THOMAS HEAVY HAULING v. ELBERT POWELL; HON. ROBERT L. WHITTAKER, DIRECTOR OF WORKERS' COMP FUNDS; HON. BRUCE W. COWDEN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: May 23, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002340-WC
THOMAS HEAVY HAULING
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. 94-WC-11055
v.
ELBERT POWELL; HON. ROBERT L.
WHITTAKER, DIRECTOR OF WORKERS' COMP
FUNDS; HON. BRUCE W. COWDEN, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART
AND
REVERSING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE, HUDDLESTON, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE:
Thomas Heavy Hauling (“THH”) appeals from a
decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board which affirmed in
part, reversed in part and remanded an opinion, order and award
issued by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) in favor of Elbert
Powell.
The ALJ found Powell to be permanently occupationally
disabled because of a worsening of a 1994 work-related injury in
combination with prior work and non-work related injuries.
The
ALJ awarded Powell permanent total disability benefits,
apportioned equally between THH and the Workers’ Compensation
Fund (“WCF”).
The Board affirmed this award, as well as the
equal apportionment, but vacated the ALJ’s calculation of
benefits and remanded this matter.
We affirm in part and
reverse in part.
In 1989, Powell commenced his employment with THH as a
truck driver.
On February 8, 1994, Powell injured his neck
while acting in the course and scope of his employment.
Powell
underwent multiple surgical procedures on his cervical spine and
later settled his claim on February 23, 1996, for a lump sum
based on 30% permanent partial disability.
Although Powell has
not worked for income since 1994, he was elected to the unpaid
office of constable of Hopkins County, Kentucky.
After his motion for reopening was granted, Powell
testified concerning his physical condition.
Powell stated
that, despite undergoing surgery on his cervical spine, he still
experiences significant pain.
To minimize the pain, Powell
performs daily at-home treatment, including wrapping a hot towel
around his neck and using a traction device.
Further, Powell
stated that he receives treatment on his neck from Dr. Timothy
Schoettle and Dr. Frank Berklacich.
Despite this treatment,
Powell noted that he still experiences pain that radiates down
-2-
his arm into his fingers, feels numbness on the left side of his
face and has difficulty sitting and standing.
Further, Powell
cannot use his neck brace or wear a seat belt while seated in an
automobile because these items rub a neck tendon and cause pain.
Powell stated that this pain has prevented him from obtaining
employment or engaging in hobbies.
During his testimony, Powell also admitted that, in
addition to the neck injury sustained while employed by THH, he
has suffered a number of other injuries.
While serving in the
United States Marine Corps in the 1960s, Powell injured his knee
playing volleyball.
In December 2000, Powell underwent knee
replacement surgery and was assessed a 40% disability because of
this surgery.
Powell receives benefits for this injury.
In 1984, while working for Wynn Oil Company, Powell
sustained a work-related back injury for which he underwent
surgery at the L4/L5 level.
Powell filed a workers’
compensation claim and received a lump sum settlement based upon
a 40% disability rating.
Additionally, on November 21, 1995,
while serving as constable in Hopkins County, Powell sustained a
lower back injury after being hit by a truck while directing
traffic.
ALJ Donald Smith, on August 19, 1998, found Powell to
be 30% occupationally disabled, with 10% of that disability pre-
-3-
existing due to Powell’s prior injuries.
ALJ Smith attributed
only 20% occupational disability to the 1995 back injury1.
On reopening, Powell produced medical evidence
concerning the worsening of his 1994 neck injury.
Schoettle has treated Powell since the 1994 injury.
Dr. Timothy
During the
original claim, Dr. Schoettle opined that Powell possessed a 15%
whole body impairment with 50% due to a dormant, pre-existing
condition of cervical spondylosis and stenosis which were
aroused by the 1994 work-related injury.
At that time, Dr.
Schoettle believed that Powell would qualify for a driving job
that involved no lifting.
On January 13, 2000, Dr. Schoettle
expressed uncertainty as to whether Powell was a candidate for
multi-level fusion.
Dr. Schoettle also noted in February 2000
that Powell had severe cervical arthritis at C3/C4.
At this
point, Dr. Schoettle referred Powell to Dr. Edward Mackey for a
second opinion on whether Powell would benefit from additional
surgery.
On March 13, 2000, Dr. Mackey opined that Powell would
not benefit from additional neck surgery.
