GUS DURELL JONES v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 30, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000469-MR
GUS DURELL JONES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA OVERSTREET, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-01052
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, SCHRODER AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE.
Appellant Gus Durell Jones appeals the
judgment from the Fayette Circuit Court entering a conditional
guilty plea and sentencing him to five years imprisonment for
possession of a handgun by a convicted felon.
The issue on
appeal is whether appellant’s right to a speedy trial was
violated.
For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm.
On May 14, 2001, a Lexington Fayette County police
officer arrested appellant for possession of a handgun by a
convicted felon, possession of crack cocaine and possession of
marijuana.
On July 12, 2001, appellant was indicted on similar
charges by a grand jury in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Kentucky.
On July 23, 2001, a Fayette
County grand jury dismissed the state charges against appellant
due to the pending federal charges.
For reasons unclear in the
record, on September 17, 2002, the United States District Court
entered an order dismissing appellant’s federal indictment.
On October 7, 2002, a Fayette County grand jury
returned an indictment against appellant for possession of a
handgun by a convicted felon, first-degree possession of a
controlled substance and possession of marijuana.
Appellant was
arraigned on October 11, at which time his counsel requested one
month to review discovery materials.
A November 8 status
conference was rescheduled for November 22, so that appellant
could have additional time to review tapes that were in the
Commonwealth’s possession.
On November 21, appellant filed a motion to dismiss
alleging that his state indictment violated the double jeopardy
clause, the due process clause and his constitutional right to a
speedy trial. In order for the Commonwealth to respond to
appellant’s motion to dismiss, the November 22 status conference
was passed to December 6, at which point the circuit court,
after hearing arguments of counsel, overruled appellant’s motion
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to dismiss.
The next status conference was scheduled for
January 17, 2003 and appellant’s trial was set for February 19,
2003.
On February 5, 2003, the Commonwealth filed a pretrial
motion, which was heard on February 7. At this point, rather
than proceeding to trial, appellant entered a conditional guilty
plea to possession of a handgun by a convicted felon.1
After
appellant waived his right to a sentencing hearing, the circuit
court sentenced him to five years imprisonment.
This appeal
followed.
Appellant contends that the state and federal
authorities violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial
by delaying court proceedings for seventeen months and
dismissing two indictments against him.
Appellant argues that
since this right was violated, dismissal is “the only possible
remedy.”
Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439, 93 S.Ct.
2260, 2263, 37 L.Ed.2d 56, 61 (1973).
In Dunaway v. Commonwealth, Ky., 60 S.W.3d 563, 569
(2001), the court analyzed a defendant’s right to a speedy trial
according to a four-part test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).
This test
involves an examination of: (1) the length of delay; (2) the
reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his
1
The drug possession charges were dismissed.
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right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant caused by the
delay.2
117.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d at
The speedy trial analysis “begins by determining if the
delay was presumptively prejudicial to the defendant; for if it
was not, the defendant’s rights were not violated, and the
inquiry ends.”
Dunaway, 60 S.W.3d at 569.
See also, Barker,
407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117.
Appellant argues that a seventeen-month delay is
presumptively prejudical.
We disagree.
In Commonwealth v.
Hale, Ky., 96 S.W.3d 24, 33 (2003), the court stated:
In order to “preserve[] our two systems of courts
from actual conflict of jurisdiction,” the United
States Supreme Court has held that either
sovereign--federal or state--has the right to
exclusive custody of a prisoner who has been
convicted of violating the laws of that sovereign
and is “permitted to exhaust its remedy . . .
before the other court shall attempt to take it
for its purpose.”
(quoting Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 260, 42 S.Ct. 309,
310, 66 L.Ed. 607, 611 (1922)).
Here, it is reasonable to
assume that by dismissing appellant’s state indictment, the
state authorities were merely trying to avoid a potential
conflict of jurisdiction with the federal authorities.
The
state authorities waited until appellant’s federal charges were
2
In Barker, the court held: “A defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy
trial cannot be established by any inflexible rule but can be determined only
on an ad hoc balancing basis, in which the conduct of the prosecution and
that of the defendant are weighed.” 407 U.S. at 514, 92 S.Ct. at 2182, 33
L.Ed.2d at 101. No one factor is ultimately determinative by itself. Gabow
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 34 S.W.3d 63, 70 (2000).
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dismissed before reinstating his state charges, which does not
appear from the record to be an intentional or deliberate
attempt to hinder appellant’s defense.
Moreover, in United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7
n.7, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1501, 71 L.Ed.2d 696, 701 (1982), the court
noted “that if charges are initially dismissed and later
reinstated, the period between the dismissal and reinstatement
is not to be included in computing the time within which a trial
must commence.”3
In the present case, no state criminal
prosecution was pending on which appellant could have been tried
from July 23, 2001, the date of the state’s dismissal, to
October 7, 2002, the date the Fayette County grand jury
reinstated appellant’s indictment.
During the intervening
period appellant was only subject to federal criminal
prosecution; thus, that time is not considered in determining
the length of appellant’s delay for trial.
Accordingly, it
follows that appellant encountered less than a six-month delay
in court proceedings from October 7, 2002, until his trial date
scheduled for February 19, 2003.
Based on the record as a
3
In MacDonald, the court explained that “[a]ny undue delay after charges are
dismissed, like any delay before charges are filed, must be scrutinized under
the Due Process Clause, not the Speedy Trial Clause.” 456 U.S. at 7, 102
S.Ct. at 1501, 71 L.Ed.2d at 701. In the present case, appellant raised a
due process violation in his motion to dismiss before the circuit court
however, this issue was not preserved for appeal.
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whole, the length of delay was not presumptively prejudicial and
therefore, the inquiry ends.4
We also note, that appellant never asserted his right
to a speedy trial,5 other than filing a motion to dismiss.
A
motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial “is not
a formal demand for a speedy trial.”
Ky., 973 S.W.2d 13, 22 (1998).
Tamme v. Commonwealth,
See also, McDonald v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 569 S.W.2d 134, 137 (1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1119, 99 S.Ct. 1028, 59 L.Ed.2d 79 (1979).
In addition,
although appellant argues that he may have been prejudiced by
the mere fact that he was incarcerated during the delay,6 he has
not identified any prejudice with respect to his ability to
present his defense if the case had proceeded to trial.7
Therefore, we conclude that appellant’s constitutional speedy
trial right was not violated in any manner.
4
In Dunaway, the court held a thirteen and one-half month delay was
presumptively prejudicial. 60 S.W.3d at 569.
5
In Barker, the court emphasized that the defendant’s failure to assert his
speedy trial right “will make it difficult for the defendant to prove that he
was denied a speedy trial.” 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at
118.
6
See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532-33, 92 S.Ct. at 2192-93, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117-8.
7
In Barker, the court identified three interests bearing on prejudice to the
defendant: “(1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize
anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility that the
defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because
the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the
fairness of the entire system.” 407 U.S. at 532-33, 92 S.Ct. at 2192-93, 33
L.Ed.2d at 117-8.
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and sentence
of the Fayette Circuit Court is hereby affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Alicia A. Sneed
Lexington, KY
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
John R. Tarter
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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