MICHAEL L. DIGIURO, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF TRENT DIGIURO v. SHANE RAGLAND
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RENDERED:
June 25, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001555-MR
MICHAEL L. DIGIURO,
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
OF TRENT DIGIURO
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LAURANCE B. VANMETER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-02669
v.
SHANE RAGLAND
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, DYCHE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE.
In this matter, we are asked to review summary
judgment entered on behalf of appellee, Shane Ragland, by the
Fayette Circuit Court.
We reverse.
Trent DiGiuro, a student at the University of
Kentucky, was killed by a single gunshot wound on July 17, 1994,
while sitting on his front porch during a party celebrating his
twenty-first birthday.
His murder went unsolved for many years.
However, in January of 2000, Shane Ragland was identified by his
ex-girlfriend as Trent’s killer.
According to the affidavit of
Detective Don Evans, Shane murdered Trent because Trent had
prevented Shane from becoming a member of a campus fraternity.
Shane was arrested for Trent’s murder on July 14,
2000.
A preliminary hearing was held on July 19, 2000; the
trial court found probable cause to believe that Shane had
committed the crime.
Shane was thereafter indicted on August
29, 2000, by a grand jury of the Fayette Circuit Court.
On
March 27, 2002, a jury found him guilty of Trent’s murder, and
he was sentenced to thirty years in prison.
Trent’s father, Michael L. DiGiuro, was appointed
Administrator of Trent’s estate on April 24, 2001, and he filed
the instant action for wrongful death on July 1, 2002.1
Initially, the case was assigned to Circuit Court Judge Gary
Payne, who, without comment, denied a motion to dismiss the case
as being time-barred.
This matter was then transferred to Judge
VanMeter, who determined on summary judgment that the wrongful
death action was indeed time-barred.
The trial court’s rationale was that Trent’s estate
should have:
1
We note that the original complaint in this action was not signed, and there
is no amended complaint. Apparently, this was not brought to the trial
court’s attention. Because the matter has been litigated to this point
without this having been brought up and in the absence of any type of
allegations invoking Rule 11, we find no harm at this point. However, upon
remand, the trial court should direct the plaintiff to file a signed amended
complaint.
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discovered “not only that [Trent] has been
injured but also that his injury may have
been caused by the defendant’s conduct,” and
based on the fact that after the arrest,
preliminary hearing and indictment, the
defendant was no longer concealed or
obstructing prosecution of a wrongful death
action, this Court is unable to escape the
conclusion that the plaintiff knew or should
have known no later than July 19, 2000, the
date of the preliminary hearing in Fayette
District Court, not only that he had been
injured, but that his injury may been have
caused by the defendant’s conduct. The case
law is clear that certainty is not required,
and the presence or absence of a criminal
proceeding or conviction of the defendant
has no bearing on the running of the statute
of limitations for a civil action based on
the same facts and circumstances.
(T.R. p. 254)(emphasis in original).
Mr. DiGiuro has appealed this ruling, arguing that
this action should not be barred as untimely and that the time
for bringing it should have been tolled until Shane was
convicted.
We are faced with a difficult issue borne from an
unsettling factual background.
“At common law, when the tortfeasor killed, rather
than seriously injured his victim, he was immune from civil
action.
Wrongful death statutes were therefore adopted to
reverse this result.”
Conner v. George W. Whitesides Co., Ky.,
834 S.W.2d 652, 655 (1992) (Stephens, C.J., dissenting).
Kentucky has had several versions of wrongful death statutes,
some of which have included time limitations.
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The present
version of Kentucky’s wrongful death statute does not, however.
It states as follows:
Whenever the death of a person results
from an injury inflicted by the negligence
or wrongful act of another, damages may be
recovered for the death from the person who
caused it, or whose agent or servant caused
it. If the act was willful or the
negligence gross, punitive damages may be
recovered. The action shall be prosecuted
by the personal representative of the
deceased.
KRS 411.130(1).
Kentucky courts have routinely applied a one-year
statute of limitations period to wrongful death cases using the
general limitation period in KRS 413.140.
654.