The record also contains medical evidence from Dr.
Frank Berklacich.
Initially, Dr. Berklacich recommended
conservative treatment for Powell’s chronic neck pain.
1
MRI and
In its opinion, the Board noted that none of these parties filed any
documentation from the 1995 claim in the record. The Board stated that the
ALJ took judicial notice of the contents of the 1995 claim, as maintained by
the Commissioner of the Department of Workers’ Claims and is considered to be
a matter of public record.
-4-
CT scan results were also not strongly supportive of an
additional surgery.
However, in November 2000, Dr. Berklacich
suggested that Powell would benefit from surgery only if it was
performed as an extension of a prior anterior fusion.
Dr.
Berklacich testified that his November 2000 opinion was based on
an MRI that showed a significant worsening of Powell’s cervical
spine.
Dr. Bercklacich suspected this worsening would continue
and require another cervical fusion.
Finally, Dr. Berklacich
assessed Powell with an impairment rating of 25% to 30%.
Dr. Frank Wood performed an independent medical
examination of Powell on June 26, 2001 and diagnosed Powell with
cervical spondylosis with myelopathy.
Dr. Wood opined that
Powell’s subjective complaints of pain are consistent with his
objective findings.
As a result of his examination, Dr. Wood
assessed Powell with a 15% whole body permanent partial rating.
However, Dr. Wood found no worsening of Powell’s neck condition.
Based upon this evidence, the ALJ found Powell to have
incurred 60% impairment because of the worsening of his 1994
neck injury.
The ALJ further found Powell to be totally
occupationally disabled and awarded benefits based upon this 60%
impairment, combined with his prior knee and back injuries.
The ALJ evenly apportioned liability for this worsening between
THH and WCF and granted a credit of 30%, representing the 1994
settlement.
While the Board ruled that substantial evidence
-5-
supported the ALJ’s findings as to Powell’s disability and the
apportionment of liability, it vacated the ALJ’s calculation of
benefits.
In vacating the ALJ’s calculations, the Board
reasoned that, since ALJ Smith found a 10% disability because of
the 1994 neck injury, res judicata principles mandate that the
credit should have been 10% instead of 30%.
Accordingly, the
Board remanded this matter to the ALJ for a finding of fact as
to the credit due to THH and WCF.
This petition followed.
We note that our review of decisions from the Workers’
Compensation Board is to be deferential.
In Western Baptist
Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-688 (1992), the
Kentucky Supreme Court outlined this Court’s role as follows:
The function of further review of the
[Board] in the Court of Appeals is to
correct the Board only where the the [sic]
Court perceives the Board has overlooked or
misconstrued controlling statutes or
precedent, or committed an error in
assessing the evidence so flagrant as to
cause gross injustice.
A claimant in a workers’ compensation action bears the
burden of proving every essential element of his cause of
action.
Snawder v. Stice, Ky. App., 576 S.W.2d 276 (1979).
Since Powell was successful before the ALJ, the question on
appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
conclusion.
Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, Ky. App., 673 S.W.2d
735 (1984).
Substantial evidence is evidence which, when taken
-6-
alone or in light of all the evidence, has probative value to
induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable person.
Bowling
v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, Ky.
App., 891 S.W.2d 406, 409 (1994), citing Kentucky State Racing
Comm’n v. Fuller, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 298, 308 (1972).
As the finder of fact, the ALJ has the sole authority
to assess and to evaluate the quality, character, and substance
of the evidence.
(1993).
Square D Co. v. Tipton, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 308
The ALJ may reject any testimony and believe or
disbelieve various parts of the evidence, regardless of whether
it comes from the same witness or the same adversary party’s
total proof.
Halls Hardwood Floor Co. v. Stapleton, Ky. App.,
16 S.W.3d 327 (2000).
Mere evidence contrary to the ALJ’s
decision is not adequate to require reversal on appeal.
Whittaker v. Rowland, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1999).
In order
to reverse the ALJ’s decision, it must be shown that no
substantial evidence supports that decision.
Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641 (1986).
Special Fund v.
Guided by these legal
principles, we now turn to THH’s assertions of error.
On appeal, THH presents several assertions of error.
First, THH argues that the ALJ’s finding that Powell is totally
disabled is not supported by substantial evidence.
We disagree.
Dr. Berklacich testified that an MRI scan revealed a worsening
of Powell’s neck injury and linked that worsening to the 1994
-7-
work-related injury.
