CEDRIC WATKINS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 9, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED:
JULY 18, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001097-MR
CEDRIC WATKINS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS O. CASTLEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00436
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: EMBERTON, CHIEF JUDGE; BAKER AND HUDDLESTON, JUDGES.
BAKER, JUDGE.
Cedric Watkins appeals from a judgment of the
Daviess Circuit Court sentencing him to ten years for
trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree and
being a persistent felony offender in the first degree following
a jury trial.
We affirm.
In September 2001, the Owensboro Police Department
received complaints about open-air drug dealing near a certain
low-income apartment complex.
In response, police officials in
the Street Crimes Unit decided to conduct an operation involving
a controlled drug-buy utilizing a confidential informant.
Sergeant David Thompson, the commanding officer of the Street
Crimes Unit, elicited the assistance of C.A., who had worked
with Sgt. Thompson on previous occasions, to act as a paid
confidential informant.
On the night of September 28, 2001, Sgt. Thompson and
Officer Scott Norris met with C.A. at a hotel parking lot,
searched him for drugs, installed a microphone transmitter in
his truck, gave him a $20 bill to purchase the drugs, and
instructed him where to go.
C.A. went to the housing complex,
drove around for a few minutes, and then parked near a refuse
dumpster.
Simultaneously, members of the Street Crimes Unit
went to the area in two vehicles--one containing Sgt. Thompson
and Officers Brock Peterson and Anthony Meadows, and a second
containing Officers Scott Norris and Mark Powers.
Sgt. Thompson
had a receiving device that allowed him to monitor and record
transmissions from the microphone transmitter.
The first
vehicle containing Thompson, Meadows, and Peterson was
positioned so that they could also visually observe C.A.’s
actions.
As C.A. circled the complex, he saw Watkins on a
bicycle.
As soon as C.A. stopped his truck at the dumpster,
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Watkins approached him and they engaged in a drug transaction.
Watkins offered to sell C.A. either two small pieces or one
larger piece of rock cocaine.
C.A. opted for the single piece,
gave Watkins the $20 bill, and drove away.
As soon as C.A. left
the immediate area, the police officers in both vehicles started
pursuing Watkins.
As the first vehicle approached Watkins, he
recognized Officer Meadows and allegedly threw an object onto
the ground.
When the officers were in the process of taking him
into custody, Watkins was still holding the $20 bill that he
received from C.A. in his hand.
When the second vehicle
arrived, Officer Peterson told them that Watkins had thrown
something.
In a search of the area, Officer Norris recovered a
brown paper napkin containing 6-7 pieces of rock cocaine on the
ground a few feet from Watkins.
Sgt. Thompson met with C.A. at the designated meeting
place, searched him again, and conducted a debriefing, which was
recorded.
C.A. gave Sgt. Thompson the piece of rock cocaine
that he had purchased from Watkins.
Watkins was arrested and
charged with trafficking in cocaine.
On November 6, 2001, the Daviess County grand jury
indicted Watkins on one felony count of trafficking in a
controlled substance in the first degree (cocaine)(Kentucky
Revised Statute (KRS) 218A.1412) and for being a persistent
felony offender in the first degree (PFO I)(KRS 532.080).
3
The
circuit court conducted a jury trial on March 26-27, 2002.
The
witnesses included, inter alia, Sgt. Thompson, Officers Norris,
Peterson and Powers for the Commonwealth, and Watkins for the
defense.
Watkins admitted selling C.A. the cocaine but
suggested that he had been entrapped and targeted by the police
in retaliation for his criticism of the police department in a
newspaper article.
Defense counsel moved for a directed verdict
based in part on a defense of entrapment at the close of the
Commonwealth’s case, which was denied.
The trial court
instructed the jury on first-degree trafficking in a controlled
substance (cocaine) with an entrapment defense and first-degree
possession of a controlled substance.
The jury returned a
guilty verdict on first-degree trafficking in a controlled
substance (cocaine) and PFO I and recommended a sentence of ten
years.
