G.S.B. v. B.T.R., C.W.R., and E.C.W., a minor
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RENDERED: December 12, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002319-MR
G.S.B.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REED RHORER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-AD-00018
v.
B.T.R.,
C.W.R., and
E.C.W., a minor
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING
AND
REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, COMBS, AND DYCHE, JUDGES.
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE: G.S.B. appeals from a judgment of adoption of
the Franklin Circuit Court that effectively terminated his
parental rights and allowed his daughter’s stepfather to adopt
her.
We reverse and remand.
G.S.B. and C.W.R. lived together off and on from
December 1988 through February 1998.
They were never married.
On November 20, 1990, C.W.R. gave birth to their daughter,
E.C.W.
C.W.R. and B.T.R. married on September 12, 1998,
approximately seven months after C.W.R. and G.S.B. had separated
for the final time.
The child resided with C.W.R. and B.T.R.
On September 20, 2000, approximately two years after
C.W.R. and B.T.R. were married, B.T.R. filed a petition in the
Franklin Circuit Court to adopt E.C.W.
G.S.B. filed an answer
in response and also filed a cross-claim wherein he requested
that he be adjudged E.C.W’s natural father, that C.W.R. be
granted custody while he be allowed visitation, and that the
court set child support payments to be made by him.
An agreed
order was entered establishing paternity; however, no action was
taken as to visitation or child support.
The trial of the case
was held in the Franklin Circuit Court during July 2002.
On October 14, 2002, the circuit court rendered
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.
Therein, the
court made numerous fact findings and conclusions before
ordering that a judgment of adoption in favor of B.T.R. be
entered.
The court found that G.S.B. and C.W.R. had a long and
tumultuous relationship that “epitomized the proverbial cycle of
domestic violence.”
The court found that G.S.B. committed
numerous acts of physical abuse and domestic violence against
C.W.R. and that much of the violence was committed in their
daughter’s presence.
Further, the court noted that G.S.B. had
an alcohol abuse problem and had difficulty with anger
management.
The court also determined that C.W.R. tried to
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encourage a good relationship between G.S.B. and their daughter
but that G.S.B. did not take the initiative in seeing her.
Next, the court found that G.S.B. had not paid any
child support nor otherwise contributed to his daughter’s
physical, medical, or educational needs since the latter part of
1999.
The court also stated that the child had not been abused
or neglected by G.S.B. and that he had not allowed her to be
sexually abused or exploited.
The court further noted that the
Cabinet for Human Resources had prepared a report and had
recommended that the adoption petition be granted provided all
legal requirements were met.
Additionally, the court stated it
had talked with the child and she had stated her desire that her
stepfather be allowed to adopt her.
The court concluded that B.T.R. was a fit and proper
person to adopt E.C.W., but it noted that B.T.R. was required to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory
requirements had been met.
The court then concluded as a matter
of law that B.T.R. had proven by clear and convincing evidence
(1) that G.S.B. had abandoned E.C.W. for a period not less than
ninety days; (2) that G.S.B. had continuously or repeatedly
inflicted emotional harm upon the child by reason of his alcohol
abuse and repeated acts of domestic violence against C.W.R. in
the child’s presence; (3) that G.S.B. had, for a period of not
less than six months, continuously or repeatedly failed or
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refused to provide essential parental care and protection for
the child, and there was no reasonable expectation of
improvement in that situation considering her age; and (4) that
G.S.B. had continuously or repeatedly failed to provide
essential food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or education
reasonably necessary and available for E.C.W.’s well-being, and
there was no reasonable expectation of significant improvement
in the foreseeable future considering her age.
The court
concluded that the granting of the adoption petition was
appropriate for those four reasons and ordered that a judgment
of adoption be entered.
This appeal by G.S.B. followed.
KRS1 199.502 addresses the conditions necessary for an
adoption without the consent of the child’s biological parent or
parents.
