COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. DEMARCUS COLEMAN
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RENDERED: June 25, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001681-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-002315
DEMARCUS COLEMAN
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON AND MINTON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
The Commonwealth has appealed from an
interlocutory order of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered on
July 23, 2003, which granted Demarcus Coleman’s motion to
suppress evidence.
Having concluded that the trial court erred
by determining that “some reasonable suspicion of drug activity”
was required before the plain-feel doctrine could have justified
the seizure of the crack cocaine found on Coleman’s person, we
vacate and remand for further proceedings.
The relevant facts are not in dispute.
On October 21,
2002, Coleman was indicted by a Jefferson County grand jury on
one count of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first
degree,1 one count of possession of marijuana,2 one count of
illegal use or possession of drug paraphernalia,3 one count of
loitering,4 one count of drinking alcoholic beverages in a public
place,5 and on one count of illegal possession of a controlled
substance in the first degree.6
One week later, Coleman appeared
in court and entered pleas of not guilty to all of the charges
in his indictment.
On January 29, 2003, Coleman filed a motion to
suppress all of the evidence against him on grounds that it had
been obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Section 10 of
the Kentucky Constitution.
March 7, 2003.
A suppression hearing was held on
Our review of the record of that hearing reveals
the following.
At approximately 4:00 a.m. on March 14, 2002, Officer
Brenda Turner of the Louisville Police Department was on foot
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1412.
2
KRS 218A.1422.
3
KRS 218A.500.
4
KRS 525.090.
5
KRS 222.202.
6
KRS 218A.1415.
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patrol near an apartment complex in the Park Hill area of
Louisville.
During her patrol, Officer Turner observed Coleman
walking around outside the area of one of the apartment
buildings while drinking what appeared to be an alcoholic
beverage.
Officer Turner stated that when she approached
Coleman, he attempted to enter a nearby building, but he stopped
when she called for him to come back and answer some questions.
Upon initial questioning, Coleman informed Officer
Turner that he did not live in that particular apartment
complex, and that he lived in a different area of the city.
Approximately 30-45 seconds later, after Officer Turner’s backup
had arrived on the scene, she placed Coleman in handcuffs and
conducted a Terry7 pat-down of his outer clothing.8
Officer
Turner testified that during this pat-down, she felt a large,
irregularly-shaped hard object in what appeared to be a plastic
baggie inside Coleman’s jacket pocket.
Officer Turner stated
that she immediately recognized the object as crack cocaine.
Officer Turner removed the object from Coleman’s pocket,
confirmed that it was in fact crack cocaine, formally placed
Coleman under arrest, and read him his Miranda9 rights.
7
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
8
Officer Turner stated that although she did not at that time place Coleman
under arrest, it was her personal policy to arrest individuals for drinking
alcohol in public unless it was clear that they lived nearby and could get
home safely.
9
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
-3-
After reading Coleman his Miranda rights, Officer
Turner stated that he informed her that his girlfriend lived at
the apartment complex in question, and that he sometimes stayed
with her.
Officer Turner stated that she asked Coleman if he
had anything in his girlfriend’s apartment that was of an
illegal nature.
Officer Turner testified that Coleman told her
that he had a small bag of marijuana, a scale, and some baggies.
Consequently, Officer Turner went to his girlfriend’s apartment
and obtained her consent to enter and seize the items that
Coleman had described.10
The trial court entered an order on July 23, 2003,
granting Coleman’s motion to suppress evidence.
The trial court
determined that although Officer Turner had reasonable suspicion
to conduct the initial Terry stop and pat-down of Coleman’s
person, the plain-feel doctrine did not justify Officer Turner’s
seizure of the crack cocaine found in Coleman’s jacket pocket.
Hence, the trial court ultimately concluded that the crack
cocaine had been seized as a result of an illegal search, and
that the marijuana and drug paraphernalia found in Coleman’s
girlfriend’s apartment were “fruits” of that illegal search.
Therefore, the trial court ordered all of the drug evidence
against Coleman to be suppressed.
10
This appeal followed.
Officer Turner stated that Coleman’s girlfriend was not arrested on the
morning in question.
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In granting Coleman’s motion to suppress, the trial
court stated in part as follows:
The Court agrees with the Commonwealth
that the police had reasonable suspicion to
stop [Coleman] based on his apparent use of
alcohol in a public place. Furthermore, the
Terry pat down would be justified for the
officer’s safety. The pat down did not
reveal the feel of a firearm or other
weapon. What it revealed was a lump in a
bag in [Coleman’s] jacket pocket.
The Court would acknowledge that the
odds of a resident of a project having crack
cocaine on their person are high. Absent,
however, some reasonable suspicion[ ] of
drug activity the Court is not satisfied
with the probability that a lump in a bag in
an otherwise legitimate location (a pocket)
could reasonably be assumed to be contraband
when measured against the community as a
whole.
Stop any person walking in a parking
lot in an east end mall, make the same
“feel[,]” and the odds of illegitimacy fail
substantially.
