JERRY W. LEONARD v. CITY OF LEBANON JUNCTION, KENTUCKY; AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT CABINET, DEPARTMENT FOR EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION; FRANKFORT, KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 3, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2003-CA-001785-MR
JERRY W. LEONARD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. WALLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00660
v.
CITY OF LEBANON JUNCTION, KENTUCKY; AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, WORKFORCE
DEVELOPMENT CABINET, DEPARTMENT FOR EMPLOYMENT
SERVICES, KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
COMMISSION; FRANKFORT, KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
TACKETT, JUDGE:
Jerry W. Leonard appeals from the dismissal of
his action against the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet for
Workforce Development and the City of Lebanon Junction.
The
Bullitt Circuit Court held that it had no subject matter
jurisdiction, as Leonard sought money damages against an immune
entity.
Leonard argues on appeal that the Commonwealth is not
entitled to sovereign immunity.
We affirm.
Leonard's claim arises from a rejected claim for
unemployment benefits, originally filed on April 1, 2001.
On
February 14, 2003, the Division of Unemployment Insurance held
that Leonard had knowingly made false statements to establish
the right to or the amount of benefits, and denied the claim
accordingly.
Leonard appealed that order, and a referee
conducted an evidentiary hearing on March 13, 2003.
The referee
affirmed the original decision, and Leonard appealed that
decision to the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission.
On
April 30, 2003, the Commission ordered a new hearing before a
different referee, because the tape recording of the hearing was
blank.
Leonard did not attend the new hearing, and the
Commission states in its brief that he did not attend because he
was not furnished a copy of the blank tape.
Leonard filed a
notice on the day of the hearing stating that he would not
participate in the scheduled hearing.
The Commission states
that the referee tried to contact Leonard three times
unsuccessfully.
Since the second hearing was not conducted, the
Commission affirmed the original referee.
Rather than file a motion for reconsideration, Leonard
filed this action in Bullitt Circuit Court, claiming damages for
"wrongful and negligent acts" of the Commission and the City
related to the handling of the unemployment claim.
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The circuit
court dismissed the action after the defendants asserted
sovereign immunity.
This appeal followed.
Leonard makes a rather tortured, incoherent argument
against sovereign immunity.
Since the doctrine of sovereign
immunity evolved from the notion that "the King can do no
wrong," and since the state constitution forbids the grant of
any title of nobility, Leonard asserts that therefore, there is
no such thing as sovereign immunity because there is no king.
Particularly, Leonard argues that municipalities are not
entitled to immunities at all; likewise, he claims that state
agencies, not being governments in themselves, are not entitled
to immunity.
He also contends that the case of Yanero v. Davis,
Ky., 65 S.W.3d 510 (2001) stands for the proposition that the
Board of Claims statute is not a creation of immunity, but a
waiver of immunity to the extent that immunity exists.
He
asserts that the requirement that he bring any action before the
Board of Claims is unconstitutional.
Leonard also insists that his action is an original
action and not an appeal, nor is it an attempt at judicial
review of the decision of the Commission.
Leonard maintained in
the circuit court that the defendants did not understand this
distinction when the defendants argued that Kentucky Revised
Statute (KRS) 341.450 et seq. established a procedure for
obtaining judicial review of a decision of the Commission, with
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which Leonard failed to comply.
According to Leonard, that
statute does not limit the court's subject matter jurisdiction,
since this action purports to be an action for damages for
negligence in the performance of the agency's "ministerial
functions".
Leonard fails to understand that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is not an "antiquated privilege" but is very
much alive and well in Kentucky.
As the Commission correctly
points out, a government acts through its agencies, and those
agencies are entitled to immunity when performing nonministerial functions.
Naturally, Leonard claims that the
defendants were negligent in performing their ministerial
functions, but a "ministerial" act is one in which the agency
has no discretion; non-ministerial, or discretionary, acts
cannot be a basis for recovery under the Board of Claims Act.
Collins v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet, Ky., 10 S.W.3d 122, 125
(2000).
Likewise, a state agency has absolute immunity when
exercising a quasi-judicial power.
"Quasi-judicial" power is
the power of an administrative body to adjudicate the rights of
persons before it; here, the Commission was acting in a quasijudicial capacity in hearing Leonard's claim for unemployment
benefits.
Accordingly, it is entitled to absolute immunity for
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any actions taken in the exercise of that power.
Leonard claims
that his action arises from the "publication" of notice that it
was conducting a fraud investigation against him.
This, too, is
a discretionary function of the agency, and therefore the agency
is entitled to immunity.
Further, the acts Leonard complains of
are the very acts that could have been reviewed had Leonard
followed the statutory process outlined in KRS 341.450(1);
having failed to exhaust his remedies, he cannot complain that
he was falsely accused of making false statements in his
application for unemployment benefits through a collateral
attack on the agency's decision which purports to be an original
action for defamation.
Leonard's failure to conform to the
statute, despite his assertions to the contrary, is fatal to his
action against both the agency and his former employer.
We will not address the question of whether the
Bullitt Circuit Court was the proper venue for the action, as
our decision affirms the dismissal of the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
Leonard cannot maintain an action
in any circuit court, so whether venue was proper is a moot
point.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Bullitt
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Jerry W. Leonard, Pro Se
Ekron, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: CITY OF
LEBANON JUCTION, KENTUCKY
Mark E. Edison
Shepherdsville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT CABINET,
DEPARTMENT FOR EMPLOYMENT
SERVICES, KENTUCKY
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
COMMISSION; FRANKFORT,
KENTUCKY
Tamela A. Biggs
Frankfort, Kentucky
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