As that statute pertains to the findings and
conclusions made by the trial court in this case, it reads as
follows:
(1)
Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS
199.500(1), an adoption may be granted
without the consent of the biological
living parents of a child if it is
pleaded and proved as part of the
adoption proceeding that any of the
following conditions exist with respect
to the child:
(a)
1
That the parent has abandoned the
child for a period of not less
than ninety (90) days;
. . . .
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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(c)
That the parent has continuously
or repeatedly inflicted or allowed
to be inflicted upon the child, by
other than accidental means,
physical injury or emotional harm;
. . . .
(e)
That the parent, for a period of
not less than six (6) months, has
continuously or repeatedly failed
or refused to provide or has been
substantially incapable of
providing essential parental care
and protection for the child, and
that there is no reasonable
expectation of improvement in
parental care and protection,
considering the age of the child;
. . . .
(g)
That the parent, for reasons other
than poverty alone, has
continuously or repeatedly failed
to provide or is incapable of
providing essential food,
clothing, shelter, medical care,
or education reasonably necessary
and available for the child’s
well-being and that there is no
reasonable expectation of
significant improvement in the
parent’s conduct in the
immediately foreseeable future,
considering the age of the child;
KRS 199.502(1)(a), (c), (e), and (g).
G.S.B. argues on appeal that there was not substantial
evidence to support the trial court’s Findings of Fact,
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Conclusions of Law and Order.
CR2 52.01 states in part that
“[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous.”
Further, “[w]hile a court’s findings will not be
disturbed on appeal if they are supported by substantial
evidence, they will not be sustained if they are supported by no
evidence.”
(1979).
Burke v. Hammonds, Ky. App., 586 S.W.2d 307, 309
We will examine each of the four findings of the trial
court and determine whether they were supported by substantial
evidence.
The trial court first determined that G.S.B. had
abandoned his daughter for a period of not less than ninety
days.
See KRS 199.502(1)(a).
This was based on the fact that
G.S.B. apparently had no contact with the child after having
lunch with her at Applebee’s in November 1999.
B.T.R. notes
that the period of time from November 1999 until his petition
for adoption was filed in September 2000 was clearly in excess
of the statutory requirement of abandonment for at least ninety
days.
“[A]bandonment is demonstrated by facts or
circumstances that evince a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the
child.”
O.S. v. C.F., Ky. App., 655 S.W.2d 32, 34 (1983).
Also, “[s]eparation to constitute abandonment and neglect must
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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be wilful and harsh.”
269, 271-72 (1960).
Kantorowicz v. Reams, Ky., 332 S.W.2d
See also D.S. v. F.A.H., 684 S.W.2d 320,
322 (1985).
It is apparently undisputed that G.S.B. had no contact
with his daughter after November 1999.
The trial court found
that G.S.B. visited approximately four times in 1998 and two or
three times in 1999.
The evidence was undisputed that in 1998
G.S.B. had a two-day visit in April, two separate days in
August, and a five-day visit in November when B.T.R. and C.W.R.
were out of town.
In 1999 G.S.B. had a two-day visit in January
and then met E.C.W. at Applebee’s in November.
Although the court found that C.W.R. had tried to
encourage a good relationship between E.C.W. and G.S.B., C.W.R.
admitted that she had informed G.S.B. in January 1999 that she
did not want any further contact between G.S.B. and their
daughter and did not want any further support from him.
In
addition, C.W.R. admitted that while she allowed G.S.B.’s mother
to visit with E.C.W. from January 1999 on, she refused to allow
G.S.B.’s mother to visit with E.C.W. at her house in Georgetown
because G.S.B. lived on the same property.
C.W.R. attempts to counter this evidence by
referencing a letter she sent to G.S.B. in October 1999 and the
November 1999 meal that she allowed to take place at Applebee’s.
Nevertheless, her actions, particularly her statement to G.S.B.
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that he was not to have contact with their daughter, underscore
the fact that his lack of contact was not all of his own doing
but was at C.W.R.’s directive that he stay away.
Under these
circumstances and under the aforementioned legal principles
applicable to the issue of abandonment, we conclude that the
evidence was not clear and convincing in this regard.
