ALITA GAIL POPE v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
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RENDERED:
September 19, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002055-MR
ALITA GAIL POPE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-01181
v.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, GUIDUGLI AND TACKETT, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE.
Alita Gail Pope (hereinafter “Pope”) has
appealed from the McCracken Circuit Court’s September 10, 2002,
order granting Allstate Insurance Company’s (hereinafter
“Allstate”) motion for summary judgment and dismissing her
complaint.
Pope was seeking underinsured motorist (hereinafter
“UIM”) benefits from Allstate, her UIM carrier.
We affirm.
On September 19, 1998, Pope was involved in a motor
vehicle accident with Lisa McGuillion (hereinafter
“McGuillion”).
There is no dispute that McGuillion was at fault
in the accident and that her carelessness and negligence caused
Pope to incur injury.
At the time of the accident, McGuillion
was insured under a policy issued by Shelter Insurance Company
(hereinafter “Shelter”).
Likewise, Pope was insured under a
policy by Allstate, which policy provided Pope with UIM
coverage.
Pope settled her claim against McGuillion and
Shelter, the liability carrier, for the sum of $17,000, and
signed a release discharging McGuillion, Shelter, and any other
person, firm or corporation on August 28, 2001.
On November 16, 2001, Pope filed a complaint in
McCracken Circuit Court, demanding a judgment against Allstate
for UIM benefits in an amount that would fairly and reasonably
compensate her for the damages incurred in the accident with
McGuillion.
Allstate filed an answer on December 11, 2001,
arguing that Pope’s complaint should be dismissed due to her
failure to comply with KRS 304.39-320 and provide it with notice
of the proposed settlement with the liability carrier.
Although
not reflected in the certified record, some discovery apparently
took place.
On June 24, 2002, Allstate filed a motion for
summary judgment, arguing that Pope failed to comply with the
requirements of KRS 304.39-320 and provide it with notice of the
proposed settlement with Shelter and McGuillion.
Pope filed a
response to Allstate’s motion, arguing that the purpose of the
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statute in question was to give notice to the UIM carrier so
that it may protect its subrogation rights and that Allstate had
failed to provide a certified copy of its policy to establish
its right to subrogation.
Further, Pope argued that Allstate
failed to show substantial prejudice from the delay in notice.
Allstate filed a reply to Pope’s response, pointing out that
Pope did not provide the circuit court with any reason to deny
the motion for summary judgment because she did not contest the
fact that no notice was given to Allstate of the proposed
settlement.
On September 10, 2002, the circuit court entered an
order granting Allstate’s motion for summary judgment as
follows:
The Defendant Allstate Insurance
Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment having
come on for consideration and the Court
being sufficiently advised and being of the
opinion that because of the Plaintiff’s
failure to give notice to Allstate Insurance
Company of his proposed settlement with the
tort feasor, Lisa McGuillion, and the
Plaintiff nevertheless having fully released
all claims against tort feasor, Lisa
McGuillion, Plaintiff is not entitled to
recover from or against Allstate Insurance
Company any of the relief for un[der]insured
motorist coverage as claimed in the
Complaint.
The Plaintiff’s Complaint against
Allstate Insurance Company is hereby
dismissed fully, with prejudice. This is a
final and appealable judgment and there is
no just cause for delay.
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This appeal followed.
Prior to addressing the merits of the appeal, we must
first address a procedural matter regarding documents Pope
attached as exhibits to her brief.
Pope attached three letters
regarding the settlement between herself and Shelter, the last
being an August 24, 2001, letter from Pope’s counsel to Ms.
Nicole M. Mignone of Allstate regarding the proposed $17,000
settlement.
Pursuant to CR 76.12(4)(c)(vii), only materials or
documents included in the certified record on appeal may be
included in the appendix to a brief.
The three documents were
not introduced in the circuit court nor were they included in
the certified record on appeal, and therefore should not have
been included as exhibits to Pope’s brief.
Accordingly, we
shall disregard the letters dated August 17, 2001, August 21,
2001, and August 24, 2001, as well as any citations to the
documents in Pope’s brief.
Croley v. Alsip, Ky., 602 S.W.2d 418
(1980).
As to the merits of the appeal, Pope argues that
Allstate failed to show that it had been prejudiced by a delay
in notice of the proposed settlement.1
She also argues that KRS
304.39-320 does not make the notice requirement mandatory due to
1
In her brief, Pope asserts for the first time that that she notified
Allstate of the settlement offer by first class mail on August 24, 2001,
prior to completing the settlement with Shelter. This assertion was never
brought before the circuit court, and cannot, therefore, be raised before
this Court on appeal.
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the Legislature’s use of the word “must” rather than “shall” in
the applicable portion of the statute.
Additionally, Pope
asserts that she should not be forced to forfeit her rights to
UIM benefits without Allstate having to show actual prejudice,
and that Allstate failed to establish its right to subrogation.
On the other hand, Allstate argues that even if notice is
assumed, Pope failed to follow the mandatory dictates of KRS
304.39-320, which provides the underinsured carrier with thirty
days from the receipt of notice of a proposed settlement to
choose whether to preserve its subrogation rights.
