MARGARET WALKER; EDWARD WALKER; MAYSVILLE NEWSPAPER; and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. LIMESTONE FAMILY YMCA; and WILLIAM GRIFFITH
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RENDERED:
October 24, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-002054-MR
&
NO. 2002-CA-002097-MR
MARGARET WALKER; EDWARD WALKER;
MAYSVILLE NEWSPAPER; and LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
APPELLANTS
CONSOLIDATED APPEALS FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT I. GALLENSTEIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00344
LIMESTONE FAMILY YMCA; and
WILLIAM GRIFFITH
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, COMBS, and DYCHE, Judges.
COMBS, JUDGE.
Margaret Walker and her husband, Edward Walker,
appeal from a July 16, 2002, order of the Mason Circuit Court
dismissing their tort action pursuant to CR1 77.02(2).
In their
complaint, the Walkers sought damages for personal injuries
sustained by Margaret when she fell in a parking lot owned by
appellee Limestone Family YMCA and maintained by appellee
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
William Griffith.
Their appeal has been consolidated with the
appeal of Maysville Newspaper, Margaret’s employer at the time
of the injury, and its workers’ compensation carrier, Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company.
After a review of the record, we are
unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
ordering the dismissal of the lawsuit.
Thus, we affirm.
On January 6, 1999, Margaret, a newspaper
photographer, drove her vehicle to the YMCA while on assignment
by her employer.
She fell on snow or ice upon exiting her
automobile in the parking lot adjoining the facility.
In her
deposition, she testified that she hit her head on the car as
she fell and that she was unconscious for some period of time.
After she regained both consciousness and composure, she went
inside the premises and completed her assignment.
Later, she
complained that she suffered injuries to her head, back, hand,
and shoulder.
She also believed that her eyesight had been
affected by the fall and that she experienced psychological
problems related to the incident.
In their complaint filed on December 16, 1999, the
Walkers alleged that Margaret’s injuries were the result of the
negligence of the YMCA and Griffith in their ownership and/or
maintenance of the premises.
The YMCA filed a cross-claim
against Griffith; Margaret’s employer and its insurer filed an
intervening complaint to recover workers’ compensation benefits
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paid on Margaret’s behalf.
Several depositions were taken on
behalf of the appellees, the last of which was filed in the
record on October 12, 2000.
There was no pre-trial activity by
any party after that time.
In a notice mailed on May 29, 2002, the court set the
matter for a show cause hearing on July 5, 2002.
The Walkers
responded to the notice by moving for a trial date.
At the
hearing, the Walkers’ attorney provided no explanation for the
delay in prosecuting the case.
Rather, he made only the
following brief statement:
Your Honor, we’re prepared to diligently
pursue the case. Ms. Walker is here. We’d
like to get the case moving.
The attorney for the intervening plaintiffs acknowledged that he
“may have been a little dilatory” in responding to certain
discovery requests, but he urged and argued that dismissal was
not warranted.
The YMCA and Griffith joined in the court’s
motion to dismiss, contending that in addition to the overall
delay, the appellants had also ignored their interrogatories and
request for production of documents.
The trial court took the matter under submission.
Prior to its ruling, Margaret filed an affidavit stating that
she had received treatment continuously since the 1999 injury
and that as late as July 2, 2002, had been referred by her
psychiatrist to three other health providers.
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On July 16, 2002, the trial court entered its order,
setting forth its reasoning in support of its dismissal of the
case as follows:
It is abundantly clear from a review of
the record[ ] that neither the plaintiffs
nor the intervening plaintiffs have taken
any steps to prosecute their claims for much
longer than one year. . . . Other than
filing a set of Interrogatories upon
Defendant Limestone Family YMCA
simultaneously with [their] Complaint and
which were answered more than two years ago
on February 2, 2000, the Plaintiffs have
taken absolutely no steps toward the
prosecution of this action. Upon receipt of
notice to show case why the action should
not be dismissed, Plaintiff[s] filed a
motion to set a trial date which motion does
not comply with the Local Rules.
In summary, more than three years have
passed since the Plaintiff’s claimed injury
accident occurred and more than thirty
months have passed since the Plaintiff[s]
filed [their] lawsuit but yet the
Plaintiff[s] [have] not undertaken any
measures to prosecute this action.
The appellants’ post-judgment motions to vacate the order of
July 12, 2002, were denied on September 11, 2002.
These appeals
followed.
The appellants contend that the trial court abused its
discretion in dismissing the case.
The Walkers assert “there is
no indication” that they were “personally responsible for the
lack of activity on the record” and that there is no “history of
dilatoriness.” (Brief for the Walkers, p. 5).
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All of the
appellants point out that a less severe sanction was available
to the trial court.
They contend that dismissal is particularly
harsh because the one-year statute of limitations for personal
injury claims has already run –- thus precluding the refiling of
the complaint.
While we agree that dismissal was a drastic
sanction, we cannot say that the trial court committed
reversible error in imposing this ultimate sanction.
CR 77.02(2), commonly referred to as the “housekeeping
rule,” is intended to expedite the removal of stale cases from
the court’s docket.
See, Hertz Commercial Leasing Corporation
v. Joseph, Ky.App., 641 S.W.2d 753 (1982) and Bohannon v.
Rutland, Ky., 616 S.W.2d 46 (1981).
CR 77.02(2) provides as
follows:
At least once each year trial courts shall
review all pending actions on their dockets.
Notice shall be given to each attorney of
record of every case in which no pretrial
step has been taken within the last year,
that the case will be dismissed in thirty
days for want of prosecution except for good
cause shown. The court shall enter an order
dismissing without prejudice each case in
which no answer or an insufficient answer to
the notice is made.
A dismissal pursuant to CR 77.02(2) is wholly a matter
for the exercise of the broad discretion of the trial court.
Wright v. Transportation Cabinet, Ky.App., 891 S.W.2d 412
(1995).
In this case, it is undisputed that the appellants took
no pretrial steps for more than two years immediately preceding
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the CR 77.02(2) notice.
There was no pretrial activity
initiated by any party for nineteen months prior to the notice.
The fact that the case may involve exceptionally complex medical
issues does not suffice to justify a complete failure by the
plaintiffs to press and develop their cause of action after the
filing of the complaint.
Even though a different circuit court
might have been more lenient, we cannot conclude that the court
abused its considerable discretion in finding that the
appellants failed to show adequate cause for the failure to
prosecute their case.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Mason Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS MARGARET
AND EDWARD WALKER:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE LIMESTONE
FAMILY YMCA:
Randy Allen Byrd
Cincinnati, OH
Russell H. Saunders
R. Hite Nally
Louisville, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS MAYSVILLE
NEWSPAPER AND LIBERTY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE WILLIAM
GRIFFITH:
Timothy J. Walker
Lexington, KY
John F. Estill
Maysville, KY
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