MARCUS TODD HASH v. UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
JUNE 11, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001007-MR
MARCUS TODD HASH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-02895
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; TACKETT AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE.
Appellant, Marcus Todd Hash, appeals an order
of the Fayette Circuit Court granting appellee’s motion for
summary judgment.
Having concluded that there are no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the University of
Kentucky was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm.
Appellant was admitted to the University of Kentucky
College of Law (“University”) for the fall semester of the
1998-1999 academic year.
Into his first semester, appellant
began to feel the effects of his battle with depression.
Upon
informing a few of his professors, Dean Louise Graham indicated
to appellant that he should consider withdrawing and return in
the fall of 1999.
Prior to taking his final exams, appellant
withdrew from the University with the intention of returning in
1999.1
However, appellant failed to meet the deadlines for
readmission because he thought that it would be automatic and
“not a problem.”
Appellant submitted his application for the 2000-2001
academic year on March 2, 2000, which was one-day late.2
Given
that the application was late, the admissions committee did not
consider it until they had reviewed all the timely applications.
On April 18, 2000, appellant received a standard rejection
letter from the University stating that his application was
denied.
On August 1, 2000, appellant submitted an appeal for
reconsideration, but the University was not persuaded.
On
August 1, 2001, appellant filed a complaint against the
1
Appellant argues that he did not voluntarily withdraw, but that he was urged
to leave for medical reasons. However, appellant offered no proof to support
this argument and nothing in the record suggests that this is a material
issue of fact.
2
Appellant alleges that his application was filed on March 1, 2000, but that
for some unknown reason it was not stamped until March 2, 2000. However, in
the deposition of Dean Drusilla Bakert, upon being questioned about this
issue, appellant’s attorney acknowledged that the application was in fact
late, stating: “I don’t want to be in a fight with [appellee’s attorney] over
that. It doesn’t matter because the application was late anyway.” See Depo.
of Drusilla V. Bakert, pg. 115, lines 12-14.
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University in the Fayette County Circuit Court for unlawful
discrimination in violation of Kentucky’s Civil Rights Act, KRS
344, et seq., alleging that he was discriminated against because
of his disability.
Upon granting the University’s motion for
summary judgment, the circuit court held that the University’s
decision to deny appellant’s admission was not based solely on
his disability and that appellant had failed to prove that he
was an otherwise qualified candidate despite his disability.
This appeal followed.
First, appellant argues that he was qualified for
admission in 2000 because his LSAT score and undergraduate grade
point average were the same as in his 1998 application, and
therefore the admissions committee must have based the rejection
solely on his disability.
We disagree.
Appellant’s March 2000 application and his appeal for
reconsideration are all that’s relevant for our review, as
appellant was admitted to the University for the 1998-1999
academic year.
Furthermore, the 1998 application is irrelevant
given that appellant withdrew prior to completing his first
semester, which according to the University’s rules and
policies, appellant was required to re-apply since admission was
not automatic.3
As such, no material issue of fact exists
3
The University’s Rules and Policies, Section VI. Withdrawal by Students
(adopted by the University Senate 4/12/93), states in pertinent part: “(B)(1)
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regarding whether appellant was otherwise qualified for
admission based on his 1998-1999 application; only appellant’s
March 2000 application and August 2000 appeal for
reconsideration are applicable here.
In construing the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KRS
344.010, et seq., Kentucky courts commonly refer to decisions
interpreting the similar federal laws.
Noel v. Elk Brand Mfg.
Co., Ky. App., 53 S.W.3d 95, 100-01 (2000); Kreate v. Disabled
American Veterans, Ky. App., 33 S.W.3d 176, 178 (2000); see
Brohm, M.D. v. JH Properties, Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 520 (6th Cir.
1998) (KRS 344 mirrors the language of the American with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act, which both
forbid discrimination on the basis of disability).
In Pushkin
v. The Regents of the University of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372,
1387 (10th Cir. 1981), the court set forth the appropriate
standard for our review:
1)
The plaintiff must establish a prima facie
case by showing that he was an otherwise
qualified handicapped person apart from his
handicap, and was rejected under
circumstances which gave rise to the
inference that his rejection was based solely
on his handicap;
2)
Once plaintiff establishes his prima facie
case, defendants have the burden of going
First-year students are expected to complete their first year of law study
without interruption. If a student withdraws from the College and University
during his or her first semester of law study, readmission is not automatic.
