JASON WESLEY OWEN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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October 3, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001476-MR
JASON WESLEY OWEN
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 01-CR-00236-002
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, DYCHE, AND McANULTY, JUDGES.
DYCHE, JUDGE:
Jason Wesley Owen appeals from a judgment and
sentence of imprisonment entered by the McCracken Circuit Court
after a jury found him guilty of criminal facilitation to
fraudulent use of a credit card over $100.00 and receiving
stolen property over $300.00.
Owen was sentenced to a total of
five years’ imprisonment for these charges.
We affirm.
On September 14, 2001, the McCracken County grand jury
returned an indictment against Owen and Robert Murphy.
Murphy
was charged with fraudulent use of a credit card, receiving
stolen property over $300.00, and being a persistent felony
offender in the second degree.
The grand jury charged Owen with
complicity to fraudulent use of a credit card and receiving
stolen property over $300.00.
This indictment stemmed from
events occurring around July 19, 2001, wherein Murphy and Owen
came into possession of rings and credit cards belonging to
Scott and Carol Aycock that were taken from Carol’s vehicle.
The credit cards were eventually used at Wal-Mart stores in the
Paducah area.
After the grand jury returned this indictment,
Murphy entered into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth
agreeing to testify against Owen.
Owen pled not guilty to the
charges against him and proceeded to a jury trial.
Owen’s trial commenced on March 13, 2002.
At trial,
two witnesses provided the most significant evidence against
Owen.
First, Carol Aycock testified that, on July 19, 2001, she
discovered that her purse, which contained $700.00 in cash,
three rings, and several credit cards that belonged to both her
and her husband, had been stolen from her vehicle.
Carol
immediately notified her husband, a sergeant for the Paducah
Police Department, who immediately launched an investigation
into this theft.
Fulfilling the terms of his plea agreement, Murphy
testified on behalf of the Commonwealth during Owen’s trial.
Murphy stated that Owen picked him up at Murphy’s residence on
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July 19, 2001.
After picking Murphy up, Owen informed Murphy
that he was in possession of some rings and numerous credit
cards belonging to the Aycocks.
According to Murphy, Owen
advised that he had obtained permission from the Aycocks to use
these credit cards.
Based upon Owen’s assurances, Murphy
traveled with Owen to a Wal-Mart store where Murphy purchased a
$200.00 Wal-Mart gift card and two drinks with one of the credit
cards.
After completing this transaction, Owen and Murphy left
Wal-Mart and went to an apartment complex called SDA Apartments.
While at SDA Apartments, Owen sold the gift card to a resident.
Murphy further testified that he returned to Wal-Mart
with Owen later that evening.
During this visit to Wal-Mart,
Murphy used another credit card to purchase a $250.00 gift card
and some clothing for himself.
card as well.
Owen eventually sold this gift
Murphy also testified that, after the Paducah
police apprehended him during another visit to Wal-Mart, he led
the officers to a dumpster where they found most of the stolen
credit cards.
Murphy acknowledged that, during the commission
of these crimes, he was under the influence of cocaine.
Murphy also provided testimony concerning the rings.
Owen informed Murphy that he wanted to dispose of the rings and
asked Murphy if he knew anyone who would be interested in these
items.
Murphy suggested that they go see Christian Clemmons,
more commonly known as Gomez.
At this point, Owen called Gomez
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and arranged a meeting at Happy’s Chili Parlor.
During this
meeting, Murphy saw Owen give the rings to Gomez, but did not
observe what Gomez gave to Owen in exchange.
After being
apprehended, Murphy called his wife and asked her to retrieve
the rings from Gomez.
Murphy’s wife successfully retrieved the
rings from Gomez and gave them to the police.
Based primarily upon Murphy’s testimony, the jury
found Owen guilty of the lesser-included charge of criminal
facilitation to fraudulent use of a credit card, as well as the
original charge of receiving stolen property over $300.00.
The
trial court sentenced Owen to a total of five years’
imprisonment pursuant to the jury’s recommendations.
This
appeal followed.
On appeal, Owen presents six assertions of error for
our review.
First, Owen argues that reversible error occurred
because the prosecutor misstated evidence and made inflammatory
comments during closing arguments.
Specifically, Owen objects
to the prosecutor’s statements that “if something is going to be
done about the criminal underworld, juries have to do it” and
that society is divided “between people who know the law, and
respect it and obey it” and the “criminal underworld.”
