JOHN PRINCE MEADE FAMILY COURT DIVISION v. REGENA FAYE BRANHAM MEADE
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RENDERED: AUGUST 27, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED:
NOVEMBER 5, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001009-MR
JOHN PRINCE MEADE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
FAMILY COURT DIVISION
HONORABLE LARRY E. THOMPSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00206
REGENA FAYE BRANHAM MEADE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
In this domestic action, John Prince Meade
(hereinafter “John”) has appealed from the Pike Circuit Court’s
May 12, 2003, order finding him in contempt of a Status Quo
Order and sentencing him to sixty days in the Pike County
Detention Center.
The sole issue John raises on appeal is that
he was denied his due process rights.
Having considered John’s
brief,1 we affirm.
1
Regena did not file a brief, and her attorney of record withdrew both in the
circuit court and in this Court.
John and Regena Faye Branham Meade (hereinafter
“Regena”) were married in Pike County, Kentucky, on June 2,
1999.
No children were born of the marriage.
John and Regena
separated on January 30, 2003, and John filed a Petition for
Dissolution of Marriage on February 6, 2003, in which he
requested an equitable division of their marital property.
On
February 6, 2003, the circuit court entered the following Status
Quo Order:
This Court is under a duty to restore
the parties’ non-marital property and
equitably divide the parties’ assets. KRS
403.190. The parties and attempt to
mitigate the potential harm to them and
their children caused by the process of
legal dissolution of marriage KRS 403.110,
KRS 403.100.(sic) To ensure the orderly
accomplishment of these goals, it is
important that during the course of this
action the parties DO NOT dispose of any
assets or incur unnecessary further
liability pending further Orders of the
Court or agreement of the parties.
Therefore, the Court ORDERS that,
except as may be necessary to pay reasonable
living expenses, neither party shall sell,
encumber, gift, bequeath or in any manner
transfer, convey or dissipate any property,
cash, stocks or other assets currently in
their possession or control to another
person, company, legal entity or family
member without first obtaining an Order from
this Court giving them (sic) permission to
do so or filing with the Court an Agreed
Order signed by both parties or their
attorneys. Further, neither party shall
incur additional debt in his/her own name or
the name of his/her spouse without first
receiving the permission of the Court to do
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so or filing with the Court an Agreed Order
signed by both parties or their attorneys
except that either spouse may incur
reasonable debt associated with the day-today cost of living. The Law does not define
what is “reasonable” in this context and the
Court will not prejudge these matters;
however, when incurring debt for day-to-day
living necessities, the parties should keep
in mind that they are in a dissolution
proceeding and, therefore, what was a
reasonable expense or debt during the
marriage may not be reasonable under these
circumstances. The parties are encouraged
to consult with their attorneys before
incurring any debt which they think may
violate the tenor or spirit of this ORDER.
Finally, neither party shall cancel any
health, life, automobile, casualty or
disability insurance currently covering
themselves or a family member or change the
named beneficiaries on such policies prior
to receiving permission of the Court to do
so or filing an Agreed Order signed by both
parties or their attorneys.
Intentional violation of this Status
Quo Order may be considered contempt of
Court subject to such sanctions as this
Court deems equitable.
On March 5, 2003, Regena filed a domestic violence
petition in Pike District Court2 and received an emergency
protective order that day.
On March 13, 2003, Regena filed her
own dissolution action in Pike Circuit Court.3
The circuit court
later dismissed Regena’s action as John’s action was already
pending and ordered that any filings in Regena’s case be re2
Case No. 03-D-00045-001. This petition was later dismissed following a
determination that the testimony did not support grounds for the entry of a
long-term domestic violence order.
3
Case No. 03-CI-00414.
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filed in the present matter.
Also on March 13, 2003, Regena
moved the circuit court for the temporary use of the marital
home and of the 2003 Sonoma truck.
On March 19, 2003, she filed
a motion for a rule in the dissolution action, alleging that
John had violated the Status Quo Order by intentionally burning
their 2000 Jeep Cherokee in March 2003.
The Court signed a Rule
on April 15, 2003, ordering John to appear on April 21, 2003, to
show cause why he should not be held in contempt.
served on John on April 18, 2003.
The Rule was
As to the domestic violence
action, Regena filed a motion for show cause order on March 13,
2003, stating that John had intentionally burned the marital
vehicle.
