WILLIAM JOSEPH PHILLIPS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 12, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2002-CA-001533-MR
WILLIAM JOSEPH PHILLIPS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-00174
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
*** *** *** ***
BEFORE:
COMBS, JOHNSON AND MINTON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE.
William Joseph Phillips has appealed from an
opinion and judgment entered by the Muhlenberg Circuit Court on
July 3, 2002, which denied his pro se motion to vacate, set
aside or correct sentence filed pursuant to RCr1 11.42, without
an evidentiary hearing.
Having concluded that the circuit court
did not err in rejecting Phillips’s claim of ineffective
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
assistance of counsel without an evidentiary hearing or
appointment of counsel, we affirm.
Phillips lived in a mobile home on his 22-acre farm in
Muhlenberg County.
On the afternoon of September 1, 1999, Roy
Markwell, Jr. saw a man he did not know near a green pickup
truck parked just off a wooded area on property that Markwell
leases for raising hay situated adjacent to Phillips’s farm.
Markwell noticed several containers, buckets, and jars on and
near the tailgate of the truck.
Markwell told the man that the
land was private and that he wanted him to stay out of the hay
field.
After reconsidering the situation, Markwell became
suspicious and decided to go to a nearby friend’s residence and
notify the police.
In order to prevent the unknown man’s exit
from the area, Markwell and his friend went to the intersection
of the paved public road and a gravel road that traverses
Phillips’s farm and extends back onto Markwell’s property.
After waiting approximately 15 minutes, Markwell heard the noise
of a vehicle’s doors slamming shut emanating from behind a
wooded area on the Phillips’s farm.
Phillips’s mobile home was
approximately 50 feet from the paved roadway off the gravel
road.
Almost simultaneously with the arrival of Muhlenberg
County Deputy Sheriff Charles Perry, Markwell saw the man exit
the wooded thicket on foot.
When the man saw Deputy Perry’s
police vehicle, he turned and ran in the opposite direction.
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Several other police officers soon arrived, including
Muhlenberg County Sheriff Jerry Mayhugh.
As the officers were
searching the area they saw Phillips, who ran into a wooded
thicket when he noticed them.
The police eventually apprehended
Phillips with the aid of a police dog and took him back to his
home.
While the police failed to find the man initially seen by
Markwell, he was later identified as being Jerry Lear, the
registered owner of the truck.
In the bed of the green truck and nearby, the police
found several large buckets, plastic tubing, liquid fire, seed
jars, hose clamps, batteries, drain cleaner, several coolers,
funnels, a jar covered with a coffee filter secured by a rubber
band, four punctured ether cans, and starting fluid.
The police
also found a blue carrying bag that contained scales, a
prescription bottle with Phillips’s name on it, a plastic tube,
three bags of marijuana, and two baggies containing a substance
later confirmed to be methamphetamine.
After being given his
Miranda2 warnings, Phillips agreed to allow the police to search
his mobile home.
During the search, the police seized two
marijuana “roach”3 cigarettes from the living room; starting
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
3
A roach is the remaining portion of a partially smoked marijuana cigarette.
-3-
fluid in the refrigerator freezer;4 a black zipper canvas bag on
the floor in the living room containing a Ruger .22 caliber
pistol; a gold-colored clear plastic pill bottle with a small
bag of methamphetamine; a red duffle bag with plastic tubing and
clear tape in the living room; coffee filters in the kitchen; a
paper plate with suspected methamphetamine in the living room; a
basting tool with a white substance on it under a cushion of the
couch in the living room; 22 red pills suspected to be Sudafed
on the dresser in the back bedroom; and a coffee cup with white
ties in it on top of the refrigerator in the kitchen.
In a
written statement, Phillips admitted that the two marijuana
cigarette roaches and the small amount of methamphetamine in the
pill bottle belonged to him.
On October 1, 1999, a Muhlenberg County grand jury
indicted Phillips on one felony count of manufacturing
methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm,5 one felony
count of possession of a controlled substance in the first
degree (methamphetamine) while in possession of a firearm,6 one
felony count of possession of drug paraphernalia while in
possession of a firearm,7 and one felony count of possession of
4
This starting fluid was similar to and the same brand as that found in the
green truck.