Conner, 834 S.W.2d at
The Court in Conner cited Carden v. Louisville & N.R. Co.,
101 Ky. 113, 39 S.W. 1027 (1897), for this holding.
However, in
the Carden case, the relevant statute at that time, the Death
Act, included an express one-year statute of limitations,
See Nichols v. Chesapeake
whereas the current statute does not.
& O. Ry. Co., 195 F. 913, 917 (6th Cir. 1912).
KRS 413.140 reads as follows:
(1) The following actions shall be commenced
within one (1) year after the cause of
action accrued:
(a) An action for an injury to the person
of the plaintiff, or of her husband,
his wife, child, ward, apprentice, or
servant . . . .
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Clearly, however, KRS 413.140 on its face does not
include wrongful deaths.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky has held that “[d]eath is simply the final injury to a
person.”
Conner, 834 S.W.2d at 654.
KRS 413.180 provides the time limitations for a
personal representative of the deceased to bring a cause of
action.
This statute provides in relevant part that:
(1) If a person entitled to bring any
action mentioned in KRS 413.090 to 413.160
dies before the expiration of the time
limited for its commencement and the cause
of action survives, the action may be
brought by his personal representative after
the expiration of that time, if commenced
within one (1) year after the qualification
of the representative.
(2) If a person dies before the time at
which the right to bring any action
mentioned in KRS 413.090 to 413.160 would
have accrued to him if he had continued
alive, and there is an interval of more than
one (1) year between his death and the
qualification of his personal
representative, that representative, for
purposes of this chapter, shall be deemed to
have qualified on the last day of the oneyear period.
This statute on its face limits its scope to actions
“mentioned” in KRS 413.090 to 413.160, which does not include
the wrongful death statute.
Nonetheless, the Court in Conner,
834 S.W.2d at 653-54, held that, although the wrongful death
statute was not explicitly included in KRS 413.180, wrongful
death actions fall under its umbrella because KRS 413.140 has
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long been recognized as establishing a one-year limitation for
wrongful death actions, and it is specifically included in KRS
413.180.
Having reviewed the relevant statutes at issue, our
attention now turns to statutory construction factors and the
purpose of statutes of limitations.
“Although the previous rule
in Kentucky was that statutes of limitations should be strictly
construed, Newby’s Adm’r v. Warren’s Adm’r, 277 Ky. 338, 126
S.W.2d 436 at 437 (1939), KRS 446.080 provides that ‘[a]ll
statutes of this state shall be liberally construed with a view
to promote their objects and carry out the intent of the
legislature . . . .’”
Plaza Bottle Shop, Inc. v. Al Torstrick
Ins. Agency, Inc., Ky. App., 712 S.W.2d 349, 351 (1986).
Nonetheless, statutes of limitations should not be “lightly
Munday v. Mayfair Diagnostic Lab., Ky., 831
evaded” either.
S.W.2d 912, 914 (1992) (citing Fannin v. Lewis, Ky., 254 S.W.2d
479, 481 (1952)).
“‘The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.’”
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Reker, Ky., 100 S.W.3d 756, 763
(2003) (quoting Kentucky Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Jeffers, Ky., 13
S.W.3d 606, 610 (2000)).
We “must consider ‘the intended
purpose of the statute — the reason and spirit of the statute
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— and the mischief intended to be remedied.’”
Commonwealth v.
Kash, Ky. App., 967 S.W.2d 37, 43-44 (1997) (quoting City of
Louisville v. Helman, Ky., 253 S.W.2d 598, 600 (1952)).
“The
Kentucky General Assembly and [the Supreme] Court [of Kentucky]
have long recognized the value of statutes which ‘bar stale
claims arising out of transactions or occurrences which took
place in the distant past.’”
Munday, supra at 914 (citing
Armstrong v. Logsdon, Ky., 469 S.W.2d 342, 343 (1971)).
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that
“‘[s]tatutes of limitation find their justification in necessity
and convenience rather than in logic. . . .
They are practical
and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of
stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense
after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared,
and evidence has been lost.’”
Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91,
102 (1982) (quoting Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325
U.S. 304, 314 (1945)).
