JAMES DAVENPORT, MIKE FITZPATRICK, BRAD GOLD, ANDREW LEACH, DANIEL MILLER, GREG MOORE, MICHAEL MOORE, DALE PARKINSON, EDDIE SLONE, KYLE SMITH, DOUGLAS TAYLER, JAMES URQUHART, TERRY WICKMAN, and MARC WOOD v. JOE NORSWORTHY, SECRETARY OF LABOR, DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS, APPRENTICESHIP AND TRAINING, LABOR CABINET, AND THE CITY OF FRANKFORT, D/B/A FRANKFORT FIRE AND EMS SERVICE CITY OF FRANKFORT v. JAMES DAVENPORT, MIKE FITZPATRICK, BRAD GOLD, ANDREW LEACH, DANIEL MILLER, GREG MOORE, MICHAEL MOORE, DALE PARKINSON, EDDIE SLONE, KYLE SMITH, DOUGLAS TAYLER, JAMES
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JULY 25, 2003; 10:00 a.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000903-MR
JAMES DAVENPORT, MIKE FITZPATRICK,
BRAD GOLD, ANDREW LEACH, DANIEL
MILLER, GREG MOORE, MICHAEL MOORE,
DALE PARKINSON, EDDIE SLONE, KYLE
SMITH, DOUGLAS TAYLER, JAMES
URQUHART, TERRY WICKMAN, and MARC WOOD
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00243
JOE NORSWORTHY, SECRETARY OF LABOR,
DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS,
APPRENTICESHIP AND TRAINING, LABOR
CABINET, AND THE CITY OF FRANKFORT,
D/B/A FRANKFORT FIRE AND EMS SERVICE
AND:
CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2002-CA-000946-MR
CITY OF FRANKFORT
v.
APPELLEES
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROGER L. CRITTENDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00243
JAMES DAVENPORT, MIKE FITZPATRICK,
BRAD GOLD, ANDREW LEACH, DANIEL
MILLER, GREG MOORE, MICHAEL MOORE,
DALE PARKINSON, EDDIE SLONE, KYLE
SMITH, DOUGLAS TAYLER, JAMES
URQUHART, TERRY WICKMAN and MARC WOOD
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING APPEAL NO. 2002-CA-000903-MR
AND AFFIRMING CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2002-CA-000946-MR
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, GUIDUGLI, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
BAKER, JUDGE:
James Davenport, Mike Fitzpatrick, Brad Gold,
Andrew Leach, Daniel Miller, Greg Moore, Michael Moore, Dale
Parkinson, Eddie Slone, Kyle Smith, Douglas Tayler, James
Urquhart, Terry Wickman, and Marc Wood bring Appeal No. 2002-CA000903-MR and the City of Frankfort brings Cross-Appeal No.
2002-CA-000946-MR from an April 23, 2002, opinion and order of
the Franklin Circuit Court.
We reverse and remand Appeal No.
2002-CA-000903-MR and affirm Cross-Appeal No. 2002-CA-000946-MR.
The genesis of this controversy surrounds the proper
amount of overtime pay owed by the City of Frankfort (the City)
to Davenport and thirteen other firefighter paramedics employed
by the City.1
Davenport initiated the instant action in the Labor
Cabinet (the Cabinet). Ultimately, the Secretary of Labor
entered a Final Order which was served upon counsel by mail on
January 22, 2002.
The order incorporated the hearing officer’s
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order.
From the Secretary’s Final Order, Davenport sought judicial
1
In this opinion, we shall hereinafter refer to Davenport and the other
paramedics collectively as Davenport.
2
review in the Franklin Circuit Court under Kentucky Revised
Statute (KRS) 13B.140.
On February 18, 2002, Davenport filed a
“complaint” with the clerk of the circuit court and addressed
one summons to the City of Frankfort, d/b/a Frankfort Fire and
EMS Service, 315 W. 2nd Street, Frankfort, KY
40601 and another
summons to Joe Norsworthy, Secretary of Labor, Labor Cabinet,
1047 U.S. 127 South, Suite 4, Frankfort, KY
40601.
The record
indicates that the summonses were duly served upon the parties
at the addresses noted above.
Thereafter, the City filed a motion to dismiss
alleging that Davenport failed to properly and timely serve it
with summons.
Specifically, the City maintained that Davenport
was obligated to serve either the chief executive officer or an
official attorney of the City pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR)
4.04(7).
Upon receipt of the motion, Davenport filed summonses
addressed to the mayor of the City of Frankfort and to the
attorney general of the Commonwealth, which were duly served.
Concluding that Davenport failed to properly serve the
City and the Cabinet within the thirty day time requirement of
KRS 13B.140, the circuit court dismissed the action.
The
circuit court determined that Davenport was required under KRS
13B.140 to timely serve the City through the chief executive
officer or an official attorney and to serve the Labor Cabinet
3
through the Attorney General of the Commonwealth.
and (7).
CR 4.04(6)
These appeals follow.
APPEAL NO. 2002-CA-000903-MR
In this Commonwealth, there is no judicial review from
an administrative agency’s decision as a matter of right under
our Constitution; rather, such review is granted by the grace of
the legislature.
