DONALD MOORE; SANDRA S. MOORE; BARBARA DELVIN; TOM MEIHAUS; ALLESON MEIHAUS; KEVIN TALBERT; VIRGINIA MOLIQUE; AND ANTHONY J. DEYE v. B&Z DEVELOPMENT, INC.; CITY OF FORT WRIGHT; AND FORT WRIGHT CITY COUNCIL
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RENDERED:
September 19, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001926-MR
DONALD MOORE; SANDRA S.
MOORE; BARBARA DELVIN;
TOM MEIHAUS; ALLESON MEIHAUS;
KEVIN TALBERT; VIRGINIA MOLIQUE;
AND ANTHONY J. DEYE
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS M. STEPHENS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-02301
B&Z DEVELOPMENT, INC.;
CITY OF FORT WRIGHT; AND
FORT WRIGHT CITY COUNCIL
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; McANULTY, JUDGE; AND HUDDLESTON,
SENIOR JUDGE.1
McANULTY, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an order of the Kenton
Circuit Court denying the appellants’ motion to intervene in the
proceedings below, and from an order adopting a settlement
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
agreement entered into among the appellees and dismissing B&Z
Development, Inc.’s zoning appeal and petition for declaratory
judgment.
The appellants contend that their motion to intervene
should have been granted and that, for various reasons, the
circuit court erred in adopting the settlement agreement and
dismissing B&Z’s zoning appeal and petition for declaratory
judgment.
Because the circuit court properly denied B&Z’s
motion to intervene, and because the remaining issues are not
properly before us, we affirm.
B&Z Development, Inc. (B&Z) is the owner of an
approximately 60-acre tract located in the City of Fort Wright.
On August 13, 1998, B&Z submitted an application to the Kenton
County Municipal Planning and Zoning Commission (Planning and
Zoning Commission) to rezone the tract to a zoning
classification which would accommodate uses such as department
stores, grocery stores, and small retail establishments.
On September 3, 1998, the Planning and Zoning
Commission held a public hearing on B&Z’s application.
Following the hearing the Planning and Zoning Commission
recommended approval of the zone change.
On September 15, 1998,
the Fort Wright City Council (City Council) voted to adopt the
Commission’s recommendation for the zone change subject to
eleven conditions, including that a Stage I Development Plan be
submitted to the Planning and Zoning Commission for review,
2
recommendation, and approval, and that the Plan be adopted by
the City Council.
The City Council’s vote was adopted as
Ordinance 576-98.
In October 2000, B&Z completed its proposed Stage I
Development Plan.
Under the plan, a Wal-Mart supercenter would
function as the anchor retail establishment of the development.
The Planning and Zoning Commission voted 14 to 1 to approve the
Plan.
Upon learning that Wal-Mart was to be the anchor
establishment, various members of the community, including the
appellants, commenced a public campaign to challenge the
development.
On October 11, 2000, the City Council conducted a
public hearing to review B&Z’s Stage I Development Plan.
At the
hearing the City Council heard evidence concerning the traffic
impact of the proposed development.
Based upon the traffic
impact evidence, the City Council denied B&Z’s proposed Stage I
Development Plan.
On November 8, 2000, B&Z filed an “Appeal and
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment” in Kenton Circuit Court
contesting the City Council’s denial of its Stage I Development
Plan.
The appeal was brought pursuant to KRS2 100.347(3), and
the petition for declaratory judgment was brought pursuant to
KRS 418.040.
2
Named as Defendants/Appellees in the circuit court
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3
case were the City of Fort Wright and the Fort Wright City
Council.
During the pendency of the circuit court case, B&Z
developed a revised Stage I Development Plan.
It appears that
the revised Stage I Plan was prepared in consultation with the
City of Fort Wright and the City Council.
Eventually, the City
of Fort Wright, the City Council, and B&Z entered into a
settlement agreement under which B&Z’s revised plan would be
adopted by the City Council and the circuit court case would be
terminated as moot.
