MYRON ADDISON SPEARS, JR. v. DORIS ANNAMARIE SPEARS (NOW GOODIN)
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RENDERED:
November 12, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2004-CA-000644-MR
MYRON ADDISON SPEARS, JR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET P. COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CI-01168
v.
DORIS ANNAMARIE SPEARS (NOW GOODIN)
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, KNOPF, AND MINTON, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
In 1992, the twelve-year marriage of Doris Goodin
(formerly Spears) and Myron Spears was dissolved by decree of
the Hardin Circuit Court.
In 1997, Spears retired from the army
and a dispute arose over the division of his pension.
By order
entered October 17, 2000, the circuit court ruled that Goodin is
entitled to 17.3% of Spears’s disposable retirement pay or, at
that time, about $228.00 per month.
Arguing that the trial
court had incorrectly accounted for his federal disability
benefits, Spears appealed.
By an opinion rendered in March
2002, this Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling.1
In December
2002, our Supreme Court denied Spears’s petition for
discretionary review.
Spears did not seek review by the United
States Supreme Court.
That was not the end of the matter.
In January 2003,
when Spears refused to abide by the court’s order, Goodin sought
to have him held in contempt.
In the course of the ensuing
proceedings, Spears moved pursuant to CR 60.02 (a), (b), (c),
and (d) to have the October 2000 order vacated.
By orders
entered August 26 and November 6, 2003, the circuit court denied
CR 60.02 relief.
Impervious to these many adverse rulings, in
March 2004 Spears, pro se, again moved to have the October 2000
order vacated, this time invoking CR 60.02(e).
The trial court
denied the motion by order entered March 24, 2004.
It is from that order that Spears, still pro se, has
appealed.
Noting that CR 60.02(e) permits a trial court to
grant relief from its otherwise final judgment if the judgment
is void, he contends that the October 2000 order requiring him
to pay Goodin 17.3% of his disposable retirement benefits is
void because it runs afoul of federal statutes prohibiting the
1
Spears v. Spears (now Goodin), 2000-CA-002678-MR (rendered
March 1, 2002).
2
attachment of a serviceman’s disability benefits.
Spears has
misunderstood the difference between a void judgment and one
merely voidable.
Because the error he alleges would give rise
to the latter but not the former, the trial court correctly
denied CR 60.02(e) relief.
A civil judgment is void “only if the court which
rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the
parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of
law.”2
“[I]f the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter
and the parties, its judgment, whether erroneous or not, is not
void.”3
An erroneous judgment is voidable.
are subject to correction by appeal.
collateral attack under CR 60.02.4
Voidable judgments
They are not subject to
Generally, mistakes of law
that survive the appellate process are imperfections our system
tolerates in the interest of finality.
Because courts and
litigants have only limited resources, litigation must at some
point come to an end.
2
United States v. Buck, 281 F.3d 1336 (2002) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted) (construing the federal
equivalent of CR 60.02(e)).
3
Skinner v. Morrow, Ky., 318 S.W.2d 419, 423 (1958).
4
Id.
3
The federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses’
Protection Act5 subjects disposable military retirement pay to
state laws regarding the division of marital assets upon
divorce.
As Spears observes, however, the act excludes from
disposable retirement pay disability benefits the retired
serviceman receives in lieu of retirement benefits.6
Spears has
replaced some of his retirement benefits with disability
benefits.
Because some of Spears’s pension accrued after his
divorce from Goodin, his pension is partially marital property
and partially non-marital.
In determining Goodin’s share of
Spears’s retirement pay, the trial court ruled in effect that
some of Spears’s disability benefits should be deemed to replace
non-marital benefits and some marital benefits.
Spears contends
that the federal laws protecting his disability benefits from
attachment require that all of them be deemed to replace marital
benefits, thus minimizing Goodin’s entitlement.
Spears argues that by misinterpreting the federal law
the trial court acted beyond its jurisdiction.
As noted above,
however, a court does not lose its jurisdiction merely because
it makes a mistake.
The trial court had jurisdiction over the
parties and over their divorce, including the division of
5
10 U.S.C. § 1408.
6
Id.; 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a); Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109
S. Ct. 2023, 104 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1989).
4
property.
Spears was accorded all the process that was due.
Even if Spears’s construction of the federal statutes were
correct, therefore, that would not make the trial court’s order
void.
Spears’s remedy was his appeal.
It was his burden to
convince an appellate court that the trial court erred.
failed to meet that burden.
He
CR 60.02 does not give him a second
appeal merely because with the benefit of hindsight he has
thought of another argument for his position.
This appeal has so little basis in the law that it
comes close to being frivolous.7
Because pro se litigants are
entitled to some leeway, we shall give Spears the benefit of the
doubt.
The trial court, however, need not tolerate further
proceedings that it determines were undertaken for the purpose
of delay or harassment.
We affirm the March 24, 2004, order of
the Hardin Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Myron Addison Spears, Jr.
Pro se
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
William L. Hoge III
Louisville, Kentucky
7
CR 73.02.
5
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