SHERRILL WOOSLEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 23, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001013-MR
SHERRILL WOOSLEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GRAYSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT A. MILLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00105
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: Sherrill Woosley appeals from a judgment of
the Grayson Circuit Court wherein he was sentenced to three
years in prison for the felony offense of flagrant nonsupport.
We affirm.
A Grayson County grand jury returned a felony
indictment against Woosley on August 6, 2002, charging him with
flagrant nonsupport.
He entered into a plea agreement with the
Commonwealth whereby he would plead guilty to the offense and
would be sentenced to three years in prison, which sentence
would be diverted for a five-year period on various conditions,
including that he not commit another offense during the period
of the diversion and that he not violate the Kentucky Penal Code
or the Controlled Substances Act.
The proceedings occurred
before the circuit court on November 19, 2002.
In March 2003 the Commonwealth filed a motion
requesting the court to require Woosley to show cause why his
diversion should not be revoked on the ground that he was found
to be in possession of methamphetamine.
The court conducted an
evidentiary hearing, and the only witness was a detective from
the Leitchfield Police Department who testified that he found
three baggies of methamphetamine in Woosley’s pocket.
The court
determined that Woosley had been in possession of the substance
and, therefore, was in violation of a condition of his
diversion.
On April 2, 2003, the court entered an order
revoking Woosley’s diversion, and he was formally sentenced to
three years in prison on April 15, 2003.
Woosley now appeals
from the final judgment and sentence.
Woosley’s first argument is that the trial court erred
in revoking his diversion based only on the allegation that he
had committed an offense.
He maintains that he should have been
presumed innocent until proven guilty and that the mere fact he
was charged with an offense was not sufficient to revoke his
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diversion in the absence of his being convicted of the offense.
We disagree.
A condition of Woosley’s diversion was that he not
commit another offense during the period of the diversion and
that he not violate the Kentucky Penal Code or the Controlled
Substances Act.
In order to be in violation of the terms of the
diversion, it was not necessary that he be convicted of the
offense.
The court only had to find that he committed an
offense, and the unrebutted testimony of the officer clearly
proved that fact.
The court properly exercised its discretion
in revoking his diversion and sentencing him to prison.
Woosley’s second argument is that the court erred in
requiring him to execute a waiver of his state and federal
constitutional rights to remain silent and to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures as a condition of his bond on
appeal.
The court set Woosley’s bail on appeal at $10,000 cash.
Several conditions of release were imposed, including that he
waive his right to remain silent and right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Woosley objected to the
aforementioned condition on his bond, but he was thereafter
released from custody upon the posting of the bond and his
agreeing to the conditions of release.
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RCr1 12.78(1) provides that “bail may be allowed by the
trial judge pending appeal not withstanding that service of the
sentence has commenced, except when the defendant has been
sentenced to death or life imprisonment.”
Further, “[t]he
applicable provisions governing bail shall apply to bail on
appeal.”
RCr 12.78(3).
“If a defendant’s promise to appear or
his or her execution of an unsecured bail bond alone is not
deemed sufficient to insure his or her appearance when required,
the court shall impose the least onerous conditions reasonably
likely to insure the defendant’s appearance as required.”
4.12.
RCr
Also, “[t]he court shall cause the issuance of an order
containing a statement of any conditions imposed upon the
defendant for his or her release.”
RCr 4.14.
Because bail on appeal is not an absolute right, the
court was free to deny Woosley bail pending appeal in this case.
See Commonwealth v. Peacock, Ky., 701 S.W.2d 397, 398 (1985).
However, once the court set bail on appeal, the applicable
provisions in the criminal rules governing bail applied.
RCr 12.78(3).
See
Nevertheless, because Woosley did not appeal from
the order allowing bail on appeal, the issue is not properly
before us for our review.2
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2
Woosley filed his notice of appeal on May 6, 2003, and the court entered the
Order Setting Bail on Appeal on May 8, 2003.
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The judgment of the Grayson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Albert W. Barber, Jr.
Owensboro, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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