ROBERT MICHAEL BALDWIN v. EDWINNA RUTH BALDWIN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: March 26, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 2003-CA-000980-MR
AND
NO. 2003-CA-001181-MR
ROBERT MICHAEL BALDWIN
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEALS FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN N. FRAZIER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00363
v.
EDWINNA RUTH BALDWIN
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, DYCHE, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Robert Baldwin appeals and Edwinna Baldwin cross-
appeals from an order of the Johnson Family Court, entered April
28, 2003, awarding a commissioner’s deed and partial
reimbursement for mortgage payments to Edwinna but otherwise
denying the parties’ requests for relief.
Edwinna claims
entitlement to additional mortgage reimbursement for payments on
the parties’ former marital residence.
Robert claims
entitlement to credit for his contributions to the mortgage
principal.
Because we agree with Robert that he is entitled to
this credit, we reverse in part and remand.
The parties’ twenty-five year marriage was dissolved
by decree entered February 4, 2000.
The decree referred the
division of the parties’ property to a domestic relations
commissioner.
The commissioner heard the matter in June 2000
and issued his recommended order in December 2000.
principal asset was their residence.
The parties’
It was agreed that Edwinna
would be awarded the residence and that she would pay Robert
half the existing equity less certain debts that Edwinna was
deemed to have paid on Robert’s behalf.
In pertinent part the
recommended order provided as follows:
Respondent [Edwinna] is awarded the marital
residence free and clear of all claims of
the Petitioner. Respondent shall assume all
incidents of liability relative to the
ownership of the marital residence
including, but not limited to, the mortgage
indebtedness at Family Bank in the
approximate amount of $29,000.00, and hold
the Petitioner harmless. . . . Respondent
shall pay to the Petitioner, one-half (1/2)
of the marital equity in the marital
residence . . . within thirty (30) days of
the entry of this Order and Judgment.
Respondent shall be entitled and is awarded
credits against the equity she is herein
ordered to pay the Petitioner in the
following amounts: . . . $3,150.00
representing one-half (1/2) of the mortgage
payments Respondent has paid on the marital
2
residence since November 1999. Respondent
shall be entitled to additional credits in
the event she has continued to pay the
entire amount of the monthly mortgage
indebtedness post-July 2000.
These provisions contemplate that Robert will continue to be
responsible for half the mortgage payment until entry of the
order, at which point Edwinna “shall assume all incidents of
liability . . . including . . . the mortgage indebtedness.”
A dispute over the value of the residence delayed the
trial court’s ruling on the commissioner’s recommendations, but
by order entered June 10, 2002, the court amended the value
found by the commissioner and otherwise adopted the
commissioner’s recommended order.
The court found the residence
to have a value of $78,300.00 and a mortgage debt of $29,000.00,
the same debt found as of June or July 2000.
The marital equity
was thus found to be $49,300.00, and Robert’s share, after the
deduction of Edwinna’s credits, was $9,200.00.
The court made
no adjustment to the mortgage debt nor to the amount of
Edwinna’s credit for mortgage payments.
Nevertheless, in April 2003, Edwinna moved for a
commissioner’s deed and for $10,800.00 additional credit against
Robert because, she alleged, she had continued to pay the entire
amount of the monthly mortgage indebtedness.
Edwinna sought
$1,600.00 from Robert apparently as the difference between the
additional credit she claimed and the $9,200.00 equity
3
settlement she owed him.
Robert did not dispute that he
remained liable for half of Edwinna’s house payment until entry
of the court’s order in June 2002, when Edwinna became solely
liable for the mortgage debt.
Robert argued, however, that if
he remained liable for the debt he also remained entitled to a
share of the increased equity; if Edwinna’s credit was to be
adjusted then so should be his equity award.
Robert also
claimed that he should be awarded a share of the tax credit
generated by the mortgage interest payments.
Without explanation the trial court granted Edwinna’s
claim to the extent of $9,200.00 but denied her claim for
$1,600.00 beyond Robert’s equity award.
The court denied
Robert’s request for an equity adjustment and for tax credit.
Both parties have appealed.
We agree with Robert that if he is to be charged for
mortgage payments after July 2000, the date at which the
mortgage debt was determined, then he is entitled to a share of
the subsequent reduction of that debt.
As Robert correctly
notes, in Drake v. Drake,1 this Court ruled that
[o]nce the parties are divorced, the
[husband’s] payments which reduce the
indebtedness on the mortgage increase the
husband’s equity in the residence.2
1
Ky. App., 809 S.W.2d 710 (1991).
2
Drake v. Drake 809 S.W.2d at 712.
4
To charge Robert for mortgage payments but to deny him a
corresponding share of mortgage reduction is clearly unfair.
The trial court erred by denying Robert the equity adjustment he
sought.
The court did not err by denying Robert a share of the
tax deduction for interest paid on the mortgage.
Robert has
cited no authority in support of this claim, and even if there
were authority, the claim is clearly untimely, having played no
part in the proceedings until months after the June 10, 2002,
order became final.
Nor did the court err by denying a portion of
Edwinna’s claim.
As noted above, Robert’s liability for house
payments does not extend beyond June 10, 2002, when the trial
court entered the order making Edwinna the sole owner of both
the house and the mortgage debt.
Edwinna’s claim, however, was
based on an alleged thirty-one months of mortgage payments.
Because the period from July 2000 to June 2002 is only about
twenty-four months, Edwinna’s claim would appear to have been
based in part on payments for which Robert bore no liability.
This is a sufficient reason, we believe, for the trial court’s
partial denial of her claim.
In sum, we reverse the trial court’s order to the
extent that it denied Robert an award of half the mortgage
principal reduction between July 2000 and June 2002 and remand
5
for determination of the amount of that award.
In all other
respects, we affirm the April 28, 2003, order of the Johnson
Family Court.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Lance A. Daniels
Paintsville, Kentucky
Brian Cumbo
Inez, Kentucky
6
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.