If a student withdraws during the first semester of law study, applications
for readmission will be referred to the Admissions Committee.”
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forward and proving that plaintiff was not an
otherwise qualified handicapped person, that
is one who is able to meet all of the
program’s requirements in spite of his
handicap, or that his rejection from the
program was for reasons other than his
handicap;
3)
The plaintiff then has the burden of going
forward with rebuttal evidence showing that
the defendants’ reasons for rejecting the
plaintiff are based on misconceptions or
unfounded factual conclusions, and that
reasons articulated for the rejection other
than the handicap encompass unjustified
consideration of the handicap itself.
See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 99
S.Ct. 2361, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979).
"An otherwise qualified
person is one who is able to meet all of a program's
requirements in spite of his handicap."
99 S.Ct. at 2367.
Davis, 442 U.S. at 406,
See also School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 n.17, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 1131, 94 L.Ed.2d
307 (1987).
Thus, the principal issue for our review is whether
appellant established his prima facie case with evidence that he
was “otherwise qualified” for admission for the 2000-2001
academic year.
The appropriate analysis for the present case is found
in Doe v. New York University, 666 F.2d 761 (2nd Cir. 1981), in
which an applicant was accepted for admission into medical
school even though she falsely represented in her application
that she did not have chronic or recurrent emotional problems.
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Upon undergoing a medical examination during the first semester
the treating physician recognized scars on her arms, which
suggested self-abuse.
Despite the misrepresentation in her
application, she was allowed to stay at NYU if she undertook
psychiatric therapy.
After failed attempts for rehabilitation,
the student reverted to her past coping mechanisms, which
resulted in a leave of absence.
The student’s readmission
application was subsequently denied.4
In reaching its decision, the court stated:
Turning to the [Rehabilitation] Act’s term,
“otherwise qualified handicapped individual,” it
is now clear that this refers to a person who is
qualified in spite of her handicap and that an
institution is not required to disregard the
disabilities of a handicapped applicant, provided
the handicap is relevant to reasonable
qualifications for acceptance, or to make
substantial modifications in its reasonable
standards or program to accommodate handicapped
individuals but may take an applicant’s handicap
into consideration, along with all other relevant
factors, in determining whether she is qualified
for admission.
Doe, 666 F.2d at 775 (emphasis added).
406, 99 S.Ct at 2367.
See Davis, 422 U.S. at
Here, the admissions committee only
considered appellant’s disability in conjunction with other
4
Appellant argues that the circuit court erroneously applied Doe to the
present case; however, the facts of the present case are not as different as
appellant suggests. 666 F.2d at 775. Similar to a medical school’s
admission process, a law school is entitled to consider a candidate’s
psychological and emotional problems, as any mental impairment may be
relevant to the individual’s ability to cope with the stresses of law school,
the ability to deal with constant pressures from other students and
professors, and to withstand the demands associated with classroom attendance
and participation. See Doe, 666 F.2d at 777.
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relevant factors, such as the timeliness of his 2000
application, in determining that he was not qualified for
admission.5
The University’s decision was not based solely on
appellant’s disability, but it was taken into account, as his
March 2000 application and August 2000 appeal for
reconsideration raise numerous relevant issues, which could not
be disregarded.
First, the University was concerned for the safety of
the already admitted students, in addition to the stability of
appellant’s mental illness.6
For instance, in appellant’s March
2000 personal statement, he explains:
I realize that all this bouncing from one doctor
to another may not sound like the greatest means
for making the glorious recovery that the
Admissions Committee might want to hear, but one
thing I’ve learned from other patients, health
professionals and my readings is that often it
takes a number of missteps before finding just
the right physician and treatment plan . . . So
you see, I can’t make the Admission Committee any
guarantees about my health and I seriously doubt
that a doctor or Maytag repair man could either.
Moreover, in appellant’s August 2000 appeal for reconsideration,
he stated in pertinent part:
5
The record indicates that the University does not review late applications
until all the timely applications are reviewed first. According to this
system, many, if not all, of the available positions may be eliminated prior
to the University’s review of late applications.
