KENNY J. TUTTLE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 23, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000443-MR
KENNY J. TUTTLE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIA HYLTON ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00010
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, McANULTY, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE.
Kenneth Tuttle (Tuttle) appeals the trial
court’s order denying relief under Rules of Criminal Procedure
(CR) 60.02.
Tuttle filed the CR 60.02 motion to vacate his 60-
year sentence for convictions on two counts of first-degree
robbery and two counts of being a second-degree persistent
felony offender.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Tuttle’s convictions stemmed from two incidents of
purse snatching in Richmond, Kentucky during March of 1998.
After the latter incident, a number of onlookers chased Tuttle,
caught him and held him until the police arrived.
The police
recovered the second victim’s purse on the ground beside Tuttle.
Ultimately, in September of 1998, a jury found Tuttle guilty of
two counts of first-degree robbery and two counts of being a
second-degree persistent felony offender.
Tuttle filed a direct appeal on the following issues:
(1) the propriety of the admission of an out-of-court
identification; (2) whether Tuttle was entitled to a directed
verdict on one of the robbery charges; and (3) whether Tuttle
was unduly prejudiced by the joint trial for both robberies.
In
an unpublished opinion rendered April 20, 2000, the Kentucky
Supreme Court affirmed Tuttle’s conviction on all grounds
asserted.
On September 28, 2001, Tuttle filed a motion under CR
60.02 to vacate his 60-year sentence.
In support, Tuttle
alleged his sentence exceeded the maximum aggregate sentence
allowed by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 532.060, KRS 532.080
and KRS 532.110.
In so arguing, Tuttle cites the language of
the statutes as amended effective July 15, 1998.
Tuttle further
argued that his maximum aggregate sentence should have been 30
years.
The trial court denied Tuttle’s CR 60.02 motion.
In
so doing, the trial court relied on Lawson v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
-2-
53 S.W.3d 534 (2001), which it noted was directly on point with
the arguments raised by Tuttle.
Lawson held that, under KRS
446.110, courts are required “to sentence a defendant in
accordance with the law which existed at the time of the
commission of the offense unless the defendant specifically
consents to the application of a new law which is ‘certainly’ or
‘definitely’ mitigating.”
Id. at 550 (quoting Coleman v.
Commonwealth, 160 Ky. 87, 169 S.W. 595, 597 (1914)).
In
Tuttle’s case, since the crimes with which the jury convicted
Tuttle occurred in March of 1998, the trial court properly
instructed the jury and subsequently sentenced Tuttle in
accordance with the pre-amendment law.
Upon the trial court’s denial of Tuttle’s CR 60.02
motion, Tuttle filed a motion under CR 59.05 to vacate the trial
court’s order.
The trial court denied Tuttle’s CR 59.05 motion
as well.
In this appeal, Tuttle raises the same argument he
raised before the trial court –- his 60-year sentence exceeded
the maximum allowable aggregate sentence under KRS 532.060,
532.080 and 532.110 -- however, Tuttle’s argument fares no
better before this Court.
Notwithstanding the facts that this
issue should have been brought on direct appeal and was not
preserved for our review, on the merits, we conclude that the
trial court properly sentenced Tuttle according to the
-3-
guidelines in place at the time of the commission of the
robberies.
See Lawson, 53 S.W.3d at 549-50.
Under KRS 532.080(5), as in effect in March of 1998,
“[a] person who is found to be a persistent felony offender in
the second degree shall be sentenced to an indeterminate term of
imprisonment pursuant to the sentencing provisions of KRS
532.060(2) for the next highest degree than the offense for
which convicted.”
A jury convicted Tuttle of two counts of
first-degree robbery and two counts of being a second-degree
persistent felony offender.
First-degree robbery is a Class B
felony, therefore, Tuttle was sentenced pursuant to the
authorized maximum terms of imprisonment for a Class A felony,
the next highest degree.
Under KRS 532.060(2)(a), as in effect
in March of 1998, the maximum term was “not less than twenty
(20) years nor more than life imprisonment.”
As Tuttle was
sentenced to two (2) 30-year terms to run consecutively for a
total of 60-years imprisonment, the aggregate of Tuttle’s
sentence did not exceed the maximum length, which was life
imprisonment.
See KRS 532.110(1)(c), as amended effective July
14, 1992 (“The aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms
shall not exceed in maximum length the longest extended term
which would be authorized by KRS 532.080 for the highest class
of crime for which any of the sentences is imposed.”); Hampton
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 666 S.W.2d 737, 740 (1984) (“No term of
-4-
years, regardless of length, conflicts technically with the
terms of a sentencing statute which expresses no limitation on
the number of years.”)
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Madison
Circuit Court denying Tuttle relief under CR 60.02 is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kenneth Tuttle, Pro Se
Burgin, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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