MELISHA WHITE AND SHARON McDANIELS v. DARRYL JONES AND AMERICAN RED CROSS
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RENDERED: JULY 25, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001811-MR
MELISHA WHITE AND
SHARON McDANIELS
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA R. ISAAC, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-02919
v.
DARRYL JONES AND
AMERICAN RED CROSS
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; KNOPF AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
SCHRODER, JUDGE.
Melisha White and Sharon McDaniels,
(appellants), appeal from an order of the Fayette Circuit Court
denying their motion to alter, amend or vacate an order granting
summary judgment in favor of Darryl Jones and American Red Cross
(appellees).
Appellants argue that there are genuine issues of
material fact as to whether appellee, Darryl Jones (Jones),
negligently operated his vehicle resulting in a rear-end
collision with appellants.
Upon reviewing the record in the
light most favorable to appellants, we conclude that there are
genuine issues of material fact, which preclude summary
judgment.
Hence, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The only undisputed facts in this case are that, on
April 19, 2001, appellants were traveling South on Limestone
Street in Lexington, Kentucky on their way to the Kentucky
Clinic.
White was driving the vehicle and McDaniels was a
passenger.
The morning of the collision, Jones was also driving
South on Limestone transporting several persons in a Red Cross
bus.
Jones was employed as a driver by Red Cross, transporting
elderly and disabled persons for medical treatments and
appointments.
When White made a lane change, her car was rear-
ended by the bus driven by Jones.
In a complaint filed on August 3, 2001, appellants
claimed that Jones negligently operated his vehicle so as to
cause the collision injuring both White and McDaniels and
damaging White’s vehicle.
Appellees asserted that the accident
was the result of White’s and/or McDaniels’ own negligence.
They also relied upon the defenses of contributory and
comparative negligence.
Depositions were taken from White, McDaniels, and Judy
Dunn, an eyewitness to the accident.
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Affidavits were entered
into the record from Jones, Tonya McMullen, a passenger on the
bus at the time of the collision, and Ed Brady, Jones’
supervisor who arrived on the scene approximately 15 minutes
after the collision occurred.
how the collision occurred.
The stories vary as to exactly
White stated that she signaled to
make a lane change, did not observe the bus in the other lane,
changed lanes, and then slowed her vehicle in an attempt to
merge into the turn lane.
She stated that when she looked in
her rear-view mirror, the bus was overtaking her and she was
forced to accelerate in an attempt to avoid being rear-ended.
Jones stated that he was traveling within the posted speed limit
and that he was maintaining a proper lookout for traffic when
White cut directly in front of his bus and immediately stopped
at a green light.
He stated that he responded by braking but
because of White’s sudden lane change and reduction in speed,
was unable to avoid the collision.
Tonya McMullen stated
virtually the same facts as Jones.
Judy Dunn stated that she
was traveling approximately a half of a block behind the
vehicles when the collision occurred.
She stated that White was
traveling behind the bus in the fast lane of traffic, abruptly
changed lanes, accelerated past Jones and then abruptly cut in
front of Jones.
She admitted that she could not observe the
distance between the two vehicles when White changed lanes but
that White was very close to the bus.
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Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment on
July 3, 2002.
A hearing on the motion was held on July 12,
2002, after which the circuit court entered summary judgment in
favor of appellees.
Appellants filed a motion to alter, amend
or vacate the judgment on July 25, 2002.
The circuit court held
a hearing on the motion on July 26, 2002, and on August 21,
2002, denied the motion.
It is from these orders that
appellants appeal.
Appellants argue that it is a question of fact for the
jury as to whether Jones was negligent.
They contend that the
record contains proof of Jones’ negligence or a permissible
inference of negligence on the part of Jones.
They also argue
that summary judgment was improperly granted before they were
able to depose Jones.
Appellees argue that appellants failed to
present any evidence to support a finding that Jones breached
any duty to appellants, entitling them to summary judgment.
When a trial court grants a motion for summary
judgment, the standard of review on appeal is "whether the trial
court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to
any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law."
S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky. App., 916
The trial court must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and should
grant summary judgment only if it appears impossible that the
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nonmoving party will be able to produce evidence at trial
warranting a judgment in his favor.
Steelvest, Inc. v.
Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 483 (1991).
