THE GAP v. CHERYL CURTIS; HON. ROGER D. RIGGS, ADMINSTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 5, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001547-WC
THE GAP
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-01-01163
v.
CHERYL CURTIS; HON. ROGER D. RIGGS,
ADMINSTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
GUIDUGLI AND JOHNSON, JUDGES; AND HUDDLESTON, SENIOR
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
The Gap, Inc. has petitioned for review of an
opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board entered on June 19,
2002, which reversed the opinion and award of the Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ), granting Cheryl Curtis permanent partial
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
disability benefits for a period of 425 weeks and calculating
her average weekly wage at $346.15.
Having concluded that the
Board has not overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or
precedent in ruling that Curtis was entitled to have her award
calculated based upon an average weekly wage of $362.25, we
affirm.2
Curtis began working for The Gap as a material handler
at one of its distribution centers in Erlanger, Kentucky, in
July 1998.
Curtis worked the night shift and she was paid
$11.25 per hour, which included shift-differential pay of $0.50.
The day-shift employees earned only $10.75 per hour.
In August 2000 Curtis suffered work-related injuries
to her lower back, right leg and hip when she attempted to lift
a box off a conveyor belt.
Curtis immediately reported the
accident to her supervisor and promptly sought medical
treatment.
Curtis subsequently returned to work and her duties
were modified due to her restrictions.
Curtis continued her
employment with The Gap until July 2001, at which time she
suffered a flare-up of her back condition.
Curtis informed her
employer that she was unable to perform her duties and she
requested lighter work.
According to Curtis, The Gap refused to
accommodate her restrictions and informed her that she would be
2
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (1992).
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terminated unless she could return to full duty.
terminated on July 20, 2001.
Curtis was
In November 2001 Curtis obtained a
position at another company as a telemarketer, earning $8.13 per
hour.
On September 4, 2001, Curtis filed an application for
resolution of her injury claim with the Department of Workers’
Claims.
A hearing was conducted on January 25, 2002, at which
time the ALJ ordered both parties to submit briefs on the issue
of whether Curtis’s shift-differential pay should be included in
calculating her average weekly wage.
Curtis argued that the
$0.50 shift-differential pay she received for working the night
shift should be considered in her average weekly wage
calculation as the applicable statute, KRS3 342.140(1)(d), only
mandates the exclusion of “overtime or premium pay.”
Curtis
cited Denim Finishers, Inc. v. Baker,4 for the proposition that
“overtime or premium pay” only refers to payment which is “in
excess of the employee’s regular hourly rate because of the
extra hours worked” [emphasis original].5
Curtis contended that
since her $0.50 shift-differential pay was not based on her
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
4
Ky.App., 757 S.W.2d 215 (1988).
5
Id. at 216 (citing R. C. Durr Co., Inc. v. Chapman, Ky.App., 563 S.W.2d 743
(1978)).
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working any extra hours, it could not possibly be construed as
“overtime or premium pay.”
The Gap, however, claimed the $0.50 shift-differential
pay that Curtis received for working the night shift was in fact
premium pay, which is expressly excluded from the average weekly
wage calculation pursuant to KRS 342.140(1)(d).
The Gap argued
that premium pay and overtime pay are two distinct concepts; and
in support of this argument, it cited the following language
from a treatise on Kentucky Workers’ Compensation:
[S]hift premiums paid to an employee working
the second or third shift are not includable
in determining the average weekly wage. The
rationale is simply that the employee’s work
is no different regardless of which shift is
worked; the employee is simply paid an
incentive for working a different shift or
longer hours.6
The Gap further argued that since the work Curtis performed was
no different than the work performed by the day-shift employees,
the extra $0.50 per hour she received was simply an incentive
for working the night shift.
The Gap claimed that Curtis’s
average weekly wage should be set at $346.15.
On March 14, 2002, the ALJ entered an opinion awarding
Curtis permanent partial disability benefits in the amount of
$42.90 per week beginning on July 20, 2001, and continuing
6
Norman Harned, Kentucky Workers’ Compensation, § 12.3, p. 169 (1998).
