A.S., A CHILD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: October 29, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000405-MR
A.S., A CHILD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CLARK CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JEAN CHENAULT LOGUE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-J-00311
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
A.S., a child brings this appeal from the
December 19, 2003, order of the Clark Circuit Court, Family
Court Division.
We affirm.
In October 1999, a juvenile petition was filed
alleging appellant had been habitually truant in violation of
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 630.020(3).
Appellant eventually
“pled status,” and the court placed certain restrictions on her
behavior.
Among the restrictions placed upon appellant were
that she attend school without fail.
Appellant was frequently
absent from school over the next few years and was subsequently
found in contempt of court for violating those restrictions.
Appellant was eventually committed to the custody of
the Cabinet for placement in a residential treatment facility.
Upon appellant’s completion of the treatment program, the
Commonwealth made a motion requesting a dispositional review of
appellant’s case.
Pursuant to the Commonwealth’s motion, on
September 25, 2003, an order was entered discharging appellant
from commitment to the Cabinet.
On December 1, 2003, the Commonwealth again filed a
motion for contempt based upon appellant’s failure to attend
school.
An order was entered on December 19, 2003, finding
appellant to be in contempt of court.
This appeal follows.
Appellant contends she could not be held in contempt
of court for her failure to attend school, as there was no valid
order in place requiring her to do so.
Specifically, appellant
asserts the September 25, 2003, order discharging her from
commitment to the Cabinet extinguished any prior court order
finding appellant to be habitually truant and requiring her to
attend school.
Appellant contends she was discharged from
commitment to the Cabinet and that no additional restrictions
were placed on her behavior.
As such, appellant contends when
she was again absent from school, the Commonwealth was required
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to file a new juvenile petition alleging habitual truancy,
rather than a motion for contempt.1
It is clear that in enacting the Unified Juvenile
Code, Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) Chapters 600-645, it was
the legislature’s intent to promote the protection of children,
ensure children had a safe and nurturing home and provide
treatment to those children brought before the court pursuant to
the code.
KRS 600.010.
It is equally clear that pursuant to
KRS 610.010(13), the court has continuing jurisdiction over a
child who has been adjudicated habitually truant until the child
reaches the age of eighteen (18).
Both the general intent of
the juvenile code and the more specific language of KRS 610.010,
indicate that the court continued to have jurisdiction over this
matter.
It is also well established that a court has the
inherent authority to secure compliance with its orders. Dunagan
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 31 S.W.3d 928 (2000).
Furthermore, KRS
600.060 specifically states that “[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of KRS Chapter 600 to 645 [the Kentucky Unified
Juvenile Code], the inherent contempt power of the court shall
not be diminished.”
As such, the court had the authority to
1
A review of the record indicates that from the time appellant was discharged
from commitment to the Cabinet on September 25, 2003, until she was before
the court on the motion for contempt on December 1, 2003, she only attended
school twelve days.
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utilize its inherent power of contempt in this juvenile
proceeding.
Appellant misconstrued the September 25, 2003, order
discharging her from commitment to the Cabinet.
The order
merely discharged appellant from commitment. The order did not,
as appellant contends, extinguish any previous orders of the
court.
The order directing appellant to “attend school without
fail” remained in effect and was a valid order.
Thus, when
appellant violated the court’s order, it was proper for the
Commonwealth to proceed by way of a motion for contempt.
Under the circumstances presented, requiring the
Commonwealth to file a new petition would be against the general
intent of the juvenile code and offensive to the notion that a
court has the inherent authority to enforce compliance with its
own orders.
The order discharging appellant from commitment to
the Cabinet was very concise and directed only that appellant be
discharged from commitment.
The order did not state, nor did it
imply, that any previous order of the court was otherwise
extinguished by its entry.
The order requiring appellant to
attend school without fail remained in effect.
Appellant choose
not to attend school, in violation of that court’s order and,
thus, was properly found in contempt of court.
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For the foregoing reasons, the December 19, 2003,
order of the Clark Circuit Court, Family Court Division, is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Gail Robinson
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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