The
evidence was not such as to exhibit a wilful and harsh attempt
by G.S.B. to abandon or separate himself from his daughter.
The second determination made by the trial court was
that B.T.R. had proven by clear and convincing evidence that
G.S.B. inflicted emotional harm on the child by reason of his
alcohol abuse and repeated acts of domestic violence committed
against C.W.R. in the child’s presence.
See KRS 199.502(1)(c).
G.S.B. concedes that he and C.W.R. had a tumultuous
relationship, that a domestic violence order was entered against
him in 1994, and that he committed several acts of domestic
violence against C.W.R., some of which occurred in the child’s
presence.
However, he notes that the court did not find that
any incident of domestic violence had occurred after the parties
finally separated in early 1998, and he also notes that the
court specifically found that “[E.C.W.] has not been abused or
neglected by [G.S.B.].”
The definition of an “abused or neglected child” is
set forth in KRS 600.020(1), and it includes a child whose
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health or welfare has been harmed or threatened when his parent
inflicts or allows to be inflicted physical or emotional injury,
creates or allows to be created a risk of physical or emotional
injury, or engages in a pattern of conduct that renders the
parent incapable of caring for the child’s needs due to alcohol
abuse.
While there was evidence that G.S.B. abused alcohol and
committed acts of domestic violence in the presence of the
child, the court entered a specific fact finding that she was
not abused or neglected by G.S.B.
Furthermore, there was no
evidence that G.S.B.’s acts of domestic violence against C.W.R.
caused the child emotional harm.
In light of these
circumstances, we conclude there was not sufficient evidence to
support the conclusion that G.S.B. inflicted emotional harm upon
her by reason of the alcohol abuse and acts of domestic
violence.
In short, the finding and the conclusion are
inconsistent.
More importantly, the statute, KRS 199.502(1)(c),
requires that it be proven that the parent “continuously or
repeatedly” inflicted physical or emotional harm on the child.
As we have noted, G.S.B. and C.W.R. separated for the final time
in February 1998.
B.T.R. filed the adoption petition in
September 2000, over two and one-half years later.
There was no
evidence of any emotional harm being inflicted on the child by
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G.S.B. due to alcohol abuse or domestic violence committed in
the child’s presence during this period of time.
When the parties orally argued this case to this
court, B.T.R.’s counsel cited R.C.R. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet
for Human Resources, Ky. App., 988 S.W.2d 36 (1998), for the
proposition that domestic violence and alcohol abuse by a father
is grounds for terminating his parental rights.
The facts in
that case are distinguishable from the facts herein.
In R.C.R.
the children were removed from the home, and the Cabinet for
Human Resources (now the Cabinet for Families and Children)
instituted an action to terminate the parental rights against
both parents due to domestic violence, alcohol abuse, and
neglect.
In the case sub judice, the domestic violence and the
potential harm to the child had ended well over two years prior
to the filing of B.T.R.’s adoption petition.
We conclude that
terminating G.S.B.’s parental rights on this ground was
improper.
The third determination by the trial court was that
B.T.R. had proven by clear and convincing evidence that G.S.B.,
for a period of not less than six months, continuously or
repeatedly failed to provide essential care and protection to
the child and that there was no reasonable expectation of
improvement in the future considering the child’s age.
Thus,
the court concluded that such determination was a separate
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ground for granting the adoption pursuant to KRS 199.502(1)(e).
G.S.B. argues that any deficiency he may have had in not paying
a sufficient amount of child support was due to no child support
order directing him to pay being in place and due to C.W.R.’s
direction to him that he have no contact and pay no support.
Furthermore, G.S.B. again notes the finding by the trial court
that he did not neglect his daughter.
The parties have argued this third conclusion by the
trial court with the court’s fourth conclusion that B.T.R. had
proven by clear and convincing evidence that G.S.B. continuously
or repeatedly failed to provide essential food, clothing,
shelter, medical care, or education reasonably necessary for
E.C.W.’s well-being and that there was no reasonable expectation
of significant improvement in the foreseeable future considering
her age.