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thereafter for a period of 425 weeks.7
In calculating Curtis’s
benefits, the ALJ concluded that Curtis’s shift-differential pay
was analogous to premium pay, which is expressly excluded from
the average weekly wage calculation pursuant to KRS
342.140(1)(d).
The ALJ reasoned that, “[i]f one were not to
exclude the fifty cent shift differential then one would not be
giving consideration to the additional term ‘premium pay’ which
is included within the statute.”8
Consequently, the ALJ set
Curtis’s average weekly wage at $346.15.
On March 25, 2002, Curtis filed a petition for
reconsideration pursuant to KRS 342.281, arguing that the ALJ
erred as matter of law in calculating her average weekly wage.
Curtis’s petition for reconsideration was denied on April 15,
2002, and she appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board.
The
Board reversed, concluding that any shift-differential pay
received by Curtis was part of her regular hourly pay and not
premium pay.
The Board based its decision primarily on Denim
Finishers, supra,9 which it read as limiting the definition of
7
The $42.90 award was calculated by applying the formula for permanent
partial disability benefits set forth in KRS 342.730(1)(b).
8
The ALJ attempted to distinguish Denim Finishers, supra, on the grounds that
“the Court was addressing the matter of additional pay for overtime,” as
opposed to premium pay.
9
The Board also appears to have relied upon two of its own opinions in its
analysis. Although the Board is free to cite its own opinions as authority,
we are not at liberty to do so and we will not consider any unpublished cases
in our analysis. See CR 76.28(4)(a).
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premium pay to “pay in excess of the employee’s regular hourly
rate because of the extra hours worked.”10
The Board reasoned
that since Curtis’s shift-differential pay was not premised upon
the amount of hours she worked, it was part of her regular
hourly pay and should have been included in her average weekly
wage calculation.
This petition for review followed.
The Gap claims the Board erred as a matter of law in
concluding that the extra $0.50 an hour Curtis received for
working the night shift was not “overtime or premium pay,” which
is expressly excluded from the average weekly wage calculation
pursuant to KRS 342.140(1)(d).
Our review of a question of law
is de novo,11 and we are required to correct the Board’s
conclusion of law if it has overlooked or misconstrued
controlling statutes or precedent.12
As previously discussed, the Board based its decision
to include Curtis’s shift-differential pay in her average weekly
wage calculation primarily on this Court’s Opinion in Denim
Finishers, which also involved the application of KRS
342.140(1)(d).
In Denim Finishers, the appellee, Rosie Baker,
worked in a garment factory pressing pants.
She worked
approximately 40 hours per week and she was paid $3.45 per hour.
10
Denim Finishers, 757 S.W.2d at 216 (citing R.C. Durr Co., supra).
11
Uninsured Employers’ Fund v. Garland, Ky., 805 S.W.2d 116 (1991).
12
Western Baptist Hospital, 827 S.W.2d at 687-88.
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If Baker pressed more than 350 pairs of pants in a given week,
she received an additional six cents for each pair of pants she
pressed above that amount.13
During her employment with Denim
Finishers, Baker suffered a work-related injury and she filed a
claim for workers’ compensation benefits.
The Board granted
Baker’s claim for benefits and set her average weekly wage at
$138.00.
The Board calculated Baker’s average weekly wage based
solely on her hourly rate of $3.45 per hour, reasoning that any
compensation she received above this amount constituted premium
pay, which is expressly excluded from the average weekly wage
calculation pursuant to KRS 342.140(1)(d).
Baker appealed the Board’s decision to the Bell
Circuit Court, which reversed the Board.14
The circuit court
classified the extra compensation Baker received as output pay
rather than premium pay and concluded that Baker’s average
weekly wage should have been set at $222.54.
Denim Finishers
appealed to this Court, claiming that Baker’s employment was
based on an hourly pay rate plus premium pay for extra pants
pressed.
Denim Finishers argued that Baker was only entitled to
have her average weekly wage set at $138.00, since any
compensation over her regular hourly pay rate constituted
13
Denim Finishers, 757 S.W.2d at 216.
14
Id.
-7-
premium pay.15
This Court concluded that any amount Baker received
over her hourly pay rate constituted output pay, as opposed to
premium pay.