On May 13, 2002, the trial court entered a judgment
sentencing Watkins to serve ten years’ imprisonment for firstdegree trafficking in a controlled substance (cocaine) and being
a PFO I consistent with the jury’s verdict.
This appeal
followed.
Watkins raises two issues on appeal.
First, he
challenges the trial court’s exclusion of certain evidence
offered by the defense concerning C.A.’s prior criminal record.
During cross-examination of Sgt. Thompson, defense counsel asked
him that whether when he hired informants, he wanted persons who
4
would be believable as a witness in a trial.
Sgt. Thompson
responded affirmatively and said he performed a background
investigation of a potential informant’s criminal history to
determine character and suitability.
When asked what his
investigation of C.A. revealed, Sgt. Thompson said he found only
“assaults.”
Defense counsel then attempted to question Sgt.
Thompson about several prior charges involving C.A., and the
Commonwealth objected.
The trial court conducted a hearing outside the
presence of the jury where defense counsel indicated that he
wanted to question Sgt. Thompson and C.A. for impeachment
purposes about the following aspects of C.A.’s criminal history:
(1) a 1995 misdemeanor conviction for violation of an emergency
protective order; (2) a 1995 charge for hindering prosecution
that was dismissed; (3) a July 2000 misdemeanor conviction for
fourth-degree assault; and (4) a pending charge for public
intoxication.
The trial court sustained the Commonwealth’s
objection with respect to excluding reference to the first three
items, but it allowed defense counsel to question C.A. during
his cross-examination as to the pending public intoxication
charge for purposes of demonstrating possible bias on the part
of C.A..
See, e.g., Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 80 S.W.3d
405, 411 (2002)(evidence of pending indictment admissible to
show bias of witness in seeking favor of prosecutor though not
5
for impeachment).
Watkins contends that the evidence of C.A.’s
criminal history was admissible to impeach Sgt. Thompson’s
statement concerning C.A.’s credibility based on a criminal
history containing only “assaults.”1
Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 611(b) sets forth the
general scope of cross-examination stating:
“A witness may be
cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case,
including credibility.
In the interest of justice, the trial
court may limit cross-examination with respect to matters not
testified to on direct examination.”
In addition, KRE 608
limits attack of a witness’ character to general reputation
evidence and KRE 609(a) limits attack of a witness’ credibility
by evidence of his criminal history to felony convictions.
See
also KRE 404(a)(3)(referring to KRE 607, KRE 608, and KRE 609
with reference to admissibility of character evidence relating
to witnesses).
Watkins asserts that the criminal history
evidence was not offered to question C.A.’s character, and these
rules do not prohibit use of the evidence to impeach Sgt.
Thompson’s testimony with respect to the thoroughness of his
research of C.A.’s background.
This position is untenable and
disingenuous.
1
Watkins appears to have abandoned any claim of error by the
trial court concerning denial of his request to use the proffered
(FOOTNOTE CONTINUED)
6
The issue of C.A.’s criminal history arose during
cross-examination of Sgt. Thompson by defense counsel involving
C.A.’s credibility or believability as a witness in any
potential criminal prosecution.
This line of questioning
clearly was intended to solicit information implicating C.A.’s
character and credibility, which is generally limited to general
reputation and not specific criminal acts.
Use of the
misdemeanor convictions would have been inadmissible to impeach
C.A. during his cross-examination under KRE 609(a), and the
defense cannot introduce evidence of specific acts that would be
otherwise inadmissible in questioning C.A. indirectly through
questioning of Sgt. Thompson absent some other valid basis other
than impeachment or attack of C.A.’s credibility or character
for truthfulness.
Although the rules of evidence do not
explicitly prohibit impeachment generally by evidence of
specific instances of conduct, the Kentucky Supreme Court has
stated that the principle prohibiting impeachment of a witness
by “‘particular wrongful acts’” is embedded in CR 43.07 and case
law.
