RANDALL POTTER DAVIDSON v. LARITA ANN MAYNARD DAVIDSON
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RENDERED: August 6, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-000054-MR
AND
NO. 2003-CA-001173-MR
RANDALL POTTER DAVIDSON
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM SIMPSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TYLER GILL, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00254
v.
LARITA ANN MAYNARD DAVIDSON
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN 2003-CA-000054
AND
VACATING AND REMANDING IN 2003-CA-001173
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, Chief Judge; BUCKINGHAM and TACKETT, Judges.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE.
Randall Davidson appeals from orders of the
Simpson Circuit Court denying motions to modify his maintenance
obligation.1
We affirm as to appeal 2003-CA-000054; we vacate
and remand as to appeal 2003-CA-001173.
Randall Davidson and Larita Ann Maynard Davidson were
married in June 1983.
1
Two children were born of the marriage.
The appeals have been consolidated for purposes of this opinion.
They separated in August 1999 when the children were three and
nine years of age.
A petition for dissolution of the marriage
followed a few months later.
On December 6, 2000, the Simpson Circuit Court entered
a decree of dissolution, which incorporated by reference the
parties’ property settlement agreement of November 17, 2000.2
The agreement provided, in part, that Randall would pay to
Larita $6,000.00 per month as maintenance for a period of eleven
years and one month.
The parties agreed that the maintenance
obligation was non-modifiable except as provided by KRS3
403.250(2), which provides for the termination of maintenance
upon the death of either party or the re-marriage of the spouse
receiving maintenance.
In April 2001, Randall filed a motion requesting
modification of his maintenance obligation.
He contended that
because “the maintenance in this action was based upon
representations that certain debts did exist, there appears to
be a genuine dispute about truthfulness of these debts.”
at 2.
Motion
Randall asked for a hearing to determine whether his
maintenance obligation should be modified or terminated.
In her
response, Larita averred that all of her representations about
the parties’ debt had been accurate.
She also contended that
2
The agreement was prepared by Randall’s counsel.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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Randall’s maintenance obligation had been made non-modifiable by
the express terms of the parties’ agreement.
On May 16, 2001, a hearing was held before the court’s
Domestic Relations Commissioner (DRC).
The DRC determined that
the maintenance provision of the agreement was not
unconscionable and that modification of the agreement was
expressly prohibited.
In a report entered July 20, 2001, the
DRC recommended that Randall’s motion for a modification be
denied.
No exceptions were filed with regard to these specific
findings.
In its orders of January 4, 2002, and July 10, 2002,
the Simpson Circuit Court confirmed the DRC’s report and denied
Randall’s motion for a modification of his maintenance
obligation.
In April 2002, eighteen months after the decree of
dissolution was entered, Randall filed a motion requesting the
court to find the property settlement agreement unconscionable
and accordingly to “enter any and all appropriate orders.”
Motion at p. 3.
While acknowledging that his gross income since
1999 had been approximately $240,000.00 per year, he claimed
that his child support and maintenance obligations consumed 66%
of his after-tax income.
Therefore, he claimed that the
property settlement agreement had been unconscionable on its
face at inception.
-3-
Citing the trial court’s findings prior to the entry
of the decree, Larita argued in response that the motion should
be summarily denied.
(9)
She highlighted the following finding:
That the parties have entered into a
Child Custody and Property Settlement
Agreement dated November 17, 2000 which
the court finds to be not
unconscionable and is hereby accepted
by the Court and made a part of the
Final Judgment in this action.
She then cited the trial court’s conclusions of law as follows:
(4)
The Court has reviewed the terms of the
Child Custody and Property Settlement
Agreement dated November 17, 2000, a
copy of which is attached hereto, which
is executed voluntarily be [sic] each
party, and the Court finds the division
of said property and debts and all
other matters addressed herein are fair
and equitable and are not
unconscionable.
Decree of dissolution at pp. 2-3.
Noting that Randall had not appealed the court’s final
judgment, she contended that he was precluded from challenging
the court’s findings and conclusions.
The DRC asked that the parties file legal memoranda
concerning Randall’s request for an evidentiary hearing on this
issue.
In a report filed September 30, 2002, the DRC found as
follows:
[T]here is a final Judgement of this Court
on the very issue which [Randall] now seeks
to review by means of an evidentiary
-4-
hearing. The ruling of this Court is that
the Agreement is not unconscionable.
Judgment was final and appealable and no
action was taken until the filing of the
motion by [Randall]. . . . the Commissioner
finds the Doctrine of res judicata applies
in this case.
The DRC recommended that the court deny Randall’s
motion to find the terms of the parties’ property settlement
agreement unconscionable.
He also recommended denial of
Randall’s request for an evidentiary hearing.
The DRC’s full
report was confirmed by the Simpson Circuit Court by an order
entered on December 17, 2002.
Randall’s first appeal followed.
(No. 2003-CA-000054-MR.)
On January 9, 2003, Randall filed another motion to
modify his maintenance obligation, contending that the parties’
agreement had recently become unconscionable because of a change
in circumstances.
