SHERRY H. HARROD, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF JEREMY SCOTT HARROD v. THE ESTATE OF FRED A. COLLATZ, III
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RENDERED: August 27, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001158-MR
SHERRY H. HARROD, ADMINISTRATRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF JEREMY SCOTT HARROD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CLAY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. CLETUS MARICLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00442
THE ESTATE OF FRED A.
COLLATZ, III
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, McANULTY, AND MINTON, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
Sherry H. Harrod, Administratrix of the Estate
of Jeremy Scott Harrod (hereinafter “Harrod”) has appealed from
the Clay Circuit Court’s order granting the Estate of Fred A.
Collatz, III’s (hereinafter “the Estate”) motion for summary
judgment and dismissing her complaint for wrongful death and
personal injury with prejudice.
Having determined that any
further recovery is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of
KRS Chapter 342, the Workers’ Compensation Act, we must affirm.
On the evening of December 4, 2000, Dr. Fred A.
Collatz, III (hereinafter “Dr. Collatz”), Jeremy Harrod
(hereinafter “Jeremy”) and Kelly Stewart (hereinafter “Kelly”)
were tragically killed in the crash of a helicopter piloted by
Dr. Collatz.
Dr. Collatz, Jeremy and Kelly were all employees
of Christian Cardiology, P.S.C. (hereinafter “Christian
Cardiology”) located in Manchester, Kentucky.
The R-44
helicopter involved in the accident was purchased by Christian
Cardiology that October.
Jeremy was in charge of the computer
systems for Christian Cardiology, and was a salaried employee.
On the day of the crash, it was common knowledge in the office
through statements of Dr. Collatz and Jeremy that the three
employees were planning on flying in the helicopter to Jackson
to look at the newly leased offices, and then proceeding to
Lexington to purchase office furniture for the new clinic.
Jeremy was to measure the clinic for computer wires and
determine what other equipment he still needed.
Sherman
Sizemore (hereinafter “Sherman”), another employee of Christian
Cardiology, was to drive in a rented truck to Lexington where he
was to meet the helicopter and drive the four men to purchase
and load the furniture.
Dr. Collatz was to call Sherman in the
event that the plans changed.
Then Sherman was to have returned
Dr. Collatz, Jeremy and Kelly to the helicopter and proceed to
Jackson with the truck while the others returned by helicopter.
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Sherman left Manchester sometime after 4:00 p.m., and
arrived in Lexington at approximately 7:00 p.m. at the location
he was supposed to meet the helicopter.
Dr. Collatz, Jeremy and
Kelly left Manchester in the helicopter at approximately 7:00
p.m. as well.
Sandy Hubbard, at that time a nurse with
Christian Cardiology, received a telephone call from Kelly
during the flight at approximately 7:15 p.m. requesting
Sherman’s pager number.
Shortly after 7:00 p.m., Sherman
received a page originating from Kelly’s cellular phone.
When
he attempted to return the page, Sherman only heard a choppy
noise.
Further attempts to call Kelly went directly to his
voicemail system.
The helicopter crashed at 7:18 p.m. between
Manchester and Lexington, and the wreckage was not found until
the next day.
Harrod, Jeremy’s mother, was appointed the
administratrix of her son’s estate, while Dr. Collatz’s wife,
Theresa Collatz, was appointed the administratrix of his estate.
The survivors of Dr. Collatz, Jeremy and Kelly applied for and
collected $50,000 in death benefits from Ohio Casualty Group,
the workers’ compensation carrier for Christian Cardiology.
On
December 3, 2001, Harrod filed a complaint in Clay Circuit Court
against the Estate, seeking damages for wrongful death and
personal injury due to the negligent conduct of Dr. Collatz, as
well as punitive damages due to Dr. Collatz’s gross negligence,
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recklessness, and willful and wanton misconduct.
In its answer,
the Estate raised as an affirmative defense that the suit was
barred by the exclusive remedy provision of KRS 342.690(1) as
both Dr. Collatz and Jeremy were engaged in the course and scope
of their employment for Christian Cardiology at the time of the
fatal crash.
Following some discovery, the Estate filed a
motion for summary judgment on this ground, arguing that the
crash did not come within the willful and unprovoked physical
aggression exception to the exclusive remedy provision.
Before
issuing a ruling on the Estate’s motion, the circuit court
allowed Harrod to take the depositions of several potential
defense witnesses as to whether Dr. Collatz and Jeremy were in
the course and scope of their employment.
After reviewing the
deposition testimony, the parties’ briefs and the other evidence
of record, the circuit court granted the Estate’s motion, noting
on the record that there was nothing to convince him that this
was not a business trip.
The circuit court’s oral ruling was
reduced to a written order on May 29, 2003.
This appeal
followed.