If the item had been felt on [Coleman]
in a suspicious location, in a sock in his
underwear, then the probability of
illegitimacy increases because it appears
there is intent to conceal.
On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred
as a matter of law by determining that “some reasonable
suspicion of drug activity” was required before Officer Turner
could have been justified in seizing the crack cocaine found
in Coleman’s jacket pocket.
We agree.
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In Minnesota v. Dickerson,11 the Supreme Court of the
United States discussed the rationale and purpose of the
plain-feel doctrine:
We think that [the plain-view] doctrine
has an obvious application by analogy to
cases in which an officer discovers
contraband through the sense of touch during
an otherwise lawful search. The rationale
of the plain-view doctrine is that if
contraband is left in open view and is
observed by a police officer from a lawful
vantage point, there has been no invasion of
a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus
no “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment--or at least no search independent
of the initial intrusion that gave the
officers their vantage point. The
warrantless seizure of contraband that
presents itself in this manner is deemed
justified by the realization that resort to
a neutral magistrate under such
circumstances would often be impracticable
and would do little to promote the
objectives of the Fourth Amendment. The
same can be said of tactile discoveries of
contraband. If a police officer lawfully
pats down a suspect’s outer clothing and
feels an object whose contour or mass makes
its identity immediately apparent, there has
been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy
beyond that already authorized by the
officer’s search for weapons; if the object
is contraband, its warrantless seizure would
be justified by the same practical
considerations that inhere in the plain-view
context [citations omitted].12
11
508 U.S. 366, 375-76, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2137, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993).
12
See also Commonwealth v. Whitmore, Ky., 92 S.W.3d 76, 80 (2002)(stating
that “[i]n Kentucky, in determining whether a ‘plain feel’ or ‘plain touch’
rule is applicable, it has been concluded that a narrowly drawn exception to
the requirement for a warrant is appropriate when the requirements of Terry,
supra, are otherwise met and the nonthreatening contraband is immediately
apparent from a sense of touch” [citations omitted]).
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However, the plain-feel doctrine does not dispense
with the requirement that a seizure of suspected contraband be
supported by probable cause.13
Rather, the plain-feel doctrine
merely states that probable cause to seize suspected contraband
may be found if, during an otherwise lawful Terry pat-down, the
illegal nature of the object detected becomes immediately
apparent to the officer based upon the sense of touch.14
Hence,
the plain-feel doctrine, much like the plain-view doctrine, is
an exception to the warrant requirement.15
In the case sub judice, we hold that the trial court
erred in its plain-feel doctrine analysis.
As Whitmore makes
clear, when the Commonwealth argues that the plain-feel doctrine
justifies the seizure of the contraband in question, the sole
issue is whether the officer, based upon her experience in
conducting Terry pat-downs, can articulate specific facts which,
if believed, would support a finding that the illegal nature of
13
Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 376 (stating that “[r]egardless of whether the
officer detects the contraband by sight or by touch, however, the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement that the officer have probable cause to believe that
the item is contraband before seizing it ensures against excessively
speculative seizures”).
14
See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 1153, 94 L.Ed.2d
347 (1987)(holding that an officer must have probable cause to believe that
an object is contraband before the plain-view doctrine will justify the
seizure of the object); and Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.Ct.
2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)(discussing the analogous plain-view doctrine and
holding that the “incriminating character” of the suspected contraband must
be “immediately apparent” to the officer before the seizure will be
justified).
15
See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375.
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the object detected became “immediately apparent” to the officer
during the Terry pat-down.16
Accordingly, since the trial court
did not make the appropriate factual findings with respect to
the plain-feel doctrine issue, we must vacate the trial court’s
order and remand with instructions to apply the Whitmore
standard to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.
Finally, we note that Coleman states in his brief that
he “does not concede” that the initial Terry stop and pat-down
of his person were constitutionally permissible as found by the
trial court.
Hence, if the trial court on remand denies
Coleman’s motion to suppress evidence, Coleman may then appeal
both the constitutionality of the initial Terry stop and patdown, and the seizure based on the plain-feel doctrine.
Based on the foregoing, the order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court is vacated and this matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
16
Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d at 80 (noting that “[h]ere, the officer testified at
the suppression hearing that she had four years[’] experience as a police
officer and had participated in over 100 drug arrests. She stated that
Whitmore was wearing a light nylon jacket and that when she did the pat down
search, the bag of crack cocaine was immediately recognizable based on her
experience. The officer testified to specific and articulable facts that the
bulge in the nylon jacket contained contraband. She described the amount,
the shape and the packaging and the unique feel of the substance. She stated
that these facts indicated to her, based on her experience, that the bulge
was crack cocaine. Moreover, the substance was not in any container that
shielded its identity. The seizure of the crack cocaine was lawful and the
trial judge was correct in overruling the motion to suppress”).
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Scott B. Drabenstadt
Louisville, Kentucky
Jeanne Anderson
Special Asst. Attorney General
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
Jeanne Anderson
Special Asst. Attorney General
Louisville, Kentucky
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