BUSTER CHANDLER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 18, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000781-MR
BUSTER CHANDLER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES E. KELLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 90-CR-00433
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND
APPELLEE
NO. 2002-CA-001696-MR
BUSTER CHANDLER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES E. KELLER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 90-CR-00433
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE.
In 2002-CA-000781-MR, Buster Chandler appeals
from an order of the Fayette Circuit Court entered on April 8,
2002, in which the trial court denied the following:
Chandler’s
motion, pursuant to CR 60.02, to vacate his conviction; his
motion to consolidate, supplement, and amend his previous CR
60.02 motion; his motion for appointment of counsel; his motion
for findings of fact; his motion for a polygraph test; his
petition for mandatory injunction pursuant to CR 65.01; motion
to supplement his CR 60.02 motion pursuant to CR 15.04; and his
motion for directed verdict.
The trial court denied Chandler’s
CR 60.02 motion since it found, in its discretion, that
Chandler’s motion was untimely filed.
In 2002-CA-001696-MR, Chandler appeals from an order
of the Fayette Circuit Court entered on July 29, 2002, in which
the trial court denied Chandler’s motion, pursuant to KRS
439.3402, for exemption from the violent offender statute, KRS
439.3401; Chandler’s motion for appointment of counsel, pursuant
to KRS 439.3402; and his motion for full evidentiary hearing,
pursuant to KRS 439.3402.
In 2002-CA-000781-MR, Chandler argues that his CR
60.02 motion, which was his second one, was filed within a
reasonable amount of time since he is uneducated and was not
aware of his current legal arguments until 2001, approximately
nine years after his conviction.
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He also argues, in general,
that the trial court erred when it denied his CR 60.02 motion
because the Commonwealth of Kentucky lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the crime since he alleges he murdered the
victim in Knoxville, Tennessee.
Finding that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion, this Court affirms the trial
court’s order.
In 2002-CA-001696-MR, Chandler argues that the trial
court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for
appointment of counsel and his motion for an evidentiary hearing
since, pursuant to KRS 439.3402, the trial court was required to
appoint counsel and to hold a hearing.
Chandler further argues
that the trial court also abused its discretion when it denied
his motion to be exempt from the violent offender statute
because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we
affirm.
FACTS
On March 25, 1990, Chandler killed his former
girlfriend, Glenda Hudson.
Chandler bit Hudson several times on
the left arm and left cheek; shot her three times; and stabbed
her in the head several times with a sharp, round object.
While
both Chandler and Hudson were from Knoxville, Tennessee,
Chandler decided to kill Hudson in Lexington, Kentucky.
After
killing her, Chandler dumped her body behind a business on New
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Circle Road in Lexington.
Hudson’s body was found, and, after a
few days, the Lexington police connected Chandler to the crime.
Chandler was eventually arrested in Nashville, Tennessee, and
while awaiting extradition Chandler confessed to a Lexington
police officer and to an assistant commonwealth’s attorney that
he had killed Hudson in Lexington.
At trial, Chandler testified
on his own behalf and, once more, confessed to killing Hudson in
Lexington, Kentucky, but claimed that he did so under extreme
emotional distress.
On April 25, 1991, after a jury trial in Fayette
County, Kentucky, Chandler was convicted of murder.
After his
conviction, in a final judgment and sentence entered on June 4,
1991, the Fayette Circuit Court sentenced Chandler to life in
prison.
Chandler appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court
of Kentucky, which affirmed his conviction.
Since his
conviction, Chandler has filed numerous post-conviction actions
including at least two motions pursuant to RCr 11.42; at least
one previous motion pursuant to CR 60.02; numerous state habeas
corpus actions; and numerous petitions for writs of mandamus.
2002-CA-000781-MR
In his subsequent CR 60.02 motion, Chandler raised a
multitude of arguments attacking his conviction.
fall into three categories:
His arguments
arguments that should have been
addressed on direct appeal; arguments that allege ineffective
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assistance of counsel that should have been addressed by RCr
11.42; and miscellaneous arguments.
In his motion, Chandler presented several issues that
should have been addressed on direct appeal.
He argued that he
perjured himself at trial; thus, his conviction was
unconstitutional.
He argued that the prosecutor violated his
due process rights when he allegedly commented on Chandler’s
parole eligibility.
He argued that the Lexington police lacked
probable cause to search Hudson’s vehicle since he had sole
control over it.
He argued that the prosecution withheld
exculpatory evidence, specifically, three letters that Chandler
himself wrote in which he stated he killed Hudson in Tennessee.
Chandler argued that his confession was involuntary because it
did not meet the corpus delecti rule.
Finally, Chandler
insisted that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because
he was forced to give dental impressions.
Chandler also alleged instances of ineffective
assistance of counsel, which should have been raised pursuant to
RCr 11.42.
He argued that his Sixth Amendment right to
compulsory process was violated when his trial counsel refused
to issue subpoenas for Lewis Combs, Mike Engles, and Ross
Alderman.
