MAC MCINTOSH JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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October 22, 2004; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 1999-CA-001920-MR
AND
NO. 2003-CA-001281-MR
MAC MCINTOSH JR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JACKSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. CLETUS MARICLE, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 99-CR-00005
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, DYCHE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE:
Mac McIntosh Jr. appeals an August 11, 1999,
judgment of the Jackson Circuit Court from a jury verdict
convicting him of two counts of burglary in the second degree
and sentencing him to seven years’ imprisonment.
McIntosh also
appeals from a May 8, 2003, order of the Jackson Circuit Court
denying his motion pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
(CR) 60.02 to vacate or set aside the 1999 judgment as void or
satisfied.
Having carefully reviewed the record, the applicable
law and the arguments presented by the parties herein, we affirm
in part, reverse in part, and remand.
On November 19, 1995, McIntosh, a seventeen year-old
juvenile, and Gerald Anderson, an adult, had been cutting
firewood and drinking beer together in Jackson County, Kentucky.
Sometime during the day, McIntosh informed Anderson that he knew
the location of a residence that they could enter and steal some
items for resale.
Anderson accepted McIntosh’s suggestion and
the pair proceeded to the residence of Fannie Ward.
Upon
arriving at the Ward residence, McIntosh kicked the door in, the
pair entered and took a grandfather clock and a microwave oven
from the house.
After McIntosh and Anderson removed the clock
and the microwave from the Ward residence, they set the house on
fire.
Thereafter, McIntosh and Anderson went to Johnny Durham’s
residence to drink more beer.
Approximately one hour later,
Anderson and McIntosh decided to unload the items taken from the
Ward residence at Anderson’s trailer.
After unloading the items taken from the Ward
residence, Anderson and McIntosh proceeded to a residence
occupied by Doug Allen.
Upon arriving at the Allen residence
and discovering that Allen was not home, McIntosh kicked the
door open.
McIntosh and Anderson then entered Allen’s residence
and removed two Nintendo entertainment systems, a radio, a
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television set, and a bicycle.
After taking these items and
loading them in a pickup truck, they also set this house on
fire.
Anderson and McIntosh then returned to Anderson’s trailer
and unloaded the items stolen from Allen.
Anderson’s live-in
girlfriend, Debbie Morris, informed the pair that she wanted
nothing to do with the stolen merchandise.
Later, Morris
informed her mother that Anderson and McIntosh had stored stolen
items in Anderson’s trailer.
Morris’s mother immediately
contacted law enforcement to recover the stolen items.
After the recovery and identification of the items in
Anderson’s possession, he was arrested and eventually entered a
guilty plea to felony charges in connection with the events of
November 19, 1995.
Law enforcement also secured a juvenile
petition against McIntosh, charging him with burglary in the
second degree and arson in the second degree in connection with
the events at the Allen and Ward residences.
The Commonwealth
moved to have McIntosh treated as a youthful offender and
requested a transfer hearing.
The transfer hearing was held on April 8, 1996.
During this hearing, the Jackson District Court found that the
Commonwealth had proven that McIntosh was fourteen years of age
at the time of the alleged commission of the offenses and that
he was charged with Class B felonies, specifically two counts of
second-degree arson.
With regard to the burglary charges, the
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district court found that McIntosh was over the age of sixteen
at the time of the alleged commission of the offenses and was
charged with two Class C felonies.
However, the district court
noted that McIntosh had never been previously adjudicated
delinquent or as a public offender of a felony on two prior,
separate occasions.
Yet the district court erroneously listed
on its transfer order that the Commonwealth had proven that
McIntosh had been previously adjudicated delinquent or as a
felony public offender on two prior, separate occasions.
In any
event, McIntosh was transferred to Jackson Circuit Court.
On January 13, 1999, approximately two years and eight
months after being transferred to Jackson Circuit Court, the
Jackson County Grand Jury returned an indictment against
McIntosh charging him with two counts of arson and two counts of
second-degree burglary.
1999.
A jury trial commenced on June 23,
At trial, two law enforcement officers testified that the
fires at the Ward and Allen residences were suspicious because
four distinct points of origin could be found and personal
property had been taken from each residence.
Gerald Anderson,
despite admitting that he entered a guilty plea to arson charges
in connection with these fires, testified that McIntosh actually
set both residences on fire in an effort to hide fingerprints.