The settlement agreement was advertised as
an agenda item and presented to the City Council in a public
hearing held on May 22, 2002, following which the City Council
voted to accept the agreement.
As a result of the turn of events, on June 5, 2000,
the appellants filed a motion to intervene in the circuit court
proceeding.
In their motion to intervene the appellants sought
to challenge both the settlement agreement and the merits of the
revised Stage I Development Plan.
B&Z and Fort Wright objected
to the intervention on the basis that the pending proceeding had
become a moot controversy with the approval of the revised Stage
I Plan.
On June 26, 2002, the first reading was held on
Ordinance No. 9-02, an ordinance adopting and approving B&Z’s
revised Stage I Development Plan.
4
On July 10, 2002, the
settlement agreement was executed by the parties to the circuit
court case, and, also, the second reading of Ordinance 9-02 was
held.
At that time the ordinance approving the revised Stage I
Development plan was enacted.
On August 14, 2002, the circuit court entered an order
denying the appellants’ motion to intervene.
The circuit court
stated that to permit the appellants to intervene would “create
a confusion of issues.”
Also on August 14, the circuit court
entered an “Agreed Order and Judgment” “adopt[ing] as its
judgment” the July 10, 2002, settlement agreement3 and dismissing
the case with prejudice.
3
The settlement agreement stated, in relevant part, as follows:
WHEREAS, a revised development plan for the
been negotiated among the parties so that a
Development Plan for the site acceptable to
parties can be adopted making the questions
in the lawsuit moot.
site has
Stage One
all
pending
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual
covenants herein contained, the parties agree to
settle the present action under the following terms
and conditions.
1. The City will enact an Ordinance substantially in
the form of Exhibit “A” attached hereto. [The
ordinance, among other things, provided for the
settlement of the circuit court case and the approval
of the revised Stage I Plan.]
2. That when effective that Ordinance will render
all of the matters in controversy in this lawsuit
moot.
3. That upon enactment of the Ordinance the parties
hereto will jointly apply to the Kenton Circuit Court
for entry of a judgment approving the Ordinance and
dismissing this lawsuit with prejudice.
5
First, we address the appellants’ contention that the
circuit court erred by denying their motion to intervene in the
circuit court proceeding.
B&Z’s “Appeal and Complaint for Declaratory Judgment”
reflects that its exclusive purpose was to challenge the City
Council’s denial of its initial Stage I Development Plan.
During the pendency of the circuit court proceedings, however,
B&Z developed a revised Stage I Plan which superceded the
initial Plan.
After developing the revised Stage I Development
Plan, B&Z no longer sought to defend the original Stage I Plan,
but rather sought to implement the revised Plan.
On June 5,
2002, when the appellants filed their motion to intervene, the
subject matter of the circuit court proceeding, B&Z’s challenge
to the City Council’s rejection of the initial Stage I Plan, was
moot.
In their June 5, 2002, motion to intervene, in support
of their motion, the appellants identified three legal issues.
First, the appellants alleged, in effect, that the adoption of
the revised Stage I Development Plan by settlement agreement did
not comply with rezoning procedures; second, the appellants
alleged that the adoption of the revised Stage I Development
Plan by settlement was improper because there was no public
hearing regarding the revised Plan; and third, the appellants
alleged that the revised Plan was improper because it violated
6
the zoning ordinance requirements for a neighborhood shopping
center.
In its order denying the appellants’ motion to
intervene, the circuit court stated as follows:
the court concludes, based upon review of
the entire record in this case, that the
motion to intervene should be denied. If
movants have a cause of action, it is from
any subsequent decision and action of the
defendant City, and not the City’s action
appealed herein. To permit intervention
would, in this court’s view, create a
confusion of the issues.
CR4 24.01, which addresses intervention as a matter of
right, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(1) Upon timely application anyone shall be
permitted to intervene in an action . . .
(b) when the applicant claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede
the applicant's ability to protect that
interest, unless that interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.