There can be no doubt that statutes of limitations can
be arbitrary and sometimes operate to halt legitimate claims.
See Simmons v. South Central Skyworker’s, Inc., 936 F.2d 268,
270 (1991) (citing Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31
(1986)).
However, to prevent such a harsh application, both the
courts and the legislature have carved out exceptions to this
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rule.
We quote from Munday, 831 S.W.2d at 914-915 on this as
follows:
Parties are at liberty to contract for a
limitation period less than the period fixed
by statute. Johnson v. Calvert Fire Ins.
Co., 298 Ky. 669, 183 S.W.2d 941 (1945).
Likewise, after a cause of action has
accrued, parties may, by agreement, extend
the time for filing the action beyond the
time in which the limitation would otherwise
run. Bankokentucky Co.’s Receiver v.
National Bank of Kentucky’s Receiver, 281
Ky. 784, 137 S.W.2d 357, 369 (1939). An
estoppel may arise to prevent a party from
relying on a statute of limitation by virtue
of a false representation or fraudulent
concealment. Cuppy v. General Accident Fire
and Life Assurance Corp., Ky., 378 S.W.2d
629 (1964). And for persons under a legal
disability, the running of the statute of
limitations ordinarily does not commence
until the disability is removed. Gunnels v.
Stanley, 296 Ky. 662, 178 S.W.2d 195 (1944).
Finally, we have held that as statutes of
limitations are in derogation of
presumptively valid claims, when doubt
exists as to which statute should prevail,
the longer period should be applied.
Troxell v. Trammell, Ky., 730 S.W.2d 525
(1987).
A claim of equitable estoppel is widely
utilized by parties who seek to avoid a
statute of limitation defense. Long ago a
tolling statute was enacted which provides
that a resident of this State who absconds
or conceals himself “or by any other
indirect means obstructs the prosecution of
the action” shall not have benefit of the
statute of limitation so long as the
obstruction continues. KRS 413.190(2). We
have held that this tolling statute is
simply a recognition in law of an equitable
estoppel or estoppel in pais to prevent
fraudulent or inequitable application of a
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statute of limitation. Adams v. Ison, Ky.,
249 S.W.2d 791 (1952). Our decisions
construing the statute and applying
equitable estoppel appear to require “some
act or conduct which in point of fact
misleads or deceives plaintiff and obstructs
or prevents him from instituting his suit
while he may do so.” Id. at 792. In Second
National Bank and Trust Co. v. First
Security National Bank and Trust Co., Ky.,
398 S.W.2d 50 (1966), we held that
fraudulent conduct or concealment could not
be assumed in the absence of evidence to
support it.
Ordinarily, proof of fraud requires a
showing of an affirmative act by the party
charged. An exception to this general rule
may be found in a party’s silence when the
law imposes a duty to speak or disclose.
Such was the case in Security Trust Co. v.
Wilson, 307 Ky. 152, 210 S.W.2d 336 (1948),
in which it was alleged that a deceased
uncle who had served as fiduciary for his
niece had converted her property to his own
use. The Court emphasized the language in
KRS 413.190 “by any other indirect means”
and stated:
“The indirect means employed
by the uncle in the case at Bar,
if it existed, was a failure to
speak and advise his niece that he
had exchanged her bonds for other
bonds and taken the title in his
own name.” Id. at 339.
The Court relied on Kurry v. Frost, 204
Ark. 386, 162 S.W.2d 48 (1942), which held
that a party who, in violation of the law,
left the scene of an automobile accident
after striking another person, “concealed
her identity.” The Court in Wilson held
that the law imposed upon the uncle a duty
of disclosure to his niece as follows:
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“that this fiduciary
relationship was such that there
was a duty upon the part of the
said Curtis to advise the said
plaintiff that he had exchanged
her bonds and taken the title to
the ones exchanged for in his own
name; that this concealment
constituted a means of obstruction
within the meaning of KRS 413.190,
and that this concealment tolled
the running of the statute of
limitations.” Security Trust Co.,
210 S.W.2d at 339-40.
The “discovery rule” is also a judicially created
exception first adopted in this Commonwealth in Tomlinson v.
