G.B. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 24, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2004-CA-000018-MR
G.B.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM NELSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES C. SIMMS III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-AD-00003
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR FAMILIES
AND CHILDREN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
G.B. appeals from an order of the Nelson
Circuit Court that terminated her parental rights to her child,
C.M.M.,1 and transferred custody of the child to the Cabinet for
Families and Children.
The order is supported by clear and
convincing evidence that the child was abused or neglected while
under the appellant’s care; that the mother continuously failed
to provide essential care and protection for the child; and that
1
In order to protect the privacy of the child, we will use initials to
identify the parents and the child.
it is in the child’s best interest that the parental rights of
the natural mother be terminated.
Therefore, we affirm the
order.
C.M.M. was born on May 19, 1998.
Based upon a
petition filed by the child’s grandmother in October 1998, the
Nelson District Circuit Court ordered that C.M.M. be placed in
the grandmother’s custody on a temporary basis.
In March 1999,
the district court returned C.M.M. to G.B.’s custody.
G.B. was
ordered to cooperate with the Cabinet and to prevent the child
from having any contact with G.B.’s father or step-grandfather.
On June 15, 1999, the Cabinet filed a petition
alleging that C.M.M. was dependent, neglected, and abused.
Through an order entered a few days later by the Nelson District
Court, C.M.M. was again removed from the appellant’s custody.
In December 1999, the district court determined that C.M.M. was
a dependent and neglected child, and she was committed to the
Cabinet.
C.M.M. has remained in foster care since June 15,
1999.
On February 11, 2000, the Cabinet filed a petition for
the involuntary termination of the parental rights of the
child’s natural mother and father.
by the Nelson Circuit Court.
Numerous hearings were held
On November 20, 2003, the circuit
-2-
court issued an order terminating the parental rights of the
child’s natural parents.
2
This appeal followed.
G.B. argues that the trial court erred in terminating
her parental rights because the Cabinet failed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence the existence of any grounds for
termination.
We disagree.
The involuntary termination of parental rights by a
court is governed by KRS3 625.090.
Before a circuit court may
terminate such rights, it must find by clear and convincing
evidence:
(1) that the child is an “abused or neglected child
as defined by KRS 600.020(1)” and (2) that termination would be
in the child’s best interest.
KRS 625.090(1).
Additionally,
the court must find the existence of one of the numerous grounds
recited in KRS 625.090(2):
including abandonment, infliction of
serious physical injury or emotional harm, sexual abuse, or
neglect in providing access to basic survival needs.
The Nelson Circuit Court found that C.M.M. was a
neglected child.
In its order terminating parental rights, the
circuit court concluded as follows:
[T]his Court has also determined . . . that
[G.B.] has neglected said child based upon
her repeated failure to provide essential
care and protection to [C.M.M.], especially
2
The order also terminated the parental rights of the child’s natural father,
J.A.M. He did not participate in the termination hearings nor has he filed
an appeal in this matter.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-3-
in light of her young age. An example of
the mother’s neglect includes her having
contact with [G.B.’s father], a convicted
sexual offender, while the child was in her
custody on May 12, 1999. In addition, [G.B]
has failed to provide this Court with any
real assurance that [C.M.M.] will be
protected from sexual predators since [G.B.]
has continued to maintain contact with [her
father] and [her step-grandfather]. Another
example of [G.B.’s] neglect was her failure
to obtain follow-up medical attention for
[C.M.M.’s] burned feet. [G.B.’s] inability
to maintain employment has contributed to
[C.M.M.’s] neglect as [G.B.] has been unable
to maintain a residence or to provide
[C.M.M.] with her necessaries. Even more
troublesome, Ms. Dow and Ms. Akin have
observed [G.B.’s] residences on several
occasions in unkept conditions. Finally,
the findings of fact contained herein have
clearly established that [G.B.’s] life has
remained in complete and utter disarray
since [C.M.M.’s] birth.
The court also found that termination of the
appellant’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest.
The court observed as follows:
Starting in June of 1998, [C.M.M.] has
continuously resided with her foster
parents, and they are willing to adopt said
child. According to the foster mother,
[C.M.M.] has become integrated into their
family. . . . In July of 2002, [G.B.’s]
therapist recommended that her overnight
visitation with [C.M.M.] be terminated.
[G.B.] has even concluded on occasion that
voluntary termination of parental rights was
in [C.M.M.’s] best interest as evidenced by
her sworn statement dated February 9, 2000,
which was attached to the petition along
with her letters which were introduced into
evidence on July 10, 2003. . . . Based upon
these findings, this Court is of the opinion
-4-
that the [Cabinet] has proven by clear and
convincing evidence that termination is in
[C.M.M.’s] best interest.
Finally, the circuit court found that the Cabinet had
established beyond any doubt the existence of a statutory ground
for termination (failure to provide basic survival needs) as set
forth in KRS 625.090(2).
It noted as follows:
It is the finding of this Court that the
[Cabinet] has proven by clear and convincing
evidence “[t]hat the parent[s], for a period
of not less than six (6) months, have
continuously or repeatedly failed or refused
to provide or have been substantially
incapable of providing essential parental
care and protection for the child and that
there is no reasonable expectation of
improvement in parental care and protection
considering the age of the child.”