Also, Dr. Berklacich indicated that
Powell’s cervical range of motion had diminished and that Powell
does possess spinal cord effacement, which will further
deteriorate his physical condition.
Finally, Dr. Berklacich
noted that this worsening ultimately requires surgery.
We also note that Powell’s own testimony supports the
ALJ’s conclusions.
Powell testified that he is unable to use a
computer, drive a truck for extended periods of time, or perform
many daily activities without pain.
To treat his pain, Powell
places a hot towel around his neck and uses a traction device at
least two times a day.
Powell also stated that his ability to
walk, stand, lift, carry, and perform fine motor skills has
diminished since 1996.
Finally, Powell does not believe that he
can perform any income producing work given his age, education,
and vocational background.
While the ALJ must necessarily
consider the worker’s medical condition when determining the
extent of the occupational disability at a particular point in
time, the ALJ is not required to rely upon the vocational
opinions of either the medical experts or the vocational
experts.
Eaton Axle Corp. v. Nally, Ky., 688 S.W.2d 334 (1985);
Seventh Street Road Tobacco Warehouse v. Stillwell, Ky., 550
S.W.2d 469 (1976).
A worker’s testimony is competent evidence
of his physical condition and of the worker’s ability to perform
various activities both before and after being injured.
-8-
Hush v.
Abrams, Ky., 584 S.W.2d 48 (1979).
Here, after considering
Patterson’s age, education, and experience, as well as the
medical and testimonial evidence, the ALJ determined that
Patterson could no longer engage in any gainful employment.
Drawing this inference is well within the ALJ’s authority.
Jackson v. General Refractories Co., Ky., 581 S.W.2d 10 (1979).
THH also asserts that the ALJ erred in finding Powell
to be totally occupationally disabled by considering the
occupational implications of Powell’s prior injuries.
argument is completely without merit.
This
The law on the date of
injury controls the rights of the parties with regard to a
workers’ compensation claim.
S.W.3d 619 (2000).
Meade v. Reedy Coal Co., Ky., 13
At the time of Powell’s neck injury,
Kentucky law provided that, even though a claimant has a
noncompensable occupational disability that existed prior to a
compensable injury, the prior disability is not excluded when
determining whether total disability exists.
Teledyne-Wirz v.
Willhite, Ky. App., 710 S.W.2d 858 (1986), superseded by statute
as stated in McNutt Construction v. Scott, Ky., 40 S.W.3d 854,
858 (2001).
Clearly, under the law in effect in 1994, the ALJ
was required to consider those injuries Powell sustained prior
to 1994.
Next, THH argues that the ALJ erroneously apportioned
some liability to it for Powell’s permanent total disability.
-9-
In making this argument, THH asserts that, under the “excess
disability” line of cases, Campbell v. Sextet Mining Co., Ky.,
912 S.W.2d 25 (1995), Fleming v. Windchy, Ky., 953 S.W.2d 604
(1997), and Whittaker v. Fleming, Ky., 25 S.W.3d 460 (2000), the
medical evidence herein clearly shows that Powell’s 1995 lower
back injury caused the increased disability at issue herein.
We
find THH’s reliance on these cases to be totally unfounded.
THH correctly points out that a claimant is not
entitled to benefits for permanent total disability until that
claimant becomes totally disabled.
Windchy, 953 S.W.2d at 607.
The employer on risk at the time of the last injury necessary to
the finding of permanent total disability is responsible for
lifetime benefits representing the percentage of disability
caused by that final injury.
Campbell, 912 S.W.2d at 28;
Windchy, 953 S.W.2d at 607-608.
Any excess disability, that
greater amount of disability resulting from the combined effect
of the latest injury superimposed on the previous disability, is
apportioned to the WCF.
Campbell, 912 S.W.2d at 28; Fleming, 25
S.W.3d at 462-463.
These three “excess disability” cases, however, are
distinguishable from the matter currently before us.
Each of
these cases dealt with the apportionment of liability between
two work-related injuries under original consideration or active
disability pre-dating both injuries for which the claimant had
-10-
already been compensated.
Moreover, each claimant in the
“excess disability” cases was not totally disabled until the
occurrence of the second injury.
See Campbell, 912 S.W.2d at
26; Windchy, 953 S.W.2d at 605.
Here, in contrast, substantial
medical evidence shows that Powell did not become totally
disabled until after his 1995 back injury.
