JAMES PATRICK JEFFRIES v. JENIFER LYNN JEFFRIES
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 5, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000708-MR
JAMES PATRICK JEFFRIES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE CYNTHIA SANDERSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00602
v.
JENIFER LYNN JEFFRIES
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI, McANULTY, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE:
James Patrick Jeffries (PJ), pro se, appeals
the McCracken Family Court’s order in his divorce case from
Jenifer Lynn Jeffries (Jenifer).
This order granted sole
custody of the couple’s two young sons to Jenifer.
PJ argues
that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding sole
custody to Jenifer.
And PJ disagrees with the trial court’s
decisions as to debt allocation and reimbursement of attorney’s
fees and costs.
PJ argues that Jenifer should have been ordered
to pay one-half of the couple’s tax liability from the 1999 tax
year, which PJ paid in full prior to Jenifer’s filing for
divorce; and PJ contends that he should not have to reimburse
Jenifer $5,792.81 in attorney’s fees and costs.
We conclude
that the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence.
And we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in awarding sole custody of the
couple’s children to Jenifer, in declining to recognize the 1999
tax liability as an outstanding marital debt, or in ordering PJ
to reimburse Jenifer for a portion of her attorney’s fees and
costs.
Thus, we affirm.
Jenifer and PJ married in 1997.
and PJ is a computer analyst.
and Ethan.
Jenifer is a nurse,
The couple has two sons, Devin
Devin’s date of birth is January 5, 2000, and
Ethan’s date of birth is January 23, 2002.
When Devin was about
eight months old, Jenifer and PJ moved from Memphis, Tennessee
to Kentucky where they lived with PJ’s parents.
After about
eight months of living with PJ’s parents, Jenifer obtained an
apartment.
PJ stayed with Jenifer in the apartment off and on,
but officially moved back in with his parents in April of 2002.
After their separation, Jenifer and PJ worked together
on sharing the child care responsibilities, but, on June 9,
2002, PJ showed up at Jenifer’s apartment unannounced, gathered
up Devin’s things and took Devin.
Jenifer alleges that while PJ
was there that night, he grabbed her by the neck while she was
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holding Ethan causing the arm cradling Ethan to hit the
doorframe.
Jenifer called the police that night, and the next
day she petitioned for divorce.
As to custody of the boys, both PJ and Jenifer sought
joint custody and each wanted his or her home to be the primary
residence.
The trial court heard the issue of custody and
initially ordered that Jenifer and PJ would have temporary joint
custody and designated Jenifer as the primary residential
custodian.
After a final hearing on child custody held January
6, 2003, the trial court amended its temporary joint custody
determination and found that it would be in the best interests
of the children to award sole custody to Jenifer.
After
entering this order, the trial court held another hearing on
March 7, 2003, to resume and conclude additional matters that
were not addressed in the January hearing.
After conducting
this hearing, the trial court entered supplemental findings of
fact and conclusions of law on March 21, 2003, from which PJ
appeals.
PJ raises three arguments on appeal.
First, PJ argues
that the couple had a debt that the trial court failed to
properly allocate between PJ and Jenifer.
Second, PJ argues
that he should not have to reimburse Jenifer for part of her
attorney’s fees and costs.
Third, PJ argues that the trial
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court abused its discretion in granting sole custody of the
children to Jenifer.
We will begin with the trial court’s decision on child
custody.
Facts on the two additional issues of attorney’s fees
and division of marital debt will be developed later in this
opinion.
The trial court possesses broad discretion in
determining whether joint custody or sole custody serves the
child's best interest.
765, 768 (1993).
See Squires v. Squires, Ky., 854 S.W.2d
And “[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.”
CR 52.01.
Our review is limited to whether the
findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous or whether the
trial court abused its discretion in awarding sole custody to
Jenifer.
See Carnes v. Carnes, Ky., 704 S.W.2d 207, 208 (1986).
“[F]indings of fact are clearly erroneous only if there exists
no substantial evidence in the record to support them.”
V.S. v.
Com., Cabinet for Human Resources, Ky. App., 706 S.W.2d 420, 424
(1986).
KRS 403.270 provides several factors that a trial
court shall consider when determining custody.
Those factors
include: the parents’ wishes; the interaction and
interrelationship of the child with his parents and any other
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person who may significantly affect the child’s best interests;
the child’s adjustment to his home, school, and community; the
mental and physical health of all individuals involved; and
information and evidence of domestic violence.
Throughout the proceedings below, PJ argued that he
has been the children’s primary caregiver and his home -- with
his parents -- has been their primary residence, therefore it is
clearly in the children’s best interests for PJ and Jenifer to
have joint custody with PJ being the primary residential
custodian.
In reviewing the record, we recognize that PJ
demonstrated that he knows how to take care of a child’s
physical needs.
Unfortunately, he also demonstrated that he and
his parents do not know how to be mature and work together for
the good of the children in a joint custody arrangement.
The
best illustration of this is the fact that after the trial court
granted Jenifer sole custody in January of 2003, PJ did not see
the children for his scheduled visits for two months.