6
In Anderson v. University of Wisconsin, 841 F.2d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 1988), a
disabled alcoholic law student whose grade point average fell below 77 was
not qualified unless “the source of the academic problem [was] abated, making
future work of satisfactory quality likely.”
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So here I am today, presenting you with one of
the more offbeat appeals you’ll have ever seen so
please don’t confuse it’s [sic] tone or look for
lack of seriousness, because in the immortal
words of Willy Wonka: “A little [] now and then,
is relished by the wisest men.” . . . I have
faith in UK Law and I think it’s time to see if
UK Law has faith in its ability to help an
individual student overcome any obstacle that may
arise, rather than letting a former student twist
in the wind until it is “safe” for him to be
readmitted.
In short, it’s time for Todd Hash and UK Law to
“put up or shut up.”
In his appeal, appellant also included quotes from characters in
movies and television shows, a picture of a professional
wrestler, and newspaper articles about mental illnesses.
Most
notable to the admissions committee was an article quoting the
University of North Carolina law student who was diagnosed with
paranoid schizophrenia after he “marched down a Chapel Hill
street randomly firing his father’s M-1 rifle.”
Dean Bakert sent appellant a letter in response to the
appeal and stated:
It is clear that you have put a lot of work into
the information that you sent, but I could not
gather from your submission whether there is any
new information regarding your application for
readmission or your medical situation. To date
we have not received any communication directly
from your doctors that describes the current
state of your health or whether it is advisable
at this time for you to re-enter law school.
Dean Bakert subsequently received correspondence from two
undergraduate professors and three doctors.
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On August 16, 2000,
Dean Bakert requested that appellant sign a general medical
release form, while also advising him that since the physician’s
letters raised a number of new issues, the admissions committee
would be unable to resolve those issues in enough time for
appellant to begin classes for the fall 2000 semester.7
In the August 16 letter, Dean Bakert also requested
that appellant be evaluated by a doctor of the University’s
choice, “[b]ecause I had 400 students starting law school in
three days, I had a candidate sending me information about law
students shooting people and I wanted to be sure as I could be
of the safety of those students.”8
Clearly, the University was
not only concerned for the stabilization of appellant’s
disability, but also for the safety of its students.
If it were
not concerned, any harm done by appellant to himself, the
faculty, or other students might expose the University “to legal
liability for knowingly permitting such exposure.”
Doe, 666
F.2d at 777.
Second, the University used its best professional
judgment in determining whether appellant was qualified.
In
7
Apparently, Dean Bakert made a unilateral decision to deny appellant’s
appeal for reconsideration, as the admissions committee was not in session
and the appeal was submitted less than a month before fall classes began.
Even so, Dean Bakert encouraged appellant to reapply for the 2001 academic
year.
8
See Depo. of Drusilla V. Bakert, pg. 63, lines 21-25. Despite appellant’s
contention, there is no affirmative evidence suggesting that the University’s
request for appellant to be reviewed by a doctor of the University’s choice
is a genuine issue of material fact.
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Anderson v. University of Wisconsin, 841 F.2d 737, 741 (7th Cir.
1988), the court stated:
The [Rehabilitation] Act does not designate a
jury, rather than the faculty of the Law School,
as the body to decide whether a would-be student
is up to snuff. The Law School may set standards
for itself, and jurors unacquainted with the
academic program of a law school could not make
the readmissions decision more accurately than
the faculty of the Law School; the process of
litigation would change the substantive standard
in addition to raising the costs of its
application. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
admonished courts to respect the academic
judgment of university faculties.9
See Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214,
106 S.Ct. 507, 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); Board of Curators of
University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 98 S.Ct. 948,
55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978).
The ultimate question is whether the
University discriminated against appellant because of his
disability.
The issue is not whether the University made a
correct decision.
Id.
A university has wide discretion in
making judgments “so long as its behavior is not so arbitrary or
irrational as to not constitute an exercise of professional
judgment.”
