KATHY CARUTHERS v. EARL ROBINETTE; ELBERT SESCO; LOWELL T. SESCO; AMERICAN GENERAL HOME EQUITY, INC.; AND GATHEL WARREN AMERICAN GENERAL HOME EQUITY, INC. v. KATHY CARUTHERS; EARL ROBINETTE; ELBERT SESCO; LOWELL T. SESCO; AND GATHEL WARREN
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RENDERED: April 23, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2003-CA-000842-MR
KATHY CARUTHERS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00272
EARL ROBINETTE; ELBERT SESCO;
LOWELL T. SESCO; AMERICAN
GENERAL HOME EQUITY, INC.;
AND GATHEL WARREN
AND:
NO.
2003-CA-000860-MR
AMERICAN GENERAL HOME EQUITY, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00272
KATHY CARUTHERS; EARL ROBINETTE;
ELBERT SESCO; LOWELL T. SESCO;
AND GATHEL WARREN
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
APPELLEES
BARBER, KNOPF, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
APPELLEES
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Kathy Caruthers and American General Home Equity,
Inc. each appeal from a declaratory judgment of the Pike Circuit
Court finding that Earl Robinette, Lowell T. Sesco, and Elbert
Sesco are the owners of a disputed tract of real property.
Caruthers argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
allowing an unlicensed surveyor to testify for the appellees,
and that the trial court’s conclusions regarding ownership of
the disputed property were clearly erroneous.
Under the
circumstances of this case, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by allowing the appellees’ surveyor to
testify.
However, we also find that the 1935 source deeds were
ambiguous concerning the scope of the property conveyed, and the
trial court failed to adequately address the extrinsic evidence
which would explain the ambiguity.
Hence, we vacate the
judgment and remand for further factual findings.
The property at issue in this case is located in Pike
County, Kentucky, at the head of the Middle Fork of Rockhouse
Creek of Big Creek.
The parties to this action stipulated that
their respective titles flow from a common source, which was a
farm consisting of over one-hundred acres owned by John B.
Smith.
Smith died intestate in August, 1923, and his interest
passed to his children, Myrtie Robinette, Wayne Smith, Jonah
Smith, Ben Smith, Willie Smith, and Maudie Maynard.
On March
23, 1932, Ben Smith and Sophie Smith, his wife, Jonah Smith and
2
Susan Smith, his wife, and Willie Smith conveyed their undivided
interests in the property to Myrtie Robinette.
However, this
deed was not recorded until 1977.
Thereafter, on February 19, 1935, the children of John
B. Smith, including Ben, Jonah, and Willie, executed two deeds
dividing their undivided interest in the property.
In their
respective deeds, Myrtie and Wayne each received from their
brothers and sisters a tract of described property.
The deed to
Myrtie conveyed approximately 30 acres, while the deed to Wayne
conveyed approximately 45 acres.
Both deeds mention a boundary
along an agreed and marked line, but Myrtie’s deed specifically
mentions that the agreed line “runs to the center of the Big
Sheep Rock.”
Both deeds state that the children of John B.
Smith were conveying the entire interest which they received
from their parents.
Shortly thereafter, Wayne Smith divided his tract and
conveyed 25 acres to his former wife, Gertrude Bevins.
tract was eventually conveyed to Earl Robinette.
Bevins’s
The portion of
the tract retained by Wayne was also eventually conveyed to Earl
Robinette.
However, Robinette sold this portion of the property
in 1995 to Lowell Thomas Sesco and Elbert R. Sesco.
Myrtie Robinette Ward died testate on July 15, 1976,
and she devised all her real property to her niece, Kathy Reece
Caruthers.
In 1987, Caruthers sold the 30 acre tract which she
3
inherited from Myrtie.
However, based on the 1932 deed,
Caruthers claims that Myrtie retained some 45 acres on the right
side of the Middle Fork.
Caruthers recorded the 1932 deed in
1977, and county tax records show that she has paid taxes on
this property since 1978.
In addition, Caruthers mortgaged the
property several times, including a currently outstanding
mortgage held by American General Home Equity, Inc.
After a dispute arose concerning ownership of the
property, Caruthers brought this declaratory judgment action
against Earl Robinette, Lowell T. Sesco, Elbert Sesco, and
Gathel Warren, who may have inherited an interest from Wayne
Smith.
Caruthers also named American General, as a holder of
the mortgage and issuer of the title insurance on the property,
and Addington Enterprises, Inc., which claimed the mineral
estate under the property based upon prior conveyances which are
not at issue in this action.
At a bench trial conducted from
July 31 to August 1, 2002, Caruthers presented documentary
evidence and testimony to support her claim to the property.