See e.g., Tamme v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 13, 29
(1998); Daugherty v. Kuhn’s Big K Store, Ky. App., 663 S.W.2d
748 (1983).
RCr 43.07 provides in relevant part:
evidence during cross-examination of C.A.
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A witness may be impeached by any party,
without regard to which party produced him,
by contradictory evidence, . . . or by
evidence that his general reputation for
untruthfulness renders him unworthy of
belief; but not by evidence of particular
wrongful acts, except that it may be shown
by the examination of a witness, or record
of a judgment, that he has been convicted of
a felony.
Watkins’ argument that C.A.’s criminal record was
admissible to impeach through contradictory evidence the
testimony of Sgt. Thompson concerning his background search of
C.A. is unavailing.
This rationale violates the collateral
facts doctrine, which is well established in case law.
See
Robert Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 4.10 (3d ed.
1993); Eldred v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 694, 705 (1994).
This doctrine prohibits impeachment by contradiction on facts
that have no independent material relevance and require
extrinsic evidence.
“‘A matter is considered collateral if the
matter itself is not relevant in the litigation to establish a
fact of consequence, i.e., not relevant for a purpose other than
mere contradiction of the in-court testimony of the witness.’”
Simmons v. Small, Ky. App., 986 S.W.2d 452, 455 (1998)(quoting
United States v. Beauchamp, 986 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993)).
The
purpose of the doctrine against impeachment by contradiction on
collateral facts is to minimize confusion for the fact-finder by
avoiding proliferation of side issues.
8
Simmons, 986 S.W.2d at
455 (quoting Lawson, § 410 at 177); Baker Pool Co. v. Bennett,
411 S.W.2d 335, 338 (1967).
While it is not necessarily
determinative which party solicits the issue subject to
contradiction, see, e.g., Rowe v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 50
S.W.3d 216, 224 (2001), many courts recognize a stricter
standard where the testimony sought to be contradicted is
elicited on cross-examination, as opposed to being volunteered
on direct examination.
See, e.g., United States v. Castillo,
181 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 1999); 28 Charles A. Wright and Victor J.
Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 6119 at 116-19 (1993).
This is based on the theory that a witness should not be
permitted to engage in perjury or mislead the jury and shield
himself from impeachment by asserting the collateral fact
doctrine.
On the other hand, opposing counsel may manipulate
questions to trap an unwary witness into volunteering statements
on cross-examination.
“[A] party cannot delve into collateral
matters on its own initiative and then claim a right to impeach
that testimony with contradictory evidence.
This would be ‘a
mere subterfuge to get before the jury evidence not otherwise
admissible.’”
Jones v. Southern Pacific R.R., 962 F.2d 447, 450
(5th Cir. 1992)(quoting Taylor v. National Railroad Passenger
Corp., 920 F.2d 1372, 1376 (7th Cir. 1990)).
The courts
generally have analyzed issues of impeachment by contradiction
under the collateral facts doctrine under a balancing test
9
weighing the probative value against its prejudicial or harmful
effect under evidentiary rule 403.
Lawson, supra; cf. Castillo, supra.
See, e.g. Simmons, supra;
The standard of review is
whether the trial court abused its discretion in either
admitting or denying impeachment by contradiction.
S.W.2d at 455; Castillo, 181 F.3d at 1132.
Simmons, 986
See also KRE 611.
In the current case, the issue of C.A.’s criminal
record arose on cross-examination of Sgt. Thompson by a line of
questions specifically designed to elicit responses concerning
C.A.’s credibility and prior criminal activity.
Whether Sgt.
Thompson conducted a background search of C.A.’s criminal
history and the thoroughness of his search was not relevant to
the issue of Watkins’ conduct.
Additionally, C.A.’s prior
convictions for violation of an emergency protective order and
fourth-degree assault and the dismissal charge for hindering
prosecution were irrelevant to his conduct as a confidential
informant participating in a controlled drug-buy.