El Kouni v. Trustees of Boston University, 169
9
Appellant argues that the circuit court erroneously relied on Anderson, in
which the law school refused to readmit a former alcoholic student for the
third time because his grade point average fell below 77. 841 F.2d at
740-41. Appellant contends that in the present case, the University had no
direct evidence that he was not qualified, such as a grade point average, and
appellant was never readmitted to the University, which was their way of
negating the stereotypical fears about persons with mental illnesses.
However, nothing in the record suggests that the University’s decision was
based on stereotypes, as opposed to honest judgments about appellant’s
depression and the many other relevant factors as explained above.
-10-
F.Supp.2d 1, 4 (D.Mass. 2001).
See also Wynne v. Tufts
University School of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19, 25-6 (1st Cir. 1991);
Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225,
106 S.Ct. 507, 513, 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985).
True, educational
institutions do not have unlimited deference, as courts “must be
careful not to allow academic decisions to disguise truly
discriminatory requirements.”
Zukle v. Regents of the
University of California, 166 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999).
However, suggesting that the University’s decision was incorrect
does not necessarily mean that it violated the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act.
A third relevant factor employed by the University in
making its decision was based on the University’s academic
standards.
In Anderson the court stressed, “[a]lthough
inability to perform at the required standard as a result of a
handicap makes a person not ‘otherwise qualified’, a court still
must decide what that standard is.
The meaning of a standard
lies in the method of its application.”10
841 F.2d at 740.
Also, “if the handicap could reasonably be viewed as posing a
substantial risk that the applicant would be unable to meet its
reasonable standards, the institution is not obligated by the
[Rehabilitation] Act to alter, dilute or bend them to admit the
10
In Anderson, the court concluded that the standard used by the committee
was that a student is not “qualified” if his average falls below 77. 841
F.2d at 740.
-11-
handicapped applicant.”
Doe, 666 F.2d at 775 (relying on Davis,
442 U.S. at 413 n.12, 99 S.Ct. at 2370).
Here, the record indicates that the University’s
academic standards encompass successful time management,
fulfilling scheduled deadlines, engagement in Socratic classroom
discussions and successful performance on intense examinations,
which are all an integral part of completing the legal education
and preparing for success as a practicing attorney.
As such,
the qualification of a disabled individual “turns not only on
whether he or she meets its reasonable standards but whether the
individual, where a few . . . must be chosen out of thousands of
applicants, is as well qualified despite the handicap as others
accepted for one of the limited number of openings.”
F.2d at 776.
Doe, 666
Accordingly, the University concluded, in its
professional judgment, and based on the reasonable academic
standards in place that appellant was not a qualified applicant
in spite of his depression.11
11
Appellant also alleges that the University failed to “seek suitable means
of reasonably accommodating a handicapped person . . . .” Zukle, 166 F.3d at
1048. However, it is well settled that the individual with the disability
has the responsibility to inform the institution that a reasonable
accommodation is needed, as it does not become an issue if the person has
never requested one. Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Company, 143 F.3d 1042,
1046 n.6 (6th Cir. 1998). See also Lue v. Moore, 43 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir.
1994); Wood v. President & Trustees of Spring Hill College, 978 F.2d 1214,
1222 (11th Cir. 1992). Appellant has failed to include any evidence
suggesting that he requested an accommodation or that the University refused
to provide an accommodation. Thus, no material issue exists.
-12-
Therefore, we find that appellant failed to prove his
prima facie case, as he was not an “otherwise qualified
handicapped person” apart from his disability.
F.2d at 1387.
Pushkin, 658
The University was entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law.12
Hubble v. Johnson, Ky., 841 S.W.2d 169,
171 (1992); Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.,
Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991).
Based on the foregoing, the order of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
Edward E. Dove
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stephen L. Barker
Joshua Michael Salsburey
Sturgill, Turner, Barker &
Moloney, PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Stephen L. Barker
Lexington, Kentucky
12
Appellant argues that the circuit court erroneously accepted as fact all
the assertions of the University, which denied him the benefit of having all
factual inferences drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. However, the
circuit court did not err, as we have previously stated, “[t]he standard of
review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly
found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. There is no
requirement that the appellate court defer to the trial court since factual
findings are not at issue.” Scifres v. Kraft, Ky. App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781
(1996) (citations omitted).
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