5
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1432 and KRS 218A.992.
6
KRS 218A.1415 and KRS 218A.992.
7
KRS 218A.500 and KRS 218A.992.
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marijuana while in possession of a firearm.8
Phillips was
allowed to remain free on bond following his arraignment.
In
March 2000, Phillips’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw and
for a continuance on the grounds that he and Phillips were
unable to reach an understanding on presenting a defense and the
need for additional time to acquire the testimony of a
psychologist on Phillips’s treatment for post-traumatic stress
disorder associated with his military service in Vietnam.
After
a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.
On March 16, 2000, Phillips’s attorney filed a motion
in limine to, among other things, exclude the written statements
that Phillips and Jerry Lear gave to the police, and to exclude
a statement by a police informant, Ronni Vincent, implicating
Phillips in the manufacture of methamphetamine.
Counsel also
moved the trial court to admit by avowal a letter written by the
psychologist who had treated Phillips for post-traumatic stress
syndrome and testimony from a Mrs. Harstein about her having
allegedly seen damage to Phillips’s front door on September 1,
1999.
During the hearing, Phillips admitted that he had signed
the document containing a written statement about the situation
and a document granting the police permission to search his
residence.
The trial court denied the motion to exclude
Phillips’s and Lear’s written statements, but it granted the
8
KRS 218A.1422 and KRS 218A.992. Jerry Lear was also indicted and convicted
of similar offenses associated with the incident on September 1, 1999.
-5-
motion to exclude Ronni Vincent’s statement.
It also refused to
admit Mrs. Harstein’s testimony.
On March 21, 2000, the trial court conducted a jury
trial with Roy Markwell, Deputy Perry, Sheriff Mayhugh, Jerry
Lear, and Cheyenne Albro, the director of a narcotics task force
called as an expert on the illegal manufacture of
methamphetamine, as witnesses for the Commonwealth.
Phillips
was the only witness who testified for the defense.
The law
enforcement witnesses testified about the various suspect items
recovered around the green truck and in Phillips’s mobile home,
the search for and apprehension of Phillips, and the written
statements obtained from Jerry Lear and Phillips.
Lear admitted
signing a written document implicating Phillips in the
manufacture of methamphetamine, but he denied having read the
statement before signing it or making the statements contained
in the document.
Albro discussed the process for manufacturing
methamphetamine and identified numerous items found in
Phillips’s residence as being consistent with the illegal
manufacture of methamphetamine.
Phillips denied being involved
in or associated with Jerry Lear in manufacturing
methamphetamine.
Although admitting that he attempted to avoid
the police, Phillips stated that he hid from them because they
did not identify themselves and he wanted to “stay out of harms
[sic] way” because he was unsure of the situation.
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The jury found Phillips guilty of manufacturing
methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm, possession of
a controlled substance (methamphetamine) while in possession of
a firearm, and possession of marijuana while in possession of a
firearm, and recommended consecutive sentences of 20 years, ten
years, and five years, respectively.9
On March 27, 2000,
Phillips filed motions for a new trial and a judgment of
acquittal with respect to the firearm enhancement provisions and
the conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine, which were
denied.
On April 17, 2000, the trial court sentenced Phillips
to serve 20 years for manufacturing methamphetamine while in
possession of a firearm, ten years for possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine) while in possession of a
firearm, and five years for possession of marijuana while in
possession of a firearm, but ordered that the sentences run
concurrently for a total sentence of 20 years.
Phillips’s
conviction was affirmed on direct appeal to the Supreme Court of
Kentucky.10
On June 7, 2002, Phillips filed an RCr 11.42 motion to
vacate his conviction, accompanied by motions for appointment of
counsel and an evidentiary hearing.
In the extensive RCr 11.42
9
The charge for possession of drug paraphernalia was dismissed prior to
trial.
10
Phillips v. Commonwealth, 2000-SC-0403-MR (not-to-be-published, rendered
September 27, 2001).
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motion, Phillips alleged numerous instances of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
On July 3, 2002, the trial court entered
a thorough opinion and judgment refusing to appoint counsel to
represent Phillips on the motion and denying the RCr 11.42
motion without an evidentiary hearing.
This appeal followed.