Two registered surveyors, Ertel Whitt, Jr. and Luke Hatfield,
testified for Caruthers.
Whitt testified that he had conducted
a survey and prepared a plat based upon the descriptions in the
1932 and 1935 deeds and the subsequent conveyances.
Whitt
testified that he had located the agreed line in the location
claimed by Caruthers.
Based upon his research and survey, Whitt
4
concluded that Myrtie Robinette had owned one-half of the
property inherited from John B. Smith, including the lands not
specifically described in the 1935 deed.
Consequently, he was
of the opinion that Caruthers still owned some 45 acres on the
right side of the head of the Middle Fork of Rockhouse Creek.
Hatfield, who also visited the property and prepared a map based
on the deed descriptions, agreed with Whitt’s conclusions.
In support of their claims, Robinette and the Sescos
primarily presented lay testimony as to the reputation of the
boundaries, ownership and possession of the property at issue.
They also presented the testimony of Mike Davis, president of
Elkhorn Engineering, Inc.
Elkhorn Engineering prepared a mining
map for Addington Enterprises.
Davis testified that he is a
mining engineer and holds a West Virginia license as a land
surveyor, but he is not licensed or registered as a land
surveyor in Kentucky.
Over Caruthers’s objection, Davis
testified that his staff had conducted a field survey and that
he had prepared a map of the property based on the descriptions
in the 1935 deeds.
He was of the opinion that Myrtie Robinette
did not have an interest in any property other than the 30 acres
conveyed to her in the 1935 deed.
On March 20, 2003, the trial court issued findings of
fact, conclusions of law and a judgment in favor of Earl
Robinette and the Sescos.
The trial court found that the 1932
5
deed did not represent the intent of the parties, and was
superseded by the 1935 deed.
Instead, the trial court found
that the parties to the 1935 deeds intended to convey all of the
property inherited from John B. Smith, including the interests
previously conveyed to Myrtie in the 1932 deed.
Consequently,
the trial court concluded Myrtie Robinette had received only the
30 acres described in her deed, and that all of the remaining
property was conveyed to Wayne Smith.
Based on this finding,
the trial court also concluded that Myrtie Robinette and
Caruthers, as her successor, were estopped to make a claim based
on the 1932 deed.
The trial court was also persuaded that the
map prepared by Elkhorn Engineering most accurately depicted the
1935 division of the property among the children of John Smith.
Accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment declaring that
Caruthers had no interest in the disputed property, and that the
property is owned by Earl Robinette and the Sescos.
Caruthers
and American General separately appealed from this judgment, and
their appeals have been consolidated before this Court.
Caruthers and American General first argue that the
trial court erred by allowing the appellees’ surveyor, Mike
Davis, to testify as an expert witness.
They note that Davis is
not licensed or registered as a land surveyor in Kentucky.
Consequently, they assert that Davis’s testimony was
inadmissible because it violated the statutory prohibition of
6
the unauthorized practice of land surveying.
Under the
circumstances presented in this case, we disagree.
Although Kentucky courts have not ruled on this
precise question, the case law from other jurisdictions
indicates that a surveyor need not be licensed in that state to
be qualified to testify as an expert witness.
Rather, most
states only require a showing that the witness possesses
sufficient knowledge, training or experience in the field in
order to qualify.1
We find the reasoning in these cases to be
persuasive.
The practice of professional engineers and land
surveyors is regulated through the state’s police powers as set
1
See Howard v. Wills, 77 Ohio App. 3d 133, 601 N.E.2d 515, 520
(1991) (Fact that surveyor was not licensed in Ohio went only to
the weight to be given to his testimony and not to his
qualification as an expert witness.); Thomas v. Olds, 150 Vt.
634, 556 A.2d 62, 64 (1989) (Statute requiring licensing of
surveyors “is aimed at protecting the public from the
unauthorized practice of engineering; it is not meant to be used
to keep properly qualified experts from testifying.”); Yoho v.
Stack, 373 Pa. Super. 77, 540 A.2d 307, 310 (Pa. Super. 1988) (“A
witness will be qualified as an expert if he or she has any
reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge on the subject
under investigation. The standard does not mandate, however,
that the witness need possess all the knowledge in his or her
special field of activity in order to qualify.”); Cutro v.
Duffy, 88 A.D.2d 1007, 451 N.Y.S.2d 937, 938 (N.Y. App. Div.,
1982) (“[A] surveyor is not required to be licensed in order to
qualify as an expert witness as long as he possesses the
requisite education and experience and is supervised by a
licensed surveyor . . . .”); and Koenig v. Skaggs, 400 S.W.2d 63,
67 (Mo., 1966). See also 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries § 108, p.