Randall, a physician, alleged that his wages
would no longer be paid on a regular basis and that his hourly
rate might be reduced due to changes at PhyAmerica, the company
responsible for subcontracting his medical services to Greenview
Regional Hospital.
He also stated that he could not “continue
to work his exhaustive and excessive work schedule to earn
sufficient income to pay his obligations to [Larita].”4
4
Larita
A profit and loss statement was prepared by Randall’s accountant and
introduced into the record at a contempt hearing held in July 2002.
That statement indicated that Randall had earned $306,021.09 in 2002
and that he had miscellaneous income totaling an additional
$10,342.13. The statement indicated that in 2002, Randall and his
-5-
countered with a motion for sanctions.
She argued that Randall
had filed repeated motions in order to harass her and to cause
her to incur unnecessary legal expenses.
On February 5, 2003, Randall filed an amended motion
to modify his maintenance obligation, requesting the court to
modify the terms of the divorce decree pursuant to the
provisions of CR5 60.02(f) “since the circumstances have changed
in an extraordinary nature justifying relief.”
In an affidavit
filed in support of the motion, Randall again contended that the
agreement had been unconscionable from its inception.
Randall
stated, in part, as follows:
I believe that the maintenance agreement
between Larita Davidson and myself was
unconscionable from its very inception and
that a review of the facts of this case will
bear out that belief. The agreement was ill
conceived and I was ill advised, albeit by
purportedly “competent” counsel, to accept
and sign on to the terms.
* * * * *
Further, I do not believe it is the intent
of the court to oppress my own lifestyle or
to mandate that I work heroic hours for what
is tantamount to indentured servitude. The
medical degree that affords me the
opportunity to achieve above average income
was earned by me, not by we.
spouse spent more than $5,500.00 for clothing; nearly $7,000.00 for
jewelry; more than $11,000.00 for a motorcycle; more than $6,000 for
entertainment; and more than $3,000.00 in dining out.
5
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
-6-
In a report filed on February 19, 2003, the DRC found
that Randall’s motion for a modification of his maintenance
obligation failed to comply with the court’s Local Rules of
Domestic Relations Practice because it had not been accompanied
by a sworn income and expense statement along with supporting
documentation.
Despite this deficiency, the DRC noted that the
motion should be denied since Randall had expressly agreed to a
clause prohibiting any modification of the maintenance
agreement.
Larita’s motion for sanctions was passed to the
court for consideration.
In an order entered May 2, 2003, the Simpson Circuit
Court confirmed the DRC’s report.
The parties were ordered to
attend a parent education clinic, but the court reserved ruling
on the issue of sanctions.
followed.
Randall’s second notice of appeal
(No. 2003-CA-001173-MR.)
Randall argues that the trial court erred in failing
to conduct an evidentiary hearing as to his allegation of the
unconscionability of the parties’ separation agreement.
He
relies on the provisions of KRS 403.180(2) and on the holdings
in Adkins v. Jones, Ky., 264 S.W.2d 265 (1954), and Shraberg v.
Shraberg, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 330 (1997).
The provisions of KRS 403.180(2) require a trial court
to consider “the economic circumstances of the parties and any
other relevant evidence produced by the parties” in determining
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whether a separation agreement is unconscionable.
In light of
this provision, Randall contends that the court was required to
conduct an evidentiary hearing following his post-decree
motions.
The provisions of KRS 403.180 relate to a court’s
initial assessment of a separation agreement.
The sections that
follow address the incorporation of an approved agreement into
the decree of dissolution and the remedies available for
enforcement of the terms of the agreement.
Furthermore, KRS
403.180(6) provides that “the decree may expressly preclude or
limit modification of terms if the separation agreement so
provides.”
Thus, Randall was not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing concerning his post-decree motions based on the
provisions of KRS 403.180.
Randall’s argument is not supported by the precedent
cited in Adkins v. Jones, supra, or Shraberg v. Shraberg, supra.
Adkins was decided in 1954, pre-dating the enactment of
Kentucky’s no-fault divorce law in 1972; the appellant’s motion
in Adkins sought to set aside the judgment.
Randall’s initial
motions did not seek the relief requested in Adkins.
In
Shraberg, the validity of a separation agreement was challenged
(pursuant to the provisions of KRS 403.180) before the court had
adjudicated the issue of fairness and prior to its entry of the
final decree of dissolution that incorporated the agreement.
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By
contrast, Randall’s motion requested the court to reconsider its
assessment of the parties’ agreement after the fact; that is,
after the court had already examined the agreement, had
determined that it was not unconscionable, and had incorporated
it into the final decree.
Thus, his reliance on Adkins and on
Schraber is ill-founded.
We hold that the court did not err in
denying an evidentiary hearing to re-visit its previous
determination that the agreement was not unconscionable.
Randall also argues that he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing based upon the allegation contained in his
motion of February 5, 2003, filed pursuant to CR 60.02(f):
“since the circumstances have changed in an extraordinary nature
justifying relief.”
We agree that he is entitled to an
opportunity to present evidence as to changed circumstances
justifying a reopening of the dissolution decree.
