TERRY D. NEUKAM v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: November 14, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000922-MR
TERRY D. NEUKAM
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN A. HAYDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00221
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, BARBER AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Terry D. Neukam has appealed from the final
judgment and sentence entered by the Henderson Circuit Court on
May 1, 2002, finding him guilty pursuant to a jury verdict of
the offense of theft by unlawful taking over $300.001 and
sentencing him to prison for a term of three years.
Having
found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
denying Neukam’s motion for a mistrial, and having concluded
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 514.030.
that the use of Neukam’s prior convictions for impeachment
purposes during the guilt phase of his trial did not result in a
manifest injustice warranting reversal under RCr2 10.26, we
affirm.
On October 12, 2001, at approximately 1:20 p.m., WalMart Loss Prevention Officer Willie Bratcher observed Neukam
remove a Sony Playstation 2 video game machine from a shelf
located in the electronics department of a Wal-Mart department
store located in Henderson County, Kentucky.
According to
Bratcher, Neukam took the video game machine to the end of the
aisle and slide it through a gap in the wall, which led to an
adjacent aisle located in a different department.
Bratcher then
witnessed Neukam repeat the process with a second machine, after
which he left the electronics department with his companion,
Catherine Helmerson.
Shortly thereafter, Bratcher witnessed
Neukam and Helmerson retrieve the two video game machines and
place them in a shopping cart.
According to Bratcher, Neukam
covered the two video game machines with several rolls of toilet
paper and proceeded to the lawn and garden section of the store.
Once Neukam and Helmerson reached the outdoor area of the lawn
and garden section, Bratcher watched Neukam slide the two video
game machines under a chain-linked fence separating the outdoor
portion of the store from the parking lot.
2
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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At this point,
Bratcher approached Neukam and identified himself as an employee
of Wal-Mart.
Bratcher then handcuffed Neukam and escorted him
to a police substation located within the store.
Shortly
thereafter, Officer Todd Seibert, a police officer for the City
of Henderson, arrived on the scene.
Officer Seibert advised
Neukam of his Miranda3 rights and placed him under arrest.4
Officer Seibert then spoke with Neukam’s companion, Helmerson,
who led him to a white van located in the Wal-Mart parking lot.
According to Officer Seibert, Helmerson opened up the driverside door to the van and pulled out a white cardboard box.
The
box contained several items of drug paraphernalia and a small
quantity of rock cocaine.
On November 14, 2001, a Henderson County grand jury
returned an indictment against Neukam charging him with theft by
unlawful taking over $300.00,5 possession of a controlled
substance in the first degree (cocaine),6 possession of drug
paraphernalia,7 and public intoxication.8
On April 4, 2002,
Neukam filed a motion to suppress the contraband obtained from
3
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
4
Helmerson was not arrested.
5
The video game machines were valued at $299.96 each.
6
KRS 218A.1415.
7
KRS 218A.500.
8
KRS 525.100.
Helmerson was not named in the indictment.
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the van.
Neukam claimed the contraband was procured in
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution.
A
hearing was conducted on the issue and Neukam’s motion to
suppress was denied.9
The case then proceeded to trial.
At trial, Bratcher, who was the first witness to
testify, described in detail the events that transpired in the
Wal-Mart store on the afternoon of October 12, 2001.
Bratcher
described the layout of the store and how he witnessed Neukam
attempt to steal two Playstation 2 video game machines.
Officer
Seibert also testified on behalf of the Commonwealth and he
described the contraband that was obtained from the van.
Officer Seibert also noted that when Neukam was arrested he was
not carrying any credit cards and that he had approximately
$6.00 on his person.
Officer Seibert further testified that
after he advised Neukam of his Miranda rights, Neukam “stated
that he didn’t want to say anything.”
Defense counsel
immediately objected to this line of questioning and moved for a
mistrial, asserting that Officer Seibert’s testimony constituted
an improper use of Neukam’s post-arrest silence.
The motion for
a mistrial was denied, but the trial court admonished the jury
not to consider this portion of Officer Seibert’s testimony.
9
The trial court concluded that Helmerson voluntarily retrieved the cardboard
box from the van and turned it over to Officer Seibert. Thus, the trial
court reasoned that a “search” never took place.
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Neukam testified in his own defense and provided a
somewhat different account of the events that transpired on the
afternoon of October 12, 2001.
Neukam insisted that he acted in
a suspicious fashion intentionally, in order to annoy Bratcher.
Neukam claimed that he was angry with Bratcher as a result of a
prior encounter, which had not occurred at the Wal-Mart store.
Neukam admitted that he removed the two video game machines from
the shelf, that he placed the two video game machines in a
shopping cart, and that he took them to the lawn and garden
section of the store.
However, Neukam claimed that he set the
two video game machines on the floor in the lawn and garden area
of the Wal-Mart store.
He denied sliding the two video game
machines under the chain-linked fence.