Siehl, Ky., 459 S.W.2d 166, 167-68 (1970).
In this
Commonwealth, cases utilizing the discovery rule generally
involve medical malpractice or product liability issues.
The
discovery rule has not yet been analyzed in a case similar to
the one at hand.
Under the discovery rule “‘a cause of action
will not accrue . . . until the plaintiff discovers or in the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered not only
that he has been injured but also that his injury may have been
caused by the defendant’s conduct.’”
Perkins v. Northeastern
Log Homes, Ky., 808 S.W.2d 809, 819 (1991) (citing Louisville
Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Products, Ky., 580 S.W.2d 497, 501
(1979)).
While the circuit court did not so specifically state
the rule, it indeed applied it in this matter.
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We believe that
in its opinion, the circuit court committed error by stating
that “[t]his law is clear that certainty is not required, and
the presence or absence of a criminal proceeding or conviction
of the defendant has no bearing on the running of the statute of
limitations for a civil action based on the same facts and
circumstances.”
On the contrary, there are no Kentucky cases
stating this principle in regard to a criminal matter affecting
a civil matter.
Further, courts in this Commonwealth have not
consistently applied the discovery rule.
Some courts have held
that, once an injured party has discovered his injury, the
statute of limitations is not tolled where a plaintiff has
failed to identify or locate potential defendants.
See Simmons
v. South Central Skyworker’s, Inc., 936 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1991);
Reese v. General American Door Co., Ky. App., 6 S.W.3d 380, 383
(1998).
However, in Wiseman v. Alliant Hosp., Inc., Ky., 37
S.W.3d 709, 712 (2000), the Court held that to trigger the
limitation period one must know:
(1) he has been wronged and
(2) by whom the wrong has been committed.
Moreover, because the discovery rule evolved initially
under medical malpractice and later was applied to product
liability and similar cases, we cannot say that it would also be
accurate to expand it to apply in the present matter.
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However,
because we ultimately resolve this matter on other grounds, we
will leave resolution of this issue for another time.
Next, in absence of Kentucky cases on point, we
analyze what other jurisdictions have done under similar facts.
The Supreme Court of Ohio in Collins v. Sotka, 81 Ohio St. 3d
506, 692 N.E.2d 581 (1998), held that a wrongful death claim
accrued when the court entered an order sentencing the defendant
for the victim’s murder.
In Collins, the Court held that it was
“unwilling to further condone . . . a ludicrous result” where “a
tortfeasor need only kill his or her victim and fraudulently
conceal the cause of death for two years to be absolved from
civil liability.”
(citation omitted).
81 Ohio St. 3d at 511, 692 N.E.2d at 584-85
Although statutory authority was lacking,
the Court thereafter held that:
In a wrongful death action that stems
from a murder, the statute of limitations
begins to run when the victim’s survivors
discover, or through the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have
discovered, that the defendant has been
convicted and sentenced for the murder.
Id.
Other courts reviewing wrongful death cases involving
a murder have tolled the statute of limitations at least until
the identity of the murderer was discovered.
See Bennett v.
F.B.I., 278 F.Supp.2d 104 (D. Mass. 2003); Bernoskie v.
Zarinsky, 344 N.J. Super. 160, 781 A.2d 52 (2001); Friedland v.
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Gales, 131 N.C. App. 802, 509 S.E.2d 793 (1998); McClendon v.
State of Louisiana, 357 So.2d 1218 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1978).
However, in each of these cases, the decedent’s estate brought a
wrongful death action within the limitation period.
None of the
courts addressed how they would have resolved the issue had the
decedent’s estate waited until after conviction before filing a
civil action.
The court in Richards v. LaCour, 515 So.2d 813 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 1987), however, did address this issue.
It
concluded that by the time of the defendant’s indictment, the
decedent’s estate was aware of his identity and should have
filed suit within the limitation period.
While we are not bound by the decisions from other
jurisdictions, we look to their reasoning for guidance on this
issue and find that the primary concern of the courts is that a
criminal defendant should not be permitted to hide behind the
protection of a statute of limitations defense when his actions
resulted in an insurmountable obstacle in the victim’s estate
timely pursuing civil remedies.