See
Terwilliger v. Terwilliger, Ky., 64 S.W.3d 816 (2002).
We do
not hold that Randall is entitled to the extraordinary relief he
seeks; our ruling merely allows him an opportunity to present
evidence as to his contention.
We are mindful of the strong and
sound policy supporting the doctrine of finality of judgments.
Substantive relief under CR 60.02(f) is available only where a
clear showing of the most extraordinary and compelling equities
is made.
Bishir v. Bishir, Ky., 698 S.W.2d 823 (1985).
In its
order of December 17, 2002, the trial court cogently observed:
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[Randall’s] motion was probably intended as
a motion under Civil Rule 60.02(f) to set
aside a Final Judgment for reasons of an
extraordinary nature justifying relief.
* * * * *
[Randall’s] only alleged basis is that the
maintenance provisions of the Property
Settlement Agreement are unconscionable
because they are financially oppressive.
* * * * *
Dr. Davidson did not attempt to address why
no appeal was taken or why he did not notice
the unfairness of the final decree for more
than a year after it was entered.
* * * * *
At this point, even if we were to assume he
is right about the Decree being
unconscionable, insufficient grounds exist
to disturb it.
Motions attempting to invoke the provisions of CR
60.02(f) must be specific in mirroring the substance of the
rule.
Mindful of the admonition of the trial court concerning
the precision required in a CR 60.02(f) motion, Randall’s motion
of February 5, 2003, properly articulated the necessary grounds
for remedying the deficiency in his earlier motion.
We note
that on remand at his evidentiary hearing, he will bear a heavy
burden in establishing proof of the extraordinary change in
circumstances that he alleges.
Bishir, supra, contains a clear
caveat in this regard:
-10-
The strong and sensible policy of the law
in favor of the finality of judgments has
historically been overcome only in the
presence of the most compelling equities.
Relief under CR 60.02(f) is available where
a clear showing of extraordinary and
compelling equities is made.
Id. at 826.
The order of the Simpson Circuit Court of December 17,
2002, is affirmed.
The order of the Simpson Circuit Court of
May 2, 2003, is vacated, and the matter is remanded for an
evidentiary hearing as set forth in this opinion.
TACKETT, JUDGE, CONCURS.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN
PART.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING
IN PART:
I concur in the portion of the majority opinion
affirming Randall’s appeal in Case No. 2003-CA-000054.
However,
I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority opinion
vacating and remanding Randall’s appeal in Case No. 2003-CA001173.
Randal is not entitled an evidentiary hearing on his CR
60.02(f) motion in my opinion.
In Randall’s motion to modify maintenance, he stated
that it was filed pursuant to KRS 403.250(1).
In support of his
motion he stated that changed circumstances made the original
agreement unconscionable.
As for the facts alleged supporting
his motion, Randall stated that he is not safely practicing
-11-
medicine because of his “excessive and unsafe work schedule” as
an emergency room physician.
He also claims that his wages will
not be paid on a regular basis and that there may be a reduction
in his hourly wage rate.
In Randall’s amended motion to modify
maintenance, he adopted all the statements made in his original
motion.
He added only that he moved the court to consider his
motion pursuant to CR 60.02(f).
KRS 403.250(1) states in part that “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in subsection (6) of KRS 403.180, the
provisions of any decree respecting maintenance may be modified
only upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and
continuing as to make the terms unconscionable.”
KRS 403.180(6)
states in part that “[e]xcept for terms concerning the support,
custody, or visitation of children, the decree may expressly
preclude or limit modification of terms if the separation
agreement so provides.”
In Scott v. Scott, Ky., 529 S.W.2d 656 (1975), the
appellate court held that KRS 403.180(6) appears to mean “that a
marriage-dissolution decree incorporating a property-settlement
agreement may be modified by the court, with respect to
maintenance payments (when authorized by the conditions set
forth in KRS 403.250), unless the settlement agreement and the
decree expressly preclude modification.”
Id. at 657.
KRS
403.180(6) and the Scott case indicate to me that the non-
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modifiable language in the property settlement agreement and
decree preclude Randall from getting any relief from the
judgment, whether it be pursuant to CR 60.02(f) or otherwise.
See also Lueckenotte v. Lueckenotte, 34 S.W.3d 387, 391-92 (Mo.
2001) (en banc).
However, it does seem logical that some extraordinary
circumstances could arise that would give a party such as
Randall relief from a maintenance obligation such as the one
herein.
For example, if Randall was severely injured in an
automobile accident and was unable to work as a physician,
perhaps he should be entitled to CR 60.02(f) relief.
At any
rate, the circumstances alleged by Randall in his motion were
not unforeseeable when the agreement and decree were entered
and, in my opinion, were not sufficient grounds of an
extraordinary nature so as to warrant an evidentiary hearing on
his CR 60.02(f) motion.
In short, I do not believe that Randall
alleged a sufficient basis for CR 60.02(f) relief in his motion.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Joseph R. Kirwan
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Timothy D. Mefford
Franklin, Kentucky
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