G.S.B. raises the same arguments regarding this
determination.
In response, B.T.R. notes that G.S.B. paid only
$1,427.45 in child support from February 15, 1998, through
November 29, 1999.
While the parties have argued the third and fourth
conclusions of the court as if they were the same, they were
not.
The third conclusion relates to KRS 199.502(1)(e) and
states that G.S.B. continuously failed or refused to provide
essential parental care and protection to the child.
The fourth
conclusion relates to KRS 199.502(1)(g) and states that G.S.B.
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continuously failed to provide essential food, clothing,
shelter, medical care or education for the child’s well-being.
KRS 199.502(1)(e) involves providing essential care and
protection, and KRS 199.502(1)(g) involves providing support.
Because E.C.W. was in the custody of C.W.R. and B.T.R., she was
receiving essential parental care and protection.
Further,
there is no evidence to indicate that during the periods E.C.W.
was with G.S.B. in 1998 and 1999 she did not receive essential
care and protection.
Thus, the court’s conclusion that G.S.B.’s
parental rights could be terminated based on KRS 199.502(1)(e)
was not supported by the evidence and was improper.
As for the fourth determination by the trial court, we
again agree with G.S.B. that there was not clear and convincing
evidence to support it.
While G.S.B. was certainly not an ideal
parent and while he abused alcohol and had previously committed
acts of domestic violence against the child’s mother, the fact
is that C.W.R. told G.S.B. in January 1999 that he was to have
no contact with the child and was to pay no support.
Not only
was G.S.B. not under any court order to pay child support, but
he could not have been convicted of misdemeanor nonsupport as
paternity was never established until G.S.B. filed a motion to
do so in this action.
See KRS 530.050 and Lane v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 371 S.W.2d 16, 17 (1963).
The evidence does not
demonstrate that G.S.B. had a settled purpose to forego all
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parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to E.C.W.
Therefore, we conclude that there was not clear and convincing
evidence to support the court’s last determination.
The U.S. Supreme Court has spoken as to the
seriousness of terminating the parental rights of a parent.
In
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S. Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.
Ed. 1042 (1923), the Court referred to the right to raise one’s
children as being “essential.”
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541, 62 S. Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L. Ed. 1655 (1942), the Court
referred to these rights as being “basic civil rights of man.”
In May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533, 73 S. Ct. 840, 843, 97 L.
Ed. 1221 (1953), the Court stated that these are “[r]ights far
more precious . . . than property rights.”
In Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L. Ed. 2d
551 (1972), the Court stated that the right of an unwed father
“in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants
deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection.”
In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759, 102 S. Ct.
1388, 1895, 71 L. Ed 2d 599 (1982), the Court noted that “[w]hen
the State initiates a parental rights determination proceeding,
it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty
interest, but to end it.”
The Court went on to note that “if
the State prevails, it will have worked a unique kind of
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deprivation . . . .
A parent’s interest in the accuracy and
justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status
is, therefore, a commanding one.”
Id., quoting Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S. Ct. 2153,
2160, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981).
In the Santosky case the Court noted that the
“fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply
because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary
custody of their child to the State.
Even when blood
relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.”
445 U.S. at 754.
In Kentucky this court held that the
principles set forth in the Santosky case apply in this state
“regardless of whether one is threatened with the loss of his or
her parental rights pursuant to KRS 199.603, the involuntary
termination statute, or by adoption of his or her child without
his consent.”
D.S., 684 S.W.2d at 323.
This brings us to another of G.S.B.’s arguments.
G.S.B. argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by
failing to consider any measure less drastic than adoption in
determining E.C.W.’s best interest.
In the D.S. case, this
court held that “we believe it incumbent upon the court when
considering a petition to adopt . . . to not only require clear
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and convincing evidence of abandonment or neglect, but to also
consider any less drastic measures to accomplish the child’s
best interest.”
Id.
This principle was reiterated in L.B.A. v.