Indeed, it does seem absurd
that where one has been a “successful” murderer for a number of
years, he is provided benefits and arbitrary defenses under the
law.
Having reviewed the purposes of statutes of
limitations and other jurisdictions’ resolution on similar
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issues, we turn finally to public policy considerations.
We
conclude that the resolution of this issue must turn on the
public policy of this Commonwealth to which we look for guidance
from the General Assembly.
We believe that a defined statute of limitations
period enacted by our legislature expresses the public policy of
this Commonwealth.
But there is no such limitation statute
enacted by the General Assembly in regard specifically to
wrongful death actions.
Because our current wrongful death
statute has no set time limit, our legislature has shown no
public policy on this particular issue.
We are well aware of the previous holding by courts in
this Commonwealth that wrongful death cases are governed by the
one-year limitation period in KRS 413.140; however, the courts
have not reviewed this issue in the context of a murder case.
We believe that there are different public policy issues in a
civil matter such as medical malpractice or product liability
cases as compared to a murder case.
In the medical malpractice
and product liability cases, the statute of limitations fulfills
its intended purpose to prevent stale claims and force the
plaintiff to use due diligence in discovering the tortfeasor and
gathering evidence.
It also protects the defendant from being
unduly burdened with old claims, advances prompt discovery of
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evidence to build a defense, and operates to prevent fraudulent
claims.
On the other hand, in this matter, these factors are
weakened considerably, if present at all.
In this case, the
claim is already stale due to Shane’s skills in carrying out
Trent’s murder and concealing his involvement in the crime.
Had
he not informed someone of it, his guilt most likely would have
gone undiscovered even yet.
Indeed, nothing in the record shows
that he was previously a suspect in the case.
Shane committed
the “perfect” murder for his guilt to go undetected, if there is
such a thing.
We also believe that this Commonwealth’s public policy
is that victims such as the DiGiuro family deserve a remedy.
The wrongful death statute itself is evidence of this and is
remedial in nature.
its intent.
Therefore, it should be construed to effect
Also, while not relevant to the case at hand, KRS
Chapter 346 evidences our legislature’s intent that families of
victims of crime be compensated.
Furthermore, delaying the civil matter would not
subvert the public policy of resolving claims promptly even
after Shane had been named a suspect or after his indictment.
Shane cannot complain that the civil matter took him by
surprise.
While the considerations in a civil and criminal
matter are separate, we cannot say that Shane was prejudiced in
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any way.
Moreover, had the jury found him not guilty, this
finding would have been beneficial to him in defending the civil
action or the civil matter might be dismissed altogether.
Alternatively, where a defendant ultimately pleads guilty, he
would be hard pressed to challenge a civil matter where the
burden of proof is lower.
Moreover, civil matters are routinely and almost
exclusively stayed until the criminal matter is resolved.
Discovery in the civil matter would in all probability have been
stayed as there is a difference between the discovery privileges
available to a defendant in each type of case.
See Degen v.
U.S., 517 U.S. 820, 825 (1996) (citing Afro-Lecon, Inc. v. U.S.,
820 F.2d 1198, 1203-1204 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Campbell v. Eastland,
307 F.2d 478, 487 (5th Cir. 1962)).
A criminal defendant is entitled to
rather limited discovery, with no general
right to obtain the statements of the
Government’s witnesses before they have
testified. Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 16(a)(2),
26.2. In a civil case, by contrast, a party
is entitled as a general matter to discovery
of any information sought if it appears
“reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b)(1).
Degen, 517 U.S. at 825-26.
Under the facts of this case, a stay would actually
serve the purpose of effective use of judicial resources and
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time, as well as benefit the parties.
Through the resolution of
the criminal matter most discovery will take place.
In this matter, we are faced with a set of facts in
which enforcing a statute of limitations, not specifically
included by the General Assembly in the wrongful death statute,
will not result in furthering the purpose of time limitations.
Had Trent’s estate filed suit in this matter within one year of
the discovery that Shane may have been responsible for Trent’s
death, in all probability, the civil matter would have been
stayed pending the outcome of the criminal matter.