In distinguishing output pay from premium pay,
this Court cited R.C. Durr Co., supra, for the proposition that,
“[t]he exclusion of overtime or premium pay in KRS 342.140(1)(d)
refers to pay in excess of the employee’s regular hourly rate
because of the extra hours worked.”16
Since all of the extra
money received by Baker was earned during her 40-hour work week,
this Court concluded that any payment she received for extra
pants pressed did not fall within the definition of “overtime or
premium pay.”17
The Gap attempts to distinguish Denim Finishers by
arguing that in Denim Finishers this Court addressed the matter
of additional pay for overtime, as opposed to premium pay.
We
reject this assertion since the sole issue in Denim Finishers
involved the question of whether the additional compensation
received by Baker constituted premium pay.18
Thus, the holding
in Denim Finishers and the definition of “overtime or premium
pay” adopted therein is applicable to the case sub judice.
15
Id.
16
R.C. Durr Co., 563 S.W.2d at 745.
17
Denim Finishers, 757 S.W.2d at 216.
18
Id.
-8-
Consequently, since the extra $0.50 per hour Curtis received for
working the night shift was not compensation for any “extra
hours worked,” it does not fall within the definition of
“overtime or premium pay” that this Court adopted in Denim
Finishers.19
The extra $0.50 per hour Curtis received for
working the night shift was part and parcel of her hourly pay
rate.
Thus, she is entitled to have her average weekly wage
calculated based upon an hourly pay rate of $11.25 per hour.
The Gap further argues that this Court’s definition of
“overtime or premium pay” in Denim Finishers cannot be
reconciled with the plain language of KRS 342.140(1)(d).
The
Gap claims that by including the term premium pay in the
language of the statute, the Legislature clearly intended to
exclude more than just overtime pay from the average weekly wage
calculation.
In support of its argument, The Gap quotes from
the ALJ’s opinion that, “[i]f one were not to exclude the fifty
cent shift differential then one would not be giving
consideration to the additional term ‘premium pay’ which is
included within the statute.”
Although the ALJ has raised a
valid concern, we disagree with his interpretation of KRS
342.140(1)(d) as a matter of statutory construction.
For whatever reason, the Legislature chose not to
define “overtime or premium pay.”
19
Id.
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When the Legislature chooses
not to define a term in a statute, courts should interpret the
term in accordance with the legislative intent surrounding the
particular statute.20
Furthermore, statutes should be construed
within their context and we should strive to give consistent
meaning to related statutory provisions.21
Thus, the term
“overtime or premium pay” should be defined within the context
of the Workers’ Compensation Act, and, more precisely, in
accordance with the legislative intent surrounding the enactment
of KRS 342.140.
The primary purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act
is to compensate disabled workers for any decrease in their wage
earning capacity which has resulted from a work-related injury.22
“The purpose of KRS 342.140 is to determine a given worker’s
wage-earning capacity so that the resulting income benefit will
be based upon a realistic estimation of what the worker would
have expected to earn had the injury not occurred.”23
In the
case sub judice, Curtis suffered a work-related injury which
resulted in a decrease in her wage earning capacity, while she
was earning and expected to continue to earn $11.25 per hour.
20
Floyd County Board of Education v. Ratliff, Ky., 955 S.W.2d 921, 925
(1997).
21
Manies v. Croan, Ky.App., 977 S.W.2d 22, 23 (1998) (citing Combs v. Hubb
Coal Corp., Ky., 934 S.W.2d 250 (1996)).
22
Newberg v. Weaver, Ky., 866 S.W.2d 435, 436 (1993).
23
Desa International, Inc. v. Barlow, Ky., 59 S.W.3d 872, 875 (2001).
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Consequently, we conclude that an hourly rate of $11.25 is a
realistic estimation of what Curtis could have expected to earn
had the injury not occurred.
Accordingly, the Board was correct
in concluding that Curtis was entitled to have her average
weekly wage calculated based upon an hourly rate of $11.25 per
hour.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the opinion of the
Workers’ Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Otto Daniel Wolff
Covington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, CHERYL
CURTIS:
Gregory N. Schabell
Florence, Kentucky
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