The trial court "must examine the evidence, not to decide any
issue of fact, but to discover if a real issue exists."
480.
Id. at
The inquiry should be whether, from the evidence of
record, facts exist which would make it possible for the nonmoving party to prevail.
“In the analysis, the focus should be
on what is of record rather than what might be presented at
trial.”
Welch v. American Publishing Co. Of Kentucky, Ky., 3
S.W.3d 724, 730 (1999).
Because summary judgment addresses only
legal questions and the existence of disputed material issues of
fact, this Court need not defer to the trial court's decision
and will review the issue de novo.
Scifres, 916 S.W.2d at 781.
“In order to state a cause of action based on
negligence, a plaintiff must establish a duty on the defendant,
a breach of the duty, and a causal connection between the breach
of the duty and an injury suffered by the plaintiff.”
Lewis v.
B & R Corp., Ky. App., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436-437 (2001).
Lucas v.
Davis, Ky., 409 S.W.2d 297 (1966), lists the common law duties
of a driver, as codified in the Kentucky Revised Statutes, as
follows:
1) Violation of KRS 189.340(6)(a), which
directs that the operator of a motor vehicle
shall not follow another vehicle more
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closely than is reasonable and prudent
having regard for traffic and road
conditions;
(2) violation of KRS 189.390(1), which
directs that the operator of a motor vehicle
shall not operate the vehicle at a greater
speed than is reasonable and prudent in
light of traffic and road conditions;
(3) violation of KRS 189.290(1), which
directs all motorists to drive in a careful
manner with regard for the safety and
convenience of pedestrians and other
vehicles on the highway;
(4) violation of KRS 189.080(1), which
requires the sounding of a horn or other
sound device to warn of the approach of a
motor vehicle.
Id. at 299-300.
White testified that she signaled appropriately before
changing lanes.
She also testified that she looked but did not
see the bus when she changed lanes.
She further stated that,
after changing lanes, she slowed to get into the turn lane but
when she looked in her rearview mirror, she saw the bus
overtaking her, at which point she accelerated to get out of the
way but was rear-ended.
McDaniel’s story, though not exactly
the same, was quite similar to White’s.
Appellants argue that
Jones must have either been speeding or inattentive and
therefore, negligent.
If we accept appellants’ argument, Jones
is strictly liable simply because he rear-ended White’s vehicle.
Clearly, this is not the law in Kentucky.
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Id. and USAA Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Kramer, Ky., 987 S.W.2d 779, 782 (1999).
We
disagree that the cases cited by appellants prove that Jones was
negligent as a matter of law.
However, we are still left with
the question as to whether a permissible inference may be drawn
as to Jones’ negligence.
Appellees make much of the fact that White stated that
she did not see the bus until just before impact, and therefore
she cannot testify that the bus was speeding, following too
closely or that Jones was inattentive.
If we accept appellees’
argument, the driver of a vehicle involved in a collision with
another vehicle would never be able to survive summary judgment
unless she personally observed that the other vehicle was
speeding or inattentive or there was a third-party eyewitness
who could so testify.
Neither is this the law.
Kramer and Lucas hold that a driver is not negligent
as a matter of law when he strikes another vehicle from the
rear.
However, they support appellants’ argument that the
driver’s negligence is a question of fact for the jury.
Lucas, 409 S.W.2d at 300.
Id. and
In essence, White’s story is that she
was traveling the speed limit, appropriately signaled, changed
lanes when she observed it was safe to do so, slowed her
vehicle, and when she next looked in her rear view mirror, the
bus was overtaking her.
For purposes of summary judgment,
viewing the facts in a light most favorable to appellants, a
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permissible inference is that the bus was unable to stop because
it was either traveling too fast for the traffic conditions or
the driver failed to observe White’s lane change and reduce
speed in time to stop without colliding with the vehicle.
While
it is true that the weight of the evidence in this case highly
favors Jones, trial courts are to refrain from weighing the
evidence at the summary judgment stage.
Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d
482-483.
Because we conclude that summary judgment was
improper, we need not address the issue of whether summary
judgment should have been granted before appellants had an
opportunity to depose Jones.
The summary judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is
reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Lawrence R. Webster
Pikeville, Kentucky
Julie Muth Goodman
Douglas J. Hallock
Lexington, Kentucky
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