Additionally, Allstate argues that although it is not required
to show prejudice, the loss of the right to preserve its
subrogation claim is obviously prejudicial, and the cases Pope
cited in her brief are unrelated to the issue she presented.
In Scifres v. Kraft, Ky.App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781
(1996), this Court addressed the standard of review to be
applied in an appeal from a summary judgment:
The standard of review on appeal of a
summary judgment is whether the trial court
correctly found that there were no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 56.03. There is no
requirement that the appellate court defer
to the trial court since factual findings
are not at issue. Goldsmith v. Allied
Building Components, Inc., Ky., 833 S.W.2d
378, 381 (1992). "The record must be viewed
in a light most favorable to the party
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opposing the motion for summary judgment and
all doubts are to be resolved in his favor."
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center,
Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (1991).
Summary "judgment is only proper where the
movant shows that the adverse party could
not prevail under any circumstances."
Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480, citing
Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, Ky., 683
S.W.2d 255 (1985). Consequently, summary
judgment must be granted "only when it
appears impossible for the nonmoving party
to produce evidence at trial warranting a
judgment in his favor. . ." Huddleston v.
Hughes, Ky.App., 843 S.W.2d 901, 903 (1992),
citing Steelvest, supra (citations omitted).
With this standard in mind, we shall review the circuit court’s
summary judgment in favor of Allstate.
In Coots v. Allstate Insurance Company, Ky., 853
S.W.2d 895 (1993), the Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed KRS
304.39-320 and held that “it does not abrogate UIM coverage to
settle with the tortfeasor and his carrier for the policy limits
in his liability coverage, so long as the UIM insured notifies
his UIM carrier of his intent to do so and provides the carrier
an opportunity to protect its subrogation.”
Id. at 900.
In
response, the General Assembly codified this ruling in the
amended version of KRS 304.39-320(3) as follows:
If an injured person . . . agrees to settle
a claim with a liability insurer and its
insured, and the settlement would not fully
satisfy the claim for personal injuries or
wrongful death so as to create an
underinsured motorist claim, then written
notice of the proposed settlement must be
submitted by certified or registered mail to
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all underinsured motorist insurers that
provide coverage. The underinsured motorist
insurer then has a period of thirty (30)
days to consent to the settlement or
retention of subrogation rights. An injured
person . . . may agree to settle a claim
with a liability insurer and its insured for
less than the underinsured motorist’s full
liability policy limits. If an underinsured
motorist insurer consents to settlement or
fails to respond as required by subsection
(4) of this section to the settlement
request within the thirty (30) day period,
the injured party may proceed to execute a
full release in favor of the underinsured
motorist’s liability insurer and its insured
and finalize the proposed settlement without
prejudice to any underinsured motorist
claim.
In reviewing the record before us, it is clear that
Pope did not comply with the terms of KRS 304.39-320 by
providing notice to her UIM carrier of the proposed settlement
with Shelter.
There is nothing in the certified record to
establish that Pope provided Allstate with the requisite notice.
She is therefore precluded from claiming any UIM benefits from
Allstate.
We disagree with Pope’s contention that the terms of
the statute are not mandatory because of the use of the term
“must” rather than “shall”.
While we agree that an injured
party is not required to provide the notice to his UIM carrier
of a proposed settlement with a liability carrier, the failure
to do so forfeits the injured party’s right to claim or recover
any UIM benefits from his or her UIM carrier.
Here, Pope’s
failure to properly notify Allstate of the proposed settlement
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with Shelter abrogates her right to collect UIM benefits from
her carrier.
Even if we assume that Pope provided the requisite
notice of the proposed settlement, the notice was insufficient
for two reasons.
the proper method.
First, she did not send the written notice by
KRS 304.39-320(3) requires the notice to be
submitted by either certified or registered mail; Pope sent her
alleged notice by first-class mail.
Second, the alleged notice
was dated August 24, 2001, while the release with Shelter and
McGuillion was signed only four days later on August 28, 2001.
The statute allows the UIM carrier thirty days from receipt of
the notice to decide whether to preserve its subrogation rights;
Pope only waited four days from sending the alleged notice
before completing the proposed settlement and signing the
release.
As to Pope’s argument that Allstate must show
prejudice before it can rely upon lack of notice as a defense,
we agree with Allstate that Pope’s citations to Gordon v.
Kentucky Farm Bureau Insurance Co., Ky., 914 S.W.2d 331 (1996),
and to Jones v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., Ky., 821 S.W.2d 791
(798), have no relevance to the issue before us.
Both Gordon
and Jones deal with delayed notification of accidents to
carriers, and provide that the carrier must show prejudice
before being entitled to use such a delay to negate coverage.
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Here, Pope clearly did not follow the statutory requirements, in
effect waiving her right to claim UIM benefits from her carrier.
The circuit court properly granted Allstate’s motion
for summary judgment as there were no genuine issues of material
fact to be decided, and Allstate was entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the McCracken
Circuit Court granting summary judgment and dismissing Pope’s
complaint is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Leslie J. Shekell
Paducah, KY
Steven C. Jackson
Paducah, KY
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