504, n. 54.
7
out in KRS Chapter 322.
Although the statutory qualifications
for these professions are clearly relevant to determine the
qualification of a proposed expert witness, the General
Assembly’s regulation of these professions does not directly
implicate the rules of evidence.
Indeed, such an interpretation
would transgress established procedure relating to the
qualification and admission of expert testimony, and would usurp
the power of the judiciary to establish rules of evidence.2
The qualifications of an expert witness are governed
by KRE 702 and 703, which vest the trial court with broad
discretion to determine whether a witness is qualified to
express an opinion in a matter which requires expert knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education.
These rules require
the trial court to determine if such expert testimony will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.3
The fact that a surveyor is not
licensed in this state may affect the weight to be given to the
witness’s testimony, but it does not necessarily render him
unqualified to testify as an expert witness.
However, just as the judiciary has the exclusive right
to formulate rules of evidence, the legislature has the
2
Drumm v. Commonwealth, Ky., 783 S.W.2d 380, 382 (1990).
3
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, Ky., 11 S.W.3d 575,
577-79 (2000).
8
exclusive right to regulate the practice of land surveying and
to prescribe the qualifications of those who engage in its
profession.
KRS 322.020(2) prohibits any person from engaging
in the practice of land surveying unless licensed as a
professional land surveyor.4
While an unlicensed individual may
4
Under KRS 322.010(10)(a), the term “Land surveying” includes,
but is not limited to:
1.
Measuring and locating, establishing, or
reestablishing lines, angles, elevations, natural
and man-made features in the air, on the surface and
immediate subsurface of the earth, within
underground workings, and on the beds or surfaces of
bodies of water involving the:
a.
Determination or establishment of the facts of
size, shape, topography, and acreage;
b.
Establishment of photgrammetric [sic] and
geodetic control that is published and used for the
determination, monumentation, or description of
property boundaries;
c.
Subdivision, division, and consolidation of
lands;
d.
Measurement of existing improvements, including
condominiums, after construction and the preparation
of plans depicting existing improvements, if the
improvements are shown in relation to property
boundaries;
e.
Layout of proposed improvements, if those
improvements are to be referenced to property
boundaries;
f.
Preparation of physical written descriptions
for use in legal instruments of conveyance or real
property and property rights;
g.
Preparation of subdivision record plats;
h.
Determination of existing grades and elevations
of roads and land;
i.
Creation and perpetuation of alignments related
to maps, record plats, field note records, reports,
property descriptions, and plans and drawings that
represent them; and
j.
Certification of documents; and
9
possess sufficient knowledge or experience to testify as an
expert witness, that person is not authorized to engage in the
practice of land surveying within Kentucky.
The giving of
expert opinions is distinct from the practice of a regulated
profession.5
2.
(b)
“Land
1.
2.
3.
The negotiation or soliciting of land surveying
services on any project in this state, regardless of
whether the persons engaged in the practice of land
surveying:
a.
Are residents of this state;
b.
Have their principal office or place of
business in this state; or
c.
Are in responsible charge of the land surveying
services or work performed.
surveying” shall not include:
The measurement of crops or agricultural land area
under any agricultural program sponsored by an
agency of the federal government or state of
Kentucky;
The services of a professional engineer who engages
in the practice of land surveying incident to the
practice of engineering, if the land surveying work
does not relate to the location or determination of
land boundaries; or
The design of grades and elevations of roads and
land;
5
In her reply brief, Caruthers suggests that allowing an
unlicensed surveyor to give expert opinions “would be equal to
allowing an experienced mother to testify of her home remedies
and the results she would achieve as an unlicensed medical
practitioner, as opposed to a licensed surgeon performing a very
specialized practice of medicine, just because the mother is
experienced and well qualified.” A more apt analogy would be a
physician who is not licensed in Kentucky. A physician licensed
in another state may testify as an expert witness upon proper
qualification. But that same physician would not be permitted to
engage in the practice of medicine within Kentucky, even if it
were incident to a legal action in which the physician was
testifying as an expert witness.
10
The decision as to the qualifications of an expert is
within the sound discretion of the trial judge and should not be
disturbed in the absence of some abuse of discretion.6
In this
case, Davis testified that Elkhorn Engineering is permitted by
the state of Kentucky to engage in land surveying and other
engineering work, and that a Kentucky-licensed land surveyor is
on the staff of Elkhorn Engineering.
Davis also testified that
he did not actually visit the site or conduct the survey.