Based upon this
evidence, the ALJ determined that the worsening of Powell’s 1994
cervical injury occurred after the effects of the 1995 event,
with that worsening ultimately responsible for rendering Powell
totally and permanently disabled.
It is clear that the ALJ
properly refused to apply the law found within the “excess
disability” cases because the subsequent worsening of Powell’s
1994 injury, not the effects of the 1995 injury, constituted
Powell’s last work-related traumatic event for purposes of
determining apportionment and liability.
Hence, we adopt the
following apportionment of liability from the ALJ’s decision as
our own:
After considering all the evidence presented
on reopening, the Administrative Law Judge
finds that the Plaintiff has sustained his
burden of showing that from the 1994 injury
standing alone, the Plaintiff’s occupational
disability has increased from 30% to 60%.
. . . The Administrative Law Judge takes
judicial notice of the fact that based on
Dr. Berklacich’s opinion that [sic] the
Plaintiff’s condition has worsened to the
extent expressed above.
The Administrative
Law
Judge
does
feel
that
the
facts
enumerated above demands [sic] application
-11-
of Teledyne Wirz v. Wilhite, Ky. App., 710
S.W.2d 858 (1986).
From the facts of this
case, it is clear that the Plaintiff has
previously incurred a pre-1994 knee injury
while employed in the marine corp [sic]
which
has
necessitated
a
total
knee
replacement performed in 2000. In addition,
the Administrative Law Judge takes judicial
notice of the fact that the Plaintiff had
previously sustained a work-related low back
injury which necessitated surgery in 1984
[and] was settled for a 40% occupational
disability. Although the Administrative Law
Judge is cognizant of the fact that the 1995
low back injury occurred subsequent to the
injury which is the subject matter of this
reopening and, therefore, any occupational
disability ramifications emanating from this
injury should not be taken into account when
determining
whether
the
Plaintiff
is
permanently totally disabled,
[See Johnson
v. Scotts Branch Coal Company, Ky. App., 754
S.W2d 555 (1988)], the Administrative Law
Judge makes a finding that based on the
restrictions imposed by the worsening of the
1994 cervical injury together with the
restrictions emanating from the prior left
knee condition as well as the prior low back
condition, that the Plaintiff has a 100%
occupational disability.
See also Teledyne
Wirz v. Wilhite, Ky. App., 710 S.W.2d 858
(1986).
Next, THH asserts that the Board erred in not giving
it a credit for a 30% occupational disability as a result of the
finding regarding Powell’s subsequent lower back injury.
We
reject this argument.
While THH presents no authority in support of this
argument, we believe that Kentucky law clearly addresses this
issue.
Generally, compensation otherwise recoverable by reason
-12-
of a work-connected permanent injury is not affected by a preexisting handicap that “is not a contributing factor to the
present work situation in which the injury occurred.”
v. Putnam, Ky., 579 S.W.2d 370, 372 (1979).
Schneider
If a prior injury
does not contribute to the subsequent total and permanent
occupational disability, then that injury is not pre-existing
for the purposes of determining the degree of occupational
disability which existed prior to the subsequent injury.
Wells v. Bunch, Ky. 692 S.W.2d 806 (1985).
See
In this event, the
employer is not entitled to a credit for that prior injury.
Id.
Here, since the ALJ determined that Powell’s 1994 injury solely
caused total and permanent occupational disability, THH is not
entitled to a 30% credit representing the award for that back
injury.
This result is supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, THH argues that the Board erred in reversing
the ALJ’s calculation of the credit it is entitled for any
overlapping periods of benefits previously paid to Powell for
his 1994 neck injury.
We agree.
The ALJ found Powell to be totally disabled, but gave
THH a credit of 30%, representing the occupational disability
assigned to Powell as a result of the 1996 settlement agreement.
The Board vacated this credit and remanded this issue because
ALJ Smith’s 1998 findings are res judicata.
determination is incorrect.
-13-
The Board’s
The rule of res judicata operates to bar repetitious
suits involving the same cause of action.
Yeoman v. Com.,
Health Policy Board, Ky., 983 S.W.2d 459 (1998).
is formed by two subparts:
preclusion.
Res judicata
(1) claim preclusion, and (2) issue
Id. at 464-465.
Claim preclusion bars a party from
re-litigating a previously adjudicated cause of action and
entirely bars a new lawsuit on the same action.
