APPALACHIAN COLLIERIES CORPORATION v. ALBERT DAVIS; ROBERT L. WHITTAKER, DIRECTOR OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUNDS, SUCCESSOR TO SPECIAL FUND; HON. RONALD W. MAY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD and ROBERT L. WHITTAKER, DIRECTOR OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUNDS, SUCCESSOR TO SPECIAL FUND v. APPALACHIAN COLLIERIES CORPORATION; ALBERT DAVIS; HON. RONALD W. MAY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 17, 2003; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000790-WC
APPALACHIAN COLLIERIES CORPORATION
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NOS. WC-92-17234 AND WC-94-06897
ALBERT DAVIS; ROBERT L. WHITTAKER,
DIRECTOR OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUNDS,
SUCCESSOR TO SPECIAL FUND; HON. RONALD
W. MAY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
AND
NO. 2003-CA-001837-WC
ROBERT L. WHITTAKER, DIRECTOR OF
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION FUNDS,
SUCCESSOR TO SPECIAL FUND
v.
APPELLEES
CROSS-APPELLANT
CROSS-PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A
DECISION OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NOS. WC-92-17234 AND WC-94-06897
APPALACHIAN COLLIERIES CORPORATION;
ALBERT DAVIS; HON. RONALD W. MAY,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
GUIDUGLI AND JOHNSON, JUDGES; AND HUDDLESTON, SENIOR
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Appalachian Collieries Corporation has
petitioned for review of an opinion of the Workers’ Compensation
Board entered on March 20, 2002, which vacated and remanded that
portion of the Administrative Law Judge’s opinion regarding
Albert Davis’s motion to reopen his claim based on a worsening
of his psychiatric condition.2
Having concluded that the Board
correctly vacated the ALJ’s ruling with regard to Davis’s
alleged worsening of his psychiatric condition based on the
ALJ’s insufficient factual findings, we affirm.
The Workers’
Compensation Funds has filed a cross-petition for review
claiming that relief cannot be granted against it on Davis’s
claim because it was not properly before the Board as a
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
2
The Board also affirmed the ALJ’s denial of Davis’s motion to reopen based
on a worsening of his physical condition. Davis has not filed a crosspetition on that issue.
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respondent.3
Having concluded that the WCF was properly before
the Board, we also affirm on the cross-petition.
Davis originally filed his workers’ compensation claim4
for occupational disability as a result of three neck injuries
he suffered while working for Bennett Trucking and Appalachian.5
Davis was injured on March 30, 1992, and July 28, 1992, while
employed by Bennett Trucking, and on August 10, 1993, while
employed by Appalachian.6
Davis also filed a workers’
compensation claim against Appalachian, alleging that he was
entitled to retraining incentive benefits (RIB).7
On July 24, 1995, ALJ Thomas A. Nanney found under the
principles of Osborne v. Johnson,8 that Davis suffered from a 60%
occupational disability.
The disability was attributed to the
effects of Davis’s injury occurring on August 10, 1993, while
employed by Appalachian.9
The ALJ determined that Davis’s
injuries on March 30, 1992, and July 28, 1992, while employed by
3
The WCF also joins in Appalachian’s argument that the Board improperly
reweighed the evidence.
4
Claim No. 92-17234.
5
Davis was employed by Bennett Trucking as a truck driver and by Appalachian
as a coal miner.
6
The reopening of the claim on the injury occurring on August 10, 1993, is
the subject of this petition for review.
7
Claim No. 94-06897.
8
Ky., 432 S.W.2d 800 (1968).
9
The ALJ dismissed Davis’s RIB claim.
Davis’s two claims were consolidated.
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Bennett Trucking, only resulted in periods of temporary total
disability for which he had previously been compensated.
The
ALJ specifically found that Davis had a 15% impairment to the
body as a whole as a result of the neck injury he suffered in
1993 and a 10% impairment to the body as a whole as a result of
his psychological impairment related to the 1993 injury.