He insisted that his conviction was unconstitutional
because his attorney failed to file a motion for a bill of
particulars.
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Chandler presented various miscellaneous arguments as
well.
In one, he argued that the trial court violated his equal
protection rights when it failed to advise him not to perjure
himself since it advised all other witnesses not to perjure
themselves.
But the majority of his arguments were variations
on his argument that his conviction was unconstitutional and/or
illegal because the Commonwealth lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the murder since he killed Hudson in
Knoxville, Tennessee, not Lexington, Kentucky.
The trial court cited Gross v. Commonwealth, Ky., 648
S.W.2d 853, 858 (1983), in which the Supreme Court held that a
criminal defendant must invoke CR 60.02 within a reasonable
time.
The Supreme Court noted that, according to CR 60.02, the
trial court has the discretion to determine what a reasonable
amount of time is.
Id.
The trial court found that Chandler had
filed his subsequent CR 60.02 motion nine years after his
conviction; determined that nine years was an unreasonable time,
given the circumstances; and denied Chandler’s CR 60.02 motion
along with his other motions.
On appeal, Chandler relies heavily on Cain v. Cain,
Ky. App., 777 S.W.2d 238 (1989).
In Cain, this Court held that
an ex-husband could use CR 60.02 to allege that his ex-wife had
perpetrated fraud during the divorce proceeding ten years
previously because, until the time of the filing of the CR 60.02
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motion, the ex-husband had no reason to question the fact that
he was the father of the couple’s youngest child.
However, Cain
simply does not apply since Chandler failed to offer any newly
discovered facts to the trial court.
He simply repeated his
assertions that the murder occurred in Tennessee.
This is
contradicted by his confession and by his trial testimony.
Chandler argues that the trial court abused its
discretion and violated his due process rights when it denied
his motion because he could not have raised his current legal
arguments on direct appeal or by RCr 11.42.
He insists that he
could only raise his arguments by CR 60.02.
Chandler argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied his CR 60.02 motion since the
Commonwealth failed to prove the “corpus delecti” that the
victim was killed in Lexington, Kentucky; and that the
Commonwealth failed to prove each and every element of murder
beyond a reasonable doubt since he killed Hudson in Tennessee.
Chandler argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when it failed to rule on his allegation of
prosecutorial misconduct.
Chandler cites Whitaker v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 895 S.W.2d 953 (1995), and claims that the
prosecutor violated his due process rights when he allegedly
commented on Chandler’s parole eligibility.
Chandler argues
that he could not have presented this issue on direct appeal or
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by RCr 11.42 since the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Whitaker after he had appealed and after he had filed his first
RCr 11.42 motion.
Chandler argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied his CR 60.02 motion because the trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the crime.
Chandler cites Duncan v. O’Nan, Ky., 451 S.W.2d 626 (1970), and
argues that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and it
can be raised at any time.
Chandler insists that since he
killed Hudson in Tennessee, the trial court lacked jurisdiction.
In Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 932 S.W.2d 359, 362
(1996), the Supreme Court of Kentucky stated that actions
pursuant to CR 60.02 are directed to the “‘sound discretion of
the court and the exercise of that discretion will not be
disturbed on appeal except for abuse.’” (Citation omitted.)
The Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed postconviction relief in criminal cases in general and addressed CR
60.02 specifically in Gross v. Commonwealth, supra.
The Supreme
Court stated:
[T]he proper procedure for a defendant
aggrieved by a judgment in a criminal case
is to directly appeal that judgment, stating
every ground of error which it is reasonable
to expect that he or his counsel is aware of
when the appeal is taken.
Next, we hold that a defendant is required
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to avail himself of RCr 11.42 . . . as to
any ground of which he is aware, or should
be aware, during the period when this remedy
is available to him. Final disposition of
that motion, or waiver of the opportunity to
make it, shall conclude all issues that
reasonably could have been presented in that
proceeding. The language of RCr 11.42
forecloses the defendant from raising any
questions under CR 60.02 which are "issues
that could reasonably have been presented"
by RCr 11.42 proceedings.
Id. at 857.
CR 60.02 limits relief in these particulars:
1) The first three grounds specified in the
rule [ (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise
or excusable neglect, (b) newly discovered
evidence, (c) perjury] are limited to
application for relief "not more than one
year after the judgment."
2) The additional specified grounds for
relief are (a) fraud, (b) the judgment is
void, vacated in another case, satisfied and
released, or otherwise no longer equitable,
or (c) other reasons of an "extraordinary
nature" justifying relief. These grounds
are specific and explicit. Claims alleging
that convictions were obtained in violation
of constitutionally protected rights do not
fit any of these grounds except the last
one, "any other reason of an extraordinary
nature justifying relief."
Id.
The record reflects that Chandler has previously
appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court.