In fact, Neukam claimed
that it would have been impossible to have done so because the
fence went “in the ground.”
Neukam also disavowed any prior
knowledge of the contraband obtained from the van.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Neukam if
he currently used drugs, to which Neukam responded “No.”
The
prosecutor then asked Neukam how long it had been since he used
drugs and Neukam responded that it had been about three years
since he used drugs.
At this time, the prosecutor confronted
Neukam with a prior conviction for possession of a controlled
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substance in the second degree,10 dated May 11, 1999, after which
Neukam admitted that he had used drugs in the past.
Defense
counsel did not object to this line of questioning.
The
prosecutor then asked Neukam if the white van located in the
Wal-Mart parking lot belonged to him and Neukam conceded that it
did.
Neukam also admitted that he told Bratcher that “he would
see him after hours.”
In closing, the prosecutor asked Neukam
if he had ever been convicted of a felony and Neukam responded
affirmatively.
Defense counsel did not object to this line of
questioning either.
The case was then submitted to the jury.11
The jury returned a verdict of guilty as to the theft
charge, recommending a prison sentence of three years.
The jury
acquitted Neukam of the remaining charges contained in the
indictment.
On April 29, 2002, the trial court adopted the
jury’s recommendation and sentenced Neukam to a prison term of
three years.
This appeal followed.
Neukam first contends that his due process rights were
violated when Officer Seibert commented upon his post-arrest
silence at trial.
Neukam claims that “[t]he admonition read by
the court [did] nothing to alter the fundamental unfairness of
the substantive use of [his] post-arrest silence.”
As
previously discussed, Officer Seibert testified on direct
10
KRS 218A.1416.
11
Helmerson did not testify at trial.
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examination that after he advised Neukam of his Miranda rights,
Neukam “stated that he didn’t want to say anything.”
Neukam
correctly cites Doyle v. Ohio,12 for the proposition that a
defendant’s due process rights preclude prosecutorial reference
to his or her post-arrest silence as part of the Commonwealth’s
case-in-chief.13
Thus, it goes without saying that Officer
Seibert’s comment amounted to error.
The question before us on
appeal, however, is whether the comment made by Officer Seibert
amounted to reversible error.
We conclude that it did not.
While not overwhelming, the evidence presented against
Neukam at trial was significant.
Bratcher testified that he
witnessed Neukam remove two Playstation 2 video game machines
from a shelf located in the electronics department of the WalMart store.
Bratcher further testified that he witnessed Neukam
proceed to the lawn and garden section of the store and slide
the two video game machines underneath a chain-linked fence
separating the outdoor portion of the store from the parking
lot.
Moreover, after defense counsel objected to the improper
comment elicited by the prosecutor during Officer Seibert’s
direct-examination, the trial court admonished the jury not to
12
426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976).
13
See Hall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 321, 323 (1993); Green v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 815 S.W.2d 398, 400 (1991); Wallen v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
657 S.W.2d 232, 233 (1983); Campbell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 564 S.W.2d 528,
532 (1978); Darnell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 558 S.W.2d 590, 593 (1977); and
Niemeyer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 533 S.W.2d 218, 221 (1976). But cf., Port v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 327, 331 (1995) (authorizing the use of postarrest silence for the purpose of impeaching a defendant’s trial testimony).
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consider this portion of Officer Seibert’s testimony as
evidence.
After the trial court admonished the jury, the
prosecutor did not focus upon Neukam’s post-arrest silence nor
did he attempt to create a negative inference based upon
Neukam’s post-arrest silence.14
Thus, we cannot conclude that a
“substantial probability exists that the result [of Neukam’s
trial] would have been any different.”15
Stated otherwise,
“[t]he alleged Doyle infraction is harmless.”16
Accordingly, we
find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
denying Neukam’s motion for a mistrial.
Neukam next argues that he was denied a fair trial
when he was impeached by a prior misdemeanor conviction
involving drug use.
As previously discussed, the prosecutor
confronted Neukam on cross-examination with a prior conviction
for possession of a controlled substance in the second degree,
dated May 11, 1999, after which Neukam admitted that he had a
prior history of drug use.
The conviction in 1999 was Neukam’s
only prior conviction for possession of drugs.
Possession of a
controlled substance in the second degree is a Class A
misdemeanor for the first offense.
14
Thus, Neukam claims that his
See Wallen, 657 S.W.2d at 233.
15
Green, 815 S.W.2d at 400 (citing Abernathy v. Commonwealth, Ky., 439 S.W.2d
949 (1969), and Niemeyer, 533 S.W.2d at 221).
16
Wallen, supra at 233-234 (citing United States v. Davis, 546 F.2d 583 (5th
Cir. 1977)).
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prior conviction was inadmissible under KRE17 609, which limits
the admissibility of prior convictions used for impeachment
purposes to felonies.18
However, since Neukam failed to object
to this evidence at trial, pursuant to RCr 10.26 he is not
entitled to relief on appeal, unless the error is a palpable
error which affected his substantial rights and resulted in a
manifest injustice.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky was recently faced with
a similar issue involving the use of prior misdemeanor
convictions for impeachment purposes.
