CHARLES GEVEDEN, REPRESENTATIVE; STEVE NUNN, REPRESENTATIVE; JIM WAYNE, REPRESENTATIVE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, ex rel. ERNIE FLETCHER, ET AL.
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RENDERED:
September 3, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2004-CA-001588-I
CHARLES GEVEDEN, REPRESENTATIVE;
STEVE NUNN, REPRESENTATIVE;
JIM WAYNE, REPRESENTATIVE
v.
MOVANTS
ON MOTION FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO CR 65.07
FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00719
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR,
ex rel. ERNIE FLETCHER, ET AL.
RESPONDENTS
OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING RELIEF UNDER CR 65.07
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, JOHNSON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
On April 13, 2004, the General Assembly adjourned
its regular session without having enacted an omnibus
appropriation for the Executive Branch of Kentucky’s government.
Anticipating the Governor’s assertion of emergency spending
powers, the Attorney General, on May 27, 2004, petitioned the
Franklin Circuit Court for a declaration of rights establishing
the limits of any such executive authority.
Resolution of that
petition is proceeding in the circuit court.
On June 28, 2004, the Governor promulgated Executive
Order 2004-650, in which he declared a state of emergency and
asserted authority under Sections 69 and 81 of our state
constitution “to cause the expenditure from the State Treasury
of such available funds as may be necessary for the operation of
government and the execution of the laws of the Commonwealth by
the Executive Branch.”
The executive order purports to
authorize the Secretary of the Finance and Administration
Cabinet to issue warrants “for the payment of all claims as may
be made by the Executive Branch of government” under a so-called
Public Services Continuation Plan, the Governor’s outline of
Executive Branch functions during the state of emergency.
On
June 30, 2004, the Franklin Circuit Court ordered that the
Governor’s plan be implemented for the first quarter of fiscal
year 2004-2005; that is from July 1, 2004, through September 30,
2004.
No relief has been sought to this Court from that order.
On July 1, 2004, State Representatives Charles
Geveden, Steve Nunn, and Jim Wayne intervened in the Attorney
General’s suit, and on July 7, 2004, they moved the circuit
court for an order enjoining the Governor to call the General
Assembly into Extraordinary Session.
By order entered July 20,
2004, the circuit court denied the motion.
2
The representatives
thereupon sought interlocutory relief in this Court pursuant to
CR 65.07.
As the parties note, an injunction is an extraordinary
remedy not to be granted unless the movant establishes both that
without it he is likely to suffer the immediate and irreparable
abrogation of a concrete personal right and that grant of the
injunction will not unduly prejudice either the public or the
non-movant.1
The propriety of injunctive relief is entrusted to
the trial court’s discretion; this Court will disturb the trial
court’s decision only if that discretion has been abused.2
The representatives contend, in effect, that they have
a right to be called into Extraordinary Session because that is
a necessary step in ending what they characterize as the
Executive Branch’s unlawful expenditure of unappropriated state
funds.
They note that Section 230 of the Kentucky Constitution
provides in part that “[n]o money shall be drawn from the State
Treasury, except in pursuance of appropriations made by law.”
Executive Order 2004-650, they insist, violates this section.
The violation may be remedied, the representatives argue, only
by the General Assembly’s passage of an appropriations bill, and
such a bill requires that the legislature be called into
session.
Hence, they claim, the Governor must be compelled to
1
Maupin v. Stansbury, Ky. App., 575 S.W.2d 695 (1978).
2
Id.
3
convene the legislature to address Executive Branch
appropriations.
We are not persuaded that the representatives
have the right to an Extraordinary Session that they assert.
Sections 27 and 28 of our state constitution provide
that the government of the Commonwealth is divided into three
departments or branches--executive, legislative and judicial-and that “[n]o person or collection of persons, being of one of
those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging
to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter
expressly directed or permitted.”
As the parties are well
aware, this separation-of-powers principle is a cornerstone of
our form of government.
