HAJAR SHAQDEIH v. SIGNATURE INN SOUTH
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RENDERED: JULY 3, 2003; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2002-CA-000768-MR
HAJAR SHAQDEIH
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-008183
v.
SIGNATURE INN SOUTH
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BAKER, GUIDUGLI, AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
BAKER, JUDGE:
Hajar Shaqdeih brings this appeal from a March 27,
2002, summary judgment of the Jefferson County Circuit Court.
We
affirm.
Appellant and her family moved into the Signature Inn
South in January 2000 following a fire in their home.
When the
family initially moved into the hotel and in the days subsequent
to their arrival, snow and ice accumulated in the parking lot
and on the sidewalks around the hotel.
Appellant’s testimony
affirmed that she was aware that the conditions in the parking
lot were “very slick.”
Similarly, she relied upon a picture
taken two days after the accident to provide visual proof that
the conditions in the parking lot did, in fact, appear
dangerous.
During the period of appellant’s stay at the hotel,
the Signature Inn South made no attempt to clear the snow and
ice from the parking lot.
On January 31, 2000, approximately three days
following the family’s relocation to the Signature Inn,
appellant slipped and fell on ice in the parking lot while
walking to her car.
Appellant testified that as she started to
walk to her car, she felt her feet slip beneath her.
She
remained in the parking lot for roughly ten minutes before
returning inside to the hotel, at which time her daughter drove
her to a clinic for treatment.
The injuries complained of
included bruising to the knees, as well as a sore arm and back.
Appellant was allegedly forced to quit cosmetology school due to
her injuries and has been unable to return since.
Appellant brought this suit on December 22, 2000, for
damages stemming from the injuries sustained in her fall.
The
Jefferson Circuit Court entered summary judgment on March 27,
2002.
This appeal follows.
On appeal, appellant raises three main issues:
(1)
Signature Inn South did not operate its premises with ordinary
care to ensure reasonably safe conditions for its guests; (2) a
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reasonable interpretation of 902 KAR 7:010(11) requires
Signature Inn South to keep its parking lots, sidewalks, and
driveways clear from ice and snow; and (3) the innkeeper/guest
relationship is akin to that of landlord/tenant, requiring a
higher standard of care between Signature Inn South and
Shaqdeih.
These arguments are without merit.
In regards to appellant’s first issue, there is a long
line of Kentucky cases standing for the proposition that a
landowner has neither a duty to stay the elements nor a duty to
warn when conditions are clear and obvious.
Standard Oil
Company v. Manis, Ky., 433 S.W.2d 856 (1968); see also, Rogers
v. Professional Golfers Ass’n, Ky. App., 28 S.W.3d 869 (2000);
Corbin Motor Lodge v. Combs, Ky., 740 S.W.2d 944 (1987).
The
standard for slip-and-fall cases as set forth in Standard Oil
states that “natural outdoor hazards which are as obvious to an
invitee as to the owner of the premises do not constitute
unreasonable risks to the former which the landowner has a duty
to remove or warn against.”
In such a situation, the defendant
owes no duty to the plaintiff because there is no negligence on
the part of the defendant.
See Corbin Motor Lodge, 740 S.W.2d
at 946.
The facts of this case are indistinguishable from the
previous cases.
The testimony of appellant clearly indicates
that she was aware of the conditions in the parking lot when she
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walked to her car on the morning of the accident, and that the
conditions were clear and obvious to the reasonably prudent
person.
She had knowledge that the parking lot was covered with
snow and ice, that nothing had been done by the hotel to clear
the area, and that the area around the Signature Inn South was
slick.
Additionally, the picture offered by appellant of the
parking lot provides evidence that the snow and ice were in fact
clear and obvious to the reasonable observer.
Therefore, no
unreasonable risk was created by the existence of the snow and
ice that would have required the hotel to warn its guests of the
conditions.
Second, appellant’s contention that 902 KAR 7:010 (11)
imposes a duty upon innkeepers to keep their parking lots and
sidewalks “clean and in good repair” is without value.
The
regulation states:
Section 11. Maintenance of Room, Furniture
and Accessories. All sleeping rooms,
hallways, lobbies and other facilities shall
be kept clean and in good repair.
Furniture, drapes, curtains and shades shall
be kept clean and in good repair.
There is no contention that regulations have the force and
effect of law.
However, appellant has failed to prove that the
intent of this section was to include the maintenance of parking
lots and sidewalks.
The whole of 902 KAR 7:010 (the “State
Hotel Code”) covers the regulatory codes for Kentucky hotels and
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motels.
Though there are sections under the code covering
aspects of hotel upkeep from linen service to sewage and waste
disposal, none of the sections speak directly to the maintenance
of hotel parking lots and sidewalks.
In the absence of such
explicit language, it hardly seems logical or judicious to
interpret the term “and other facilities” as found in Section 11
to include outdoor parking lots and sidewalks.
As stated in the
Brief for Appellee, to do so would be “violative of the court’s
duty to give effect to the legislature’s intent.”
See also
Commonwealth v. Plowman, Ky., 86 S.W.3d 47, 49 (2002).
Under the common law, a defendant does not incur
liability unless there has been a voluntary assumption of a
duty.
Based on this principle, had Signature Inn South
attempted to clear the parking lots and sidewalks and either
failed to do so effectively or had stopped before the clearing
was complete, a duty would have attached.
Ky., 438 S.W.2d. 535, 536 (1969).
See Johnson v. Brey,
The decision of the hotel to
refrain wholly from clearing the hazards does not make it liable
for failure to exercise reasonable care.
Rather, Signature Inn
South was under no obligation to clear the ice and snow from its
parking lot and therefore acted accordingly.
Finally, appellant argues that the “special”
relationship between she and Signature Inn South requires the
same standard of care as applies to a landlord/tenant
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relationship.
The appellant bases this argument on Davis v.
Coleman Management Co., Ky. App., 765 S.W.2d. 38 (1989) and Fuhs
v. Ryan, Ky. App., 571 S.W.2d 627 (1978), which held that
landlords are responsible for the upkeep of tenants’ common
areas.
However, relying on the Court’s decision in In Re Dant
and Dant of Kentucky, 39 F.Supp. 753 (D.C. Ky. 1941), this
argument is misplaced.
The Court stated, “it is settled in
Kentucky that to constitute a tenancy of any kind, the tenant
must get some definite control and possession of the premises
with the intention on the part of the owner to dispossess
himself of the premises under consideration.”
Id. at 757, 758.
There is no indication that the relationship that existed
between Signature Inn South and appellant was anything beyond
that of the traditional innkeeper/guest association.
Though
appellant and her family were planning to stay at the hotel for
an extended period of time while looking for a new home, this
fact alone does not alter the relationship between the appellee
and appellant in this case.
There was no “definite control and
possession” on the part of appellant, nor any intention of
Signature Inn South to “dispossess” itself of the premises, save
for a nightly rental.
To hold the hotel to a heightened
standard of care based upon an extension of the law of tenancy
would be unjust.
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Matthew W. Stein
Nutt Law Office
Louisville, KY
Debbie D. Sandler
Steven F. Claypoole
Clark & Ward
Louisville, KY
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