JOSEPH HARDEN, by and through his next friend and father, ROGER HARDEN v. KENTUCKY HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
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RENDERED: APRIL 30, 2004; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000035-MR
JOSEPH HARDEN, by and through his next
friend and father, ROGER HARDEN
v.
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-02381
KENTUCKY HIGH SCHOOL
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
AND
APPELLEE
NO. 2002-CA-001939-MR
JOSEPH HARDEN, by and through his next
friend and father, ROGER HARDEN
v.
APPELLANT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-02381
KENTUCKY HIGH SCHOOL
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING APPEAL NOS. 2002-CA-000035-MR
AND 2002-CA-001939-MR
APPELLEE
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, TAYLOR AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Joseph Harden, by and through his next friend
and father, Roger Harden (collectively referred to as “Harden”),
brings Appeal No. 2002-CA-000035-MR from a December 7, 2001,
Opinion and Order and Appeal No. 2002-CA-001939-MR from an
August 19, 2002, Amended Order of the Fayette Circuit Court.
We
dismiss.
Joseph Harden was in the tenth grade and attended
Lexington Catholic High School in the fall of 2000.
He played
basketball that school year while enrolled at Lexington
Catholic.
On January 16, 2001, Joseph was diagnosed with
Attention Deficient Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Inattentive
type. Thereafter, on January 25, 2001, Joseph transferred to
Henry Clay High School where special education was available for
children with ADHD.
On February 28, 2001, the Commissioner of the Kentucky
High School Athletics Association (KHSAA) found Joseph
ineligible to participate in interscholastic athletics for one
year from the date of transfer from Lexington Catholic to Henry
Clay, pursuant to KHSAA Bylaw 6, Section 1.
Commissioner’s decision to a hearing officer.
Harden appealed the
At a hearing on
April 16, 2001, the hearing officer recommended overruling the
Commissioner’s determination and finding Joseph immediately
eligible to participate in interscholastic athletics at Henry
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Clay.
The matter was then referred to KHSAA’s Board of Control,
which reversed the recommendation of the hearing officer.
On
May 25, 2001, the Board of Control concluded that Joseph was
ineligible to play for one year from the date of transfer
pursuant to the applicable KHSAA Bylaw.
On June 22, 2001, Harden filed a Complaint in the
Fayette Circuit Court against the Kentucky State Board for
Elementary and Secondary Education and KHSAA.
Therein, Harden
alleged that the decision of KHSAA Board of Control was
arbitrary and capricious and that KHSAA discriminated against
Joseph upon the basis of his disability by refusing to provide
him reasonable accommodations and by prohibiting him from
participating in basketball at Henry Clay.
Harden sought a
temporary and permanent injunction to enjoin enforcement of the
KHSAA Board of Control’s order prohibiting him from playing
interscholastic basketball at Henry Clay for a period of one
year from the date of transfer.
Harden also asserted a claim
for compensatory and punitive damages, including attorney’s
fees.
On October 19, 2001, the Fayette Circuit Court entered
an Opinion and Order concluding:
The question at issue is whether Joseph
Harden’s transfer to Henry Clay High School
so that he could exercise his right to be
schooled under a 504 plan preempts
application of the Transfer Rule. To do so,
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Harden would have to establish that he had
no choice but to go to a school with a 504
program. Given that his IEP indicates that
he has good social skills, is intelligent,
in excellent physical condition and needs
only individual attention with his homework,
preferential seating, extra test time if
needed, and a special place and time for
work at home, the Board’s findings that the
circumstances creating the ineligibility
were within the control of the parties is
neither arbitrary nor capricious and is
supported by substantial evidence.
The circuit court determined that the Board of Control’s
decision that Joseph was ineligible to play interscholastic
basketball at Henry Clay for a period of one year was supported
by substantial evidence of probative value and, therefore, not
arbitrary or capricious.
There remain additional issues in the
Fayette Circuit Court for adjudication that are not before this
Court.
