CANDY G. DENZIK (NOW BLAZAR) v. GARY I. DENZIK
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 24, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001805-MR
CANDY G. DENZIK (NOW BLAZAR)
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS R. LEWIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-01647
v.
GARY I. DENZIK
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER AND McANULTY, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE.1
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellant, Candy Denzik Blazar (Blazar), appeals
from a judgment rendered against her for fraudulent
misrepresentation, holding that she must pay Appellee, Gary
Denzik (Denzik), restitution in the sum of $54,720.26 for child
support payments.
1
The payments were made for the benefit of the
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
minor child born during the parties’ marriage, and were used for
the support and well being of the child.
We reverse the
judgment against Blazar, finding that no evidence of fraud was
submitted to the jury, and that the child support payments are
not recoverable.
The parties were initially married in 1981.
divorced in May, 1984.
They
The parties remarried in December, 1984.
That marriage ended in March, 1990.
During the parties’ second
marriage, Blazar gave birth to a daughter in June, 1987.
The
parties lived together as a family until the 1990 divorce, and
neither party sought a paternity determination at the time of
the divorce.
Dissolution documents show that the parties had
one child together.
support, and did so.
Denzik was ordered to pay weekly child
Denzik was granted regular visitation with
the child and Blazar had custody of the child.
The parties
acted in all respects as if Denzik was the child’s father for
thirteen years.
At trial, Blazar testified that she saw a picture of
her ex-boyfriend’s daughter in the paper in 2000, and claimed to
notice a similarity between that child and her daughter.
that time her daughter was thirteen years old.
At
Blazar
approached her former boyfriend and requested that he take a
paternity test.
He did so, and it was determined that the child
born during the parties’ marriage was in fact fathered by the
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ex-boyfriend.
Blazar disclosed this fact to Denzik in
September, 2000.
The time of the disclosure was shortly after
the paternity test results showed that Denzik was not the
child’s father.
At no time prior to receipt of the paternity
test results had Blazar ever indicated to Denzik that he might
not be the father of the child born during the parties’
marriage.
Denzik testified before the court that he had
suspected that Blazar had been unfaithful to him during the
marriage, but that she had denied such conduct when questioned.
Once it was determined that Denzik was not the biological father
of the child, Denzik filed a motion to terminate child support
obligations.
The motion was granted in December, 2000.
Denzik
has not paid child support since that date, but has continued to
request visitation with the child.
After his child support obligations were terminated,
Denzik filed the underlying action, claiming that Blazar had
fraudulently misrepresented the paternity of the child to him.
Denzik sought damages for fraud.
Denzik demanded judgment in
the sum of all child support payments made by him for the
support of the minor child for the past five years.
The parties
had been divorced for ten years at the time Denzik’s action was
filed, and Denzik had paid child support for all ten of those
years.
The jury found Blazar guilty of fraud, and awarded
Denzik the damages sought.
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Blazar contends that Denzik’s claim was barred by the
applicable Statute Of Limitations, KRS 413.120(12) and
413.130(3).
Blazar asserts that as the complaint lists the
alleged misrepresentations as having occurred “during the
marriage” and “during the divorce,” and those dates were ten or
more years prior to the filing of the action and therefore,
outside the limitations period.
KRS 413.120(12) provides a five
year limitations period for actions based on fraud.
KRS
413.130(3) provides a discovery rule delaying the date for
filing an action for fraud until the fraud is discovered, but
states “the action must be commenced within ten (10) years of
making the contract or the perpetration of the fraud.”
As
Denzik’s action was not filed within ten years of the marriage
or divorce, Blazar contends that the action was untimely.
Denzik asserts that the injury resulting from the
alleged fraudulent misrepresentations continued up to the time
that he last made his required monthly child support payment.
He contends that the limitations period began to run on the date
of the last payment, in the summer of 2000.
During the
underlying action, Denzik requested child support for the five
years previous to the disclosure of the paternity test,
contending that this claim met with Statute Of Limitations
requirements.
We agree that the fraud, if there was in fact
fraud, was ongoing such that Denzik’s action fell within the
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applicable limitations period.
The underlying action was not
barred by the Statute Of Limitations.
Blazar argues that Denzik failed to meet the
applicable standard for proof of the elements of fraudulent
misrepresentation.
Blazar argues that Denzik could not provide
evidence of any instance in which she intentionally
misrepresented paternity either during or after the parties’
marriage.
Blazar also asserts that Denzik failed to plead fraud
with the specificity required by CR 9.02.
It was uncontroverted
that Denzik and Blazar had an ongoing sexual relationship during
the period of time in which the minor child was conceived.
It
is uncontroverted that there was no evidence presented showing
that Blazar knew Denzik was not the father of the minor child
prior to 2000, other than the fact that she was engaging in
sexual relations with both men at the approximate time the child
was conceived.
There was no evidence presented that Denzik
contacted the child’s biological father until 2000 or that she
knew that Denzik was not the child’s father prior to that time.
The record shows that the parties acted as though
Denzik was the father of the minor child from the date of her
birth through 2000.
