VADA ENDICOTT MARTIN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY CABINET FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN; AND JAMES D. ENDICOTT
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 7, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001750-MR
VADA ENDICOTT MARTIN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIE PAXTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CI-00929
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
CABINET FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN;
AND JAMES D. ENDICOTT
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, DYCHE, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
McANULTY, JUDGE:
This is a child support case in which Vada
Endicott Martin (Vada) appeals from the Floyd Circuit Court’s
order denying her motion to alter, amend or vacate the court’s
previous order determining her monthly child support obligation
and arrearage payments for her three minor children.
On appeal,
Martin argues that Kentucky’s inclusion of Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) in determining her child support obligation is
contrary to federal law and is unconstitutional.
Because we
find this case indistinguishable from Commonwealth of Kentucky,
ex rel. Morris v. Morris, Ky., 984 S.W.2d 840 (1998), in which
the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the inclusion of SSI
benefits in the income computation for calculation of child
support payments is not in conflict with a federal antiattachment statute relating to SSI benefits, we affirm.
Vada and her former husband, James Endicott (James),
have three minor children.
The children reside with James.
On
January 10, 2000, the circuit court ordered Vada to pay monthly
child support according to the Kentucky child support
guidelines.
On February 8, 2000, Vada filed a motion to
reconsider child support on the grounds that she was disabled
and currently had a claim for SSI disability benefits pending
with the Social Security Administration.
After hearing the
motion to reconsider, the circuit court lowered Vada’s monthly
child support payment from $278.46 to $200; however, it also
granted judgment to James in the amount of $988.21 for child
support arrearages accrued through January 31, 2000.
Prior to
the entry of the court’s order reducing child support, Vada was
arrested for flagrant non-support for persistently failing to
provide support.
On March 31, 2000, the Social Security Administration
(Administration) found that Vada had mild mental retardation, a
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dysthymic disorder and a hearing deficit in the left ear.
The
Administration ultimately decided that Vada was disabled under
the applicable sections of the Social Security Act.
Based on
Vada’s disability, limited income and impending receipt of SSI
payments, Vada filed a motion to alter, amend or vacate or grant
her relief from her monthly child support obligation of $200.
Vada asked the court to set her child support obligation at $60
per month, the minimum payment under KRS 403.212(d).
In an
order entered April 24, 2000, the court granted Vada’s motion in
part; however, it set her monthly child support obligation at
$166.46 per month, retroactive to October 15, 1999.
This amount
was based on Vada’s SSI payments of $500 per month.
On March 19, 2002, the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Cabinet for Families and Children (Cabinet), filed a motion for
an arrearage judgment in the amount of $1,103.94.
On April 12,
2002, the domestic relations commissioner recommended judgment
in the amount of $1,170.40, representing child support
arrearages owed by Vada through March 30, 2002.
The
commissioner further recommended that Vada pay $40 a month in
addition to her regular child support amount of $166.46.
this point, Vada’s monthly SSI payments totaled $545.
At
Vada
filed exceptions to the commissioner’s recommendations, which
the circuit court later overruled.
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The court adopted the
commissioner’s recommendation as to monthly child support and
arrearage payments.
Vada filed a motion to alter, amend or vacate the
court’s order establishing her child support obligations.
The
circuit court denied Vada’s motion in an order entered August
14, 2002, precipitating this appeal.
On appeal, Vada’s fundamental argument is that federal
preemption bars enforcement of orders requiring payment of child
support from SSI benefits.
In other words, Vada argues that
Kentucky’s inclusion of SSI as income for determining child
support obligations is unconstitutional under existing federal
statutes.
In addition, Vada argues that the exclusion of SSI as
a means-tested public assistance program under Kentucky law,
thereby including SSI payments in the calculation of gross
income for child support purposes, is contrary to federal law
and basic logic.
Whether federal law preempts enforcement of child
support orders requiring payment of child support from SSI
benefits is a question of law.
novo.
Accordingly, our review is de
See GTE Mobilnet of Ohio v. Johnson, 111 F.3d 469, 475
(6th Cir. 1997).
We begin by setting out the federal and Kentucky
statutes that Vada claims are at issue.
§ 407(a):
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The first is 42 U.S.C.
The right of any person to any future
payment under this subchapter shall not be
transferable or assignable, at law or in
equity, and none of the moneys paid or
payable or rights existing under this
subchapter shall be subject to execution,
levy, attachment, garnishment, or other
legal process, or to the operation of any
bankruptcy or insolvency law.
Vada claims that KRS 403.212(2)(b), the Kentucky
statute that lists the sources of income to be included in the
child support calculation, is in conflict with 42 U.S.C. §
407(a).
KRS 403.212(2)(b) is as follows:
"Gross income" includes income from any source,
except as excluded in this subsection, and
includes but is not limited to income from
salaries, wages, retirement and pension funds,
commissions, bonuses, dividends, severance pay,
pensions, interest, trust income, annuities,
capital gains, Social Security benefits, workers'
compensation benefits, unemployment insurance
benefits, disability insurance benefits,
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), gifts,
prizes, and alimony or maintenance received.
Specifically excluded are benefits received from
means-tested public assistance programs,
including but not limited to public assistance as
defined under Title IV-A of the Federal Social
Security Act, and food stamps.