The
ALJ noted that Davis’s “psychological impairment [was] directly
related to the final injury occurring on August 10, 1993[,]”10
and equally apportioned Davis’s award between Appalachian and
the Special Fund.11
Davis appealed the ALJ’s decision and the
Board and this Court both affirmed.12
On September 27, 2000, Davis filed a motion to reopen13
both the 1992 injury claim and his 1994 RIB claim.
Davis’s
motion to reopen his RIB claim was denied, but his motion to
reopen his 1992 claim for his 1993 neck injury and the resulting
psychological overlay was granted.14
Davis’s final hearing on this reopening was held
before ALJ Ronald W. May on August 27, 2001.
In an opinion and
10
Davis was born on July 10, 1959, has an IQ of approximately 70, and is
functionally illiterate in reading, spelling, and mathematics.
11
The Special Fund is now known as the Workers’ Compensation Funds.
12
1995-CA-003383-WC.
13
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.125.
14
Claim No. 92-17234 was assigned to Davis’s case in 1992 following the
filing of the first report of injury pertaining to the injury of March 30,
1992, but the application for adjustment of claim was not filed until after
the injury of August 10, 1993.
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order rendered on November 26, 2001, the ALJ found that Davis
had sustained no worsening of the physical injury of August 10,
1993, and that there was no evidentiary basis on which to
apportion the work-relatedness of any worsening of his
psychological impairment.
The ALJ’s opinion summarized the
various medical evidence which included reports from Dr. David
Shraberg and Dr. Rosa Riggs.
Dr. Shraberg, who is a psychiatrist and neurologist,
had performed an independent evaluation of Davis on March 22,
2001, and he conducted an extensive review of Davis’s medical
records.
Dr. Shraberg diagnosed Davis as suffering from
psychological symptoms associated with the systemic illnesses of
throat cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and
chemical dependency.
He also diagnosed Davis as suffering from
a personality disorder involving symptom magnification with
passive dependent and passive aggressive features.
Dr. Shraberg
stated that under the American Medical Association (AMA)
Guidelines, Davis had a Class I impairment, producing a 0%
impairment rating.
Dr. Riggs, who is a medical doctor and a psychologist,
evaluated Davis on May 23, 2001, and also conducted an extensive
review of his medical records.
Dr. Riggs diagnosed Davis as
suffering from major depression, generalized anxiety disorder
with panic attacks, chronic pain with both psychological factors
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and general medical conditions of his left arm, upper back, and
neck due to the 1993 injury.
Dr. Riggs stated that after Davis
was injured while working in the mines in 1993 “[h]e has not
been able to work [ ] and the pain has caused his depression,
anxiety and chronic pain.”
Dr. Riggs stated that Davis was
suffering a Class IV impairment, producing a 55% psychiatric
impairment to his body as a whole.
As to Davis’s claim of worsening of his psychological
condition, the ALJ stated:
[E]ven if the ALJ were to determine any
worsening of plaintiff’s emotional
condition, I have no evidentiary basis on
which to determine how much would be due to
the work injury of August 10, 1993 and how
much would be due to the other non-work
causes reported by both Dr. Riggs and Dr.
Shraberg. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion
to reopen must be over-ruled.
Davis appealed and on March 20, 2002, the Board
entered its opinion affirming in part, vacating in part, and
remanding the claim to the ALJ.
As to Davis’s psychological
claim, the Board determined that its interpretation of the ALJ’s
decision “indicates he simply failed to make any ruling on this
aspect of Davis’[s] cause of action, in spite of the fact that
evidence from Dr. Riggs was present which could have supported
an increase in occupational disability from a psychiatric
standpoint.”
The Board then stated:
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Consequently, we interpret the ALJ’s
determination on this issue as indicating
that he either misinterpreted or
misconstrued Dr. Riggs’[s] medical opinions.