On appeal, Harrod argues that the circuit court’s
entry of a summary judgment was improper as there remained
genuine issues of material fact as to whether Dr. Collatz and
Jeremy were in the course and scope of their employment when the
helicopter crashed, that her receipt of workers’ compensation
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benefits would not bar the action, and that the circuit court’s
decision was premature in light of a similar case pending before
the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
On the other hand, the Estate
continues to argue that the uncontested evidence of record
establishes that Jeremy and Dr. Collatz were in the course and
scope of their employment at the time of the crash.
In
particular, the Estate asserts that Harrod’s claims are barred
by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation
Act, that the exception to the exclusive remedy provision is not
applicable in this case, that there are no genuine issues of
material fact to be decided, and that the rule against hearsay
is not a bar to the admission of testimony regarding the purpose
of the flight.
Furthermore, the Estate argues that the summary
judgment was not prematurely entered and asserts that the Estate
was not properly named or sued in the original lawsuit.
Our standard of review of summary judgments is well
settled:
The standard of review on appeal when a
trial court grants a motion for summary
judgment is “whether the trial court
correctly found that there were no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” The trial court must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, and summary judgment
should be granted only if it appears
impossible that the nonmoving party will be
able to produce evidence at trial warranting
a judgment in his favor. The moving party
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bears the initial burden of showing that no
genuine issue of material fact exists, and
then the burden shifts to the party opposing
summary judgment to present “at least some
affirmative evidence showing that there is a
genuine issue of material fact for trial.”
The trial court “must examine the evidence,
not to decide any issue of fact, but to
discover if a real issue exists.” While the
Court in Steelvest used the word
“impossible” in describing the strict
standard for summary judgment, the Supreme
Court later stated that that word was “used
in a practical sense, not in an absolute
sense.” Because summary judgment involves
only legal questions and the existence of
any disputed material issues of fact, an
appellate court need not defer to the trial
court’s decision and will review the issue
de novo. (Citations in footnotes omitted.)
Lewis v. B&R Corporation, Ky.App., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (2001).
With this standard in mind, we shall review the circuit court’s
ruling in this matter.
As agreed below, the pivotal issue in this case is
whether Dr. Collatz and Jeremy were in the course and scope of
their employment for Christian Cardiology when the fatal crash
occurred.
KRS 342.690(1) provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
If an employer secures payment of
compensation as required by this chapter,
the liability of such employer under this
chapter shall be exclusive and in place of
all other liability of such employer to the
employee, his legal representative, husband
or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin,
and anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages from such employer at law or in
admiralty on account of such injury or
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death. . . . The exemption from liability
given an employer by this section shall also
extend to such employer’s carrier and to all
employees, officers or directors of such
employer or carrier, provided the exemption
from liability given an employee, officer or
director or an employer or carrier shall not
apply in any case were the injury or death
is proximately caused by the willful and
unprovoked physical aggression of such
employee, officer or director.
The case law interpreting this statute has consistently held
that, “[e]xemption from liability provided an employer by the
statute also extends to employees of the employer.”
Properties, Ky., 50 S.W.3d 195, 197 (2001).
Wymer v. JH
Furthermore, in
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Reker, Ky., 100 S.W.3d 756, 760
(2003), the Supreme Court stated that:
We have consistently held that, except for
the clause pertaining to a “willful or
unprovoked physical aggression” at the hands
of the employer or insurer or their agents,
KRS 342.690(1) and its predecessor statutes
shield a covered employer and its insurer
from any other liability to a covered
employee for damages arising out of a workrelated injury.
See also Shamrock Coal Co., Inc. v. Maricle, Ky., 5 S.W.3d 130
(1999); McCray v. Davis H. Elliott Co., Inc., Ky., 419 S.W.2d
542 (1967).
In this case, Harrod attempts to argue that Jeremy was
not in the course and scope of his employment because the crash
happened outside of the Manchester office and outside of his
normal working hours, and because moving furniture was not a
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part of his normal work duties.
Additionally, she asserts that
any testimony concerning the purported work-related purpose of
the flight would be inadmissible as hearsay.
Furthermore,
Harrod asserts that Dr. Collatz was outside the course and scope
of his employment because he had apparently deviated from the
original plan to fly from Manchester to Jackson, and then to
Lexington, as the crash occurred on a direct path between
Manchester and Lexington.
As a result, Harrod asserts that the
Estate failed in its burden of proving its affirmative defense,
i.e., that her suit is barred by the exclusive remedy provision
of KRS 342.690(1).
We disagree.
The crux of Harrod’s argument hinges on her assertion
that deposition testimony regarding the purpose of the trip was
inadmissible hearsay.
KRE 801(c) provides the definition of
hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
Hearsay is
inadmissible except as provided by the rules.
KRE 802.
However, there are several exceptions to the rule against
hearsay.
See KRE 801A; KRE 803; KRE 804.