These issues surround Harden’s claim of discrimination
under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) Chapter 344)) and claim for damages, including punitive
damages, associated therewith.
The October 19, 2001, Opinion
and Order did not include Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR) 54.02 language.
On December 7, 2001, the circuit court entered an
Amended Order which “amended” the October 19, 2001, Opinion and
Order to include the following CR 54.02 language: “it is a final
and appealable order, there being no just cause for delay.”
On December 28, 2001, Harden filed a Notice of Appeal
with this Court (Appeal No. 2002-CA-000035-MR).
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Therein, Harden
specifically stated that the appeal was taken from the December
6, 2001, Opinion and Order.
Thereafter, on January 3, 2002,
Harden filed an Amended Notice of Appeal which designated the
Opinion and Order appealed from as dated December 7, 2001.
On January 30, 2002, KHSAA filed a motion to dismiss
Appeal No. 2002-CA-000035-MR.
KHSAA argued that the period of
Joseph’s ineligibility had expired, thus rendering the appeal
moot.
By order dated February 19, 2002, this Court denied that
motion.
On May 24, 2002, Harden filed a motion for relief from
judgment under CR 60.02 in the Fayette Circuit Court.
Harden
requested that the circuit court vacate its October 19, 2001,
Opinion and Order.
On August 19, 2002, the circuit court
entered an Amended Order that denied Harden’s motion under CR
60.02.
On September 17, 2002, Harden filed a Notice of Appeal
with this Court from the August 19, 2002, Amended Order (Appeal
No. 2002-CA-001939-MR).
This Court then ordered Appeal Nos.
2002-CA-000035-MR and 2002-CA-001939-MR consolidated by order
entered October 30, 2002.
Subsequently, KHSAA filed a motion to
dismiss Appeal Nos. 2002-CA-000035-MR and 2002-CA-001939-MR.
KHSAA again argued that the appeals were moot as the
ineligibility period had expired.
In support thereof, KHSAA
cited to the recent Court of Appeals opinion of Kentucky High
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School Athletic Association v. Davis, Ky. App., 77 S.W.3d 596
(2002).
By order entered February 7, 2003, this Court denied
KHSAA’s motion to dismiss.1
Although we have previously ruled that the instant
appeals are not moot, we are compelled to reconsider such
rulings as the issues presented in these appeals have now been
fully briefed and the complete record is presently before us.
Upon consideration of the whole, we are of the opinion that the
above appeals should be dismissed as moot.2
As judicial power may constitutionally extend only to
justiciable controversaries, an appellate court is generally
without jurisdiction to reach the merits of a moot appeal.
See
Kentucky High School Athletics Association v. Runyon, Ky., 920
S.W.2d 525 (1996); Associated Industries of Kentucky v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 912 S.W.2d 947 (1995); Black v. Elkhorn Coal
Corporation, 233 Ky. 588, 26 S.W.2d 481 (1930); Kentucky High
School Athletic Association v. Davis, Ky. App., 77 S.W.3d 596
(2002).
opinions.
This is regarded as the prohibition against advisory
An appeal is recognized as moot “when it is no longer
‘live’ or when the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in
1
It should be noted that when motion panels of this Court consider motions
during the pendency of an appeal, the record below generally is not before
the panel. Accordingly, the panels would not have been aware of the
proceedings below that were pending during the appeal.
2
Harden asserts that this Court may not reach the issue of mootness because
Kentucky High School Athletic Association failed to file a cross-appeal
raising such issue. The issue of mootness, however, goes to the jurisdiction
of the Court and may be raised sua sponte.
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the outcome. . . .”
5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 640
(1995).
Appeal No. 2002-CA-000035-MR was taken from an October
19, 2001, order of the circuit court affirming the Board of
Control’s imposition of the ineligibility period.
The appeal
focuses upon whether there was substantial evidence to support
the Board of Control’s decision to impose the ineligibility
period.
Appeal No. 2002-CA-001939-MR was taken from the circuit
court’s order denying Harden’s CR 60.02 motion to vacate the
October 19, 2001, order.