Hence, the
statute of limitations would not operate as it would normally to
end litigation and prevent stale claims.
In sum, we conclude that, under the facts of this
particular case and in absence of a specific limitation period
prescribed by the wrongful death statute, the public policy of
this Commonwealth would not be furthered by using the general
statute of limitations.
Instead, we find that the public policy
of this Commonwealth would be furthered by allowing the family
of a murder victim to wait until conviction of a defendant
before filing suit.
There being no statutory authority or
binding case law on point, we now hold narrowly that a case
involving an unsolved murder has different policy considerations
than other wrongful death actions and decline to apply KRS
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413.140.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter to the
trial court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, CONCURS.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, DISSENTING.
I conclude that
neither the discovery rule nor KRS 413.190(2) affords the
appellant any relief in the determination of whether its
complaint was filed within the limitation period.
respectfully dissent.
Therefore, I
Before doing so, however, I feel it is
necessary to summarize the salient points of the majority
opinion in order that my dissenting views may be properly
understood.
Since DiGiuro’s death occurred on July 17, 1994, and
the civil action was filed on July 1, 2002, the statute of
limitation set forth in KRS 413.140(1)(a) barred the complaint
as untimely unless the appellant could show relief under either
the discovery rule or KRS 413.190(2).
The majority declines to
state whether it believes the discovery rule should be extended
to cases of this nature, and the majority does not address KRS
413.190(2) in any manner.
Rather, the majority decides this
case on public policy considerations, states that the victim’s
family deserves a remedy, and declines to apply the one-year
statute of limitation in KRS 413.140(1)(a) in any manner.
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I
believe that neither the discovery rule nor KRS 413.190(2) save
the complaint from being time-barred, and I believe that public
policy considerations are generally best left for determinations
by the legislature or by our supreme court.
“With the exception of cases involving latent injuries
from exposure to harmful substances, Kentucky courts have
generally refused to extend the discovery rule without statutory
authority to do so.”
Roman Catholic Diocese of Covington v.
Secter, Ky. App., 966 S.W.2d 286, 288 (1998).
“Kentucky case
law has previously limited the extension of the discovery rule
primarily to causes of action arising from recovery of stolen
property, medical or professional malpractice and latent illness
or injury resulting from exposure to harmful substances.”
Vandertoll v. Commonwealth, Ky., 110 S.W.3d 789, 796 (2003).
Furthermore, in Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp., Ky., 580 S.W.2d 497 (1979), the Kentucky Supreme Court
agreed that the issue of extending the discovery rule was a
matter of policy and that the Kentucky Court of Appeals should
not attempt to make new policy.
Id. at 499.
However, assuming that the discovery rule should be
made applicable herein, it would not result in the appellant’s
complaint being held to be timely filed.
In the Johns-Manville
case our supreme court stated that “[a] cause of action will not
accrue under the discovery rule until the plaintiff discovers or
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in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered
not only that he has been injured but also that his injury may
have been caused by the defendant’s conduct.”
Id. at 501,
quoting Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170,
174 (1977).
See also Gray v. Commonwealth, Transp. Cab., Dep’t
of Highways, Ky. App., 973 S.W.2d 61, 62 (1997).
Assuming the
applicability of the discovery rule to the facts herein, the
appellant knew that DiGiuro’s death may have been caused by the
appellee when the appellee was arrested or by no later than the
preliminary hearing held on July 19, 2000.
The one-year statute
of limitation was tolled until no later than that date.
Therefore, since the appellant’s complaint was filed on July 1,
2002, it would be time-barred even if the discovery rule had
applicability.
Regardless, the majority opinion does not rest
on the discovery rule.
Turning to the applicability of KRS 413.190(2), that
statute states as follows:
When a cause of action mentioned in KRS
413.090 to 413.160 accrues against a
resident of this state, and he by absconding
or concealing himself or by any other
indirect means obstructs the prosecution of
the action, the time of the continuance of
the absence from the state or obstruction
shall not be computed as any part of the
period within which the action shall be
commenced. But this saving shall not
prevent the limitation from operating in
favor of any other person not so acting,
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whether he is a necessary party to the
action or not.
Id.
