KENNETH W. HOOD v. TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, KENTUCKY, INC.; PETE GRITTON; MIKE DEPRILLE; MARK DAUGHERTY; AND PAULA MILLS
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 17, 2003; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO.
2002-CA-001936-MR
KENNETH W. HOOD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-01488
v.
TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING,
KENTUCKY, INC.; PETE GRITTON;
MIKE DEPRILLE; MARK DAUGHERTY;
AND PAULA MILLS
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; JOHNSON AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
Kenneth Hood appeals from a summary judgment of
the Fayette Circuit Court, entered May 30, 2002, dismissing his
employment-discrimination complaint against Toyota Motor
Manufacturing of Kentucky, Inc.
Hood alleges that Toyota
invidiously discharged him from an assembly-line trainee
position because it deemed him to be disabled.
The trial court
ruled that Hood had failed to proffer proof that he is disabled
for the purposes of the anti-discrimination laws and that Hood’s
discharge was not invidious.
We agree with the trial court.
Toyota hired Hood on March 10, 1997, to work on one of
its assembly teams.
After a week of orientation, Hood began
training for one of his team’s five assembly processes.
The job
required Hood to perform repetitive motions with his arms raised
above his head.
By March 19, he was obliged to seek medical
attention for pain in his shoulders.
In early April, his
treating physician diagnosed chronic bilateral rotator cuff
tendonitis with early joint degeneration, likely the result of
Hood’s nearly twenty years of strenuous weight training.
The
physician restricted him to work that did not require him to
lift more than ten pounds overhead and that did not require him
to reach overhead for more than ten seconds at a time.
There is
no dispute that one cannot perform the assembler job with these
restrictions.
Upon learning of Hood’s restrictions, Toyota
placed him on medical leave.
In mid-July 1997, Hood sought to resume his assembler
training and presented Toyota with a reevaluation from his
physician, which stated, in part, that
[i]t is my opinion that at this time [Hood]
may be released to full duty without
restrictions. Mr. Hood has conveyed to me
2
that there is a job opportunity at the
Toyota plant in which he would be on a team
that rotates duties such that although he
would be doing overhead work, it would not
be repetitive overhead work eight to ten
hours per day as his only job description.
I think this would be an ideal scenario for
Mr. Hood, and thus I have released him to
return to work.
Toyota interpreted this note as releasing Hood to a
job requiring less overhead work than the assembler position and
so refused to reinstate him to the training program.
medical leave expired in September 1997.
Hood’s
Because he had not by
then supplied the company with an unambiguous release to his
former position, Toyota terminated his employment.1
1
Hood asserts that Toyota’s policy of limiting medical leave to
six months is discriminatory. The reason for this assertion is
not entirely clear. If Hood means only that Toyota’s decision
not to release him from medical leave should not be confused
with its decision to terminate him, we agree. The first
decision could be discriminatory even if the second were not,
and in that case a proper termination under the leave policy
would not excuse the prior discrimination. If he means that the
six-month leave policy is itself discriminatory, however, we
disagree. Hood’s assertion to the contrary notwithstanding,
that is not the holding of Toyota Manufacturing U.S.A., Inc. v.
Epperson, Ky., 945 S.W.2d 413 (1996), a case in which that issue
had been raised but not addressed by the trial court and our
Supreme Court remanded the issue to the trial court. A company
is not obliged to keep its workers on medical leave
indefinitely. Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Company, 143 F.3d
1042 (6th Cir. 1998); Monette v. Electronic Data Systems
Corporation, 90 F.3d 1173 (6th Cir. 1996). Aside from his
mistaken reading of Epperson, Hood has suggested no reason to
find Toyota’s leave policy discriminatory.
3
Thereupon Hood brought suit against Toyota,2 alleging
that Toyota had discriminated against him because of its
perception that he was disabled.
The trial court agreed with
the company that the physician’s July letter was ambiguous, but
permitted Hood to depose the physician to clarify her
recommendations.
At her deposition, the physician testified
that she regarded Hood’s shoulder problems as chronic, that she
had not intended to release him to the same position that had
caused him so much pain before, and that she had intended to
limit her release to a position conforming generally to the
restrictions she had imposed in April.
In light of this
testimony, the trial court granted Toyota’s motion for summary
judgment.
It is from that order that Hood has appealed.
To state a prima facie claim of disability
discrimination under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KRS 344.010
et seq., a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that (1) he was disabled within the meaning of the Act,
(2) he was a qualified individual; and (3) he suffered an
adverse employment action because of his disability.3
Hood has
2
In addition to Toyota, Hood’s complaint named Pete Gritton,
Mike Deprille, Mark Daugherty, and Paula Mills, Toyota
employees. By order entered June 19, 1998, the trial court
dismissed Hood’s suit against these individuals. Hood has not
appealed from that ruling.
3
Noel v. Elk Brand Manufacturing Company, Ky. App., 53 S.W.3d 95
(2000). In construing the Kentucky Act, courts commonly refer
4
failed to raise a genuine issue with regard to either of the
first two elements.
KRS 344.010(4) defines disability as “(a) A physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one (1) or more
of the major life activities of the individual; (b) a record of
such impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such an
impairment.”
Hood denies that he is impaired, but contends that
Toyota regarded him as having a substantially limiting
impairment.
We disagree.
A substantially limiting impairment
is one that significantly interferes with an individual’s basic
activities.4
Hood’s evidence suggests only that Toyota thought
he suffered from a shoulder condition that limited his ability
to hold his hands over his head and perform repetitive motions.
This is not such an interference with one’s basic activities as
to amount to a disability for the purposes of the Act.5
Neither has Hood adequately alleged that he is a
qualified individual.
A qualified individual under the Act is
to decisions construing the similar federal laws. Id.; Brohm v.
JH Properties, Inc., 149 F.3d 517 (1998). We shall do likewise.
4
Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, 238 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir.
2001); McKay v. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, U.S.A., Inc., 110
F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1997).
5
Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, supra; McKay v. Toyota
Motor Manufacturing, U.S.A., Inc., supra; Petty v. Freightliner
Corporation, 123 F. Supp. 2d 979 (W.D.N.C. 2000).
5
one who “with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employment position.”6
Hood
maintains that as of July 1997 he was able to perform the
assembler job for which he had been hired.
There is no
meaningful dispute, however, that his physician disagreed.
As
her deposition testimony makes clear, she believes Hood’s
shoulder problems are chronic and will be aggravated by the sort
of overhead lifting and reaching required by the assembler job.
Hood proffered no other medical assessment of his condition.
We
agree with the trial court that Toyota is entitled to rely upon
the physician’s assessment in judging Hood’s qualifications.7
In sum, Toyota did not discriminate against Hood.
It
relied, legitimately, on an individualized and objective medical
assessment of Hood’s impairment to determine that he was not
qualified to perform the assembler job.
requires no more.
The Civil Rights Act
Accordingly, we affirm the May 30, 2002,
judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
6
KRS 344.030(1).
7
Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Company, 143 F.3d 1042 (6th Cir.
1998); Blanton v. Inco Alloys International, Inc., 108 F.3d 104
(6th Cir. 1997).
6
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
David B. Sandler
Katherine A. Hessenbruch
Greenebaum Doll & McDonald PLLC
Louisville, Kentucky
William C. Jacobs
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES:
David B. Sandler
Louisville, Kentucky
7
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