Morris testified at trial that McIntosh admitted to her that he
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kicked the doors in at the Ward and Allen residences, stole
personal items from each house, and started the fires.
The jury found McIntosh not guilty on the arson
charges but did convict McIntosh of two counts of second-degree
burglary.
The jury recommended a sentence of seven years’
imprisonment on each count, to be run concurrently for a total
sentence of seven years’ incarceration.
However, the jury also
wrote on the verdict form that it recommended McIntosh’s
sentence be probated.
The circuit court ultimately sentenced
McIntosh to a total of seven years’ imprisonment.
After the
judgment was entered, the trial court overruled McIntosh’s
motions for shock probation and pre-release probation.
McIntosh
timely appealed his conviction.
After filing his appeal from the trial court’s
judgment of conviction and sentence, McIntosh filed his CR 60.02
motion to set aside the judgment of conviction as void or
satisfied.
In his CR 60.02 motion, McIntosh argued that the
circuit court did not possess subject matter jurisdiction over
him because the grand jury’s failure to timely indict him caused
the transfer order to expire by operation of law.
Additionally,
McIntosh argued that the circuit court should vacate his seven
year prison sentence and sentence him as a juvenile in
accordance with the provisions of Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 635.060.
On May 8, 2003, the circuit court rejected these
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arguments and entered an order denying the CR 60.02 motion.
McIntosh also appealed from this order.
This Court ordered both
appeals consolidated and heard together.
Before turning our attention to the arguments McIntosh
presents in his direct appeal, we note that McIntosh has failed
to properly preserve any of these alleged errors for appellate
review.
Nevertheless, we shall review these alleged errors
under the palpable error rule, Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 10.26.
Under RCr 10.26, if upon consideration
of the whole case, there is not a substantial possibility that
the result would be different absent the error, there is no
manifest injustice to the defendant.
Schoenbachler v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 95 S.W.3d 830, 836 (2003).
McIntosh first asserts that the Jackson Circuit Court
did not have subject matter jurisdiction over him because,
pursuant to RCr 5.22, the transfer order expired by operation of
law when the Jackson County Grand Jury failed to timely issue an
indictment.
We find this assertion to be without merit.
Pursuant to RCr 5.22(2), final adjournment of a grand
jury without having indicted a defendant shall effect the
defendant’s discharge and exonerate any bail posted by the
defendant.
The failure of a grand jury to return an indictment
against a defendant does not prevent the charge from being
submitted to another grand jury.
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RCr 5.22(3).
Thus, the
purpose of RCr 5.22 is to limit the period of time a defendant
may be held in custody without being indicted.
Peercy v.
Paxton, Ky., 637 S.W.2d 639 (1982).
However, KRS 635.020(3) limits the jurisdiction of the
district court to act any further following its determination of
probable cause.
In Commonwealth v. Halsell, Ky., 934 S.W.2d 552
(1996), the Supreme Court found that, following a determination
of reasonable cause to believe a child over age 14 has been
charged with a felony wherein a firearm was used to commit the
offense, KRS 635.020(4) operates to limit the jurisdiction of
the district court to act any further.
Further, Section 112(5)
of the Kentucky Constitution vests the circuit court with
jurisdiction as to that particular class of offenders.
Nothing
in KRS Chapter 635 or KRS Chapter 640 requires the Commonwealth
to recertify its case against McIntosh in district court before
presenting the case against McIntosh to another Grand Jury.
Thus, contrary to McIntosh’s assertions, we believe that
Kentucky law does not permit a juvenile transfer order to expire
by operation of law.
Next, McIntosh argues that the charges against him
should have been dismissed with prejudice because his right to a
speedy trial, as articulated in Section 11 of the Kentucky
Constitution, and the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, was violated.
Particularly, McIntosh submits that
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his right to a speedy trial was violated because his June 23,
1999, trial commenced nearly four years after being first taken
into custody pursuant to a juvenile complaint.
McIntosh
correctly asserts that the length of the delay for speedy trial
purposes is measured from the earlier of the date of indictment
or the date of arrest.
Cain v. Smith, 686 F.2d. 374, 381 (6th
Cir. 1982); Dunaway v. Commonwealth, Ky., 60 S.W.3d 563 (2001).
However, while a juvenile may be taken into custody under the
same circumstances applicable to the arrest of an adult, the
detention of the juvenile is not deemed an arrest.