When the legislature has conferred a statutory
right of judicial review, our Supreme Court has mandated strict
compliance with the terms of the statute.
See Board of
Adjustments of City of Richmond v. Flood, Ky., 581 S.W.2d 1
(1978).
KRS 13B.1402 authorizes and governs judicial review of
final orders of the Labor Cabinet.
The terms of the statute
provide for the filing of a petition in the circuit court and
for service of the petition “upon the agency and all parties of
record.”
KRS 13B.140.
Conspicuously absent from the terms of
KRS 13B.140 are the specific procedures by which service is to
be accomplished.
When a statute authorizing judicial review
2
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 13B.140 reads in relevant part:
(1) All final orders of an agency shall be subject to judicial review in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. A party shall institute an
appeal by filing a petition in the Circuit Court of venue, as provided in the
agency’s enabling statutes, within thirty (30) days after the final order of
the agency is mailed or delivered by personal service. If venue for appeal
is not stated in the enabling statutes, a party may appeal to Franklin
Circuit Court or the Circuit Court of the county in which the appealing party
resides or operates a place of business. Copies of the petition shall be
served by the petitioner upon the agency and all parties of record. The
petition shall include the names and addresses of all parties to the
proceeding and the agency involved, and a statement of the grounds on which
the review is requested. The petition shall be accompanied by a copy of the
final order.
4
from an administrative decision fails to provide specific
procedures for service, we think such procedures should be
gleaned from the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (Civil
Rules).3
Thus, we look to the Civil Rules to furnish the
specific procedures for service under KRS 13B.140.
To decide which Civil Rules apply to KRS 13B.140, we
must initially determine whether judicial review under KRS
13B.140 is properly viewed as an original action or as an
appeal.
This determination is essential because of the
different service procedures applicable to appeals and original
actions under the Civil Rules.
KRS 13B.140 itself speaks in terms of “institut[ing]
an appeal by filing a petition in the Circuit Court . . . .”
Even though the statute utilizes the term “appeal,” we think the
judicial review contemplated thereunder is more properly
characterized as an “original action.”4
See Commonwealth
Transportation Cabinet v. City of Campbellsville, Ky. App., 740
3
This opinion should not be misconstrued as holding that the Kentucky Rules
of Civil Procedure in any way supersede applicable Kentucky Administrative
Regulations.
4
We are cited to Cosmos Broadcasting Corp. v. Commonwealth Transportation
Cabinet, Ky. App., 759 S.W.2d 824 (1988) and to Board of Adjustments of the
City of Richmond v. Flood, Ky., 581 S.W.2d 1 (1979) for the proposition that
the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (Civil Rules) do not apply to judicial
review of an administrative agency’s decision. In Cosmos, the statute relied
upon, KRS 183.620, has long since been repealed. Thus, we do not view Cosmos
as controlling. In Flood, the statute, KRS 100.347 which authorizes judicial
review, specifically provided that the Civil Rules were to govern only after
the appeal “is taken.” Thus, we view Flood as clearly distinguishable.
5
S.W.2d 162 (1987).
We are buttressed in our conclusion by KRS
23A.010(4) which provides in part:
The Circuit Court may be authorized by law
to review the actions or decisions of
administrative agencies, special districts
or boards. Such review shall not constitute
an appeal but an original action. (Emphasis
added).
In KRS 23A.010(4), the legislature clearly and
unambiguously signaled its intent that judicial review from a
decision of an administrative agency shall be considered an
original action.
Hence, we are of the opinion that judicial
review under KRS 13B.140 is properly viewed as an original
action.
In this Commonwealth, a civil action (including an
original action) is commenced upon the filing of a complaint (or
petition) and the issuance of summons (or warning order) in good
faith under CR 3.01.5
CR 4.04 delineates precise procedures for
properly effectuating service of the summons and complaint (or
petition).
Therefore, we hold that CR 3.01 and CR 4.04 provide
the proper procedures for accomplishing service under KRS
13B.140.
In the case at hand, CR 4.04(6) and (7) mandate that
the Labor Cabinet be served through the Attorney General and
5
We note that Michie’s Kentucky Rules Annotated published by LexisNexis
designates this rule as CR 3; whereas, the Kentucky Rules of Court published
by West Group designates it as CR 3.01. In this opinion, we use the West
designation and refer to the rule as CR 3.01.
6
that the City be served through the chief executive officer or
official attorney.
Because Davenport failed to timely serve the
aforementioned parties, it is clear that Davenport did not
adhere to the specific service procedures of CR 4.04(6) and (7).
We, nevertheless, do not think such failure fatal to judicial
review.
CR 3.01 requires summons be issued in good faith; the
good faith provision has been held to mean that summons be
issued with a “good faith” intention that it be immediately
served or served in due course.
See Roehrig v. Merchants
Businessmen’s and Mutual Insurance Company, Ky., 391 S.W.2d 369
(1965).
The City urges us to hold the good faith provision of
CR 3.01 inapplicable to judicial review of administrative
decisions under KRS 13B.140.