We note that there was no contemporaneous objection to
the prosecutor’s closing argument.
As such, this issue is not
properly preserved for our review.
Absent contemporaneous
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objections, prosecutorial misconduct is not grounds for reversal
unless the acts complained of rise to palpable error.
Justice
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 987 S.W.2d 306, 316 (1998); Davis v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 574 (1998).
Thus, we review this
issue pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
10.26 under the standards for palpable and substantial error.
The requirement of manifest injustice as used in RCr
10.26 means that the error must have prejudiced the substantial
rights of the defendant in that, as a result of the error, a
substantial possibility exists that the result of the trial
would have been different.
Partin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 918
S.W.2d 219, 224 (1996); Schaefer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 622
S.W.2d 218 (1981); Castle v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 44 S.W.3d
790, 793-794 (2000).
Attorneys are granted wide latitude during closing
argument.
Tamme v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 13, 39 (1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1153 (1999).
A prosecutor may comment on
the evidence, tactics, and on the falsity of a defense position.
Hodge v. Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 824, 854 (1999), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1018 (2000); Tamme, 973 S.W.2d at 38.
A
prosecutor also may express an opinion based on the evidence.
Derossett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 867 S.W.2d 195, 198 (1993);
Slaven v. Commonwealth, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 845, 859 (1997).
While
a prosecutor may not encourage a verdict based on passion or
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prejudice, Bush v. Commonwealth, Ky., 839 S.W.2d 550, 557
(1992), a prosecutor may make arguments related to deterrence
based on grounds or reasons reasonably inferred from the
evidence.
See Caretenders, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Ky., 821
S.W.2d 83, 89 (1991) (citing Wallen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 657
S.W.2d 232, 234 (1983)).
In order to justify reversal based on
prosecutorial misconduct, the comments must be so serious as to
render the entire trial fundamentally unfair.
Partin, 918
S.W.2d at 224; Slaughter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 744 S.W.2d 407,
411-412 (1987), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1113 (1989).
Generally,
improper remarks by a prosecutor in closing argument will not
render a trial fundamentally unfair if they would not have
affected the outcome of the trial.
See Slaughter, supra; Clay
v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 867 S.W.2d 200, 205 (1993).
We are not convinced that the comments by the
prosecutor herein were improper or rendered Owen’s trial to be
fundamentally unfair.
The evidence presented at trial, mainly
Murphy’s testimony implicating Owen in the events surrounding
the unauthorized use and possession of the Aycocks’ credit cards
and rings, was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Owen was
guilty of facilitating the fraudulent use of a credit card and
receiving stolen property.
The Commonwealth also introduced a
videotape made by Wal-Mart’s surveillance system which placed
Owen and Murphy at the store prior to Murphy’s use of the stolen
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credit cards.
Moreover, we believe that the prosecutor’s
statement that only juries could do something about the
“criminal underworld” is proper in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Slaughter:
Appellant urges that the prosecutor coerced
the jury to reach a verdict of guilty. He
stated to the jury that he had done all he
could do, that the police had done all they
could do, that the judge had been fair and
impartial, and "... now it's going to come
your time to deal with justice in this
particular case." This argument of
appellant is little short of being specious.
A prosecutor can ask the jury not to "let
the officer down." Johnson v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 446 S.W.2d 561 (1969). A prosecutor
may call on the jury to do its duty. McPeak
v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 29, 213 S.W.2d 447
(1948). A prosecutor may tell a jury that
one way to stop murder is "for all of us to
do our job...." Wallen v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 657 S.W.2d 232 (1983). Under the
parameters of these cases, it is obvious
that the statement was proper.
Slaughter, 744 S.W.2d at 412.
Hence, we conclude that the prosecutor’s closing
argument did not render Owen’s trial fundamentally unfair
because there is no reasonable possibility that, but for those
comments, the outcome of the trial would have been different.
Next, Owen asserts that the trial court erred by
allowing the prosecutor to comment on Owen’s failure to testify
in his own behalf.
Owen’s primary trial strategy was to
discredit Murphy and imply that Murphy committed the crimes
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alone.
Toward this end, Owen’s counsel asked Murphy on cross-
examination whether he drove Owen’s car alone.
that he did not use Owen’s car on July 19, 2001.
Murphy replied
At this point,
Owen’s counsel asked Murphy, “No matter what anybody else says,
you didn’t use that car?”
anybody else says.”
