DOUGLAS H. RANK v. KAY MONTGOMERY AND GARY MONTGOMERY, HER HUSBAND
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 7, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-001092-MR
DOUGLAS H. RANK
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-00799
v.
KAY MONTGOMERY AND
GARY MONTGOMERY, HER HUSBAND
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, BARBER AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Douglas H. Rank has appealed from the order
entered by the Fayette Circuit Court on April 24, 2002, which
granted Kay Montgomery and her husband, Gary Montgomery’s motion
for summary judgment.
Having concluded that the trial court
properly determined that the Montgomerys’ allegations in their
complaint against Dr. Rank were entitled to judicial immunity
and that Dr. Rank has otherwise failed to demonstrate that there
is a genuine issue as to any material fact, we affirm.
As part of Kay Montgomery’s medical treatment for
injuries she suffered in an automobile accident, she received
treatment from Dr. Rank, a psychiatrist.
Kay was Dr. Rank’s
patient from 1994 to 1998,1 and during the course of treatment
and while Kay and Gary Montgomery were married, Kay and Dr. Rank
engaged in a sexual relationship.
On March 3, 1999, the
Montgomerys filed a complaint against Dr. Rank in Fayette
Circuit Court alleging professional malpractice.
The
Montgomerys alleged, inter alia, that Rank failed to properly
treat Kay and infected her with a sexually transmitted disease
(STD), namely herpes, which Kay transmitted to Gary.
In Dr.
Rank’s answer, filed on March 25, 1999, he denied the
allegations and asserted certain affirmative defenses; however,
he did not assert any counterclaims against the Montgomerys.
Prior to the professional negligence case going to a
jury trial, the Montgomerys voluntarily dismissed their claims
for relief based on the allegation that Dr. Rank had infected
Kay with herpes.2
The Montgomerys voluntarily dismissed this
1
The Montgomerys allege that Dr. Rank treated Kay from 1994 to 1998. Dr.
Rank, however, alleges that he treated Kay from 1993 to 1997.
2
Although there is no filestamp on the Montgomerys “NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF
CLAIMS,” the document indicates that it was served upon Dr. Rank’s counsel on
February 18, 2000. The Montgomerys withdrew from their complaint their claim
that Dr. Rank “infected her with a sexually transmitted disease, which she
thereafter transmitted to her husband, Gary Montgomery.”
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claim after they learned that neither Kay nor Dr. Rank was in
fact afflicted with herpes.
The jury trial in the Montgomerys’
suit against Dr. Rank was held from March 6 to March 9, 2000,
and resulted in a verdict in favor of the Montgomerys.3
Of
course, the jury did not consider Kay’s allegation that Dr. Rank
infected her with herpes.
It is agreed that on March 10, 1999, the Lexington
Herald-Leader published a newspaper article concerning the
lawsuit.
The article, entitled “Suit alleges woman’s
psychiatrist seduced her, gave her disease,” included the
Montgomerys’ claim that Dr. Rank had allegedly infected
Montgomery with a STD, which she had passed to her husband.
Dr.
Rank further alleged that prior to and subsequent to March 3,
1999, the date the Montgomerys filed their complaint, Kay told
“numerous people” that he had infected her with herpes, which
she thereafter transmitted to her husband.
On March 2, 2000,
Dr. Rank filed a separate action in Fayette Circuit Court and
alleged in his complaint that the Montgomerys’ accusations were
both libelous and slanderous.
Dr. Rank alleged that Kay knew
her statements were false at the time of their publication
because she knew her test results were negative.
3
In addition to a monetary judgment, Dr. Rank’s medical license was suspended
by the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure for six months and certain
restrictions were placed upon his practice once his suspension ended.
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In the case sub judice, the Montgomerys filed their
answer to Dr. Rank’s complaint on March 24, 2000, and asserted,
inter alia, that Dr. Rank’s complaint should be dismissed
because he had failed to present his allegations in a compulsory
counterclaim as required by CR4 13.01 and that the claim was
barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity.