610.190(1).
KRS
A juvenile is not deemed to be arrested until the
decision has been made to try the child in circuit or district
court.
Id.
Here, while the Jackson District Court did find
probable cause to transfer this matter to Jackson Circuit Court
in order for McIntosh to be tried as a youthful offender, the
decision to try McIntosh in circuit court was not completed
until the Jackson County Grand Jury issued the indictment.
Therefore, since the delay in this matter occurred prior to
McIntosh’s indictment or actual arrest as an adult, the speedy
trial provisions of Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution and
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution are not
implicated.
Rather, the issue that permeates McIntosh’s
argument is whether the circuit court erred in failing to
dismiss the charges against him due to a lengthy preindictment
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delay because “unjustified and prejudicial preindictment delay
may constitute a violation of due process and require dismissal.
Prejudice alone will not suffice."
Kirk v. Commonwealth, Ky., 6
S.W.3d 823, 826 (1999)(citation omitted).
The United States Supreme Court, in United States v.
Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977), indicated that a due process
inquiry must consider both the reasons for the delay and the
prejudice to the accused. Id. at 790. Dismissal of the
indictment is required only where the accused shows substantial
prejudice to the ability to present a defense and where the
prosecutorial delay was intentional in order to gain a tactical
advantage.
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971);
Kirk, 6 S.W.3d at 826; Reed v. Commonwealth, Ky., 738 S.W.2d
818, 820 (1987).
McIntosh has not attempted to argue that there was an
intentional effort on behalf of the Commonwealth to delay the
procurement of an indictment for tactical reasons.
To succeed
on a claim that the delay caused substantial prejudice to him,
he must satisfy both prongs.
Even had we found that McIntosh
had demonstrated actual prejudice, he has failed to present any
argument related to intentional delay for tactical advantage.
Consequently, as a matter of law, we reject any assertions of
prejudicial preindictment delay.
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Third, McIntosh contends that he was entitled to a
directed verdict of acquittal.
McIntosh asserts that the
Commonwealth failed to introduce evidence that is both
qualitatively and quantitatively sufficient to establish that he
is guilty of second-degree burglary beyond a reasonable doubt.
We disagree.
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must
draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the Commonwealth.
S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991).
Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816
If the evidence is sufficient to induce
a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given.
Id.
For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial court
must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but
must reserve for the jury questions as to the credibility and
weight to be given to such testimony.
Id.
On appellate review,
the test of a directed verdict is that if, under the evidence as
a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find
guilt, only then is the defendant entitled to a directed verdict
of acquittal.
Id.
Using the Benham standard, we believe that it was not
clearly unreasonable for the jury to find McIntosh guilty based
upon the evidence as a whole.
McIntosh’s co-defendant, Gerald
Anderson, testified that McIntosh developed the idea to break
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into the Ward and Allen residences and take personal property
for resale.
Anderson testified that McIntosh kicked the door
down on both residences and assisted in taking numerous items of
personal property.
Further, Morris testified that McIntosh
readily admitted to burglarizing the Ward and Allen residences.
With all of the facts taken together in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, it was not unreasonable for a jury to
believe that McIntosh had committed two counts of second-degree
burglary.
As such, the circuit court correctly denied the
motion for directed verdict.
Finally, we address McIntosh’s argument, raised in
both his direct appeal and in the appeal from the denial of his
CR 60.02 motion, that the Jackson Circuit Court was without
authority to sentence him pursuant to KRS 640.030 and that the
circuit court erred by refusing to vacate the seven year prison
sentence.
McIntosh argues that KRS 640.040(4) limits the
circuit court to the more lenient dispositions provided by KRS
635.060.
KRS 640.040(4) provides as follows:
Any youthful offender convicted of a
misdemeanor or any felony offense which
would exempt him from KRS 635.020(2), (3),
(4), (5), (6), (7), or (8) shall be disposed
of by the Circuit Court in accordance with
the provisions of KRS 635.060.
Our review of this argument reveals that McIntosh is
correct.
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Canter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 843 S.W.2d 330 (1992), is
factually similar to the matter currently before us.
In Canter,
the juvenile defendant was charged with murder, a capital
offense, but ultimately convicted of a Class C felony, firstdegree criminal abuse.