Murphy replied, “No matter what
During closing argument, the prosecutor
pointed out that Owen failed to call any witnesses to impeach or
otherwise dispute Murphy’s testimony.
We believe that the prosecutor’s statements concerning
Owen’s inability to call witnesses to impeach Murphy’s testimony
did not directly address Owen’s silence.
The prosecutor’s
remarks only address Owen’s failure to refute Murphy’s testimony
by any means.
“‘A prosecutor may properly comment on the
defendant’s failure to introduce witnesses on a defensive
matter.’”
Weaver v. Commonwealth, Ky., 955 S.W.2d 722, 728
(1997)(citation omitted).
Therefore, we reject Owen’s argument
as to this issue.
Third, Owen argues that the trial court improperly
admitted Murphy’s admission that he was under the influence of
cocaine on the night of the crimes.
Owen contends that Murphy’s
admission violated the trial court’s prior ruling excluding
proof that Owen traded the rings for drugs.
We disagree.
Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 403 provides the
trial court with the discretion to admit relevant evidence so
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long as the prejudicial effect of the evidence does not outweigh
its probative value.
Here, since Murphy’s credibility was a
central issue, evidence relating to the truthfulness of Murphy’s
testimony is highly relevant.
Accordingly, evidence of Murphy’s
cocaine use on the night of the crimes was relevant to explain
Murphy’s inability to recall certain details of the crimes.1
Moreover, the trial court’s ruling on Owen’s motion in limine
did not categorically exclude all drug-related evidence.
The
trial court’s ruling merely prohibited the Commonwealth from
introducing evidence that Owen traded the rings for drugs.
Thus, we find no error in the trial court’s decision to permit
the Commonwealth to introduce evidence concerning Murphy’s use
of cocaine on July 19, 2001.
Next, Owen argues that the trial court erred by not
allowing him to introduce an out-of-court statement made by
Gomez wherein Gomez informed the Paducah police department that
Murphy, not Owen, gave him the rings on July 19, 2001.
At
trial, Owen argued that Gomez’s statement was admissible for
impeachment purposes under an exception to the hearsay rule.
On
appeal, Owen asserts that the trial court’s refusal to allow the
introduction of Gomez’s statement violated the confrontation
clauses of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions.
1
Since
On cross-examination, Murphy was unable to recall the number of clothing
items he purchased with the credit cards, where Owen sold the $250.00 gift
card, Murphy’s exact location when he observed Owen giving Gomez the rings,
or even what type of clothing Owen and Murphy wore on the night in question.
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Owen has changed his grounds for appeal as to this issue, we
need not address this argument.
A party cannot present a new
theory of error on appeal after specifying a different reason
for his objection at trial.
Gabow v. Commonwealth, Ky., 34
S.W.3d 63, 75 (2000).
Fifth, Owen asserts that the trial court erred by
refusing to permit his trial counsel to make an additional
closing argument following the Commonwealth’s closing argument.
Owen’s trial counsel desired to address the jury again in order
to correct an error he made during his first closing argument.
RCr 9.42(f) mandates that the Commonwealth address the jury last
during closing arguments.
Accordingly, Owen’s argument is
without merit because permitting him to address the jury again
following the Commonwealth’s closing argument would clearly
violate RCr 9.42(f).
Finally, Owen contends that the trial court erred by
ordering him to pay restitution in the amount of $1,300.00 to
Carol Aycock and by apportioning the restitution liability
jointly and severally between Owen and co-defendant Murphy.
Owen concedes that this issue is unpreserved.
As such, we
review this issue pursuant to RCr 10.26 for palpable and
substantial error.
KRS 533.030(3) requires a court to order a defendant
to make restitution to a crime victim when the victim has
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“suffered monetary damage as a result of the crime due to his
property having been converted, stolen or unlawfully obtained.”
Here, the jury found that Owen unlawfully received the Aycocks’
credit cards and facilitated in Murphy’s fraudulent use of those
credit cards.
Based upon the jury’s findings, there is no
question that KRS 533.030(3) requires the trial court to order
restitution.
KRS 533.030(3) also addresses the issue of
apportionment of restitution between multiple defendants.
According to this statute, “[w]here there is more than one (1)
defendant . . . restitution may be apportioned.”
Thus, the
apportionment of this restitution obligation jointly and
severally between Owen and Murphy appears to be within the
discretion of the trial court.
Hence, we find no error.
The judgment of the McCracken Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Rebecca Ballard DiLoreto
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Matthew D. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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