Indeed, the circuit court reached
such a conclusion by relying upon the strict compliance rule
enunciated in Flood, 581 S.W.2d 1 (1979); however, we believe
the circuit court misconstrued the holding in Flood.
Flood
simply held that a party must strictly comply with the terms of
a statute authorizing judicial review; Flood did not address the
issue of a party’s strict compliance with the Civil Rules
applicable to such a statute.
Accordingly, we think the circuit
court improperly applied the strict compliance rule to bar the
good faith provision of CR 3.01.
7
We now address whether Davenport acted in good faith
pursuant to CR 3.01.
It is well established that service of
process is completed in good faith if, “when the summons was
issued, the plaintiff had a bona fide, unequivocal intention of
having it served presently or in due course or without
abandonment.”
Roehrig, 391 S.W.2d at 371.
Considering the good
faith provision of CR 3.01, our Supreme Court specifically
commented:
What is the meaning of “good faith” . .
. ?
It can be, and usually is, something
less than perfection or complete accuracy.
Above all, it means not to take advantage of,
not to deceive, not to be underhanded.
Id. at 370.
In the case at hand, the record indicates that
Davenport served a generic address at the City of Frankfort and
served the Secretary of Labor.
Upon receiving the City’s motion
to dismiss, Davenport immediately corrected his mistake and filed
summonses addressed to the proper parties under CR 4.04.
We
think the facts of this case mirror those of Jones v. Baptist
Healthcare System, Ky. App., 964 S.W.2d 805 (1997), Crowe v.
Miller, Ky., 467 S.W.2d 330 (1971), and Roehrig, 391 S.W.2d 369.
In each of these cases, the Court held that appellant’s
inadvertent service of process on the wrong party did not, in and
of itself, constitute a lack of good faith when immediate efforts
were made to remedy same.
For instance, in Roehrig, the
controlling statute required that process be served upon the
Commissioner of Insurance.
Appellant, however, mistakenly served
8
the agent of the insurance company.
When the error was
discovered, a summons was reissued for the proper party.
The
court concluded that mere misdirection of the original summons
did not constitute “a lack of good faith.” Id. at 371; see also
Hausman’s Adm’r. v. Poehlman, 314 Ky. 453, 236 S.W.2d 259 (1951).
Undoubtedly, Davenport should have been aware of the
service requirements of CR 4.04.
However, failure to follow CR
4.04 is not tantamount, per se, to a lack of good faith.
Although Davenport’s attempts to serve the City and the Cabinet
were less than perfect, we cannot say it was intended to defraud
or to seek an unconscionable advantage.
Furthermore, when the
summonses were issued, we think Davenport intended they be served
“presently or in due course or without abandonment.”
Roehrig,
391 S.W.2d at 371; see also Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Alexander,
277 Ky. 719, 127 S.W.2d 395 (1939).
We also view the argument presented by the City that
Davenport’s efforts constituted “bad faith” as misdirected.
The
City argues that Davenport acted in bad faith by failing to
address the summons to the mayor.
We believe this failure is
not, itself, indicative of a lack of good faith, but more akin
to mere negligence.
As the Kentucky Supreme Court held,
“negligence, rather than bad faith, in the execution and
issuance of a summons will not bar a cause of action.”
964 S.W.2d at 807.
Jones,
In sum, we are of the opinion that Davenport
acted in good faith under CR 3.01; consequently, we conclude the
circuit court erred by dismissing the action.
9
Cross-Appeal No. 2002-CA-000946-MR
On cross-appeal, the City contends that Davenport’s
failure to file exceptions to certain portions of the hearing
officer’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended
Order (hearing officer’s findings) deprived the circuit court of
jurisdiction and rendered judicial review “moot.”
The record
reveals that Davenport did, in fact, file exceptions to the
hearing officer’s findings.
As Davenport filed exceptions to
the hearing officer’s findings, we are of the opinion that
jurisdiction was proper because Davenport exhausted all
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.
See
Swatzell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 866, 869 (1998).
The City also challenges the sufficiency of
Davenport’s exceptions.
By only excepting to certain findings
of fact and conclusions of law, the City maintains that
Davenport “fails on the merits to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.”
Brief for City of Frankfort at 25.
We
think the sufficiency of exceptions is better left for a
determination upon the merits of a controversy.
As the circuit
court dismissed this action without considering the merits, it
is premature for this Court to reach such issue.
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion and order of
the Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed in part and reversed in
10
part, and this cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS/CROSSAPPELLEES:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE, LABOR CABINET:
John Frith Stewart
Thomas J. Grady
Segal, Stewart, Cutler,
Lindsay, Janes & Berry, PLLC
Louisville, KY
John D. Parsons
Kentucky Labor Cabinet
Frankfort, KY 40601
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES:
Thomas Grady
Segal, Stewart, Cutler,
Lindsay, Janes & Berry, PLLC
Louisville, KY
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT, CITY
OF FRANKFORT:
John O. Sheller
Smith & Smith, Attorneys
Louisville, KY
11
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.