DAVID EUGENE THACKER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 12, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000984-MR
DAVID EUGENE THACKER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LAURANCE B. VANMETER, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 01-CR-01045
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, BARBER AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
David Eugene Thacker has appealed from a final
judgment and sentence of imprisonment entered by the Fayette
Circuit Court on April 23, 2002, convicting him of escape in the
second degree1 and as being a persistent felony offender in the
first degree (PFO I).2
Having concluded that Thacker was not
entitled to dismissal of the charges pursuant to KRS 500.110 and
that his convictions were supported by the evidence, we affirm.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 520.030.
2
KRS 532.080(3).
On June 28, 1994, Sergeant Richard Kukuk of the
Fayette County Detention Center filed a criminal complaint
against Thacker for committing the offense of escape in the
second degree.
In support of this criminal complaint, Sergeant
Kukuk alleged that, on June 28, 1994, Thacker failed to return
to the Fayette County Detention Center from his work release
assignment at 5:00 p.m. as required.
As a result of this
criminal complaint, a Fayette District Judge issued a warrant
for Thacker’s arrest on June 28, 1994.
After learning that Thacker was an inmate at the Lee
Adjustment Center, the Fayette County Sheriff transmitted a
detainer, accompanied by the June 28, 1994, criminal complaint
and arrest warrant, to that facility on August 31, 2000.
The
Lee Adjustment Center acknowledged receipt of this detainer from
the Fayette District Court on September 7, 2000.
On August 9, 2001, Thacker filed a motion to dismiss
the criminal complaint with the Fayette Circuit Court.
In his
motion, Thacker acknowledged that a detainer had been issued
against him and lodged with the Lee Adjustment Center.
Thacker
claimed that in August 2000 he had filed an uncontested motion
for disposition of this pending charge3 pursuant to KRS 500.110
in the Fayette Circuit Court.
Thacker was arraigned in Fayette
3
This motion is not contained in the written or videotaped record of this
matter.
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District Court on August 31, 2001.
The district court passed
Thacker’s motion to dismiss to the circuit court and this matter
was bound over to a Fayette County grand jury.
On October 9,
2001, the grand jury indicted Thacker for escape in the second
degree and as being a PFO I.
During his initial appearance in
circuit court, Thacker entered a plea of not guilty to both
charges.
On January 20, 2002, the circuit court held a hearing
concerning Thacker’s motion to dismiss.
At this hearing,
Thacker testified that after being served this detainer, he
directed a prison legal aide to submit documents requesting a
speedy trial on his pending escape charge.
While unable to
produce a copy of this motion, Thacker produced records from the
Lee Adjustment Center’s legal mail log verifying that these
documents were mailed to Fayette Commonwealth’s Attorney Ray
Larson and Fayette Circuit Court Clerk Robert True on October
13, 2000.
Accordingly, Thacker acknowledged that the speedy
trial motion he executed had been sent to circuit court
officials rather than district court officials.
However,
Thacker stated that he had entrusted this matter to his legal
aide because he did not know which court had jurisdiction and
because the escape charge was a felony.
Thacker’s trial counsel argued that Thacker had
substantially complied with KRS 500.110 by mailing his motion
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for a speedy trial to the circuit court officials and that these
officials had a good faith obligation to forward this speedy
trial request to the district court officials.
The circuit
court denied Thacker’s motion to dismiss, ruling that KRS
500.110 required Thacker to forward his request for a speedy
trial to district court officials since the detainer originated
from that court.
This matter proceeded to trial on March 21, 2002.
The
Commonwealth called three witnesses to testify concerning the
circumstances surrounding Thacker’s alleged escape.
Linda
Black, chief deputy clerk for the criminal division of Fayette
Circuit Court, testified that according to court records Thacker
had been convicted on June 13, 1994, by the Fayette Circuit
Court of the amended misdemeanor charge of receiving stolen
property4 and was sentenced to serve eight months in the Fayette
County Detention Center, but that he had been granted work
release privileges.
Black further testified that an arrest
warrant for Thacker had been issued for the escape charge at
issue herein based upon Sergeant Kukuk’s criminal complaint.
According to Black, this warrant was not served upon Thacker
until August 31, 2000.
