JANICE E. FORD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: July 16, 2004, 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000252-MR
AND
NO. 2002-CA-002246-MR
JANICE E. FORD
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00032
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
VACATING AND REMANDING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; KNOPF, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE.
Appellant Janice E. Ford (hereinafter
appellant) has filed two separate appeals which will be heard
together.
Appeal No. 2002-CA-000252-MR appeals her conviction
in the McCracken Circuit Court for trafficking in a controlled
substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and being a
persistent felony offender in the first degree.
Appeal No.
2002-CA-002246-MR pertains to the court’s denial of a Motion
pursuant to CR 60.02.
Appellant asserts numerous errors were
committed in her trial.
We have reviewed her arguments on
appeal, and we affirm in part and vacate in part the Court’s
judgment and remand for a new trial.
The charges in this case were brought against
appellant following an undercover drug buy arranged by the
Paducah police department.
A police detective sent a
confidential informant to make a buy from appellant at the MiniMo motel in Paducah.
The detective and another officer
conducted electronic surveillance by both monitoring over a
receiver and recording the conversations between the informant
and appellant.
They also observed the informant enter and leave
appellant’s room at the motel.
Following the transaction, the
detective met with the informant and recovered a baggie
containing a substance from her.
The detective performed a
field test which indicated that the substance purchased at the
motel was cocaine.
The detective obtained a search warrant, and
later that same night searched appellant’s motel room.
Appellant was present and was in possession of the buy money
from the informant which had been photocopied by police.
The police laboratory tested the baggie the informant
obtained from appellant, and other baggies from the room
containing white powder suspected of being cocaine.
The lab
also tested electronic scales and a makeup bag containing a
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mirror, all with a white residue.
The baggies and the
electronic scales tested positive for cocaine.
Appellant first alleges that the trial court erred in
failing to transfer her case to another division of the
McCracken Circuit Court.
As grounds for the motion to transfer,
appellant’s counsel stated that Judge Clymer’s son was a
material witness in the case.
KRS 26A.015(2)(d)4 states that
any judge of the Court of Justice shall disqualify himself in
any proceeding where the judge or the judge’s spouse, or a
person within the third degree of relationship to either of
them, or the spouse of such a person is to the knowledge of the
judge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
The
court held a hearing on the motion on October 25, 2001.
At the hearing, the Commonwealth stated that Deputy
Sam Clymer’s sole involvement in the case was transporting the
drug evidence to the laboratory.
The Commonwealth acknowledged
that the witness was in law school out of state, and it was
believed they did not need him to testify.
The Commonwealth
identified the general rule with respect to substances which are
not clearly identifiable or distinguishable is that it is
unnecessary to establish a perfect chain of custody or to
eliminate all possibility of tampering or misidentification so
long as there is persuasive evidence that “the reasonable
probability is that the evidence has not been altered in any
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material respect.”
See Rabovsky v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973
S.W.2d 6, 8 (1998), citing United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d
1528, 1532 (10th Cir. 1989).
The Commonwealth stated that
consequently in Kentucky it is not necessary to prove every link
in the chain of custody.
Appellant responded that Kentucky case law does not
excuse those who transported the item from one place to another
from having to testify.
Appellant asserted she would only know
if the chain of custody was objectionable after hearing the
witnesses.
The court ultimately denied the defense motion,
adjudging that the witness was not crucial to the Commonwealth’s
case.
At trial, appellant argued for a directed verdict based
on a “flaw in the chain of custody,” due to an absent witness.
First, we note that appellant should have filed a
motion to recuse under the statutes rather than a motion to
transfer divisions.
KRS 26A.015(3)(a) provides that any judge
of the Court of Justice disqualified under the statute shall be
replaced by the Chief Justice.
KRS 26A.020 provides that when a
judge cannot properly preside in an action pending in the court,
the circuit clerk shall at once certify the facts to the Chief
Justice who shall immediately designate a special judge.
In
addition, we believe that if appellant felt the court’s decision
was erroneous, she should have sought disqualification of the
judge under KRS 26A.020(1).
Nichols v. Commonwealth, Ky., 839
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S.W.2d 263, 265 (1992).
If a party files with the circuit clerk
an affidavit that the judge will not afford a fair and impartial
trial, the circuit clerk shall at once certify the facts to the
Chief Justice who shall immediately review the facts and
determine whether to designate a special judge.
Id.
A party
may either file a motion to recuse or an affidavit pursuant to
Nichols, 839 S.W.2d at 265.
KRS 26A.020, or both.
The statute
provides a separate and distinct opportunity to a party to
complain that the judge will not be fair and impartial.
Id.
The judge is generally considered to be in the best
position to determine whether questions regarding his
impartiality are reasonable.
947 S.W.2d 416 (1997).
Jacobs v. Commonwealth, Ky. App.,
There is no hard and fast rule as to
whether a witness who will testify to the chain of custody is a
material witness.
The integrity of the evidence becomes an
issue in the case if there is an imperfect chain of custody and
insufficient evidence that the substance was probably not
altered in any way.
The trial court must keep in mind that if
the chain of custody becomes an issue in the case, a witness who
will testify to a portion of it may be a material witness.