The trial court sentenced the juvenile
defendant in Canter pursuant to KRS 640.030 as follows:
[E]ight (8) years in the Cabinet of [sic]
Human Resources at a facility so designated
by the Cabinet for Human Resources until the
defendant reaches the age of eighteen (18)
or is paroled or probated, whichever first
occurs[;] and if parole or probation has not
been granted, after the defendant reaches
the age of eighteen (18) she shall be
returned to this Court, at which time the
Court will determine whether or not the
defendant will be placed on probation or
conditional discharge or returned to the
Cabinet for Human Resources to complete a
treatment program, or be incarcerated in an
institution operated by the Corrections
Department [sic].
Canter, 843 S.W.2d at 331.
On appeal, Canter argued that the trial court erred in
sentencing her pursuant to KRS 640.030 because KRS 640.040(4)
dictates that the final disposition of a youthful offender is
dependent upon the ultimate conviction, not the original charge.
The Kentucky Supreme Court agreed:
[W]e need examine only the relationship of
this statute to subsection (2) of KRS
635.020 the threshold for possible youthful
offender status for a child "charged with a
capital offense, Class A felony or Class B
felony." A Class C felony, of which Canter
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was ultimately convicted, certainly would
not fall within the purview of KRS
635.020(2); had she originally been charged
with only a Class C felony, she clearly
would have been exempt from youthful
offender status, and disposition would have
been pursuant to KRS 635.060.
Id. at 332.
Accordingly, Canter stands for the principle that the
final disposition of a youthful offender is dependent upon the
ultimate conviction, not the original charge.
Thus, a juvenile
under the age of fourteen who is charged with a capital offense,
Class A felony or Class B felony, but is convicted only of a
Class C or Class D felony is to be sentenced under the
provisions of KRS 635.060.
In the matter currently before this Court, McIntosh
was convicted only of two counts of burglary in the second
degree.
Both of these convictions constitute Class C felonies.
Had McIntosh been charged with only these offenses, the
Commonwealth would have had to prove that McIntosh had “on two
prior separate occasions been adjudicated a public offender for
a felony offense.”
KRS 635.020(3).
While the district court’s
order indicates that the Commonwealth met that burden, it is
clear from the audiotape of the transfer hearing that this
portion of the transfer order is clearly erroneous.
In making
its findings on the record at the conclusion of the April 8,
1996, transfer hearing, the district court noted:
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The court has considered all the testimony
involved today, it is going to sustain the
motion . . . to transfer Mr. McIntosh [as a]
youthful offender and the court will state
several things on the record. It is
admirable that Mr. McIntosh has not had any
trouble with the law and the court certainly
appreciates that, and that is a very
important thing that needs to be addressed
and commented on. The fact that you
[McIntosh] don’t have any prior record in
here is a good thing, and I personally
appreciate that. However, arson and
burglary, although it is not a crime against
the person, . . . it’s an extremely serious
crime and basically takes away a person’s
home and their security and all the things
they have worked for.
For its part, the Commonwealth presented no evidence
at the transfer hearing, or at any other point during the
pendency of its prosecution of McIntosh, that McIntosh possessed
a prior criminal record.
CR 60.02 is available in both civil and criminal
proceedings.
(1968).
Fanelli v. Commonwealth, Ky., 423 S.W.2d 255
The purpose of CR 60.02 is to bring before a court
errors which (1) had not been put into issue or passed on, and
(2) were unknown and could not have been known to the moving
party by the exercise of reasonable diligence and in time to
have been otherwise presented to the court.
Young v. Edward
Technology Group, Inc., Ky. App., 918 S.W.2d 229, 231 (1995)
(citing Davis v. Home Indem. Co., Ky., 659 S.W.2d 185 (1983).
We believe that McIntosh properly and timely brought this issue
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to the attention of the Jackson Circuit Court in his CR 60.02
motion and that his motion is well taken.
Accordingly, the
circuit court erred by refusing to properly consider McIntosh’s
CR 60.02 motion and order McIntosh to be sentenced in accordance
with the provisions of KRS 635.060.
The August 11, 1999, judgment convicting McIntosh of
two counts of burglary in the second degree is affirmed.
However, the sentencing provisions of the August 11, 1999,
judgment and the Jackson Circuit Court’s May 8, 2003, order
denying McIntosh CR 60.02 relief are reversed, and this matter
is remanded to Jackson Circuit Court for disposition in
accordance with the provisions of KRS 635.060.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Timothy G. Arnold
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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