Cook v. Paducah Recapping Service, Ky., 694
S.W.2d 684 (1985).
While it is not incumbent upon an
Administrative Law Judge, in rendering a
decision, to provide either a detailed
summary of the facts, a discussion of the
law or the merits, details of his reasoning
when, as here, there are substantial
conflicts in his summary of the testimony of
witnesses he specifically rejects, it is not
only reasonable, but necessary that the
opinion accurately reflect consideration of
the totality of that evidence. Big Sandy
Community Action Program v. Chaffins, Ky.,
502 S.W.2d 526 (1973). While this Board
consistently gives great deference to the
fact-finding of Administrative Law Judges,
as we are obligated to do by the standard of
review, such deference is not without
limits. Golden v. Anaconda Wire and Cable,
Ky.App., 556 S.W.2d 174 (1977); Cook v.
Ward, Ky., 381 S.W.2d 168 (1964). We
therefore vacate the opinion of the ALJ with
regard to his interpretation of the
psychiatric evidence submitted in this
reopening and remand this action for entry
of a new decision containing an accurate
summary of all the evidence of record. In
so ruling, we wish to clearly state that we
are not ordering any particular result with
regard to this issue on remand. We
acknowledge that depending upon whether the
ALJ finds the testimony of Dr. Riggs or Dr.
Shraberg to be more credible, different
potential outcomes may result.
In its petition for review, Appalachian argues that
the record “had conflicting medical evidence on the issues of
claimant’s reopening[,]” and that the ALJ’s 13-page opinion
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“makes abundantly clear that upon his consideration of the
conflicting medical evidence on the issues involved he was not
persuaded the claimant had fulfilled his burden of establishing
by supporting evidence any increase of occupational disability
by either physical injury or psychological condition.”
“It is well established that the ALJ, as fact-finder,
has the authority to believe part of the evidence and disbelieve
other parts, even if it came from the [same] witness or the same
adversary party’s total proof.”15
“As long as the ALJ’s
determination is suggested by any evidence of substance, it
cannot be said that the record compels a different result.”16
“The [Board] is suppose to decide whether the evidence is
sufficient to support a particular finding made by the ALJ, or
whether such evidence as there was before the ALJ should be
viewed as uncontradicted and compelling a different result.”17
“[T]he Board may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ
concerning the weight of evidence on questions of fact.”18
This
Court’s further review of the Board’s decision “is to correct
the Board only where the [ ] Court perceives the Board has
15
Roberts v. Estep, Ky., 845 S.W.2d 544, 547 (1993) (citing Caudill v.
Maloney’s Discount Stores, Ky., 560 S.W.2d 15 (1977)).
16
Id. at 547 (citing Special Fund v. Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641 (1986)).
17
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 685, 687 (1992).
18
Smith v. Dixie Fuel Co., Ky., 900 S.W.2d 609, 612 (1995) (citing KRS
342.285(2)).
-8-
overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or
committed an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to
cause gross injustice.”19
In its opinion, the Board emphasized that the ALJ’s
relevant findings on the worsening of Davis’s psychological
condition were limited to the following:
12.
13.
19
The ALJ would first note that
plaintiff’s original claim was filed
alleging no injuries other than neck
injuries. The claim was later amended
to include depression and anxiety. The
claim was never amended to cover any
type of hand injury nor of any
lumbosacral injury nor any impairment
of radiculopathy into the lower
extremities. The ALJ points this out
as both Dr. Shraberg and Dr. Riggs
listed conditions or circumstances
other than the neck injury of
August 10, 1993 as causative agents
and there was no attempt on the part
of either of those witnesses to
apportion between the contributing
causes. Even if the ALJ should
determine that plaintiff had sustained
a worsening in his
psychiatric/psychological condition, I
have no basis from the reports of Dr.
Riggs and Dr. Shraberg to determine how
much of [sic] emotional problem would
be the result of the neck injury of
August 10, 1993.