On February 25,
2002, the Montgomerys moved for summary judgment; Dr. Rank filed
his response on March 27, 2002; and the trial court granted the
Montgomerys’ motion for summary judgment on April 24, 2002.
The
trial court ruled that since the claims made by Dr. Rank in his
complaint should have been asserted as a compulsory counterclaim
pursuant to CR 13.01 in the original action the Montgomerys
filed against him, the claims could not be brought as a separate
action.
Additionally, the trial court ruled that the
Montgomerys were entitled to absolute immunity for any
allegations they asserted in their complaint and concluded that
there was “no factual proof in the record in this case
indicating that Defendants made any actionable statements or
took any actionable actions against Plaintiff outside the
context of the pleadings in the underlying action.”
This appeal
followed.
Summary judgment is only proper “where the movant
shows that the adverse party could not prevail under any
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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circumstances.”5
The trial court must view the record “in a
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for
summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his
favor.”6
However, “a party opposing a properly supported summary
judgment motion cannot defeat that motion without presenting at
least some affirmative evidence demonstrating that there is a
genuine issue of material fact requiring trial.”7
This Court has
previously stated that “[t]he standard of review on appeal of a
summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that
there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that
the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
There is no requirement that the appellate court defer to the
trial court since factual findings are not at issue” [citations
omitted].8
Accordingly, our review of the record will be viewed
in a light most favorable to Dr. Rank and any doubts will be
resolved in his favor.
Dr. Rank argues that the Montgomerys were not entitled
to judicial immunity for the allegations made in their
underlying complaint against him.
In particular, Dr. Rank
5
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480
(1991) (citing Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985)).
6
Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480 (citing Dossett v. New York Mining &
Manufacturing Co., Ky., 451 S.W.2d 843 (1970)).
7
Hubble v. Johnson, Ky., 841 S.W.2d 169, 171 (1992)(citing Steelvest, supra,
at 480).
8
Scifres v. Kraft, Ky.App., 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (1996).
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argues that the Montgomerys’ claim that he infected Kay with
herpes, which she then allegedly passed to Gary, was
“impertinent and irrelevant” to their malpractice claim, and
also “false and malicious.”
immunity does not apply.
Thus, Dr. Rank argues that judicial
We disagree.
In Schmitt v. Mann,9 the former Court of Appeals
discussed the scope of judicial immunity as it relates to
allegations made in a complaint:
The prevailing rule and the one recognized
in this jurisdiction is that statements in
pleadings filed in judicial proceedings are
absolutely privileged when material,
pertinent, and relevant to the subject under
inquiry, though it is claimed that they are
false and alleged with malice [citation
omitted].
In the case at bar, the Montgomerys alleged in their
underlying complaint against Dr. Rank that he committed
professional malpractice during his treatment of Kay.
The
sexual relationship between Dr. Rank and Kay during this
treatment was a key component of their malpractice claim.10
The
Montgomerys also asserted that because of that alleged
malpractice, Kay had suffered various damages, including severe
emotional distress, and physical and mental injuries.
9
We
291 Ky. 80, 163 S.W.2d 281, 283 (1942).
10
The Montgomerys alleged that Dr. Rank’s sexual relationship with Kay was an
ethical violation and fell below “accepted medical standards.” See The
Principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to
Psychiatry, Section 2, annotation 1 (2001), stating in part that “[s]exual
activity with a current or former patient is unethical.”
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believe the Montgomerys’ claim that Dr. Rank had allegedly
infected Kay with herpes was “material, pertinent, and relevant”
to their malpractice claim.
This allegation, if accepted as
true by a jury, would certainly be relevant when assessing the
appropriate amount of damages to be awarded.
As Schmitt makes
clear, these claims are entitled to judicial immunity even
though they may have been asserted falsely and/or maliciously.
Therefore, the Montgomerys’ allegations in their complaint that
Dr. Rank infected Kay with herpes, which she then passed to
Gary, was entitled to judicial immunity.
Accordingly, the trial
court did not err in granting the Montgomerys’ motion for
summary judgment on this issue.