In addition to challenging the trial court’s rejection
of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Phillips
contends the court erred in failing to appoint counsel for him
and to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the RCr 11.42 motion.
A movant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing
or to appointment of counsel on an RCr 11.42 motion.11
Generally, a hearing and appointment of counsel are not required
where the issues raised in the motion are refuted on the record,
or where the allegations, even if true, would not be sufficient
to invalidate the conviction.12
Claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel may be rejected without an evidentiary hearing if
they are refuted on the record.13
In order to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a person must satisfy a two-part test showing both that
11
See Fraser v. Commonwealth, Ky., 59 S.W.3d 448, 453 (2001); and Harper v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 311, 314 (1998).
12
Fraser, 59 S.W.3d at 452-53 (stating counsel need not be appointed if an
evidentiary hearing is not required and an evidentiary hearing is required
only if there is a material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively
resolved, i.e., conclusively proved or disproved, by an examination of the
record); Hodge v. Commonwealth, Ky., 116 S.W.3d 463, 469-70 (2003).
13
Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 41 S.W.3d 436, 442 (2001).
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counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency
caused actual prejudice resulting in a proceeding that was
fundamentally unfair and unreliable.14
The burden is on the
defendant to overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s
assistance was constitutionally sufficient or that under the
circumstances counsel’s action might be considered “trial
strategy.”15
A court must be highly deferential in reviewing
defense counsel’s performance and should avoid second-guessing
counsel’s actions based on hindsight.16
In assessing counsel’s
performance, the standard is whether the alleged acts or
omissions were outside the wide range of prevailing professional
norms based on an objective standard of reasonableness.17
“‘A
defendant is not guaranteed errorless counsel, or counsel
adjudged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely
to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.’”18
“A
fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every
effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight,
14
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984); Commonwealth v. Tamme, Ky., 83 S.W.3d 465, 469 (2002); Foley v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 878, 884 (2000).
15
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 983 S.W.2d 479,
482 (1998); Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 905, 912 (1998).
16
Haight, 41 S.W.3d at 442; Harper, 978 S.W.2d at 315.
17
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89; Tamme, 83 S.W.3d at 470; Commonwealth v.
Pelphrey, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 460, 463 (1999).
18
Sanborn, 975 S.W.2d at 911 (quoting McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 949
S.W.2d 70 (1997)).
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to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct
and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the
time. . . .
There are countless ways to provide effective
assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense
attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same
way.”19
In order to establish actual prejudice, a defendant
must show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different or was rendered
fundamentally unfair and unreliable.20
Where the movant is
convicted in a trial, a reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
proceeding considering the totality of the evidence before the
jury.21
Phillips complains generally that defense counsel was
ineffective because he was unprepared for trial.
He notes that
counsel moved to withdraw and sought a continuance, which the
trial court denied after conducting a hearing.
Phillips takes
issue with the trial court’s suggestion, based on
representations made by counsel, that his preparation was
19
Hodge, 116 S.W.3d at 469.
20
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 80 S.W.3d 405,
411-12 (2002).
21
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95.
Foley, 17 S.W.3d at 884.
See also Bowling, 80 S.W.3d at 412; and
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impeded by Phillips’s lack of cooperation.
Regardless of
possible fault for any alleged lack of preparation, this issue
is only relevant to the extent that it caused actual prejudice
to Phillips involving specific situations.
A general allegation
of lack of preparation is insufficient to establish ineffective
assistance of counsel.
As a result, we need only review the
specific allegations raised in Phillips’s brief.
Phillips asserts that defense counsel was ineffective
for failing to request a jury instruction requiring the finding
of a nexus between the pistol found in his mobile home and the
drug offenses.22
In fact, Phillips’s attorney did raise the
issue of a sufficient nexus before the trial court in a motion
in limine, a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, and a
new trial motion.
Phillips relies on the opinion of Justice
Keller in Phillips’s direct appeal, writing for the two
dissenting justices, who agreed with the majority that there was
sufficient evidence of a nexus to withstand a directed verdict,
but believed instead that the issue should have been explicitly
submitted to the jury.
However, Justice Keller acknowledged
that prior caselaw was unclear on the standards of the nexus
inquiry and whether it was a factual issue requiring a jury
finding.
