DEBORAH TAYLOR AND JOHN D. TAYLOR v. DR. MARK SANDER
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 29, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002220-MR
DEBORAH TAYLOR AND JOHN D. TAYLOR
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM GRANT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN L. BATES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00033
v.
DR. MARK SANDER
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Deborah Taylor and John D. Taylor (collectively
referred to as appellants) bring this appeal from a September
19, 2003, summary judgment of the Grant Circuit Court.
We
affirm.
The facts are as follows.
Appellee owned a 22.5 acre
farm in Grant County, Kentucky, upon which two mobile homes were
situated.
Appellee rented one of the mobile homes to Danny
Marksberry (Marksberry).
Apparently, the rent consideration was
in the form of services rendered by Marksberry to appellee
rather than cash payment.
On October 13, 2002, Marksberry invited Deborah Taylor
(Deborah) to his home to play cards.
at least three beers.
That evening Deborah drank
Deborah stayed at the mobile home that
night and took a Xanax before going to bed.
She awoke around
4:30 a.m. from an alleged noise outside the trailer.
She then
opened the rear door of the mobile home by unlocking its
deadbolt.
She alleges to have fallen out of the back door of
the mobile home (about a three-foot fall) and suffered injuries
to her foot and right knee.
She further alleges her kneecap was
crushed and her leg was broken in eleven places.
Incredibly,
Deborah did not seek medical attention at that time; instead,
she went to her home and only sought medical attention some six
hours after the alleged fall.
On January 27, 2003, appellants filed a complaint in
the Grant Circuit Court against appellee.
Appellants claim
Deborah’s fall was caused by appellee’s failure to provide
suitable steps exiting the back door of the mobile home.
Appellee answered and, thereafter, made a motion for summary
judgment.
The motion was granted on September 19, 2003, and
appellants’ claims were dismissed.
This appeal follows.
Appellants contend the circuit court committed error
by entering summary judgment.
Summary judgment is proper where
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there exist no material issue of fact and movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel
Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991).
As to a landlord’s liability for demised premises, the
general rule under the common law is:
[A] landlord who, without covenanting to
repair, and without knowledge of latent
defects, puts a tenant into full possession
and control of the demised premises, not
intended for public purposes, and which are
free from defects of construction
constituting a nuisance, will not, in the
absence of statute, be liable for personal
injuries sustained on the demised premises,
by reason of the defective condition
thereof, by the tenant and others entering
on the premises under the tenant's title.
Starns v. Lancaster, Ky. App., 553 S.W.2d 696, 697
(1977)(quoting 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 417(3) at 33
(1968)).
Appellants allege that appellee is nevertheless liable
because numerous exceptions to the above general rule are
applicable in this case.
Initially, appellants argue that appellee had actual
knowledge of the mobile home’s lack of stairs from the rear
door, and therefore, had knowledge of a latent defect in the
mobile home.
The back door did have concrete blocks in a
stair-like formation; however, there was a two-foot drop from
the doorway jam to the first block.
constitutes a latent defect.
Appellants contend this
We disagree.
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The very definition
of a latent defect is a defect that a reasonably careful
inspection would not reveal or is a hidden defect.
DICTIONARY
1026 (Revised 4th ed. 1968).
BLACK’S
LAW
Even if the concrete-block
stairs could be considered a “defect,” the stairs are not as a
matter of law a latent defect.
We, thus, reject appellants’
contention that there existed a latent defect upon the premises.
Next, appellants contend the general rule of landlord
non-liability is inapplicable because appellee violated Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 383.595(1)(a), which states the landlord
shall “[c]omply with the requirements of applicable building and
housing codes materially affecting health and safety . . . .”
Appellants allege the applicable building and housing code
violated by appellee is the CABO One and Two Family Dwelling
Code.
Appellants, however, failed to offer us a specific cite
for CABO and failed to indicate to this Court whether CABO was
adopted by city ordinance or state regulation.
Appellants did
offer the affidavit of Terry Conrad, Grant County Building
Inspector, wherein he opined that CABO would be applicable to
the mobile home.
Appellants state the affidavit created an
issue of fact upon the applicable building code in this case.
However, the determination of applicable law or code is a
question of law for the court.
As such, we reject the
contention appellee violated KRS 383.595(1)(a) by violating
CABO.
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Appellants further argue appellee would be liable for
the demised premise under the Restatement (Second) of Property,
Landlord & Tenant § 17.6 (1977).
Thereunder, a landlord of
property is liable:
[F]or physical harm caused to the tenant and
others upon the leased property with the
consent of the tenant or his subtenant by a
dangerous condition existing before or
arising after the tenant has taken
possession, if he has failed to exercise
reasonable care to repair the condition and
the existence of the condition is in
violation of . . . a duty created by statute
or administrative regulation.
Id.
We do not believe appellee would be liable under the
Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord & Tenant § 17.6
(1977), as there has been no violation of a duty created by
statute or administrative regulation.
Next, appellants contend appellee is liable under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 361 (1965), which states as
follows:
A possessor of land who leases a part
thereof and retains in his own control any
other part which is necessary to the safe
use of the leased part, is subject to
liability to his lessee and others lawfully
upon the land with the consent of the lessee
. . . for physical harm caused by a
dangerous condition upon that part of the
land retained in the lessor’s control, if
the lessor by the exercise of reasonable
care (a) could have discovered the condition
and the risk involved, and (b) could have
made the condition safe.
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We reject this contention.
First, we point out the facts do not
demonstrate that appellee retained control over the mobile home.
Appellee’s undisputed testimony indicates that Marksberry was
solely responsible for the maintenance, upkeep, and daily care
of the mobile home.
Furthermore, appellee’s undisputed
testimony also indicates he was not on the subject property
during the entire tenancy of Marksberry.
We do not believe the
concrete staircase constitutes a “dangerous condition” within
the contemplation of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 361 (1965).
In the case at hand, Deborah chose to exit the back door at
night in complete darkness.
Thus, we are of the opinion
appellee would not be liable under the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 361 (1965).
Appellant also contends the lack of proper stairs on
the back of the mobile home constituted a nuisance.
Nuisances
are “that class of wrongs arising from the unreasonable,
unwarrantable, or unlawful use by a person of his own property
and producing such material annoyance, inconvenience,
discomfort, or hurt that the law will presume a consequent
damage.”
City v. Sears, 313 Ky. 784, 233 S.W.2d 530, 532
(1950)(quoting 39 Am. Jur., Nuisances § 2).
It has been
observed that “the creation of trifling annoyance in
inconvenience does not constitute an actionable nuisance
. . . .”
Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Anderson, 288
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Ky. 501, 156 S.W.2d 857, 859 (1941).
In this case, we believe
the concrete-block staircase cannot be included in the class of
wrongs arising from the unreasonable, unwarranted, or unlawful
use of property; rather, we believe it more akin to the creation
of an inconvenience upon property, which does not constitute an
actionable nuisance.
We, thus, reject appellants’ contention
that the concrete-block staircase constituted a nuisance.
We view appellants’ remaining contentions as either
moot or without merit.
Under the facts of this case, if anyone
had responsibility for maintaining Deborah’s safety at the
trailer, it was Marksberry, not appellee.
In sum, we are of the opinion the circuit court
properly entered summary judgment dismissing appellants’ claims
against appellee.
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment of the
Grant Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Meredith L. Lawrence
Warsaw, Kentucky
Nick Benson
Benson and Schultz, P.S.C.
Walton, Kentucky
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