s decisions, classification decisions,
and/or about improper segregation time.
P-38.
Sims issued Harrison a disciplinary report for a major
rule infraction of destroying state property, knowing it was
false and not based on reliable evidence.
P-39.
Rader issued Harrison a disciplinary report for a major
rule infraction to obtain goods under false pretenses, knowing
it was false and not based on reliable evidence.
P-40.
Morris, Clark, Taylor, Morgan, and Sapp failed and/or
refused to adequately investigate the claims and the complaints
submitted and/or assigned to them about the other appellees’
abuse, harassment, and unfair treatments directed toward
Harrison.
P-44.
Judith Morris, Carol Williams, James Morgan, and Clark
Taylor failed and/or refused to properly investigate complaints
made by Harrison and they failed and/or refused to house
Harrison in the least restrictive environment pursuant to
Chapter CPP 18 et seq. and they failed and/or refused to ensure
that CPP’s were followed.
The issues in the disciplinary action relating to the
gold ring were considered in argument “M” and disposed of
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therein.
P-27 and P-28 do not contain facts, merely
conclusions.
We do not know if they add an issue to the
disciplinary appeal.
Therefore, the circuit court did not err
in dismissing this count.
N. VENUE
Harrison contends the Boyle Circuit Court dismissed
part of his complaint because it was not in the proper venue.
His argument does not indicate which counts or causes of actions
or claims he is referring to or where they should be, or why.
A
reading of the order dismissing his suit does not discuss venue
except to mention that Harrison has sued the appellees for the
same basis in multiple forums.
In reviewing Harrison’s “arguments” in his brief to
this Court, we note that paragraphs 17, 31, 42, and 57 of the
amended complaint are not discussed, nor is C-16 of the original
complaint.
We will consider those accusations abandoned without
further comment.
For the foregoing reason, the order of Dismissal of
the Boyle Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James Nick Harrison, Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Rebecca Baylous
Justice and Public Safety
Cabinet
Frankfort, Kentucky
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