HATONYA KENDRICK v. TOYOTA; WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUNDS; HON. BONNIE KITTINGER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
September 17, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-001115-WC
HATONYA KENDRICK
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-95-07370
TOYOTA; WORKERS' COMPENSATION
FUNDS; HON. BONNIE KITTINGER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, TACKETT, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
Hatonya Kendrick (hereinafter “Kendrick”) has
petitioned this Court for review of the decision of the Workers’
Compensation Board (hereinafter “the Board”), which affirmed the
April 26 and May 29, 2002, orders of the Chief Administrative
Law Judge that declined to extend the four-year reopening
limitation contained in KRS 342.125(3).
In her petition,
Kendrick asserts that Toyota’s post-award voluntary payment of
temporary total disability benefits extended the four-year
limitation period, or, in the alternative, that the payment
served as a waiver/estoppel as to the requirements of KRS
342.125(3).
We affirm.
In Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d
685 (1992), the Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed its role and
that of this Court in reviewing decisions in workers’
compensation actions.
“The function of further review of the
WCB in the Court of Appeals is to correct the Board only where
the [] Court perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued
controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in
assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice.”
Id. at 687-88.
In the present matter, we have determined that
the Board did not overlook or misconstrue any controlling
authority or commit any error in assessing the evidence.
Further, because we cannot improve upon the Board’s excellent
opinion, we shall adopt the opinion authored by Board Member
Gardner as our own:1
The only issue raised by Hatonya
Kendrick (“Kendrick”) on appeal is whether
the payment of temporary total disability
(“TTD”) benefits extends the four-year
reopening limitation of KRS 342.125(3).
The facts and procedures necessary to
determine the issue on appeal are limited.
By opinion and award rendered August 11,
1
Although the Board relies upon an earlier, unpublished opinion of this
Court, which cannot be cited as authority, we nevertheless have reviewed that
decision and through our own research have determined that the prior holding
as relied upon by the Board accurately reflects the law.
-2-
1997, Kendrick was awarded 20% occupational
disability for injuries to her upper
extremities sustained on February 2, 1994,
in the course and scope of her employment
with Toyota Manufacturing (“Toyota”).
More than four years later, on March
27, 2002, Kendrick filed a motion to reopen,
based on a change of condition – that she
was now more disabled than at the time of
her award. Her affidavit attached to the
motion stated she had been under the care of
her treating physician, Dr. Luis Schecker,
and Toyota had voluntarily instituted TTD
benefits through February 12, 2002.
Kendrick claimed she had not yet reached
maximum medical improvement. In an order
rendered April 26, 2002, Hon. Sheila C.
Lowther, Chief Administrative Law Judge
(“CALJ”) granted Kendrick’s motion to
reopen. The order stated the CALJ
recognized the existence of the limitations
period of KRS 342.125 as amended effective
December 12, 1996. However, in light of
Kendrick’s assertion that she was entitled
to an additional period of TTD, the matter
was reopened. The CALJ, in a subsequent
order rendered May 29, 2002, further
clarified that the reopening was solely
allowed to address Kendrick’s claim for an
additional period of TTD.
The matter was assigned to
Administrative Law Judge Ron Johnson. A
benefit review conference (“BRC”) was held
on December 10, 2002. The BRC order and
memorandum stated Kendrick had not waived
her right to appeal the interlocutory order
of May 29, 2002 limiting her reopening to
the issue of an additional period of TTD.
The claim was later reassigned to Hon.
Bonnie Kittinger, Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) who determined, in an order rendered
December 30, 2002, Kendrick had not reached
maximum medical improvement and TTD benefits
should be reinstated. Kendrick was referred
for a university evaluation on the issue of
-3-
maximum medical improvement, and the claim
was placed in abeyance. In an order
rendered January 20, 2004, the ALJ
determined Kendrick was at maximum medical
improvement and, therefore, her claim for
additional TTD benefits was denied.
On appeal, Kendrick argues since TTD
benefits were voluntarily reinstated postaward, and within four years of the August
11, 1997 award, the payments extended the
four-year period to file a motion to reopen
pursuant to KRS 342.125(3). Kendrick argues
she could not or should not file a motion to
reopen during the period of payment of TTD
benefits because she was receiving benefits
and, for that reason, there was nothing to
adjudicate. She submits that her motion was
timely because it was made within four years
of the last payment of TTD benefits. She
takes the position that either the period in
which to file a claim was lengthened by
payment of TTD benefits, or in the
alternative, payment of TTD should serve as
a waiver/estoppel as to the requirements of
KRS 342.125(3).
In response, Toyota argues the fouryear period of KRS 342.125(3) cannot be
extended. It contends that even though
Kendrick was receiving voluntary payment of
TTD, earlier reopening is not prohibited by
statute or case law. Toyota submits that
KRS 342.125(3) is a specific statute of
limitations and therefore takes precedence
over the more general statute of limitations
found in KRS 342.185 and KRS 342.265. It
also submits this is not a situation in
which estoppel/waiver applies. In support
of its arguments, Toyota cites Baker v. City
of Louisville, 2003-CA-000079 (rendered
September 19, 2003 and designated not to be
published).2
2
2003 WL 22159056 (Ky. App.)[footnote 1 in original].
-4-
The version of KRS 342.125(3), in
effect on the date of Kendrick’s award
provides in pertinent part:
Except for reopening solely
for determination of the
compensability of medical
expenses, fraud, or conforming the
award as set forth in KRS
342.730(1)(c)2., or for reducing a
permanent total disability award
when an employee returns to work,
or seeking temporary total
disability benefits during the
period of an award, no claim shall
be reopened more than four (4)
years following the date of the
original award or order granting
or denying benefits. . . .