Rather, he relied on information gathered by subordinates under
his control and direction to prepare the map.7
Under the
circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by allowing Davis to testify.
Davis established
his qualifications to testify as an expert, and we are not
convinced that his participation in this litigation amounted to
the unauthorized practice of land surveying.
We have some questions about the sufficiency of the
map upon which the trial court relied.
Davis testified that his
staff had conducted only a field survey, not a full survey of
the property.
6
Davis also indicated that the maps offered were
See Wheeler v. Commonwealth, Ky., 121 S.W.3d 173, 183 (2003).
7
Although the common use of the term suggests otherwise, the
marks on the ground made by a professional land surveyor
constitute the actual boundary survey. 201 KAR 18:150 § 4. The
plat and the legal description are merely the record of the
survey, and are not the survey itself.
11
not survey plats, that no coordinates or corners were set, and
he did not provide a legal description.
Furthermore, while the
deed to Wayne Smith only called for 45 acres, the Elkhorn map
adds an additional 30 acres to his tract.
In addition,
Caruthers’s surveyor, Hatfield, testified that Elkhorn’s map
ignores changes in elevation and changes the direction and
distance calls set out in the 1935 deeds.
Nevertheless, these issues ultimately go to the
sufficiency of the evidence which supported the trial court’s
conclusion.
As this matter was tried before the circuit court
without a jury, our review of factual determinations is under
the clearly erroneous rule.8
This rule applies with equal force
on an appeal from a judgment in an action involving a boundary
dispute.9
Furthermore, “[a] fact finder may choose between the
conflicting opinions of surveyors so long as the opinion relied
upon is not based upon erroneous assumptions or fails to take
into account established factors."10
On the other hand, the construction of a deed is a
matter of law, and the intention of the parties is to be
8
CR 52.01.
9
Croley v. Alsip, Ky., 602 S.W.2d 418, 419 (1980).
10
Webb v. Compton, Ky. App., 98 S.W.3d 513, 517 (2002) (quoting
Howard v. Kingmont Oil Co., Ky. App., 729 S.W.2d 183, 184-85
(1987)).
12
gathered from the four corners of the instrument.11
The entire
instrument is to be considered in the light of attendant
circumstances and it is to be presumed that no clause or word in
a deed was used without meaning or intent.12
A court may not
substitute what the grantor may have intended to say for what
was said.
The rule is well settled that words in a deed that
are not technical must be construed as having their ordinary
connotation.13
In reaching its conclusion, the trial court noted that
in the 1935 deed, Myrtie Robinette and her siblings conveyed the
“whole and entire interest in their (Deceased) fathers [sic] and
mothers [sic] Real Estate, so as to include all land in said
boundary.”
Based upon this language, the court found that the
children of John B. Smith intended to divide all of the property
which they inherited from their parents.
Therefore, the court
disregarded any contrary language in the unrecorded 1932 deed.
In essence, the trial court found that the 1935
division deeds were not ambiguous, and limited its reading to
the four corners of those deeds.
We agree that extrinsic
evidence cannot be admitted to vary the terms of a written
11
Phelps v. Sledd, Ky., 479 S.W.2d 894, 896 (1972).
12
Dennis v. Bird, Ky. App., 941 S.W.2d 486, 488 (1997).
13
Phelps v. Sledd, 479 S.W.2d at 896.
13
instrument in the absence of an ambiguous deed.14
Moreover,
parol evidence is admissible only to explain a latent ambiguity
in a deed.
A latent ambiguity is one which does not appear upon
the face of the words used, and it is not known to exist until
the words are considered in light of the collateral facts.15
Caruthers contends that the 1935 division deeds contain such a
latent ambiguity, and that the trial court should have looked to
the 1932 deed and to other extrinsic evidence to explain the
ambiguity.
Had the trial court done so, Caruthers asserts that
the trial court would have found that Myrtie Robinette retained
the portion of the tract which was not specifically conveyed in
the 1935 deeds.
We agree that the 1935 deeds contain a latent
ambiguity.
Although the 1935 deeds state that the children of
John B. Smith are conveying all of the interest which they
inherited from their parents, the deeds did not actually divide
the entire tract.
Rather, when the deed descriptions are read
together, they exclude a portion of the original tract from the
division.
The specific descriptive terms of the property
conveyed appear to contradict the more general statement that
14
Hoheimer v. Hoheimer, Ky., 30 S.W.3d 176, 178 (2000); Sword v.
Sword, Ky., 252 S.W.2d 869 (1952).