Id. at 486.
Issue preclusion bars the parties from relitigating any issue
actually litigated and finally decided in an earlier action.
Id.
Here, our focus is on issue preclusion since the Board
found that the 1998 findings by ALJ Smith actually litigated and
decided the extent of Powell’s 1994 neck injury.
For issue
preclusion to operate as a bar to further litigation, certain
elements must be present.
First, the issue in the second case
must be the same as the issue in the first case.
(Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982).
been actually litigated.
Id.
Restatement
Second, the issue must have
Third, even if an issue was
actually litigated in a prior action, issue preclusion will not
bar subsequent litigation unless the issue was actually decided
in that action.
Id.
Fourth, for issue preclusion to operate as
a bar, the decision on the issue in the prior action must have
been necessary to the court’s judgment.
Id.
Moreover, the
party bound by the doctrine must have been given a full and fair
-14-
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.
Moore v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Resources, Ky., 954
S.W.2d 317 (1997).
Here, it is clear that the doctrine of issue
preclusion cannot apply to the matter before us.
There is no
evidence before us that the extent of Powell’s 1994 neck injury
was actually litigated before ALJ Smith.
Even if this issue was
fully litigated before ALJ Smith, THH was never a party to
Powell’s 1995 workers’ compensation action2.
Thus, since THH was
not a party to the 1995 litigation, this employer could not have
been provided with a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
extent of any disability sustained by Powell due to his 1994
neck injury.
Thus, we believe that the Board prejudiced THH by
incorrectly applying the doctrine of res judicata in this matter
and reverse the Board on this issue.
The ALJ, pursuant to
Whittaker v. Rowland, supra, correctly calculated the credit due
THH for overlapping payments on Powell’s 1994 neck injury.
The opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board is
affirmed in part and reversed in part.
HUDDLESTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS WITH SEPARATE OPINION.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURRING:
I fully concur in the
majority opinion, but I write separately to clarify an
2
The parties to the 1995 action were Powell, the Hopkins County Fiscal
Court, and the Special Fund.
-15-
additional point.
The majority correctly holds that the
doctrine of res judicata does not apply to this case.
However,
the Board’s opinion seems to confuse the doctrine of res
judicata with a related doctrine, collateral estoppel.
Indeed,
these doctrines are frequently conflated in case law and
collateral estoppel is sometimes referred to as a form of issue
preclusion encompassed by res judicata.
See Gregory v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 610 S.W.2d 598, 600 (1980); and Rosenbalm v.
Commercial Bank of Middlesboro, Ky. App., 838 S.W.2d 423, 429
(1992).
But see Yeoman v. Commonwealth, Health Policy Board,
Ky., 983 S.W.2d 459, 465 (n. 2) (1998).
Nonetheless, collateral
estoppel is a distinct theory from res judicata.
Res judicata and collateral estoppel each concern the
preclusive effects of a former adjudication.
Carroll v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp., Ky., 37 S.W.3d 699, 702 (2000).
Under
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, however, such an
adjudication precludes re-litigation of issues actually
litigated and determined in the prior suit, regardless of
whether it was based on the same cause of action or involved the
same parties as the second suit.
Napier v. Jones By & Through
Reynolds, Ky. App., 925 S.W.2d 193, 195-96 (1996).
But while
identity of parties is not a prerequisite for the application of
collateral estoppel, the party against whom it is invoked must
have been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
-16-
issue in the prior action.
461 S.W.2d 556, 559 (1970).
Sedley v. City of West Buechel, Ky.,
See also Moore v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 954 S.W.2d 317, 318-19 (1997).
In this case, THH was never
a party to Powell’s 1995 claim, and it cannot be bound by an
adjudication in which it did not participate.
Therefore, the
finding by the ALJ in the 1995 claim that Powell had only a 10%
active disability due to his neck claim has no preclusive effect
in this re-opening.
Accordingly, I fully agree with the panel
that the Board erred in setting aside the ALJ’s calculation of
the credit due to THH for Powell’s pre-existing active
disability.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE ELBERT
POWELL:
W. Kenneth Nevitt
Nevitt Law Office
Louisville, Kentucky
Randall L. Hardesty
Mitchell & Hardesty
Madisonville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE WORKERS’
COMPENSATION FUNDS:
David W. Barr
Frankfort, Kentucky
-17-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.