As a practical matter, the “disposition of the action”
in this case amounted to a dismissal of B&Z’s appeal and
petition for declaratory judgment as moot.
While in the
meantime the parties did enter into a settlement agreement and
the circuit court “adopt[ed] as its Judgment the Settlement
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
7
Agreement”; nevertheless, the circuit court’s “adoption of the
settlement agreement” was not res judicata as to the appellants,
see Napier v. Jones By and Through Reynolds, Ky. App., 925
S.W.2d 193, 195 (1996), and the appellants had the remedy of
appealing the City Council’s approval of the revised Stage I
Development Plan under KRS 100.347(3),5 much as B&Z appealed the
City Council’s denial of the initial Plan under the same
statute.
As denial of their intervention did not impair the
appellant’s ability to protect their interests, they were not
entitled to intervene as a matter of right under CR 24.01.
Similarly, CR 24.02, which addresses permissive
intervention, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Upon timely application anyone may be
permitted to intervene in an action: . . .
(b) when an applicant's claim or defense and
the main action have a question of law or
fact in common. . . . In exercising its
discretion the court shall consider whether
the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
the original parties.
The appellants’ “claims” and/or “defenses” raised in
their motion to intervene concerned issues related to the City
Council’s adoption of the revised Stage I Plan.
5
Again, the
KRS 100.347(3) provides, in part, that “[a]ny person or entity claiming to
be injured or aggrieved by any final action of the legislative body of any
city, county, consolidated local government, or urban-county government,
relating to a map amendment shall appeal from the action to the Circuit Court
of the county in which the property, which is the subject of the map
amendment, lies.
8
subject matter of B&Z’s appeal and petition for declaratory
judgment was the City Council’s denial of the initial Stage I
Plan.
The appellant’s remedy to the City Council’s approval of
the revised plan was an appeal under KRS 100.347(3).
As such,
the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying the
appellants’ motion to intervene under CR 24.02.
In summary, we agree with the circuit court that the
issues the appellants sought to litigate in the pending circuit
court proceeding would “create a confusion of the issues.”
As
reflected in their motion to intervene, the appellants sought to
challenge the procedures surrounding the adoption of the revised
Stage I Development Plan, the merits of the revised Plan, and
whether the revised Plan could be adopted by settlement
agreement.
However, these issues, all of which concerned the
revised plan, were outside the scope of B&Z’s appeal and
petition for declaratory judgment.
The circuit court proceeding
litigating B&Z’s appeal and petition for declaratory judgment
was not the proper forum to consider the issues raised by the
appellants in their motion to intervene, as that proceeding was
concerned with the City Council’s denial of B&Z’s initial Stage
I Development Plan.
See Summe & Ratermann Company v. City of
Covington, Ky., 314 S.W.2d 568 (1958).
The appellants also seek to appeal the circuit court’s
August 14, 2002, order adopting the settlement agreement and
9
dismissing the case with prejudice.
CR 73.02(2) authorizes “a
party to file a timely notice of appeal . . .”
added.)
(Emphasis
“The term ‘party’ as used in CR 73.02(2) clearly means
a party to the proceeding.”
City of Louisville v. Christian
Business Women's Club, Inc., Ky., 306 S.W.2d 274, 276 (1957);
Bartholomew v. Paniello, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 616 (1956).
The term
“party” as used in CR 73.02 means a party of record, and one who
is not a party may not appeal even though he files a notice of
appeal.
White v. England, Ky., 348 S.W.2d 936, 937 (1961).
As
the appellants’ motion to intervene was denied, they were not
parties to the circuit court case, and, as such, they do not
have standing to appeal the order adopting the settlement
agreement and dismissing the case.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Kenton
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Richard G. Meyer
Mark D. Guilfoyle
Covington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE B&Z
DEVELOPMENT:
Gerald F. Dusing
Mary Ann Stewart
Covington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE CITY OF
FORT WRIGHT:
Peter J. Summe
Fort Wright, Kentucky
10
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