The majority made little mention of this statute in its
opinion.
However, the appellant claims that the statute saves
its complaint from being time-barred.
The cause of action herein arose under KRS 411.130(1).
In Conner v. George W. Whitesides Co., Ky., 834 S.W.2d 652, 654
(1992), the court reaffirmed the applicability of the one-year
limitation period in KRS 413.140(1)(a) to wrongful death claims.
Therefore, since this cause of action is subject to KRS
413.140(1)(a), KRS 413.190(2) is also applicable.
Pursuant to
that statute, the one-year limitation period does not run when
the defendant has absconded, concealed himself, or by any other
indirect means obstructed the prosecution of the action.
See
KRS 413.190(2).
Assuming that the appellee absconded, concealed
himself, or by any other indirect means obstructed the
prosecution of the action, he did so only until he was arrested
on July 14, 2000.
As of that date, his identity was revealed
and the appellant was no longer unable to prosecute a civil
action against him.
Therefore, since the complaint was not
filed until nearly two years after the appellee’s arrest, the
complaint was time-barred.
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The appellant argues that the appellee concealed his
identity even after his arrest and that he continued to do so by
maintaining his innocence.
Therefore, the appellant asserts the
one-year limitation period did not begin to run until the
appellee was convicted of the crime.
Thus, since the jury
verdict was rendered on March 27, 2002, and the civil complaint
was filed on July 1, 2002, the appellant argues that it was
timely filed.
In determining when the statute began to run, we must
examine when the appellee was no longer “absconding,”
“concealing himself,” or “by any other indirect means
obstruct[ing] the prosecution of the action.”
413.190(2).
See KRS
Once the appellee was arrested, he was no longer
absconding or concealing himself.
Furthermore, before it can be
said that the appellee was obstructing the prosecution of the
action “by any other indirect means,” he must have committed
“some act or conduct which in point of fact misleads or deceives
plaintiff and obstructs or prevents him from instituting his
suit while he may do so.”
792 (1952).
Adams v. Ison, Ky., 249 S.W.2d 791,
Also, the appellee’s “representation or conduct
must have been relied upon reasonably and in good faith and have
resulted in prejudice from having refrained from commencing his
action within the limitation period.”
Id. at 793.
In the case
sub judice, the appellant knew the appellee’s identity once he
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was arrested and charged with the crime.
The appellee did
nothing to obstruct or prevent the appellant from instituting
his civil complaint from that time forward.
In short, I
conclude that KRS 413.190(2) affords no relief to the appellant.
As has been noted, the majority does not base its
opinion on either the discovery rule or KRS 413.190(2).
Rather,
the majority bases its opinion on public policy considerations.
The majority acknowledges that wrongful death cases are governed
by the one-year limitation period in KRS 413.140(1)(a).
Conner, 834 S.W.2d at 654.
See
However, the majority holds that a
murder case is different from other wrongful death cases because
of different public policy considerations and that, therefore,
the one-year limitation period in that statute should have no
applicability at all.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s analysis
for several reasons.
First, since the majority declines to
apply the one-year limitation period in KRS 413.140(1)(a), then
it apparently holds that there is no statute of limitation
applicable to a wrongful death action resulting from a murder.
Surely, this cannot be so.
Second, public policy considerations
are more properly addressed by the legislature or by our supreme
court, particularly where statutory law is applicable.
Third, I
see no reason why a death by murder should be classified
differently from any other wrongful death case.
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In fact, the
statute allowing civil actions for wrongful death includes
circumstances under which the act was committed by willful
conduct.
See KRS 411.130(1).
Finally, the majority states that the public policy in
this commonwealth is that victims such as the appellant deserve
a remedy.
I agree.
However, I believe the appellant’s remedy
was to file a civil complaint against the appellee within one
year of learning of his identity following his arrest.
Its
failure to do so rendered its complaint untimely, and the
circuit court properly dismissed it as barred by the applicable
statute of limitation.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
F. Thomas Conway
Nicole H. Pang
Louisville, Kentucky
J. Guthrie True
Johnson, Judy, True &
Guarnieri, LLP
Frankfort, Kentucky
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