TIMBERLINE CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. GARY ALLEN PEDLEY; NORMAN A. RALEY; AND J. W. CHURCH COMMERCIAL CONSTRUCTION, INC.
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RENDERED:
September 19, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001248-MR
TIMBERLINE CONSTRUCTION, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE HENRY M. GRIFFIN, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-00663
GARY ALLEN PEDLEY;
NORMAN A. RALEY; AND
J. W. CHURCH COMMERCIAL
CONSTRUCTION, INC.
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, GUIDUGLI AND PAISLEY, JUDGES.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE. Timberline Construction, Inc. (“Timberline”)
appeals from an order of the Daviess Circuit Court denying
Timberline’s motion to compel arbitration.
We affirm.
On April 28, 1997 and May 2, 1997, contracts were
entered into between Timberline, Gary Pedley (“Pedley”) and
Church Commercial Construction, Inc. (“Church”). Under the
contracts, Pedley and Church agreed to work as subcontractors to
contractor Timberline and furnish labor and materials in the
construction of a restaurant in Owensboro, Kentucky.
After construction began, Pedley was injured on June
13, 1997 when one of the restaurant’s walls collapsed.
On June
5, 1998, he filed the instant action in Daviess Circuit Court
against Timberline and Church alleging negligence.
After
various preliminary matters were undertaken, the action
languished until January 14, 2002, when Pedley moved for a trial
date.
On April 12, 2002, Timberline filed a motion to
dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
As
a basis for the motion, Timberline relied on provisions of the
1997 contracts which required any controversy or claim arising
between the contractor and subcontractors to be settled by
arbitration.
The motion was denied.
Thereafter, Timberline
filed a motion to compel arbitration and to stay the proceedings
until the issues were fully arbitrated.
Pedley filed a
competing motion seeking to move forward with trial.
On May 21, 2002, the trial court rendered an order
denying Timberline’s motion and canceling a scheduled jury
trial.1
The court opined that Timberline’s failure to raise the
issue of arbitration until almost four years after the action
1
Trial was cancelled when it became apparent that Timberline was prepared to
prosecute the instant appeal.
-2-
commenced, and some three weeks prior to trial, constituted a
waiver of its contractual right to arbitration.
Alternatively,
it concluded that Timberline’s failure to comply with pretrial
order deadlines constituted an absolute waiver of the
arbitration provision at issue.
This appeal followed.
Timberline now argues that the trial court erred in
ruling that it waived its right to have the underlying dispute
resolved by arbitration.
Specifically, it maintains that KRS
417.050 does not permit the doctrine of waiver to be applied to
an arbitration contract clause; that the law favors the
enforcement of arbitration agreements; that the agreement to
arbitrate must be enforced absent a showing of fraud; that no
claim has been made that arbitration would be unfair or
prejudicial to Pedley; and, that lack of jurisdiction cannot be
waived.
Timberline seeks to have the order on appeal reversed,
and the matter remanded with instructions to enforce the
arbitration clause.
We have closely studied Timberline’s arguments and
find no basis for tampering with the order on appeal.
In
reaching its conclusion that Timberline waived its right to
compel arbitration, the trial court relied on Conseco Finance
Servicing Corporation v. Wilder, Ky. App., 47 S.W.3d 335 (2001).
As the parties no doubt are aware, Conseco stands for the
proposition that “. . . waiver is among those grounds on the
-3-
basis of which a court may refuse to enforce an arbitration
agreement.”
Id. at 344.
This Court held in Conseco that waiver
may be inferred from a party’s actions, though such an inference
shall not be lightly undertaken.
Id.
In determining whether a
party waived a contractual right to arbitrate, the Court cited
with approval Cabinetree of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Kraftmaid
Cabinetry, Inc., 50 F.3d 388, 390 (7th Cir.,1995), which stated
that “ . . . an election to proceed before a nonarbitral
tribunal for the resolution of a contractual dispute is a
presumptive waiver of the right to arbitrate."
Id.
In the matter at bar, it is uncontroverted that
Timberline chose to proceed before a nonarbitral panel, to wit,
the Daviess Circuit Court, rather than assert its right to
arbitrate.
Clearly, Conseco required the trial court to
conclude that this action constituted a presumptive waiver.
The
dispositive questions, then, are whether Timberline overcame
this presumption in its motion to compel arbitration, and/or
whether Timberline correctly maintains that KRS 417.050 operates
to bar the application of the waiver doctrine.
We cannot conclude that Timberline overcame the
presumption that it waived arbitration, given that it waited
almost four years after the action was filed to raise the issue
of arbitration.
It cannot reasonably be argued that the
decision to proceed in circuit court rather than to demand
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arbitration from the outset was anything but volitional choice,
and the trial court correctly opined that it is one which
Conseco requires Timberline to live with.
Similarly, we read Conseco as disposing of
Timberline’s assertion that KRS 417.0502 operates to bar the
waiver doctrine from applying to arbitration agreements.
Conseco clearly held that waiver may be applied to arbitration
agreements.
Conseco aside,
KRS 417.050 does not address waiver
and we do not read it as an impediment to the application of
waiver.
As such, we find no error on this issue.
Lastly, Timberline asserts that Pedley has not claimed
that arbitration would be unfair or prejudicial, and also argues
that a lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived.
While we agree
with these assertions, they have little bearing on the
resolution of the matter at bar.
a showing of prejudice.
Waiver may be applied without
Conseco, supra, at 344 (“Unlike
estoppel or laches, waiver may be found in the absence of
prejudice to the party asserting it.”).
Similarly, there is no
basis upon which we may conclude that the arbitration agreement
operates to bar the circuit court from exercising jurisdiction.
2
KRS 417.050 states, in relevant part that, “A written agreement to submit
any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in written contract to
submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties
is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
for the revocation of any contract.”
-5-
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Daviess
Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
David L. Yewell
Owensboro, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, GARY
PEDLEY AND NORMAN RALEY:
Bryan R. Reynolds
Owensboro, KY
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, J. W.
CHURCH COMMERCIAL
CONSTRUCTION, INC.:
Jeanie Owen Miller
Owensboro, KY
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