Furthermore,
the law recognizes the significant effect of information on
prior criminal activity by restricting its use as evidence,
specifically for misdemeanor offenses.
Admission of this
evidence would have diverted the trial to extraneous issues
involving the extrinsic evidence on facts surrounding C.A.’s
prior criminal activity.
Any minimal relevance of C.A.’s
criminal record was outweighed by its prejudicial and harmful
10
effects.
Under the circumstances, the information sought to be
introduced by Watkins to contradict Sgt. Thompson’s testimony
was subject to exclusion under the collateral facts doctrine and
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding it.
Watkins also challenges the trial court’s denial of
his motion for a directed verdict.
More specifically, he
alleges that the Commonwealth failed to satisfy its burden of
proof that he was not entrapped by the confidential informant.
Under KRS 505.010, a person is not guilty of an
offense, when he was “induced or encouraged to engage in
[proscribed] conduct by a public servant or by a person acting
in cooperation with a public servant” and “at the time of the
inducement or encouragement, he was not otherwise disposed to
engage in such conduct.”
The entrapment defense is not
available if the public servant or person acting in cooperation
with the public servant “merely affords the defendant an
opportunity to commit an offense.”
KRS 505.010(2)(a).
See also
Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 554 S.W.2d 401 (1977).
“The
critical test is not the extent of the police participation in
planning and assisting in the crime, but whether the defendant
was predisposed to commit the crime regardless of any
encouragement or inducement on the part of the authorities.”
Commonwealth v. Sanders, Ky., 736 S.W.2d 338, 340 (1987).
As a
“defense” under the penal code, once the defendant produces
11
enough evidence to create a doubt as to the defense, the burden
of proof shifts to the Commonwealth.
Commonwealth v. Day, Ky.,
983 S.W.2d 505, 508 (1999); KRS 500.070(3).
With respect to
entrapment, where the government has induced a person to violate
the law, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was predisposed to commit the criminal act
prior to first being approached by the government agents.
Day,
983 S.W.2d at 508 (citing Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S.
540, 549, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 1540, 118 L.Ed2d 174 (1992)).
“Predisposition . . . focuses upon whether the
defendant was an unwary innocent or, instead, an unwary criminal
who readily availed himself of the opportunity to perpetuate the
crime.”
Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62, 108 S.Ct.
883, 99 L.Ed2d 54 (1988)(internal questions and citations
omitted).
The courts have identified five factors relevant to
determine whether a defendant was predisposed to commit a crime:
(1) the character or reputation of the defendant; (2) whether
the initial suggestion of criminal activity was made by the
government; (3) whether the defendant engaged in criminal
activity for a profit; (4) whether the defendant expressed
reluctance to commit the offense which was overcome by
government persecution; and (5) the nature of the inducement or
persuasion applied by the government.
See, e.g., United States
v. Khalil, 279 F.3d 358, 365 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v.
12
Thomas, 134 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Santiago-Godinez, 12 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 1993).
Although
none of these factors alone is determinative, the most important
factor is whether the defendant exhibited a reluctance to commit
the offense that was overcome by government inducement.
Santiago-Godinez, 12 F.3d at 728; United States v. Skarie, 971
F.2d 317, 320 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. McLernon, 746
F.2d 1098, 1113 (6th Cir. 1984).
Watkins raises the entrapment issue in the context of
a directed verdict motion.
In Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816
S.W.2d 186 (1991), the Kentucky Supreme Court delineated the
standard for handling a criminal defendant’s motion for directed
verdict as follows:
On motion for directed verdict, the
trial court must draw all fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence
is sufficient to induce a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty, a directed
verdict should not be given. For the
purpose of ruling on the motion, the trial
court must assume that the evidence for the
Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the
jury questions as to the credibility and
weight to be given to such testimony.
Id. at 187 (citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill, Ky., 660 S.W.2d 3
(1983)).
See also Norris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 89 S.W.3d 411,
416 (2002).