Next, Sergeant Kukuk testified that he obtained the
criminal complaint against Thacker on June 28, 1994, after
4
KRS 514.110.
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Thacker had failed to return to the detention center following
his work release assignment.
Sergeant Kukuk admitted that he
possessed no specific or independent recollection of the events
that caused him to file the criminal complaint against Thacker.
Lieutenant Brian Proffitt of the Lexington-Fayette
Urban County Government’s Division of Community Corrections
testified that he had been personally notified on June 28, 1994,
that Thacker had failed to return to the detention center from
his employment as a maintenance worker at the Campbell House Inn
Golf Course.
Upon learning of Thacker’s absence, Lieutenant
Proffitt contacted the golf course, but he was unable to locate
Thacker.
Since Lieutenant Proffitt was going off duty, Sergeant
Kukuk was dispatched to obtain the criminal complaint against
Thacker.
On cross-examination, Lieutenant Proffitt admitted
that his recollection concerning these events was vague and that
his testimony was based upon Thacker’s booking records
maintained by the Fayette County Detention Center.
However,
Lieutenant Proffitt also testified that he was personally
familiar with Thacker, that Thacker’s booking records
consistently and accurately identified Thacker, and he
identified Thacker at trial.
Moreover, Lieutenant Proffitt
acknowledged that it was his responsibility to prepare and
maintain records concerning inmates lodged in the Fayette County
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Detention Center and that he was responsible for the preparation
and maintenance of Thacker’s booking records.
Based upon this evidence, the jury convicted Thacker
of escape in the second degree and as being a PFO I.
The jury
recommended a five-year prison sentence on the escape
conviction, which was enhanced by the PFO I conviction to a
sentence of 15 years.
The circuit court followed the jury’s
sentencing recommendation when it sentenced Thacker on April 23,
2002.
This appeal followed.
Thacker first claims the circuit court erred by not
granting his motion to dismiss the underlying escape charge
because the Commonwealth failed to comply with the requirements
of KRS 500.110, which provides as follows:
Whenever a person has entered upon a
term of imprisonment in a penal or
correctional institution of this state, and
whenever during the continuance of the term
of imprisonment there is pending in any
jurisdiction of this state any untried
indictment, information or complaint on the
basis of which a detainer has been lodged
against the prisoner, he shall be brought to
trial within one hundred and eighty (180)
days after he shall have caused to be
delivered to the prosecuting officer and the
appropriate court of the prosecuting
officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the
place of his imprisonment and his request for
a final disposition to be made of the
indictment, information or complaint;
provided that for good cause shown in open
court, the prisoner or his counsel being
present, the court having jurisdiction of the
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matter may grant any necessary or reasonable
continuance [emphasis added].
In Huddleston v. Jennings,5 a panel of this Court
interpreted the phrase “‘the prosecuting officer and the
appropriate court of the prosecutor’s jurisdiction’” to mean the
prosecutorial office which has lodged the detainer and the court
in which the entered indictment, information or complaint
forming the basis for the detainer was pending when the detainer
was lodged.6
In the case sub judice, it is undisputed that
Thacker’s detainer was based on an arrest warrant issued by the
Fayette District Court because of a criminal complaint filed in
that court by Sergeant Kukuk, and that the Lee Adjustment Center
had acknowledged that the detainer was from the district court.
Thus, Thacker was required to make his request for final
disposition of the criminal complaint to the Fayette District
Court and to the Fayette County Attorney who is the normal
prosecuting officer in that court.7
Thacker’s position would be correct if the detainer
had been based upon the indictment issued by the Fayette County
grand jury on October 9, 2001.
This Court addressed this issue
in Huddleston:
5
Ky.App., 723 S.W.2d 381 (1986).
6
Id. at 382.
7
KRS 15.725(2) states that the county attorney shall attend district court
and prosecute all violations subject to the jurisdiction of the district
court.