15
Thornhill Baptist Church v. Smither, Ky., 273 S.W.2d 560, 562
(1954); citing Carroll v. Cave Hill Cemetery Co., 172 Ky. 204,
189 S.W. 186, 190 (1916).
14
the siblings had intended to divide the entire tract which they
had inherited from the parents.
Therefore, the trial court
should have considered the parol evidence to explain the
ambiguity.16
Nonetheless, Caruthers and American General are not
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law at this point in time.
Because the trial court relied only on the 1935 deed
descriptions, it did not consider other evidence which might
have explained the apparent ambiguity.
We conclude that there
are issues of fact which remain for the trial court to resolve.
Most notably, the sufficiency of the 1932 deed has
also not yet been determined.
The parties agree that an
unrecorded deed is valid and effective between the parties to
that deed, and against a subsequent grantee who knew or had
notice of its existence prior to his purchase, or had
information sufficient to put him on inquiry that would have led
to its discovery upon a search; such information is deemed
equivalent to notice.17
However, an unrecorded deed is not valid
16
Thornhill Baptist Church v. Smither, 273 S.W.2d at 562-63;
citing Tarr v. Tarr's Executor, 259 Ky. 638, 82 S.W.2d 810,
811(1935).
17
Turner v. McIntosh, Ky., 379 S.W.2d 470, 472 (1964).
15
against a subsequent purchaser for value and without notice of
the deed.18
Earl Robinette testified that he acquired his property
in 1947 and in 1952 – long before the 1932 deed was recorded.
But it is not clear from the record that the disputed area was
within the property conveyed in his chain of title.
If the
property is not within his chain of title, then Caruthers would
not be estopped from claiming the property under the unrecorded
1932 deed.
Likewise, it is not clear from the record before this
Court whether this property was ever specifically conveyed to
Myrtie Robinette or to Wayne Smith.
Although the Elkhorn map
assumes that the disputed area was included in the property
conveyed to Wayne Smith, the 1935 deed descriptions do not fully
support that assumption.
But on the other hand, the 1932 deed
appears to convey only an undivided interest in the John B.
Smith farm to Myrtie Robinette, and not a specific portion of
that tract.
It is not clear from the record before this Court
that the description in that deed would necessarily encompass
the property now claimed by Caruthers.
To determine the intent and effect of the 1935
division deeds, the trial court must look to all of the facts
18
KRS 382.270.
16
and circumstances which existed at the time those deeds were
executed.
Where a deed contains both a particular and a general
description of the property conveyed, the particular will
prevail over the general.19
The intention of the parties must be
looked at to determine what interest was conveyed.
In
determining the intention of the parties, courts look at the
whole deed, along with the circumstances surrounding its
execution, and courts may also consider the acts of the parties
following the conveyance.20
To this end, the 1932 deed may be
relevant to the question of whether the parties to the 1935
deeds intended to exclude a portion of the John B. Smith farm
from the division.
Similarly, the trial court should consider
whether the parties understood that the disputed area had
already been separately conveyed to Myrtie, as well as the
conduct of the parties both before and after the transaction.
The testimony of Whitt and Hatfield, together with the
other testimony offered by Caruthers, would support the
conclusion that Wayne and Myrtie did not intend to divide the
entire tract between them in 1935.
But conversely, the
testimony offered by Earl Robinette would indicate that the
sheep rocks were the recognized boundary between Myrtie and
19
Handy v. Standard Oil Co., Ky., 468 S.W.2d 302, 303 (1971).
20
Arthur v. Martin, Ky. App., 705 S.W.2d 940, 942 (1986).
17
Wayne’s tracts.
Although the Elkhorn map does not exactly
follow the 1935 deed descriptions, it is accurate to the extent
that it reflects those descriptions as supplemented by
reputation evidence concerning the boundary.
Furthermore, the
trial court must determine whether the disputed property was
ever included within Earl Robinette’s chain of title, and
whether he knew or had reason to know of a prior conveyance to
Myrtie.
These are all questions of fact, and are exclusively
within the purview of the trial court to decide.
Therefore, we
conclude that this matter must be remanded for additional
factual findings.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Pike Circuit Court is
vacated, and this matter is remanded for additional findings of
fact, conclusions of law and a judgment consistent with this
opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/APPELLEE
KATHY CARUTHERS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
EARL ROBINETTE, LOWELL SESCO,
AND ELBERT SESCO:
Dwight O. Bailey
Bailey Law Office
Flatwoods, Kentucky
Michael de Bourbon
Pruitt & de Bourbon Law Firm
Pikeville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT AMERICAN
GENERAL HOME EQUITY, INC.
Donald H. Combs
Combs & Combs, PSC
Pikeville, Kentucky
18
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