A court must be mindful of the rule that
“[c]redibility and weight of the evidence are matters within the
13
exclusive province of the jury.”
Commonwealth v. Smith, Ky., 5
S.W.3d 126, 129 (1999)(citations omitted).
Jurors are free to
believe parts and disbelieve other parts of the evidence
including the testimony of each witness.
Id.
The standard for
appellate review of a denial of a motion for directed verdict
alleging insufficient evidence dictates that if under the
evidence as a whole it would not be clearly unreasonable for a
jury to find the defendant guilty, he is not entitled to a
directed verdict of acquittal.
Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187;
Holbrooks v. Commonwealth, Ky., 85 S.W.3d 563, 569 (2002).
In order to obtain a directed verdict and dismissal as
a matter of law based on entrapment, a defendant must establish
“undisputed” evidence demonstrating a “patently clear” absence
of predisposition.
United States v. Harris, 9 F.3d 493, 498 (6th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1428-29 (6th
Cir. 1994).
In determining whether the evidence was
insufficient to establish predisposition, a reviewing court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution
and resolve all reasonable inferences in its favor, and cannot
choose between conflicting testimony or make credibility
determinations.
United States v. Barger, 931 F.2d 359, 366 (6th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Silva, 846 F.2d 352, 355 (6th Cir.
1988).
The question of entrapment is a factual issue generally
left to a jury to decide.
See Mathews, 485 U.S. at 63, 108
14
S.Ct. at 886; Barger, 931 F.2d at 366.
See also Day, 983 S.W.2d
at 588.
The evidence indicated that Watkins approached C.A.’s
vehicle shortly after C.A. parked near a dumpster in the housing
complex.
Both C.A. and Officer Patterson testified that Watkins
made the initial contact asking C.A. what he wanted.
Watkins
testified that C.A. spoke first asking for “a 20,” referring to
$20 worth of drugs.
The audiotape of the transaction revealed
that Watkins asked C.A. if he was a policeman and then
negotiated with C.A. over the sale of one large or two small
pieces of rock cocaine.
Officers Thompson and Peterson stated
that when Watkins recognized the police officers approach him
after the transaction, he threw an item that was later retrieved
and found to contain 6-7 pieces of cocaine.
Although Watkins
denied throwing any item and denied ownership of the brown
napkin, it was recovered a few feet from him and in the area
pointed out to Officer Norris by Officer Peterson.
Furthermore,
on the audiotape of the debriefing of C.A. by Sgt. Thompson
shortly after the controlled drug-buy, C.A. stated that Watkins
had taken the pieces of cocaine offered him from a similar brown
napkin.
Finally, Watkins still had the $20 bill received from
C.A. in his hand when arrested by the police.
Analysis of the five factors establishes sufficient
evidence to withstand a directed verdict motion.
15
The
Commonwealth did not attempt to offer evidence of Watkins’
character or reputation.
There was testimony that Watkins made
the initial contact, albeit disputed by Watkins.
however, is reserved for the jury.
Credibility,
Watkins conceded selling the
drugs for profit, and his attempt to ameliorate this fact by
alleging he was merely trying to acquire additional funds to
purchase drugs for his own use is virtually irrelevant.
Watkins’ only reluctant in selling the drugs was his fear that
C.A. was a police officer and he freely engaged in negotiations
without repeated or strong persuasion from C.A.
Finally, the
nature of the inducement or persuasion supplied by the
government was not unusual but rather a relatively paltry sum of
$20.
Watkins mischaracterizes the analysis in asserting the
charge should have been dismissed “because the evidence strongly
supports an entrapment by [C.A.].”
Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, Watkins obviously did
not show undisputed evidence demonstrating a patently clear
absence of predisposition.
Accordingly, the trial court
properly submitted the question of entrapment to the jury and
denying Watkins’ request for a directed verdict.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Daviess Circuit Court.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Kim Brooks
Covington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Ian G. Sonego
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
17
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