Our courts are to be ever on guard
against its erosion.3
Whether to summon an Extraordinary Session of the
General Assembly and what matters are to be addressed at such a
session are questions entrusted to the discretion of the
Governor under Section 80 of our state constitution.4
We do not
agree with the representatives that Section 230 implies or
necessitates an exception to the separation of powers doctrine
that would permit a court to interfere with the Governor’s
3
Legislative Research Commission v. Brown, Ky., 664 S.W.2d 907
(1984).
4
Royster v. Brock, 258 Ky. 146, 79 S.W.2d 707 (1935). Section
80 of the Kentucky Constitution provides in part that “[h]e [the
Governor] may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the General
Assembly at the seat of government[.]”
4
exercise of this discretion.5
Although the General Assembly’s
failure to enact an Executive Branch budget has raised serious
questions about the meaning of Section 230, the situation does
not require us to jettison settled and basic constitutional
principles.
There being no authority for the relief the
representatives seek, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied their motion to compel the Governor to
call an Extraordinary Session.
Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that the motion for relief
under CR 65.07 be, and hereby is, DENIED.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION IN
WHICH DYCHE, JUDGE, ALSO JOINS.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURRING:
I concur with the
Majority Opinion, but choose to write separately to express my
opinion concerning the Governor’s discretion in not calling an
Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly.
In my opinion,
the authority given to the Governor by Section 80 of the
Kentucky Constitution permits the exercise of a political power
and a discretionary power that is not subject to judicial
review.
5
Traynor v. Beckham, 116 Ky. 13, 22, 74 S.W. 1105, 1107 (1903).
5
The movants argue that “in these unique circumstances,
the calling of a special session is converted from a
discretionary act that lies wholly within the Governor’s
political discretion, to a mandatory constitutional duty, which
the courts can and should enforce.”
But, in Traynor v. Beckham,6
the former Court of Appeals stated that “[a]ll courts agree that
a mandamus will not lie against a Governor to compel the
exercise of governmental, political, or discretionary powers.”
Further, in Page, Second Auditor v. Hardin,7 the Court stated
that “[w]here, by the Constitution or the law, the Governor has
a discretionary power, or where on any ground, his act is made
conclusive as to all rights involved, it is of course not within
the province of a Court to inquire into the propriety or
impropriety of the act.”
The Court noted that “when the supreme
executive is vested with a discretion, his decision is final.
The question whether the discretion is conferred and exists, is
a judicial question.”
Clearly, Section 80 provides that the
Governor “may,8 on extraordinary occasions, convene the General
6
116 Ky. 13, 22, 74 S.W. 1105, 1107 (1903).
7
47 Ky. 648, 656 (1848). See also 52 Am.Jur.2d Mandamus § 108
(2004) (noting that where “duties necessarily involv[e] the
exercise of official judgment and discretion, the doctrine is
uncontroverted that mandamus will not lie to control or compel
his action”).
8
“‘May’ is permissive[.]”
446.010(20).
Kentucky Revised Statutes
6
Assembly at the seat of government[.]”
The people’s granting
the Governor discretion in performing this act could not be
stated more clearly.
Thus, the movants’ argument that the
General Assembly’s failure to enact a budget eliminated the
Governor’s discretion in not calling an Extraordinary Session is
without merit.
ENTERED:__September 3, 2004__
__/s/ ____Wm._L. Knopf______
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
PLEADINGS FOR MOVANTS:
PLEADINGS FOR RESPONDENTS:
Walter A. Baker
Glasgow, KY
Sheryl G. Snyder
Jason P. Renzelmann
Frost Brown Todd LLC
Louisville, KY
Phillip J. Shepherd
Frankfort, KY
John C. Roach
General Counsel
Office of the Governor
Frankfort, KY
ORAL ARGUMENTS FOR MOVANTS:
Phillip J. Shepherd
Frankfort, KY
ORAL ARGUMENTS FOR
RESPONDENTS:
Sheryl G. Snyder
Louisville, KY
7
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