Prior to the 1996 amendments, an
injured worker was permitted to reopen a
settlement or award at any time. However,
since December 12, 1996, time limitation has
been imposed with the intended purpose of
cutting off, after four years, all
reopenings for awards entered after that
date, subject only to the enumerated
exceptions. See Brooks v. University of
Louisville Hospital, Ky., 33 S.W.3d 526
(2000); Meade v. Reedy Coal Co., Ky., 13
S.W.3d 619 (2000). Since Kendrick’s award
was dated August 11, 1997, her motion to
reopen, on its face, was violative of the
four year statute of limitations in KRS
342.125(3). Voluntary payment of TTD
benefits post-award is not an exception
contained within the statute.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in Baker
v. City of Louisville, supra, addressed the
very argument Kendrick now makes on appeal.
While we recognize that an unpublished
opinion from our appellate court does not
constitute either primary or secondary
authority in the courts of the Commonwealth,
nonetheless we deem it prudent to adopt the
-5-
court of appeals’ reasoning until such time
there is published authority addressing the
issue. In Baker, supra, unlike the case sub
judice, the claimant was injured prior to
1996 and settled his claim before the
effective date of the 1996 amendments, thus
triggering the statute of limitations
contained in KRS 342.125(8). That statute
provides “claims decided prior to December
12, 1996, may be reopened within four (4)
years of the award or order, or within four
(4) years of December 12, 1996, whichever is
later. . . .” The court’s reasoning,
however, applies equally to KRS 342.125(3).
Addressing the claimant’s argument that the
abeyance provisions contained in KRS
342.265(5) and the statute of limitations
contained in KRS 342.185(1) should be
applied so as to extend the statute of
limitations on reopening, the court
determined those statutes were directed
solely to the “application for resolution of
a claim” and the filing of an “application
for adjustment of claim” respectively. The
court stated that based upon the plain
language of the statutes, they were
applicable to initial claims and not motions
to reopen. The court further stated:
Moreover, although KRS 342.265(5)
and KRS 342.185(1) are general
statutes of limitations, the fouryear limitations period set out in
KRS 342.125(8) deals specifically
with the reopening of a claim. It
is well established that when two
statutory provisions deal with a
similar subject matter, the
specific statute controls over the
general statute. Boyd v. C & H
Transportation, Ky., 902 S.W.2d
823[, 824] (1995); Land v.
Newsome, Ky., 614 S.W.2d 948
(1981). As KRS 342.125(8)
specifically and unambiguously
addresses the filing deadline for
the reopening of a claim, it
-6-
clearly applied in the situation
before us on appeal.
Baker v. City of Louisville, supra.
Likewise, KRS 342.125(3) is specific to
reopening and neither KRS 342.265(5) nor KRS
342.185(1) has any application.
Furthermore, we disagree with Kendrick
that the principle of equitable
estoppel/waiver applies. Again, this issue
was discussed in Baker, supra, wherein the
court identified the essential elements of
equitable estoppel as:
(1) conduct which
amounts to a false
representation or
concealment of material
facts, or[,] at least,
which is calculated to
convey the impression
that the facts are
otherwise than, and
inconsistent with, those
which the party
subsequently attempts to
assert; (2) the
intention, or at least
the expectation, that
such conduct shall be
acted upon by, or
influence, the other
party or other persons;
and (3) knowledge,
actual or constructive,
of the real facts. And,
broadly speaking, as
related to the party
claiming the estoppel,
the essential elements
are (1) lack of
knowledge and of the
means of knowledge of
the truth as to the
facts in question; (2)
reliance, in good faith,
-7-
upon the conduct or
statements of the party
to be estopped; and (3)
action or inaction based
thereon of such a
character as to change
the position or status
of the party claiming
the estoppel, to his
injury, detriment, or
prejudice.
Weiand v. Board of Trustees of
Kentucky Retirement Systems, Ky.,
25 S.W.3d 88, 91 (2000) (quoting
Electric and Water Plant Board of
City of Frankfort v. Suburban
Acres Development, Inc., Ky., 513
S.W.2d [489], 491 (1974)).
Baker, slip opinion at p[.] 3.
determined:
The court
Clearly, the facts herein do
not satisfy the requirements for
equitable estoppel. The city’s
payment of voluntary TTD benefits,
consistent with its obligation
under KRS Chapter 342, was not
conduct which amounted to a false
representation of a material fact.
Further, it cannot be said that
Baker lacked the means to acquire
knowledge regarding the
limitations period set out in KRS
342.125(8). Hence, no basis
exists for applying the doctrine
of equitable estoppel so as to
deprive the city of its
limitations defense.
Id.
We fully agree with Toyota that its
voluntary payment of TTD benefits was not an
action of waiver or estoppel so as to
-8-
prevent it from asserting the four-year
statute of limitations of KRS 342.125(3).
Accordingly, the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge is hereby AFFIRMED.
For the foregoing reasons, the Board’s decision
affirming the order limiting the reopening is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, TOYOTA:
Wayne C. Daub
Louisville, KY
H. Douglas Jones
Kenneth J. Dietz
Florence, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, WORKERS’
COMPENSATION FUNDS:
David W. Barr
Frankfort, KY
-9-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