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Where there has been a later indictment
as a result of which the detainer charge is
no longer pending in the lower court, it
does not seem an unreasonable burden to
place on the county attorney to forward the
request to the Commonwealth attorney, and
upon the district court to forward the
request to the circuit court. See e.g. KRS
15.725(3). To require another request to be
made by the prisoner once he discovers the
charge is now pending in another court would
inevitably result in delays defeating the
very purpose of the statute. We believe the
intent of the statute is that the 180 days
begin to run once an otherwise proper
request is made to the court in which the
detainer charge was pending when lodged and
to the normal prosecutor in that court. An
indictment on the same charge subsequent to
the lodging of the detainer would not
require that the request be made to the
circuit court and the Commonwealth attorney
unless the indictment had become the basis
for the detainer. If, however, the
subsequent indictment is known to the
prisoner, there appears no sound reason why
he should not be entitled to make his
request directly to the circuit court and
Commonwealth’s attorney.8
Thacker failed to comply with KRS 500.110 since the
basis for his detainer was the criminal complaint and arrest
warrant issued by the Fayette District Court.
Thacker was
served with the arrest warrant and the criminal complaint, both
of which clearly indicated that the charge was pending in
district court, not circuit court.
At no time was this detainer
based upon the October 9, 2001, indictment from the Fayette
8
Huddleston, 723 S.W.2d at 383.
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Circuit Court.
The circuit court properly denied Thacker’s
motion to dismiss.
Thacker next claims that the trial court erred by
denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal based on
the Commonwealth’s failure to produce a witness at trial who
possessed any actual memory of Thacker’s escape from the Fayette
County Detention Center.
In Commonwealth v. Benham,9 the
Supreme Court of Kentucky noted the standard for review of a
motion for a directed verdict:
On a motion for directed verdict, the
trial court must draw all fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence
is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror
to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict
should not be given. For the purpose of
ruling on the motion, the trial court must
assume that the evidence for the
Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the
jury questions as to the credibility and
weight to be given to such testimony.10
When considering a criminal defendant’s motion for a
directed verdict of acquittal, the trial court must not
substitute its own opinion about the credibility of witnesses or
the weight that should be given to the evidence presented, since
“[q]uestions of credibility and weight of the evidence are for
9
10
Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186 (1991).
Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187.
S.W.2d 3 (1983).
See also Commonwealth v. Sawhill, Ky., 660
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the jury.”11
In addition, the standard for appellate review
concerning the denial of a motion for a directed verdict of
acquittal dictates that, if under the evidence as a whole, it
would not be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find the
defendant guilty, the defendant is not entitled to a directed
verdict of acquittal.12
A conviction may properly be based on
circumstantial evidence when that evidence is of such character
that reasonable minds would be justified in concluding that the
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.13
In the case sub judice, it is not disputed that Black
and Sergeant Kukuk possessed no actual knowledge of the facts
surrounding Thacker’s failure to return to the detention center
after work.
Lieutenant Proffitt was the only witness to testify
that he remembered the events concerning Thacker’s escape.
While Lieutenant Proffitt admitted that his memory of the escape
was vague, he identified Thacker during trial and testified that
he, in fact, investigated Thacker’s failure to return to the
detention center.
Lieutenant Proffitt also testified that most
of the information concerning his investigation of Thacker’s
escape from custody came from his review of the actual booking
11
Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 789 S.W.2d 748, 750 (1990).
Commonwealth, Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219 (1996).
See also Partin v.
12
Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187; Baker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 54, 55
(1998).
13
Baker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 860 S.W.2d 760 (1993); Bussell v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 882 S.W.2d 111, 114 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1174, 115 S.Ct. 1154,
130 L.Ed.2d 1111 (1995).
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records of the Fayette County Detention Center that he prepared
during the normal course of his employment.
Furthermore, these
booking records, according to Lieutenant Proffitt, are required
to be maintained indefinitely.
Under KRE 803(6), a business record is admissible
where both the maker of the record and the person providing the
information for the record were acting under a business duty to
do so and it was the regular practice of the business in
question to make the memorandum, report or record.14
Here,
Lieutenant Proffitt’s testimony established that he had a duty
to maintain these booking records and that he kept these records
pursuant to the detention center’s normal operating procedures.
These booking records were available at trial and could have
been admitted into evidence.
A party presenting a business
record is permitted to read from that business record at trial.15
Thus, the evidence was sufficient to induce a reasonable jury to
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Thacker was guilty.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
14
Rabovsky v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 6, 10 (1998).
15
Id.; Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 907 S.W.2d 783 (1995).
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bobby Amburgey
Lexington, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
J. Gary Bale
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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