H.A., Ky. App., 731 S.W.2d 834, 836 (1987), wherein this court
stated that “less drastic measures must be considered by the
court prior to granting termination and involuntary adoption.”
In the case sub judice it is obvious that less drastic
measures were not considered prior to terminating the parental
rights of G.S.B.
Such measures should have been considered in
light of the fact that he was not under a court order to pay
support and had been told by C.W.R. that he was to pay no
support and was to stay away from their daughter.
While it
appears that G.S.B. has been a poor parent in many respects, he
is still the natural and legal father of E.C.W.
Until the
requirements of the statute are met by clear and convincing
evidence, he must remain so.
Finally, we note that the facts in this case are
somewhat similar to those in G.R.M. v. W.M.S., Ky. App., 618
S.W.2d 181 (1981).
Therein, the trial court terminated the
parental rights of a father to his children based on his failure
to support them for three years and failure to even see them for
over four years.
The court therein concluded that “this was due
in great part to the actions and attitude of the appellee.”
Further, the court stated, “[t]o terminate a father’s parental
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rights on this basis under this provision flies in face of the
true spirit and intent of this statute, which is to sever
relations between innocent children and a deadbeat,
disinterested parent.”
Id. at 184.
In light of the actions of
C.W.R., we conclude that B.T.R. did not prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parental rights of G.S.B. should be
terminated.
Therefore, the order of the Franklin Circuit Court is
reversed and remanded for further proceedings in connection with
G.S.B.’s cross-claim.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
COMBS, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
COMBS, JUDGE, DISSENTING:
As I cannot agree with the
assessment of the majority opinion that the evidence in this
case failed the tough standard of “clear and convincing,” I
respectfully dissent.
The thorough findings of the trial court
were amply substantiated by evidence that was obviously weighed
and evaluated by the court with great care.
That evidence fully
satisfies each and all of the statutory criteria that must be
met before a court may order termination of parental rights.
The majority opinion essentially penalizes the mother
in this case for endeavoring to insulate her daughter from a
continual pattern of the most severe emotional abuse.
The
record is replete with instance after instance of violent
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behavior by the alcoholic father –- including numerous outbursts
of domestic violence (e.g., strangling the mother and
brandishing a gun in her face) routinely committed in the
presence of the child.
After an exasperating attempt to
encourage and to nurture a relationship between father and
daughter, the mother finally “ordered” him to stay away.
stay away.
He did
He meekly obeyed a woman whom he had never hesitated
to brutalize repeatedly.
It is noteworthy that he made
absolutely no attempt to invoke the courts to assert his
parental rights at this point.
The majority opinion observes that the domestic
violence and its attendant emotional harm to the child had ended
more than two years before the filing of the adoption petition.
From this fact, it reasons that the potential for emotional harm
had ended and that, therefore, there was no legitimate basis to
determine that he had “continuously or repeatedly” (KRS
199.502(1)(c)) inflicted ongoing harm.
This reasoning
essentially would require that harm be occurring
contemporaneously with or up to the filing, a requirement
clearly not contained in the statute.
The record illustrates
the continuity and repetition of the abuse –- as well as the
virtual certainty that there would be no improvement in the
behavior of the perpetrator.
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In upholding the parental rights of this father, the
majority opinion quotes Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651,
92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed. 2d 551 (1972).
It relies on that
case for the proposition that parental rights are entitled to
deference and protection – “absent a powerful countervailing
interest.”
I would submit that such a “countervailing interest”
has been clearly and convincingly established by the facts of
this case.
This is a very difficult case, one that is emotionally
wrenching for all concerned –- including the members of this
appellate panel.
However, I would not disturb the well-reasoned
opinion of the trial court in its findings of facts (entered
after sound and meticulous analysis) or in its application of
the law (satisfying all the statutory criteria) to those facts.
I would affirm the judgment of adoption and the termination of
parental rights.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Kevin P. Fox
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Michael L. Hawkins
Dana M. Todd
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES:
Michael L. Hawkins
Frankfort, Kentucky
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