(emphasis added).
In Morris, 984 S.W.2d at 840, the Kentucky Supreme
Court granted discretionary review to decide whether KRS
403.212(2)(b) was in conflict with 42 U.S.C. § 407(a).
In
setting out the issue, the Morris court noted that “[i]f KRS
403.212(2)(b) indeed conflicts with the federal statute, then
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the SSI provision of the state statute must yield by virtue of
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.”
Id.
(citing U.S. CONST. Art. VI, § 2).
After considering the statutory provisions and goals
of the SSI program, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that “the
‘legal process’ referred to in 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) is of the
nature of a garnishment order directed towards a governmental
entity.”
Id. at 841 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 659 for definition of
“legal process”); see also Whitmore v. Kenney, Pa. Super., 626
A.2d 1180, 1184 (1993) (emphasizing that 42 U.S.C. § 659 does
not refer to any legal process, but “any writ, order, summons,
or other similar process in the nature of garnishment . . .”).
Moreover, the Morris court considered the fact that “nothing in
KRS 403.212(2)(b) subjects SSI benefits to execution, levy,
attachment, garnishment, or any similar involuntary transfer.”
Because the Kentucky statute merely allowed the court to include
SSI benefits in the calculation, the court concluded that there
is no direct conflict between the state and the federal
statutes.
See id. at 841-42.
In this appeal, Vada argues that her case is
distinguishable from Morris because Morris was a narrow decision
primarily based on the fact that the father had never been
subjected to any type of enforcement action such as contempt or
garnishment.
Id. at 842.
In this case, prior to her receipt of
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SSI payments, Vada was arrested for flagrant non-support.
Moreover, Vada alleges that the Cabinet continuously argues that
contempt and criminal actions against Vada are appropriate
remedies in the event she fails to make child support payments
in the future.
Vada asserts that such measures effectuated
through the legal system are exactly the types of involuntary
transfers that 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) prohibits.
In partial
support, Vada cites Justice Stephens’ dissent in Morris, in
which Justices Cooper and Stumbo joined.
See id. at 842-47.
In addition to the dissenting opinion in Morris, Vada
cites cases from other jurisdictions that have considered the
issues raised in this appeal.
See Davis v. Office of Child
Support Enforcement, Ark., 20 S.W.3d 273 (2000) (Arnold, C.J.,
dissenting) (holding that “federal law does prohibit state court
ordered child-support payments exclusively from SSI benefits”);
Becker County Human Services v. Peppel, Minn. App., 493 N.W.2d
573 (1992) (interpreting “legal process” broadly to include
contempt proceedings and “holding that federal law precludes
requiring SSI recipients to use their benefits for child
support”); Tennessee Dept. Of Human Services, ex rel. Young v.
Young, Tenn., 802 S.W.2d 594 (1990) (holding Tennessee state
court’s garnishment of SSI check through the Social Security
Administration was preempted by applicable federal statutes
prohibiting SSI payments from being subject to legal process).
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While there may be support for Vada’s arguments in other
jurisdictions, a majority of the Kentucky Supreme Court has held
that KRS 403.212(2)(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) are not in
conflict.
In so concluding, the court reasoned that “[t]he
patent intent of this statute [42 U.S.C. § 407(a)] is to
prohibit creditors from asserting claims upon SSI funds that
take precedence over the SSI recipient's rights to such funds.”
Morris at 841.
More importantly for the purposes of this appeal, the
Morris majority held that “the ‘legal process’ referred to in 42
U.S.C. § 407(a) is of the nature of a garnishment order directed
towards a governmental entity.”
Id. at 841.
In other words,
contempt is not legal process under the statute.
Moreover, the
court has issued no garnishment orders toward a government
entity in this case.
In short, this case cannot be
distinguished from Morris.
We move to Vada’s second argument that the exclusion
of SSI as a means tested public assistance program under KRS
403.212(2)(b), thereby including SSI payments in the calculation
of gross income for child support purposes, is contrary to
federal law and basic logic.
As discussed above, our Supreme
Court has concluded that no preemption by the federal SSI
program prevents a trial court from directing a parent, whose
sole source of income is SSI benefits, to pay child support.
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Vada believes it is illogical to include SSI payments
in the calculation of gross income when it is a means-tested
public assistance program, and KRS 403.212(2)(b) specifically
excludes benefits received from means-tested public assistance
programs as gross income.
However, Vada may spend her SSI
payments anyway she chooses, even if they are federal funds
designed solely for her benefit.
That she does not believe
these funds should be considered as her income for support of
her three children is illogical to us.
While the equities of Vada’s circumstances may have
allowed for an adjustment of the guideline award under KRS
403.211, we are simply unable to distinguish this case from
Morris.
As an intermediate appellate court, we are duty-bound
to defer to principles well established in Kentucky case law.
See Fisher v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Com'n, Ky. App., 880
S.W.2d 891, 892 (1994).
“Whatever our view of the advisability
of the policy set out in that precedent, we are precluded from
simply choosing not to follow the law.”
Id.
The judgment of the Floyd Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Michael P. Studebaker
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
JoAnn Harvey
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
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