Dr. Rank also argues that the Montgomerys were not
entitled to judicial immunity for those alleged slanderous
statements that Kay “made to persons outside the scope of their
original lawsuit.”
Specifically, Dr. Rank argues:
The facts clearly indicate that the
[Montgomerys’] actions went beyond the
allegations set forth in their original
malpractice [c]omplaint against [Dr. Rank].
Statements that [Dr. Rank] caused [ ] Kay
Montgomery [ ] to be infected with a
sexually transmitted disease (herpes), which
she in turn gave to her husband, Gary
Montgomery, were made to persons outside the
scope of their original lawsuit.
However, aside from these bare allegations, Dr. Rank has failed
to offer any evidence whatsoever in support of his assertion
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that Kay and/or Gary made slanderous statements to persons
outside the scope of their pleadings.
In Dr. Rank’s deposition testimony, he admitted that
he had no personal knowledge of either Kay or Gary telling
anyone that he, Dr. Rank, had given Kay a sexually transmitted
disease.
In his answer to one of the Montgomerys’
interrogatories, Dr. Rank named several individuals who Kay
and/or Gary allegedly told that Dr. Rank had infected Kay with a
STD.
However, Dr. Rank has failed to offer any evidence, either
in the form of an affidavit from these individuals or otherwise,
to support these self-serving statements.
Finally, Dr. Rank
points to the deposition testimony of Kay, in which she admits
discussing issues related to her alleged STD infection with two
attorneys and three doctors.
At best, Kay’s testimony is vague
with respect to her discussions with these individuals.
It is
not clear whether these conversations touched upon how Kay may
have contracted the alleged STD or who may have given it to her.
Moreover, assuming Dr. Rank had proven that Kay made slanderous
statements to these individuals, which he has clearly failed to
do, it is likely that most, if not all, of these statements
would be absolutely privileged communications and not subject to
a defamation claim.11
Therefore, it is clear that Dr. Rank has
11
See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 587 (1977), stating in part that “[a]
party to a private litigation . . . is absolutely privileged to publish
defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a
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failed to present any “affirmative evidence demonstrating that
there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial.”12
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting the
Montgomerys’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of the
Montgomerys’ alleged slanderous statements made outside the
scope of their complaint.
Dr. Rank next argues that he should be allowed to
pursue a cause of action against the Montgomerys for malicious
prosecution.13
However, the record shows that Dr. Rank failed to
file a motion with the trial court seeking to amend his
complaint to add a cause of action based on malicious
prosecution.
Where a party has established that he is entitled
to summary judgment on the cause of action in the complaint at
issue, and the party opposing summary judgment has failed to
take the proper procedural steps to amend his complaint to add
proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of or during the course
and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates, if the
matter has some relation to the proceeding.”
12
Hubble, 841 S.W.2d at 171 (1992)(citing Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480).
13
“Strictly speaking, this suit is improperly designated as a claim for
‘malicious prosecution.’ This is old terminology deriving from wrongful
prosecution of criminal cases, a separate cause of action as described in
Restatement (Second) or Torts, § 653-73 (1977). Properly designated, this
tort is the ‘wrongful sue of civil proceedings,’ the elements of which are
described in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 674-681B.” Prewitt v.
Sexton, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 891, 893 (1989).
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an additional cause of action, summary judgment in favor of the
moving party will be affirmed.14
Finally, since we have concluded that the Montgomerys’
were entitled to summary judgment on the issue of judicial
immunity and on the grounds that Dr. Rank has failed to proffer
any evidence demonstrating that a genuine issue as to any
material fact exists, it is unnecessary to discuss Dr. Rank’s
claim that the trial court erred in concluding that his slander
claim against the Montgomerys was a compulsory counterclaim.
Based on the foregoing, the order of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
BARBER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
BAKER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
David A. Weinberg
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Douglas L. Hoots
Carolyn C. Zerga
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES:
Douglas L. Hoots
Lexington, Kentucky
14
See Townsend v. Gulf Interstate Gas Co., Ky., 308 S.W.2d 793, 794-95
(1958).
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