He urged the Court to do more “to assist the bench and
22
See generally Commonwealth v. Montaque, Ky., 23 S.W.3d 629 (2000)
(requiring nexus or connection between firearm and drug offenses for
constructive possession under KRS 218A.992).
-11-
bar” in clarifying these issues.
The majority of the Court
declined to support the dissenters’ position.
Our Supreme Court recently held in Johnson v.
Commonwealth,23 that a proper jury instruction for a firearm
enhancement under KRS 218A.992(1) should require the jury to
find a nexus beyond a reasonable doubt between the possession of
the firearm and the offenses.
However, as the Opinion in
Phillips’s direct appeal suggests, at the time of Phillips’s
trial, the requirement for an instruction requiring a jury
finding of a nexus for the firearm enhancement was not clear.
There is no general duty on a defense attorney to anticipate
changes in the law.24
Therefore, an attorney generally does not
render ineffective assistance for failing to anticipate changes
in the law.25
Given the state of the law at the time, defense
counsel’s failure to request an instruction containing a nexus
provision was not outside the wide range of reasonable
performance.
Phillips contends defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to move to disqualify the prosecutor because of a
possible conflict of interest in that he had represented
23
Ky., 105 S.W.3d 430 (2003).
24
See Sistrunk v. Vaughn, 96 F.3d 666, 670-71 (3d Cir. 1996); and Gattis v.
Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 231 (3d Cir. 2002).
25
See Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 151, 165 (2001) (involving
failure to request instruction); Lott v. Coyle, 261 F.3d 594, 609 (6th Cir.
2001); and Parker v. Bowersox, 188 F.3d 923, 929 (8th Cir. 1999).
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Phillips’s former wife in their divorce action.
Phillips
asserted that the prosecutor was “overzealous” because of
animosity arising from the prior civil action.
As evidence of
overreaching, Phillips points to the count of the indictment for
possession of drug paraphernalia that he alleges was based on
the turkey baster found in his mobile home, and a separate
unrelated charge for having an illegal sewer system.
This
argument is clearly without merit because the drug paraphernalia
charge was dismissed prior to trial and the sewer system charge
was not involved in this prosecution.
Thus, Phillips has not
demonstrated any actual prejudice from his attorney’s failure to
seek disqualification of the prosecutor.
Phillips also maintains that defense counsel was
ineffective for not cross-examining Sheriff Mayhugh about
allegedly conflicting statements.
Phillips states that during
the preliminary hearing, Sheriff Mayhugh at one point identified
the three suspects in the September 1, 1999, incident as Jerry
Lear, Jeff Stewart, and William Phillips, but later identified
the third suspect as Scott Huckleberry, in addition to Lear and
Phillips.
Phillips also contends Sheriff Mayhugh’s trial
testimony and the prosecutor’s argument suggested that three
persons were present at the scene, which Phillips maintains
conflicts with Roy Markwell’s testimony that he saw only one
person.
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The trial court properly found that no real conflict
existed between the testimony of Sheriff Mayhugh and Roy
Markwell.
First, a review of the record shows that Sheriff
Mayhugh did not testify at the trial that three persons were
present and involved in the September 1 incident.
Second,
Markwell’s testimony was limited to only the person he saw and
he did not claim to know whether any other persons might have
been present.
The prosecutor relied on Jerry Lear’s written
statement indicating that Phillips and Huckleberry were present
but ran away when Markwell approached the green truck, not
Sheriff Mayhugh’s testimony.
Sheriff Mayhugh’s momentary
misidentification at the preliminary hearing was
inconsequential.
The trial court correctly ruled that defense
counsel was not deficient because a reasonable trial attorney
could conclude that Phillips’s suggested line of crossexamination of Sheriff Mayhugh would not have been very
beneficial.
Next, Phillips claims defense counsel was ineffective
for failing to call Mrs. Harstein and her daughter about their
having seen damage to his front door.
He asserts this evidence
would have supported his testimony that someone broke into his
mobile home and planted some of the incriminating items.
As
discussed earlier, defense counsel filed a motion in limine
seeking to introduce Mrs. Harstein’s testimony by avowal but it
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was denied.
Defense counsel indicated that he pursued this
procedure because the witness was otherwise unavailable.