On
remand, appellant may again seek recusal by filing a proper
motion to recuse under the statute and/or seeking
disqualification by filing an affidavit with the circuit clerk.
Nichols, 839 S.W.2d at 265.
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We find reversible error in appellant’s second
argument on appeal.
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth
erred in having the informant interpret the audio tape during
her testimony.
The Commonwealth argues that the issue is not
preserved because appellant objected only at the beginning of
the testimony.
We do not agree that appellant had to continue
to object during the informant’s testimony, since her objection
was that the informant should not have been allowed to interpret
the tape at all.
Thus, we find the error was preserved.
Bailey
v. Bailey, 297 Ky. 400, 406, 180 S.W.2d 316, 319 (1944).
We agree that the Commonwealth’s use of the informant
to interpret the audio tape was error.
straightforward.
The law on this issue is
It is for the jury to determine as best it can
what is revealed in a tape recording without embellishment or
interpretation by a witness.
S.W.2d 176 (1995).
Gordon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 916
The tape is audible but, as is typical for a
surveillance tape, it is unclear at times.
The trial court
ruled that the witness could testify to those portions of the
tape which were hard to understand.
However, the fact that
portions of a tape are difficult to understand is a reason for
refusing to allow one party’s version of the tape for the
jurors’ use, rather than a reason for providing it.
Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534, 540 (1988).
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Sanborn v.
The witness did not testify only to her recollection
of the transaction.
The witness obviously attempted to
interpret the tape in response to the Commonwealth Attorney’s
questions.
The Commonwealth would play part of the tape, stop
it, and ask the witness to tell the jury what they had just
heard.
The informant testified to what she and every person
present in the room said.
The informant explained the street
terminology used to refer to various drugs.
She testified about
the background noises on the tape, and distinguished for the
jury appellant’s voice from the television in the room.
She
told the jury what actions were taken at various times during
the tape even when little could be heard.
We believe the
Commonwealth’s approach of having the witness tell the jury what
it heard throughout the tape usurped the jury’s fact-finding
function.
As a result, we find that this was reversible error.
Appellant’s next claim is that the trial court should
have suppressed the evidence from the search because of a defect
in the warrant and abuse of the “knock and announce” rule.
Appellant concedes that she did not object to admission of the
evidence below.
We find these arguments are unpreserved for
appellate review.
Appellant also complains that the Commonwealth
Attorney used denigrating language to refer to her in closing
argument.
This claim is unpreserved as well.
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An objection to
improper statements made during closing arguments must be
contemporaneous so that the court is given the opportunity to
consider whether an admonition would cure the error.
Commonwealth, Ky., 955 S.W.2d 722, 728 (1997).
Weaver v.
Appellant
alleges this issue amounts to palpable error under RCr 10.26,
but we do not believe the complained of statements amounted to a
manifest injustice under that Rule.
Appellant additionally argues there were errors in her
indictment on persistent felony charges.
However, the
Commonwealth was permitted to amend the indictment to correct
error, and appellant does not show prejudice to her substantial
rights.
RCr 6.16.
Appellant’s remaining claim of error under
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d
69 (1986), as to the Commonwealth’s removal of a black juror
from the jury panel by peremptory challenge is rendered moot by
our reversal of this case.
In Appeal No. 2002-CA-002246-MR, appellant claims that
it was error for the court to dismiss the pro se CR 60.02 motion
she filed after her trial.
CR 60.02 allows defendants to raise
issues that were unknown and could not have been known to the
moving party by exercise of reasonable diligence and in time to
have been otherwise presented to the court.
Gross v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (1983).
CR 60.02
provides relief that is not available by direct appeal or in
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post-conviction relief proceedings.
Id.
It is not intended to
give defendants additional opportunities to challenge a
judgment.
Id.
Appellant does not allege recent discovery of the
issues she raised in her CR 60.02 motion.
Her motion alleged
that an officer committed fraud and perjured testimony in the
grand jury proceedings and at trial.
In fact, the officer was
cross-examined by appellant’s counsel at trial on the same
matters he testified to before the grand jury.
Therefore, these
are not proper allegations for a CR 60.02 motion.
Moreover, courts ordinarily do not attempt to
scrutinize the quality or sufficiency of the evidence presented
to the grand jury.
585, 588 (2000).
Commonwealth v. Baker, Ky. App., 11 S.W.3d
Courts will not go behind an indictment for
the purpose of inquiring into the competency of evidence before
the grand jury, even if it is averred that no legal evidence was
produced before the grand jury.
20 S.W.3d 906 (2000).
Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
The purpose of an indictment is merely to
inform the accused of the essential facts of the charge so he
will be able to prepare a defense.
Malone v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
30 S.W.3d 180 (2000).
Appellant’s other main argument in the CR 60.02 was
that the Commonwealth never informed appellant, the grand jury
or petit jury that the informant was charged with theft and drug
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charges subsequent to working as an informant in the case at
bar.
This claim is refuted by the record.
The record shows
that a week before trial the Commonwealth informed appellant in
continuing discovery of the informant’s name and her indictment
for theft by unlawful taking and possession of marijuana, which
apparently occurred after the grand jury met in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate appellant’s
conviction in the McCracken Circuit court and remand for a new
trial.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Euva D. Hess
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Janine Coy Bowden
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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