JOYCE KIRK v. JOY NEWSOME AND KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
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RENDERED: October 8, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-002214-MR
JOYCE KIRK
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS R. LEWIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00774
v.
JOY NEWSOME AND
KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, TACKETT, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
Joyce Kirk appeals from an order of the Warren
Circuit Court awarding court costs to Joy Newsome in Newsome’s
action to recover damages sustained in an automobile accident.
The trial court awarded court costs after the parties settled
the action.
As there is no “prevailing party” pursuant to CR
54.04, we reverse the order awarding costs.
The facts are not in dispute.
On October 5, 2001,
Kirk and Newsome were involved in an automobile accident in
Warren County, Kentucky.
On May 20, 2002, Newsome filed a
complaint in Warren Circuit Court seeking recovery for damages
sustained in the accident.
The complaint was amended on March
13, 2003 to include as a party defendant Kentucky Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Company (“Farm Bureau”).
The parties entered into settlement talks, and on
April 11, 2003, Kirk tendered an offer of judgment.
Following
settlement negotiations but prior to entry of an order, Newsome
made an oral motion for Kirk to pay the costs incurred by
Newsome.
The trial court rendered an order on May 20, 2003,
assessing against Kirk court costs of $4,326.12.
Thereafter, on
May 30, 2003, Kirk filed a motion to vacate the April 11, 2003,
order.
The motion to vacate was sustained by order rendered on
August 7, 2003.
Newsome countered with a motion to alter, amend or
vacate the August 7, 2003, order vacating the award of court
costs.
Kirk filed a timely response.
An agreed order of
dismissal was rendered on August 18, 2003, which operated to
dismiss as settled and satisfied all claims that were brought or
could have been brought in the complaint and amended complaint.
Lastly, on September 22, 2003, the trial court
rendered an order which forms the basis of the instant appeal.
It reversed the order which stated that Newsome was not entitled
to court costs, and ordered Kirk to pay the costs in the amount
of $4,326.12.
This appeal followed.
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Kirk now argues that the trial court committed
reversible error in rendering the award of court costs in favor
of Newsome.
She maintains that no costs should be awarded
because there has been no judgment as contemplated by CR 54.04.
She also argues that Newsome is precluded from recovering costs
incurred after the April 11, 2003, offer of judgment, that any
costs should be split pro-rata with Farm Bureau, and that
certain costs should be excluded because they were not
contemplated as compensible by the civil rules.
She argues the
circuit court’s order should be reversed and the matter remanded
with directions to enter a judgment in her favor.
CR 54.05 states:
(1) Costs shall be allowed as of course to
the prevailing party unless the court
otherwise directs; but costs against the
Commonwealth, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent
permitted by law. In the event of a partial
judgment or a judgment in which neither
party prevails entirely against the other,
costs shall be borne as directed by the
trial court.
(2) A party entitled to recover costs shall
prepare and serve upon the party liable
therefore a bill itemizing the costs
incurred by him in the action, including
filing fees, fees incident to service of
process and summoning of witnesses, jury
fees, warning order attorney, and guardian
ad litem fees, costs of the originals of any
depositions (whether taken stenographically
or by other than stenographic means), fees
for extraordinary services ordered to be
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paid by the court, and such other costs as
are ordinarily recoverable by the successful
party. If within five days after such
service no exceptions to the bill are served
on the prevailing party, the clerk shall
endorse on the face of the judgment the
total amount of costs recoverable as a part
of the judgment. Exceptions shall be heard
and resolved by the trial court in the form
of a supplemental judgment.
Costs are awarded, if at all, to the prevailing party.
Id.
The dispositive question, then, is whether Newsome is
properly characterized as a prevailing party for purposes of CR
54.04.
We conclude that she is not.
A panel of this Court previously addressed the
question of whether “a plaintiff who obtains a verdict finding a
defendant liable but fails to obtain a verdict awarding damages
is the successful or prevailing party.”
Lewis v. Grange Mutual
Casualty Company, Ky. App., 11 S.W.3d 591 (2000).
While this
question differs somewhat from the issue at bar, Lewis addressed
the underlying question of what constitutes a prevailing party
for purposes of CR 54.04.
In Lewis, we found that a majority of jurisdictions
have concluded that a prevailing party, for the purpose of
awarding costs, is one who is successful with regard to the main
issue in the action.
See generally, Cooper v. Carlson, 511 P.2d
1305 (Alaska 1973).
Furthermore, while some states have
determined that a judgment on liability alone is enough to
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confer prevailing party status, others require that the party
recover monetary damages in order to prevail.
Lewis, 511 S.W.3d
at 594.
The common factor throughout is that there must be
either a judgment of liability, or a judgment of liability
coupled with an award of damages in order to make a successful
claim for costs.
That is to say, in order to recover costs the
complaining party must, at a minimum, be awarded a judgment
establishing that his or her complaint was meritorious.
In
Lewis, we ultimately agreed with those jurisdiction which
concluded that “a plaintiff in a negligence action who succeeds
in obtaining a liability verdict against a defendant but is not
awarded damages has not prevailed for the purposes of awarding
costs.” Id.
In the matter at bar, the action terminated by way of
an agreed order of dismissal.
award made.
No judgment was rendered, and no
Newsome may believe herself to be the prevailing
party as she was successful in extracting $25,000 from an
insurer.
Conversely, Kirk may reasonably argue that she
prevailed as she was a defendant in a negligence action against
whom no judgment was rendered and no damages awarded.
Ultimately, though, we need not reach this issue as the instant
action failed to reach the Lewis threshold of a judgment and
award of damages.
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Pursuant to Lewis and the reasoning contained therein,
we believe that an action terminated by an order of dismissal
does not create a prevailing party for purposes of CR 54.04.
Accordingly, neither party to a dismissed action is entitled to
recover costs unless by agreement of the parties.
Having
disposed of Kirk’s claim of error, we hold as moot her
subsidiary arguments relating to the offer of judgment, pro rata
splitting of costs, and the exclusion of costs not tendered to
the court in conformity with CR 54.04.
For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the order of
the Warren Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Clarence Terrell Miller
Bowling Green, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, JOY
NEWSOME:
Steven O. Thornton
Bowling Green, KY
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