* * * *
The child’s mother, [G.B.] has repeatedly
failed, for a period of not less than six
(6) months, to provide [C.M.M.] with
essential parental care and protection. For
instance, the evidence has established that
[G.B.] has been unable to maintain stable
housing as she has lived at the following
addresses since [C.M.M.’s] birth: (1) with
her grandmother on at least six occasions,
(2) in Florida for approximately 1 ½ months
with the child’s father, (3) at Pine Village
Apartment on at least two occasions, (4) in
a mobile home on Cleo Avenue, (5) in a
mobile home on the Curtsinger farm, (6) at
Bard Home Apartments on at least two
occasions, and (7) there are allegations
that she has resided with her father on
occasion. [G.B.] even admitted that she was
evicted from at least two apartments and
that she moved from Cleo Drive because she
was unable to pay her rent. The evidence
-5-
also established that [G.B.] has been unable
to provide certain necessaries based upon
the following proof: (1) her electricity was
turned off, (2) [the Cabinet] has provided
assistance to [G.B.] on six occasions for
either food or utilities, (3) Ms. Dow
personally provided her transportation,
assisted [G.B.] with housing and purchased
food for her, (4) Ms. Dow made arrangement
through Voluntary Action to assist [G.B.]
with her rent and obtaining food, (5) Ms.
Dow helped [G.B.] in applying for AFDC and
food stamps, and (6) Ms. Akin assisted
[G.B.] on an electric bill and by personally
providing her with a mattress and spring.
* * * * *
This Court does not believe there is any
reasonable expectation of improvement in
regard to [G.B.’s] parental care and
protection, considering the age of the
child.
The standard of appellate review in a termination of
parental rights case is carefully circumscribed.
R.C.R. v.
Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Resources, Ky. App., 988 S.W.2d
36 (1998).
The trial court has broad discretion in determining
whether the child fits within the abused or neglected category
and whether the abuse or neglect warrants termination.
Department for Human Resources v. Moore, Ky. App., 552 S.W.2d
672 (1977).
The findings of the trial court will not be
disturbed unless there is no substantial evidence in the record
to support its findings.
V.S. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for
Human Resources, Ky. App., 706 S.W.2d 420 (1986).
-6-
Clear and convincing proof does not
necessarily mean uncontradicted proof. It
is sufficient if there is proof of a
probative and substantial nature carrying
the weight of evidence sufficient to
convince ordinarily prudent-minded people.
Rowland v. Holt, 253 Ky. 718, 70 S.W.2d 5, 9 (1934).
We have reviewed the comprehensive findings made by
the Nelson Circuit Court based upon evidence presented over the
course of numerous hearings.
We are not persuaded that the
court erred in determining that C.M.M. was a neglected child.
The court’s finding that the termination of parental rights was
in the child’s best interest is also clearly supported by the
evidence.
The evidence presented by the Cabinet convincingly
supported the court’s conclusions.
Contrary to the appellant’s contention, the Cabinet
also proved by clear and convincing evidence grounds for
termination as set forth in KRS 625.090(2).
There is adequate
evidence to support the court’s determination that for a period
of not less than six (6) months, the appellant continuously or
repeatedly failed or refused to provide (or was substantially
incapable of providing) essential parental care and protection
for C.M.M. without any reasonable expectation of improvement in
the appellant’s care and protection of the child.
Thus, we
cannot conclude that the court’s findings are clearly erroneous.
Nor can we conclude that the Cabinet failed to meet its burden
-7-
of proving its case by clear and convincing evidence as required
by KRS 625.090.
Ample evidence was presented in this case to indicate
that G.B. had repeatedly failed to provide proper medical
treatment for C.M.M.; that she had routinely permitted two sex
offenders open access to the child in violation of a direct
court order; that she was unable to provide her with a safe and
stable home; and that she was unable even to provide her with
safe food to eat and milk to drink.
The Cabinet repeatedly
offered its services to the appellant, but G.B. was unable or
unwilling to complete five different case plans aimed at
reuniting her with her child.
G.B. even sought the voluntary
termination of her parental rights on two separate occasions (so
advising the child on one occasion with resulting unnecessary
emotional turmoil).
The circuit court gave G.B. every opportunity over the
course of numerous hearing dates to show that her ability to
provide properly for the child was improving.
Nevertheless, as
the child’s guardian ad litem has observed,
the evidence in this case revealed, in clear
and convincing fashion, a young woman who is
unable to sustain any ability to provide
essential care and life skills for herself,
let alone a child, and that the pattern of
such has been evident for a period of over 5
years.
-8-
The overwhelming evidence demonstrates that G.B. was
substantially incapable of providing essential parental care and
protection for C.M.M. and that there is no reasonable
expectation of improvement in her ability to care for and to
protect the child.
Consequently, we are not persuaded by the
appellant’s contention that the evidence failed to support the
court’s finding that sufficient grounds for termination of
parental rights had been demonstrated.
We find no error in the
termination of the appellant’s parental rights.
The judgment of the Nelson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John David Seay
Bardstown, Kentucky
Mary Gaines Locke
Munfordville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR THE GUARDIAN AD
LITEM:
Jason P. Floyd
Bardstown, Kentucky
-9-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.