The report of Dr. Ghory did not even
contain a history of the work related
injury of August 10, 1993 on which
plaintiff’s earlier award was based.
To the contrary, although the year was
given wrong as 1994, the only injury
Western Baptist Hospital, 827 S.W.2d at 687-88.
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event Dr. Ghory had in his history was
plaintiff’s first neck injury that
occurred in a head-on collision when
plaintiff was driving a coal truck for
Bennett Trucking on March 30, 1992. It
may be that Dr. Ghory is not an
accurate history taker but it also
could be that plaintiff considers that
first neck injury to have been the most
severe injury and that his two
subsequent injuries were of less
severity.
14.
Dr. Muffly is an orthopedic surgeon
respected by this ALJ. However, Dr.
Goodman is also an orthopedic surgeon
and Dr. Graulich is a neurologist and
both of them are also equally respected
by this ALJ. However, both Dr.
Graulich and Dr. Goodman have the
advantage of having examined
[plaintiff] both before and after the
ALJ decision of July 24, 1995. Niether
of those physicians must speculate as
to how or why other physicians arrived
at their own prior impairment ratings
as they have their own prior
examination work product for reference
for determining whether there has been
any worsening.
15.
Although the evidence is in conflict,
the ALJ is more persuaded by the
evidence of Dr. Goodman and Dr.
Graulich that plaintiff has sustained
no worsening in the physical residuals
from his injury. As noted earlier
herein, even if the ALJ were to
determine any worsening of plaintiff’s
emotional condition, I have no
evidentiary basis on which to determine
how much would be due to the work
injury of August 10, 1993 and how much
would be due to the other non-work
causes reported by both Dr. Riggs and
Dr. Shraberg. Accordingly, plaintiff’s
motion to reopen must be over-ruled.
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The requirement that the ALJ make adequate findings of
fact was addressed by our Supreme Court in Wilder v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,20 as follows:
KRS 342.275 directs the administrative law
judge in workers’ compensation cases to file
an award, order, or decision with “a
statement of the findings of fact, rulings
of law, and any other matters pertinent to
the question at issue . . . .” The purpose
of the statute is to have the Workers’
Compensation Board record the “relevant
basic considerations upon which its ultimate
decision rests.” Blue Diamond Coal Company
v. Pennington, Ky., 424 S.W.2d 122, 124
(1968). Similarly, in Shield v. Pittsburgh
and Midway Coal Mining Company, Ky.App., 634
S.W.2d 440 (1982), the court stated that
“[t]he case law dealing with
administrative bodies clearly
indicates that it is required that
basic facts be clearly set out to
support the ultimate conclusions
(citations omitted). The Workers’
Compensation Board is not exempted
from this requirement. . . .
[T]he statute [KRS 342.275] and
the case law require the Board to
support its conclusion with facts
drawn from the evidence in each
case so that both parties may be
dealt with fairly and be properly
apprised of the basis for the
decision.” Id. at 444 [emphasis
original].
In R.J. Corman Railroad Construction v. Haddix,21 the
Supreme Court affirmed this Court which had affirmed the Board’s
20
Ky., 788 S.W.2d 270, 272 (1990).
21
Ky., 864 S.W.2d 915 (1993).
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remand to the ALJ for appropriate factual findings concerning a
claim arising out of a psychological condition.
The Supreme
Court stated that “a more thorough discussion is warranted and
therefore the Board’s decision to remand was proper.”22
Likewise, we conclude that the Board properly remanded this
matter to the ALJ for the purpose of making more complete
factual findings which include an accurate summary of all the
evidence of record.
In its cross-petition, the WCF argues that it was not
a proper party to Davis’s appeal to the Board.
The WCF claims
that since it was not named in the caption or the body of the
notice of appeal as a respondent, “a proper appeal was not
perfected against [it],” and Davis is thus precluded from
obtaining any additional benefits from it.23
22
Id. at 917.