It is undisputed that Joseph’s period of ineligibility
has expired and that Joseph may freely play interscholastic
athletics at Henry Clay.3
As was the situation in Davis, 77
S.W.3d 596, we likewise cannot grant relief of any kind as the
period of ineligibility has passed.
Harden, however, argues
that the appeals are not moot:
The finding of ineligibility clearly
stigmatizes Appellant, and subjects him to
whatever findings are inherent in the
decision of the Board of Control with
respect to those reasons the Board of
Control offered as those it believed
actually prompted Joseph Harden’s transfer
to HCHS as opposed to Appellant’s diagnosis
of disability and Judge Karem’s findings
that he had a right to pursue an education
commensurate with that diagnosis, a decision
outside of his control. Therefore, the
determination of eligibility is precisely
3
Presumably, Joseph has now graduated from high school or otherwise did play
basketball after the one year ineligibility period expired.
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what Appellant Harden, [sic] seeks
regardless of whether the time has passed
within which he could have played basketball
had he been declared eligible pursuant to
the original determination by the KHSAA
Board of Control.
Harden’s Reply Brief at 4.
We must reject Harden’s argument.
We simply do not believe that a determination of pure
eligibility is a legally cognizable interest so as to create a
justiciable controversy for a decision upon the merits.
The effect of this Court granting Harden a favorable
ruling on the moot eligibility issue would be simply to punish
KHSAA or set an example for future eligibility cases.
However,
every eligibility case is different and must be adjudicated upon
the facts presented.
Additionally, Harden’s discrimination and
damage claims are still pending before the circuit court, and he
will have a sufficient remedy if he prevails on the merits.4
It is hereby ORDERED that Appeal Nos. 2002-CA-000035MR and 2002-CA-001939-MR are DISMISSED as moot.
VANMETER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
/s/ Jeff S. Taylor___________
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
ENTERED: April 30, 2004___
4
The dismissal of these appeals should have no effect on the proceedings
below.
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JOHNSON, JUDGE, CONCURRING:
I concur with the
Majority Opinion because this Court is required to follow the
Supreme Court precedent of KHSAA v. Runyon.5
6
However, I
believe Runyon incorrectly decided the question of mootness, and
I would follow the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Lexington
Herald-Leader Co., Inc. v. Meigs.7
In Brown v. Baumer,8 the Court noted that one exception
to the mootness doctrine is “where the question is of public
interest.”
Certainly, the vast participation in high school
athletics demonstrates that the issue of a student athlete’s
eligibility is a question of public interest.
Furthermore, the
very nature of the limited duration of a sport’s season and an
athlete’s eligibility causes such disputes to be “‘capable of
repetition, yet evading review.’”9
We need to look no further
than Runyon and Kentucky High School Athletic Association v.
Davis,10 as well as this Court’s dockets to see that such cases
are regularly litigated at the appellate level.
For the
appellate courts to continue to choose to evade review of these
5
Ky., 920 S.W.2d 525 (1996).
6
SCR 1.030(8)(a).
7
Ky., 660 S.W.2d 658, 661 (1983).
8
301 Ky. 315, 322, 191 S.W.2d 235, 238 (1946)).
9
Meigs, supra at 661 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982)).
10
Ky.App., 77 S.W.3d 596 (2002).
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cases under a misguided application of the mootness doctrine
will only result in inconsistent results from various circuit
courts across the state.
The KHSAA’s procedures have been
seriously challenged in numerous cases for lacking basic due
process.
These important questions should be addressed by our
Supreme Court to give the KHSAA, future student athletes, and
the trial courts appropriate precedent to follow.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Thomas E. Clay, P.S.C.
Louisville, Kentucky
Phillip D. Scott
Margaret A. Miller
Theodore R. Martin
GREENEBAUM DOLL & MCDONALD,
PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
Mikell Grafton Skinner
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
Mikell Grafton Skinner
Louisville, Kentucky
Theodore R. Martin
GREENEBAUM DOLL & MCDONALD,
PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
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