In addition, he
has filed at least two RCr 11.42 motions; at least one prior CR
60.02 motion; numerous habeas actions; and numerous actions for
mandamus.
Chandler raised or should have raised the majority of
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his current claims on direct appeal.
The rest of his claims
were raised or should have been raised by RCr 11.42.
However, even if CR 60.02 was the appropriate means to
address his current legal arguments, the Supreme Court has held
that CR 60.02 must be invoked within a reasonable amount of
time, and it is within the trial court’s sound discretion to
determine what constitutes a reasonable amount of time.
Gross
v. Commonwealth, supra at 857.
Considering the nature of Chandler’s claims, he was
aware or should have been aware of them well before 2001.
In
fact, since shortly after Chandler was convicted, he has
insisted via various post-conviction actions that he killed
Hudson in Tennessee.
For Chandler to wait nine years to present
these claims was not reasonable, and the trial court acted well
within its discretion when it denied Chandler’s subsequent CR
60.02 motion as untimely.
Thus, we affirm the trial court’s
denial of Chandler’s motions.
2002-CA-001696-MR
On July 22, 2002, Chandler filed with the trial court
a motion, pursuant to KRS 439.3402, for exemption from the
violent offender statute, KRS 439.3401; a motion, pursuant to
KRS 439.3402, for appointment of counsel; a motion, pursuant to
KRS 439.3402, for an evidentiary hearing; and a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.
Chandler argued that the trial court
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should exempt him from the violent offender statute because the
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the crime
since he killed the victim, Glenda Hudson, in Knoxville,
Tennessee.
The trial court granted Chandler’s motion to proceed
in forma pauperis but summarily denied the rest.
On appeal, Chandler argues that the trial court abused
its discretion when it refused to hold a hearing regarding his
motion for exemption from the violent offender statute because
the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
murder since he killed Hudson in Tennessee.
Chandler insists
that, pursuant to KRS 439.3402, the trial court was required to
appoint him counsel.
Thus, Chandler argues, when it refused to
appoint counsel, the trial court violated Chandler’s Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights.
Chandler also insists that the
trial court violated KRS 439.3402 when in refused to hold an
evidentiary hearing.
Furthermore, according to Chandler, the
trial court abused its discretion when it failed to rule on the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction because, according to
Duncan v. O’Nan, supra, subject matter jurisdiction can be
raised at any time.
Finally, Chandler insists that the trial
court refused to appoint him counsel because he is AfricanAmerican.
KRS 439.3401, popularly known as the violent offender
statute, applies to any criminal defendant who has been
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convicted of or pled guilty to any capital offense, Class A
felony, or Class B felony that involved the death or serious
physical injury of the victim.
The statute significantly
extends the minimum period of time a criminal defendant must
serve before being eligible for parole.
KRS 439.3401.
However,
the statute does not apply to a criminal defendant who has been
determined to be a victim of domestic violence as defined by KRS
533.060.
KRS 439.3401(5).
This is the only exemption to the
violent offender statute.
According to KRS 439.3402, any violent offender
convicted prior to July 14, 1992, may file a motion with the
sentencing court to be exempt from the statute if the court
determines that the offender was a victim of domestic violence
as defined by KRS 533.060.
Pursuant to KRS 439.3402, the
offender may also request appointment of counsel and an
evidentiary hearing.
Chandler filed a motion to be exempted from the
violent offender statute as well as filing motions for an
evidentiary hearing and for appointment of counsel.
However,
Chandler argued that he should be exempt from the statute based
on his allegation that he killed the victim, Hudson, in
Tennessee.
This argument cannot be addressed by means of a
motion filed pursuant to KRS 439.3402.
The only argument that
can be addressed in a motion pursuant to KRS 439.3402 is whether
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the criminal defendant was a victim of domestic violence.
Since
Chandler failed to allege that he was a victim of domestic
violence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Chandler’s motions.
Thus, we affirm the Fayette Circuit
Court’s denial of Chandler’s motions.
CONCLUSION
In 2002-CA-000781-MR, we affirm the Fayette Circuit
Court’s denial of Chandler’s motion, pursuant to CR 60.02, to
vacate his conviction; his motion to consolidate, supplement and
amend his previous CR 60.02 motion to vacate his conviction; his
motion for appointment of counsel; his motion for findings of
fact; his motion for a polygraph test; his petition for
mandatory injunction pursuant to CR 65.01; his motion to
supplement his CR 60.02 motion pursuant to CR 15.04; and his
motion for directed verdict.
Furthermore, in 2002-CA-001696, we
affirm the Fayette Circuit Court’s denial of Chandler’s motion,
pursuant to KRS 439.3402, for exemption from the violent
offender statute, KRS 439.3401; his motion, pursuant to KRS
439.3402, for appointment of counsel; and his motion, pursuant
to KRS 439.3402, for an evidentiary hearing.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Buster Chandler, Pro Se
Kentucky State Penitentiary
Inmate Legal Office
Eddyville, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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