And in a
hearing held in March of 2003, he informed the trial court that
he did not contest Jenifer’s moving to Texas because he had no
intention of visiting with his children again.
PJ argues that the trial court’s findings on custody
are inconsistent with the evidence presented, rely on
inadmissible and irrelevant evidence and are unfairly biased
against PJ.
In particular, PJ asserts that the court-ordered
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domestic violence evaluation that took place as a result of the
pushing incident on June 9, 2002, should not have been entered
into evidence or considered for a variety of reasons.
But PJ
had no problem with the evaluation being admitted as evidence
during a hearing on January 6, 2003, even after the trial court
asked him if he wanted to see it before it got in the record.
PJ’s response was “No, I’ve seen it.”
Now he argues that he did not understand the
evaluation was being admitted as evidence.
Having reviewed the
hearing during which the trial court admitted the evaluation and
the subsequent findings issued by the trial court directly
commenting on the content of the evaluation, we can give no
credence to this assertion.
On the issue of custody, we conclude that the trial
court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.
And we
hold that the trial court appropriately and carefully considered
the relevant factors in making its custody determination.
We move to the issue of attorney’s fees.
The trial
court ordered PJ to reimburse Jenifer a portion of her
attorney’s fees amounting to $5,792.81.
In reaching this
decision, the trial court considered two factors.
First, the
trial court found that PJ made numerous unsubstantiated and
unwarranted allegations about Jenifer that Jenifer was forced to
defend.
In the trial court’s findings, it stated that the
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evidence PJ put on in an attempt to prove that Jenifer was a
drug addict was incredible and unworthy of belief.
Second, the
trial court found that PJ had greater financial resources than
Jenifer.
PJ argues that Jenifer is not entitled to
reimbursement for a part of her attorney’s fees because she did
not demonstrate that he had a financial advantage over her.
And
PJ asserts that it was Jenifer’s own tactics -- not PJ’s -during the proceedings that caused her excessive attorney’s
fees.
Under KRS 403.220, a trial court is permitted to order
a party to pay a reasonable amount to the other party for costs
and attorney’s fees.
In ordering PJ to reimburse Jenifer for
costs and attorney’s fees, the trial court found a disparity in
their financial resources.
required.
(1990).
And under KRS 403.220, no more is
See Gentry v. Gentry, Ky., 798 S.W.2d 928, 937
But the trial court also found that Jenifer incurred a
portion of her attorney’s fees because PJ persisted in putting
on unbelievable evidence of Jenifer’s alleged drug addiction.
The record supports the trial court’s findings on the
issue of attorney’s fees.
PJ accuses Jenifer of clouding the
issues in their divorce proceedings with allegations of
infidelity and drug abuse.
But our review of the record shows
that PJ persevered in trying to prove that Jenifer was having an
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affair –- consistently denying that Ethan was his, but never
taking a paternity test -- abusing alcohol, abusing pain killers
and smoking marijuana.
These issues were litigated in every
hearing, costing Jenifer for her attorney’s time and other
related expenses.
There is no abuse of discretion in ordering
PJ to reimburse Jenifer for his inappropriate litigation and
controlling and abusive tactics.
And the costs and fees
assessed by the court were reasonable.
Finally, we address PJ’s argument that the couple’s
1999 tax liability was a debt the trial court failed to
allocate.
On this issue, the trial court found as follows:
6. The Respondent testified that the
parties had a joint tax liability for the
1999 tax year in the amount of $3,833.15.
The Respondent testified that he borrowed
$3,200 from his employer and paid the full
liability on June 3, 2002. The Respondent
further testified that he repaid his
employer $3,200 thereafter with funds he
alleged were his non-marital property. The
Respondent requested that the debt be
considered a marital obligation and that the
Petitioner be ordered to reimburse him for
one-half (1/2) of the amount paid or onehalf (1/2) of the $3,200 in alleged nonmarital funds which he claimed to repay his
employer. The Court finds that because the
tax liability was paid prior to the entry of
the Decree, and, in fact, prior to the
divorce action even being commenced, there
is no debt to divide by the Court.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the
Respondent is not entitled to any deduction
or credit against his share of the marital
estate and the Court will not order the
Petitioner to reimburse the Respondent any
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amount in light of the payment of the tax
obligation.
PJ does not dispute that he paid the tax liability to
the IRS before Jenifer petitioned for divorce, but claims that
in order to pay the debt, he had to borrow money from his
employer.
place.
So where he satisfied one debt, another debt took its
PJ made this argument during the proceedings below, but
he produced no documents nor presented any testimony to prove
that he did receive a loan from his employer.
As PJ presented
no proof to support his argument, the trial court was correct in
deciding the tax liability issue as it did.
There was no debt
to divide.
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment on the issues of child custody, reimbursement
of Jenifer’s attorney’s fees and costs, and the allocation of
marital debt.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James Patrick Jeffries, pro se
Mayfield, Kentucky
Brian S. Katz
Paducah, Kentucky
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