23
Davis’s notice of appeal reads in relevant part as follows:
ALBERT DAVIS,
VS.
PLAINTIFF,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
APPALACHIAN COLLIERIES CORP, ET AL.,
DEFENDANT.
The Petitioner, ALBERT DAVIS, though counsel,
hereby gives notice of his appeal from the Opinion of
the Administrative Law Judge dated November 26, 2001
in the matter styled Albert Davis v. Appalachian
Collieries Corporation and Special Fund, Claim number
94-06897 & 92-17234, before the Kentucky Department
of Workers’ Claims.
The Special Fund was also included in the certificate of service.
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CR24 73.03(1) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he
notice of appeal shall specify by name all appellants and all
appellees (‘et al.’ and ‘etc.’ are not proper designation of
parties) . . . .”
Moreover, this Court has stated:
Under CR 73.03, the remaining parties to the
action were not made parties to the appeal
by the use of “et al.” in the caption. Not
being specifically named, they were not
parties to the appeal, but this would not
prevent the appeal from being perfected as
to the parties who were specifically named
in the caption.25
In Milligan v. Schenley Distillers, Inc.,26 a workers’
compensation case where the Special Fund and the Board were not
properly named as appellees, this Court stated that if the
appellant “failed to name an indispensable party to the appeal,
the appeal must be dismissed” [citations omitted].27
“An
indispensable party is one whose absence prevents the Court from
granting complete relief among those already parties.”28
In the case sub judice, it can be argued that the
Special Fund/WCF is not an indispensable party since the award
for psychological impairment related to Davis’s 1993 injury was
previously apportioned equally between Appalachian and the
24
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
25
Schulz v. Chadwell, Ky.App., 548 S.W.2d 181, 184 (1977).
26
Ky.App., 584 S.W.2d 751 (1979).
27
Id. at 753.
28
Id. at 753 (citing CR 19.01).
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Special Fund.
Thus, while Davis’s failing to name the Special
Fund as a party would preclude him from pursuing his claim
against the WCF, he could still pursue any apportioned claim
against Appalachian.
However, as Davis desires to also pursue
his claim against the WCF, we must determine whether by naming
the Special Fund in the body of the notice of appeal and in the
certificate of service, Davis substantially complied with CR
73.03.
In Morris v. Cabinet for Families & Children,29 our
Supreme Court stated:
In Blackburn v. Blackburn, Ky., 810
S.W.2d 55 (1991), this Court held that a
notice of appeal was adequate under CR 73.03
if it contained a listing of parties
sufficient to give the opposing party notice
of the identities of the parties against
whom the appeal was filed. The principal
objective of a pleading is to give fair
notice to the opposing party. Id. at 56,
citing Lee v. Stamper, Ky., 300 S.W.2d 251
(1957).
Morris involved a termination of parental rights by a
circuit court.
In the notice of appeal, the minor child was not
named as an appellee, but the child was named in the caption of
the case, to wit: “In Re the Interest of [CJM], a Child.”
While
the child was not included in the certificate of service, copies
of the pleadings were provided to the child’s guardian ad litem.
The Supreme Court determined that “[t]hese factors together
29
Ky., 69 S.W.3d 73, 74 (2002).
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substantially comply with the requirements of CR 73.03 and
provided sufficient notice to all parties concerned that the
minor child was also an Appellee.”
Similarly, in the case sub
judice, we hold that the listing of the Special Fund/WCF in the
body of the notice of appeal and in the certificate of service
was sufficient to substantially comply with the requirements of
CR 73.03.
Accordingly, the Board is affirmed on WCF’s cross-
petition.
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion of the Board is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
Gayle G. Huff
Harlan, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLEE, ALBERT DAVIS:
Susan Turner Landis
Harlan, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSS
APPELLANT, WORKERS’
COMPENSATION FUND:
Joel D. Zakem
Frankfort, Kentucky
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