On March 19, 2003, Regena filed another motion for a
show cause order, alleging that John had violated the emergency
protective order by calling her after being served with the
Petition for Emergency Protective Order.
The same day, she also
filed a motion for show cause order, motion for rule, and motion
for sanctions, stating that John had called her at work on March
18, 2003, and was continuing to attempt to contact her, all in
violation of the emergency protective order.
By a Calendar Order entered April 21, 2003, the
circuit court indicated that all pending issues would be heard
on April 29, 2003.
Although the record in this action does not
contain any record of the April 29, 2003, hearing, the record
does contain three exhibits apparently introduced into evidence,
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including photographs of the burned Jeep, an audio tape, and a
Criminal Complaint and Summons filed against John by Regena on
March 19, 2003.
A Docket Order dated April 29, 2003, indicates
that testimony was taken that day, and that the circuit court
would watch a videotape of John and then issue a ruling.
By
order entered May 9, 2003, the circuit court ordered the parties
to appear for a hearing on May 12, 2003.
At the May 12, 2003, court date, the circuit court
issued rulings as to all of the pending motions and issues both
in the domestic violence action and in the present matter.
After stating that it had reviewed extensive testimony, the
circuit court found John in contempt as to one of the domestic
violence motions relating to telephone calls and as to the
burning of the Jeep in the dissolution action only.
The circuit
court found by clear and convincing evidence that John burned
the Jeep, and that it had occurred one month after the Status
Quo Order was entered.
As a result of the finding of contempt,
the circuit court sentenced John to sixty days in jail, probated
forty days for one year, and ordered him to serve twenty days in
the Pike County Detention Center.
After John indicated that he
would be appealing the ruling, the circuit court allowed him to
post a $500 appeal bond to stay the sentence pending the appeal.
John posted the bond and filed a notice of appeal on May 13,
2003.
The same day, the circuit court entered a written order
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memorializing its oral rulings, which had been reduced to
writing on the Docket Order.
As to the contempt issue, the
circuit court stated:
2. The Court finds that the Petitioner
herein violated the status quo order entered
herein at the inception of this matter by
intentionally burning the Respondent’s Jeep
Grand Cherokee, causing the same to be
totally destroyed. The Court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that the Petitioner
is in contempt of this court and shall be
sentenced to sixty (60) days in the Pike
County Detention Center. Forty (40) days
shall be probated on condition that the
Petitioner, John Prince Meade, have no
contact or communication with the
Respondent, Regina (sic) Meade, and comply
with all orders of this Court.
The circuit court made the May 13, 2003, order final and
appealable.
On appeal, John argues that the circuit court’s
finding of contempt is not supported by the record because there
is no evidentiary record to review in the dissolution action as
to contempt.
He also argues that he was denied due process
because the evidence on which the contempt was found was not
taken in the dissolution proceeding, citing Commonwealth v.
Burge, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 805 (1996), and Newsome v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 35 S.W.3d 836 (2001).
We disagree with John’s assertions.
While we agree that a person is entitled to due
process protections in the area of contempt, we must hold that
John received due process in that a hearing was clearly held
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during which John testified, and that the circuit court reviewed
this testimony prior to entering a ruling.
This is evident in
the circuit court’s statements in open court on May 12, 2003, in
the Docket Order entered that day, and in the written order
entered May 13, 2003.
Furthermore, there was nothing to prevent
John from designating the record of the contempt hearing because
it obviously concerned the present case, and the record on
appeal contains notations of this hearing.
Because John did not
request that the circuit court include the contempt hearing in
the designation of record, he cannot now use that omission to
argue for a reversal on appeal.4
Furthermore, because the record
does not include this hearing, we must assume that the evidence
introduced supports the circuit court’s finding of contempt.
75.01.
CR
Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Weartz, Ky.App., 636
S.W.2d 891 (1982); Burberry v. Bridges, Ky., 427 S.W.2d 583
(1968); Hamblin v. Johnson, Ky., 254 S.W.2d 76 (1953).
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Pike
Circuit Court finding John in contempt is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
No appellee brief filed.
W. Sidney Trivette
Pikeville, Kentucky
4
We note that this is John’s second attempt to circumvent the application of
the Status Quo Order. In the May 13, 2003, order, the circuit court
indicated that John had moved at the hearing to voluntarily dismiss the
dissolution action, “to prevent a ruling on the violation of the status quo
order.”
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