Denzik sought and received visitation with
the child despite various disputes through the years as to how
much visitation was appropriate.
During the custody and
visitation battles, Blazar never indicated that that Denzik was
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not the child’s father.
In his sworn deposition testimony
Denzik admitted that neither he nor anyone else had ever
questioned the child’s paternity.
He stated that his sister,
who is married to Blazar’s brother, never knew he was not the
father of the child until Blazar revealed the paternity test
results.
The record is devoid of any evidence that Blazar
fraudulently concealed paternity of the child.
Denzik argues that the jury is the finder of fact, and
had the right to determine the veracity of Blazar based on the
evidence before it.
He contends that a mother “knows” who the
father of her child is, and claims that Blazar must have somehow
known he was not the child’s father at the time she was
conceived.
law.
This argument is clearly without basis in fact or
As this Court recognizes, even in cases where the child’s
skin and hair tone differ markedly from that of the parent, a
paternity test is required to prove or disprove paternity.
the present case, no such marked difference is present.
In
The
child’s appearance as shown in photographs exhibited at trial is
not markedly different from Denzik’s.
There is a legal
presumption that a child born in wedlock is the natural child of
the married parties.
(1955).
Little v. Little, Ky., 275 S.W.2d 588, 589
No evidence in the record supports a finding that
Blazar intentionally deceived Denzik as to the paternity of the
child, or that Blazar knew of the fact that Denzik was not the
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father of the child until 2000.
Upon the discovery of the true
paternity of the child, Blazar promptly notified Denzik, and his
child support obligation was stopped.
In order to be successful on a claim of fraud, the
claimant must prove all applicable elements of fraud.
Rivermont
Inn, Inc. v. Bass Hotels & Resorts, Inc., Ky. App., 113 S.W.3d
636, 639 (2003), citing United Parcel Service v. Rickert, Ky.,
996 S.W.2d 464 (1999).
Denzik failed to provide any evidence in
support of his claims of fraud.
Evidence supporting a claim for
fraud must be sufficient to warrant sending the case to the
jury.
Hanson v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co., Ky., 865 S.W.2d
302, 307 (1993).
The record in this action is devoid of any
evidence supporting the claim of fraud.
When reviewing a jury determination, this Court “. . .
must accept the evidence as true; draw all reasonable inferences
from it in favor of the claimant; refrain from questioning the
credibility of the claimant, and refrain from assessing the
weight that should be given to any particular item of evidence.”
United Parcel Service v. Rickert, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 464, 468
(1999), citing Lewis v. Bledsoe Surface Mining Co., Ky., 798
S.W.2d 459 (1990).
The reviewing court may reverse the jury’s
determination only where the jury verdict is so flagrantly
against the weight of the evidence as to indicate passion or
prejudice.
Bierman v. Klapheke, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 16, 19 (1998).
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In the present case, the record does not contain any
evidence of intentional fraud on the part of Blazar.
credibility of the witnesses is not an issue here.
The
The only
evidence submitted was the admitted fact that Blazar had a brief
affair during the time that the child was conceived.
All
parties agree that at the same time she had an ongoing physical
relationship with her husband.
There is no showing that she
knew the child was not his at any point earlier than 2000.
For
this reason, the jury’s verdict goes directly against the
evidence before it, even when all reasonable inferences are made
in favor of the claimant.
For this reason, we reverse the jury
verdict.
Denzik claims that he is entitled to an award of all
child support previously paid by him.
Denzik admitted under
oath that he believed all payments made were used to benefit the
child, and that he could not provide any evidence that Blazar
used the payments inappropriately.
Child support is paid for
the benefit of the child, and any change in the amount of
support only operates prospectively.
707 S.W.2d 352, 353-54 (1986).
Clay v. Clay, Ky. App.,
Child support does not benefit
the mother, and thus she is not liable for support wrongfully
paid.
McBride v. McBride, 803 So.2d 1168, 1169 (Miss. 2002).
A
putative father generally will not be provided restitution for
child support made for a child which ultimately turns out not to
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be his.
Miller v. Miller., 956 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1998).
Child
support payments made in error, or in excess of the support
legally required are considered gifts to the child, and are not
recoverable by the payor.
(Iowa, 1990).
Newman v. Newman, 451 N.W.2d 843
Recoupment of back child support paid in error is
generally barred by the courts, as such a judgment would inflict
harm upon the child.
Wigginton v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 760
S.W.2d 885, 886 (1988).
Even where, as here, a child support
order is vacated, such vacation does not permit the payor a
right to recoup payments previously made.
App., 707 S.W.2d 352 (1986).
Clay v. Clay, Ky.
Under the circumstances in this
case, even if the evidence supported a finding that Blazar acted
fraudulently in obtaining child support, Denzik would not be
able to recoup payments made in the past which were used for the
benefit of the child.
For this reason, the jury’s verdict must
be reversed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Timothy J. Crocker
Mark A. Thurmond
Franklin, Kentucky
Kelly Thompson, Jr.
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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