Our Supreme Court has
addressed the hearsay rule as follows:
The essence of the rule prohibiting the
admission of hearsay evidence is the absence
of an opportunity for cross-examination.
While a number of exceptions have been
developed to permit the admission of hearsay
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evidence when it has been shown to be
necessary and trustworthy, the general rule
has not been lost in the exceptions. . . .
[T]he statements must possess
characteristics or have been made under
circumstances which substantially eliminate
the possibility of error. Reliability must
be established.
Barnes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 794 S.W.2d 165, 168 (1990).
Harrod argues that the deposition testimony concerning
the purpose of the trip would be inadmissible at trial because
it constituted hearsay to which no exception would apply.
The
Estate counters with the argument that the statements fit within
several exceptions, including KRE 801A(c)(1), which provides
that, “[a] statement by the deceased is not excluded by the
hearsay rule when offered as evidence against the plaintiff in
an action for wrongful death of the deceased.”
KRE 803(3) also
provides an exception for “the declarant’s then existing state
of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily
health).”
We agree with the Estate that the statements
attributed to both Jeremy and Dr. Collatz as to the work-related
purpose of the flight are admissible as exceptions to the rule
against hearsay.
The statements attributed to the declarants
retain sufficient reliability to alleviate any possibility of
error.
There is no evidence that any of the employees of
Christian Cardiology had any reason to fabricate their
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testimony, and Doug Jarvis, who had never met Dr. Collatz prior
to renting a truck to him, testified that Dr. Collatz told him
he was using the truck to get office furniture.
Reviewing the deposition testimony in its entirety, we
must hold that the circuit court was correct in finding that
there was nothing to convince him that the trip was not made for
a business purpose.
We agree with the Estate’s assertion that
the only testimony supporting Harrod’s theory that the flight
was not business related was her own testimony.
However, she
had no knowledge at all that Jeremy was even planning a
helicopter flight that evening, for business or for pleasure.
Her testimony concerning Jeremy’s usual work hours and other
aspects of his work for Christian Cardiology constitute mere
conjecture, and is not sufficient to overcome the overwhelming
deposition testimony establishing that the flight was related to
business.
Harrod next asserts that her receipt of workers’
compensation benefits does not preclude the present action.
Harrod relies upon the opinion of Russell v. Able, Ky.App., 931
S.W.2d 460 (1996), to support this argument.
However, the
Russell case deals with the exception to the exclusive remedy
rule of KRS 342.690(1) in that Russell claimed that she was
injured in the course and scope of her employment by the willful
and unprovoked aggression of a co-employee.
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The court
ultimately reversed the entry of a summary judgment, concluding
that:
[A] material issue of fact exists as to
whether Able’s conduct constituted a willful
and unprovoked act of aggression thereby
falling outside of the immunity provided
under KRS 342.690. If such is the case,
Russell may be permitted to proceed with her
common-law action against Able in accordance
with KRS 342.700(1).
Id. at 463.
In the present case, we agree with the Estate’s
argument that the exception for unprovoked physical aggression
contained within KRS 342.690(1) is inapplicable.
Nowhere has
Harrod claimed, nor can she establish, that the actions of Dr.
Collatz were intentional in causing the tragic deaths of all
three occupants of the helicopter, including his own.
Finally, Harrod urges this Court to hold that the
circuit court’s entry of a summary judgment was premature in
light of a case currently pending before the Supreme Court of
Kentucky on discretionary review.
However, that case1 deals with
the application of KRS 342.610(4), which provides an exception
from the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act
when an employee is injured or killed due to the deliberate
intention of the employer to produce the injury or death.
Although Harrod attempts to apply this reasoning to her case, we
have already determined that Harrod never claimed that the
1
Moore v. Environmental Construction Co., 2001-SC-000227-DG.
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exclusion for the unprovoked physical aggression of an employee
was applicable in her case.
Therefore, there is no need to
await the Supreme Court’s decision prior to rendering an opinion
in this case.
As a final argument, the Estate asserts that it was
not properly named as the defendant in the suit in that Harrod
should have named Dr. Collatz’s personal representative rather
than the Estate itself.
We note that the circuit court
initially raised this issue at the March 6, 2003, hearing
regarding the Estate’s motion for summary judgment, but that the
circuit court indicated that it would not be reviewing the
issue.
It is clear from the record that the circuit court based
its decision on its finding that Harrod failed to counter the
Estate’s evidence that the flight was for a business purpose.
Because the circuit court did not do so, we shall not address
this issue any further.
For the foregoing reasons, the Clay Circuit Court’s
summary judgment dismissing the action with prejudice is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
J. Guthrie True
David J. Guarnieri
Frankfort, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. Clarke Keller
Lexington, KY
J. Arthur Mozley
Atlanta, GA
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
J. Arthur Mozley
Atlanta, GA
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