Moreover, Phillips has stated that these witnesses saw the
condition of the door the day after the incident, which severely
weakens their testimony.
Given the questionable availability
and weak probative value of these witnesses’ alleged testimony,
Phillips has not shown that failure to call them constituted
deficient performance or actual prejudice.
Phillips also asserts that defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the testimony about the red
pills found in his bedroom being “suspected” or “possibly”
Sudafed, which is commonly used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine.
The record reveals that counsel did in fact
object to this testimony on the basis that the pills were not
conclusively identified by scientific testing.
The trial court
sustained the objection and admonished the jury to disregard the
characterization of the red pills.
Thus, defense counsel was
not deficient.
Next, Phillips states defense counsel was ineffective
for failing to move for a mistrial because items associated with
Jerry Lear were admitted into evidence and sent back to the jury
room during the jury’s deliberation.
We agree with the trial
court that all of the exhibits were properly admitted, and
therefore, subject to inspection by the jury.
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Counsel was not
constitutionally ineffective for failing to perform a futile act
or object to admissible evidence.26
Defense counsel’s failure to
object to the exhibits being available to the jury or to seek a
mistrial on this basis was not deficient performance.
Phillips also criticizes defense counsel’s failure to
present evidence that Jerry Lear’s written statement implicating
Phillips was obtained through undue influence because Lear pled
guilty pursuant to a plea bargain to the drug charges against
him.
During cross-examination by defense counsel, Jerry Lear
stated that he had received a sentence of 16 years on a guilty
plea to several drug offenses.
However, Lear denied making the
statements implicating Phillips in the written statement
attributed to him.
Rather than attack the written statement,
defense counsel attempted to rely on Lear’s trial testimony,
which exonerated Phillips by indicating he was not involved in
the drug operation.
Since Lear stated that he did not make the
statements in the written confession, defense counsel could not
have impeached the statements by showing they were coerced.
Consequently, defense counsel’s failure to aggressively
challenge Lear’s written statement on the grounds of undue
influence was legitimate trial strategy.
Phillips also challenges defense counsel’s failure to
object to testimony by Cheyenne Albro that manufactured
26
Bowling, 80 S.W.3d at 415, 418 (citing Commonwealth v. Davis, Ky., 14
S.W.3d 9, 11 (1999)).
-16-
methamphetamine using the anhydrous lithium metal reduction
method is referred to on the street as “Nazi dope” or “Nazi
crank.”
Phillips asserts that this reference to the Nazi regime
was unduly prejudicial.
As an expert on the illegal manufacture
and sale of methamphetamine, Albro was qualified to offer this
testimony.
Even if defense counsel had been successful in
challenging it based on KRE27 403, he may very well have decided
not to call extra attention to the reference by doing so.
Moreover, this isolated, single reference could not have had
much, if any, effect on the outcome of the trial.
Finally, Phillips argues that defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to develop and interject evidence that
Ronni Vincent, who was a paid informant who told the police in
March or April 1999 that Phillips had been manufacturing
methamphetamine at his farm, had stolen checks from Phillips
while serving as a housecleaner for him.
Phillips contends that
the testimony of Cheyenne Albro and the police officers was
tainted by the connection with Ronni Vincent.
He further
postulates that defense counsel should have examined these
witnesses on the connection and Vincent’s alleged bias against
Phillips.
As evidenced by his motion in limine to exclude any
testimony relating to Ronni Vincent, which was granted, defense
counsel’s strategy was to prevent the insertion of possible
27
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
-17-
incriminating evidence from another source.
We agree with the
trial court that the potentially harmful effects of interjecting
Ronni Vincent into the trial outweighed any possible benefit.
In conclusion, defense counsel did not render
deficient performance with respect to most of the issues raised
by Phillips.
Furthermore, given the evidence and the various
items recovered from his mobile home, Phillips has not shown a
reasonable probability that any error by counsel would have
affected the outcome or resulted in an unfair trial.
Finally,
Phillips has not presented a factual issue that is not refuted
by the record or raises a legitimate claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err
in denying the RCr 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing
and the appointment of counsel.
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion and order of
the Muhlenberg Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
William J. Phillips, Pro Se
Eddyville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
N. Susan Roncarti
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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