In Commonwealth v. Pace,19
the defendant, Ricky Pace, was arrested for DUI while operating
his ATV.
Pace was subsequently indicted for DUI, fourth offense
in five years; driving while his license was suspended for DUI,
second offense; and for operating an ATV on a highway.
At
trial, Pace testified in his own defense and denied that he was
under the influence of an intoxicant at the time of his arrest.
During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Pace
concerning his prior DUI convictions.
Pace’s attorney did not
object to this line of questioning and Pace was subsequently
found guilty of all the charges contained in the indictment.
17
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
18
See, e.g., Slaven v. Commonwealth, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 845, 859 (1997).
19
Ky., 82 S.W.3d 894 (2002).
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In his appeal to this Court, Pace argued that his
prior DUI convictions were inadmissible as “prior bad acts”
under KRE 404(b).20
This Court agreed and reversed Pace’s DUI
conviction, holding that the introduction of his prior DUI
convictions amounted to palpable error affecting his substantial
rights and resulting in a manifest injustice under RCr 10.26.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed, reasoning that “[t]he
palpable error rule set forth in RCr 10.26 is not a substitute
for the requirement that a litigant must contemporaneously
object to preserve an error for review.”21
The Supreme Court
noted that “[i]n determining whether an error is palpable, ‘an
appellate court must consider whether on the whole case there is
a substantial possibility that the result would have been any
different.’”22
Applying this criterion, the Supreme Court was
unable to “conclude that the outcome would have been any
different had the evidence in question been excluded.”23
Thus,
while the Supreme Court agreed that Pace’s prior DUI convictions
were inadmissible during the guilt phase of his trial, it
20
See Commonwealth v. Ramsey, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 526, 529 (1996).
21
Pace, 82 S.W.3d at 895.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 896.
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concluded that the error, absent an objection, did not
“constitute palpable error warranting review under RCr 10.26.”24
Similarly, in the case sub judice, we are unable to
“conclude that the outcome would have been any different had the
evidence in question been excluded.”
Neukam stood trial for
possession of a controlled substance in the first degree
(cocaine), possession of drug paraphernalia, and public
intoxication, in addition to theft by unlawful taking over
$300.00.
However, Neukam was acquitted of possession of a
controlled substance in the first degree (cocaine), possession
of drug paraphernalia, and public intoxication.
Since Neukam
was acquitted of the drug-related charges, it would be difficult
to conclude that the Commonwealth’s use of Neukam’s prior
conviction for possession of drugs for impeachment purposes
resulted in a manifest injustice in his conviction for theft.
Neukam further claims that his right to a fair trial
was violated when the Commonwealth questioned him about his
prior felony conviction.
As previously discussed, the
prosecutor asked Neukam on cross-examination if he had ever been
convicted of a felony and Neukam responded affirmatively.
No
objection was made to this line of questioning and the nature of
Neukam’s prior felony conviction was never revealed to the
24
Id.
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jury.25
Neukam’s prior felony conviction, which occurred in
Illinois, was for residential burglary.26
KRE 609 clearly
permits the use of prior felony convictions for impeachment
purposes, provided that a period of more than ten years has not
elapsed since the date of the conviction.27
conviction is dated September 17, 1986.
Neukam’s burglary
However, KRE 609
further permits the use of a prior felony conviction even if
more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the
conviction, provided the trial court determines that the
probative value of the conviction substantially outweighs any
prejudicial effect.28
Neukam argues on appeal, and the
Commonwealth does not deny,29 that the trial court failed to make
any findings as to whether the probative value of Neukam’s prior
felony conviction substantially outweighed its prejudicial
effect.
Neukam further argues that the use of his prior felony
conviction at trial constituted reversible error under RCr
10.26.
We disagree.
As was stated by the Supreme Court in Pace, supra,
“[t]he palpable error rule set forth in RCr 10.26 is not a
25
See KRE 609(a).
26
Neukam was sentenced to a prison term of six years for the conviction.
27
KRE 609(b).
28
Id.
29
The Commonwealth chose not to brief this issue.
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substitute for the requirement that a litigant must
contemporaneously object to preserve an error for review.”30
Even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred by failing to
make any findings to support the admission of Neukam’s prior
felony conviction, we cannot conclude that without such error
the result of Neukam’s trial would have been any different,
thereby resulting in a manifest injustice.
As previously noted,
while not overwhelming, the evidence presented against Neukam at
trial was significant, at least in respect to the theft charge.
Once again, we are unable to “conclude that the outcome would
have been any different had the evidence in question been
excluded.”31
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the final judgment
and sentence of the Henderson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David T. Eucker
Frankfort, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Brian T. Judy
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
30
Pace, 82 S.W.3d at 895.
31
Id. at 896.
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